Transterrestrial Musings

Comments

ESAS is just not set up to deliver anything of much value, so it's not at all surprising it's facing the same kind of downward spiral NASA has experienced in other major programs in recent decades. If something isn't worth doing, it isn't worth doing well.

Maybe there could be an alternative to ESAS that would be worth doing, but I am sure NASA could not find it or execute it, for near-deterministic reasons of organizational structure and culture.

Anyway, it's good to see the hopeful reaching some of the same conclusions this cynic did years ago. To save time, let me tell them where they will ultimately end up: advocating dismantling NASA and terminating US government manned spaceflight for long enough for all involved to retire or die. This will be the only way to prevent the infection from reestablishing itself. This position is independent of whether private manned space efforts can succeed (I am dubious in the near term).

Posted by Paul D. at December 11, 2007 07:36 AM

What measurable metric is there to support the proposition that "VSE is dying?" Vague arguments about "lack of vision" don't cut it.

Posted by Mark R. Whittington at December 11, 2007 10:01 AM

What measurable metric is there to support the proposition that "VSE is dying?" Vague arguments about "lack of vision" don't cut it.

Did I read that correctly? Mark Whittington, who has never offered the slightest bit of math to support his arguments (and ignores all the math that refutes his claims), is now saying that arguments which lack numbers don't cut it???

Is that a mea culpa? Or does Mark not know the meaning of the word "metric"?

Posted by Edward Wright at December 11, 2007 02:01 PM

Well, I guess that Ed Wright doesn't have a clue as to why "VSE is dying." Not a big surprise.

Posted by Mark R. Whittington at December 11, 2007 02:11 PM

Ed follows Mark like the Coyote follows the Road Runner.

Posted by Mike Puckett at December 11, 2007 02:11 PM

"What measurable metric is there to support the proposition that "VSE is dying?""

Gee, I dunno, maybe:

* The only two Presidential candidates (Clinton, Obama) to speak substantively about NASA want to delay the lunar return (Clinton) or the entire effort (Obama), including a Shuttle replacement.

* There are now multiple proposals in Congress to drain funding from Constellation and extend Shuttle operations, from one flight all the way to 2015.

* Constellation is likely facing another year of flat funding under a continuing budget resolution or omnibus bill.

* The Ares I schedule has slid to the right one year for every year it's been in design, and will most likely get stretched out to 2017 based on the long-lead elements identified in the GAO report.

* The lunar architecture does not close. There is a mismatch to the tune of almost 5,000 pounds between Ares I performance and Orion mass for the lunar architecture.

* By the time Griffin gets done screwing around with paper napkin designs for the LAS and all the issues in the GAO report relating to flight instability and structural vibration issues on Ares I, the ISS architecture probably won't close either.

* The robotic lunar program has been reduced to one mission with a piggyback that's in serious schedule trouble.

* No serious heavy lift, TLI stage, or lunar lander development is scheduled to start until 2011.

Naw, there's no evidence that the VSE is dying. Just ignore that graveyard to your right and keep on whistling.

Posted by JoeBlow at December 11, 2007 02:14 PM

Mark, I don't think it's possible to prove that VSE will fail. But it exhibits many of the warning signs. For example, the key decision making process (the ESAS report and subsequent decision) was done in a brief few month period. And since, there have been several indications that either the participants were operating with incomplete knowledge or even ulterior motives.

Eg, the ESAS committee didn't know about fixes to the blackout regions of EELV flight profile. Nor a good explanation why NASA should develope the Ares 1 when EELVs can fill that mission. Adn the guesses for loss of mission and loss of crew are way too precise to be believed. Finally there is the emphasis on preserving "workforce". And let us not forget the delay in implementing these approaches. The Ares 1 isn't scheduled for any sooner than 2014 and the Ares V, if it ever gets developed, before 2018 or so. The DIRECT proposal would have been flying before that.

Now we're seeing substantial modification of both the Ares 1 and the Orion capsule due to Ares 1 having lower performance than expected. Also we're nearing the biggest hurdle of all, whether the next administration (which even if Republican is likely to be hostile to all things having to do with the Bush administration) will allow this program to continue.

But these don't in themselves indicate a program is dying. After all, the Space Shuttle had similar problems, but it's still limping along ineffectively. I think it more likely that the VSE will morph into another meaningless waste of public funds, following in the footsteps of several predecessors.

Posted by Karl Hallowell at December 11, 2007 02:19 PM

Well, I guess that Ed Wright doesn't have a clue as to why "VSE is dying." Not a big surprise.

I have a very good idea, Mark. Part of it comes from seeing the numbers, which have been posted here (and elsewhere) many times before.

Numbers that you ignore in favor of ignorant, proven statements about ESAS being the cheapest lunar architecture, etc.

Another part of it comes from talking to numerous politicians, who you obviously have no contact with (based on your naive statements).

Posted by Edward Wright at December 11, 2007 02:41 PM

There is certainly one honest statement in this thread. "Mark, I don't think it's possible to prove that VSE will fail." My point exactly. So, therefore, why say it anyway? Incomplete knowledge and even ulterior motives would be my guess.

Posted by Mark R. Whittington at December 11, 2007 03:28 PM

Joe Blow, to examine your points:

"* The only two Presidential candidates (Clinton, Obama) to speak substantively about NASA want to delay the lunar return (Clinton) or the entire effort (Obama), including a Shuttle replacement."

No proof that VSE will die even if either of these folks are elected. Clinton wanted to kill the space station and was unable to due to Congressional opposition.

"* There are now multiple proposals in Congress to drain funding from Constellation and extend Shuttle operations, from one flight all the way to 2015."

Only one that I know of, very unlikely to pass.

"* Constellation is likely facing another year of flat funding under a continuing budget resolution or omnibus bill."

True, but still no proof that VSE will die.

"* The Ares I schedule has slid to the right one year for every year it's been in design, and will most likely get stretched out to 2017 based on the long-lead elements identified in the GAO report."

See above

"* The lunar architecture does not close. There is a mismatch to the tune of almost 5,000 pounds between Ares I performance and Orion mass for the lunar architecture."

Source of this figure, please. The recent press conference suggested that the weight problem was in hand.

"* By the time Griffin gets done screwing around with paper napkin designs for the LAS and all the issues in the GAO report relating to flight instability and structural vibration issues on Ares I, the ISS architecture probably won't close either."

An opinion, unsupported by evidence.

"* The robotic lunar program has been reduced to one mission with a piggyback that's in serious schedule trouble."

Incorrect. NASA just announced a mission called Grail to examine the Moon's interior.

"* No serious heavy lift, TLI stage, or lunar lander development is scheduled to start until 2011."

True, but illrelevent.

Posted by Mark R. Whittington at December 11, 2007 03:37 PM

Karl - A sure fire way to really damage VSE is to open the selection of hardware to the political process. This whole arguement over Ares vs EELV vs Direct sounds to these ears like dueling experts (and some pretending to be experts). My knowledge of aerospace engineering is somewhat limited, but I do know that these kinds of choices intall tradeoffs with advntages and disadvantages for each. At some point a selection must be made and the argument concluded. Otherwise we may see the next man on the Moon be an officer of the PLA.

Posted by Mark R. Whittington at December 11, 2007 03:41 PM

I have to agree with JoeBlow on the details there, good summary.

I do understand why Mike Griffin chose the Ares 1, as a training exercise for the MSFC engineers. However, NASA management is not letting the engineers do their jobs or let the numbers dictate the design, not dictates from above to ignore the numbers and "make it work".

I, more than just about anyone, want to see the VSE work. However, The ESAS architecture is unsustainable, just as the Saturn V architecture was unsustainable. Anything that takes multiple political administrations to happen is not going to happen unless there is a groundswell of popular support, which just ain't there for the ESAS implementation of the VSE.

If the democrats get both the white house and congress one of the loudest voices will be that NASA has wasted 100 billion dollars building a space station that they want to now throw away and not use in order to build a lunar base that they are already planning to throw away and not use so that they can go to Mars and plant a flag and a few footprints.

Can anyone see the illogic of this and how little likelyhood that congress will fund it? Without practical value in contributing to the economic and security posture of this country, the money is not going to be there. This is just a simple fact, supported by 30 years worth of similar failed efforts.

Posted by Dennis Ray Wingo at December 11, 2007 03:52 PM

In July 0f 2003, Sean O'Keefe announced that the development of Orbital Space Plane was being accelerated so it could send crews to the International Space Station by 2008.

http://www.space.com/businesstechnology/technology/osp_okeefe_030715.html

Since then, OSP has been renamed "CEV" and changed to an Apollo-style capsule, which was said to be easier to develop.

Nevertheless, CEV will not be ready in 2008 as O'Keefe promised. The first manned flight is currently scheduled for 2014-2015.

Four and a half years ago, the first manned flight was 5 years away. Today, it is 7-8 years away.

Despite all the money spent in the last four and a half years, NASA has made negative progress toward the goal of flying a CEV.

After Bush's speech in 2004, the goal was to land astronauts on the Moon by 2018. The Mars Society optimistically said, "Provided this is the approach adopted, a program initiated in 2009 could easily achieve piloted lunar landing by 2015 and launch the first human Mars expedition by 2018."

Although NASA pursued the heavy-lift approach advocated by the Mars Society, they are not on track to land astronauts on the Moon by 2015 or even 2018. The official target date is now 2020, and even that is in doubt. Little progress there, either.

Posted by Edward Wright at December 11, 2007 04:44 PM

"No proof that VSE will die even if either of these folks are elected."

I don't know what your definition of "die" is. But deferring development start for a human lunar return until after the next Presidency, circa 2018, which would pushing the first mission into the late 2020s/early 2030s would effectively kill the VSE under any reasonable definition of the term. Although she's recanted somewhat, that's Clinton's apparent plan. Obama would go further and delay a Shuttle replacement for ISS servicing into the same timeframe.

"Clinton wanted to kill the space station and was unable to due to Congressional opposition."

Wrong. The House came within a vote (or a few, depending on the specifics of the count) of killing the space station budget. It was the Clinton Administration, with Gore's lead, that saved the program by bringing the Russians into the partnership. With the new foreign policy rationale, the space station budget passed easily the following year.

"Only one that I know of, very unlikely to pass."

No, there's two. There's Weldon's proposal in the House, which would extend Shuttle operations by five years and delay Constellation by an equal amount. Then there's Hutchison's proposal in the Senate, which would get the camel's nose under the tent with at least one additional Shuttle flight for AMS deployment.

"True, but still no proof that VSE will die."

You really think that if another CR or two causes Shuttle's replacement for ISS servicing to not fly operationally until 2016 or 2017 that the VSE isn't effectively dead? That's the same timeframe that we were suppossed to have the first opportunity for missions to the Moon under the VSE.

"See above"

See what above? Read the GAO report. Based on SSME development history and the fact that J-2X is a new engine development, J-2X will require nine years of development, not seven.

"Source of this figure, please. The recent press conference suggested that the weight problem was in hand."

Read the CxP briefing to JSC management on NASAWatch. The press conference (or reporting on it) only referred to the ISS architecture. As the mass and performance breakdowns midway through that briefing attest, the lunar architecture is still out of bed by thousands of pounds.

And all that neglects the fact that major design decisions that could cost Orion many more thousands of pounds (launch abort system, landing system) are still being held up by Griffin.

"An opinion, unsupported by evidence."

No it's not. Read the GAO report. There are multiple, major threats to Ares I mass. The second stage is already down to single-string systems and has POGO issues that will require additional mass to counteract or isolate Orion from. The first stage has acoustic issues that threaten to shake Orion and astronauts apart and will require more mass to counteract or isolate Orion from. The interfaces between the first and second stages and between the second stage and payload need reinforcing to accommodate the high thrust from the first stage. And the entire vehicle is likely unstable in flight, requiring even more systems and mass to counteract. Despite failing to get their hands around Ares I over the past two to three years, NASA has to pull off multiple miracles in the next ten months or so to make Ares I/Orion flyable, nevertheless safe.

"Incorrect. NASA just announced a mission called Grail to examine the Moon's interior."

GRAIL is a mission funded by the Space Science Directorate as part of the Discovery Program. It is not funded by the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate as part of the Robotic Lunar Exploration Program. The mission is pure science and has little to do with a human lunar return. The mission is taking data on the Moon's gravity field. It is not mapping resources, identifying landing sites, testing out human space flight technologies, etc. The Exploration Systems Mission Directorate's Robotic Lunar Exploration Program is still dead after LRO/LCROSS (which is way behind schedule). There will be no more lunar robotic missions supporting human space exploration because Griffin zeroed out funding for that program to feed Ares I/Orion.

"True, but illrelevent."

It's completely relevant. Those lunar hardware new starts are in 2011, well into a possible Clinton or Obama Presidency. And that's what Clinton and Obama are both going to defer until 2018. (Obama will defer even more than that.)

Time to wake up and smell the corpses rotting in the graveyard.

Posted by Anonymous at December 11, 2007 05:22 PM

Although she's recanted somewhat, that's Clinton's apparent plan. Obama would go further and delay a Shuttle replacement for ISS servicing into the same timeframe.

When did she say that?

According to the Washington Post, her campaign said just the opposite: "Senator Clinton does not support delaying the Constellation program and intends to maintain American leadership in space exploration."

According to ABC News, Hillary was a NASA fan since childhood and even applied to be an astronaut. Her website says she'll complete ISS, speed development of new government launch vehicles and spacecraft, and protecting the Shuttle workforce from layoffs.

On the other hand, she has talked publicly about using prizes to spur innovation, which makes her more pro-free enterprise and competition than Bush. That's not saying much, of course... :-)

But a few prizes wouldn't represent significant budgetary competition for massive pork like ISS, ESAS, etc. If Hillary's elected, ESAS will likely die in her Administration, and fanboys will blame her for that just as they blame Nixon for "cancelling" Apollo. But that's true regardless of who the next President is.

Posted by Edward Wright at December 11, 2007 07:50 PM

"Despite all the money spent in the last four and a half years, NASA has made negative progress toward the goal of flying a CEV."

Compare that to the progress made by SpaceX over that timeframe, for a fraction of the cost, and project only a few years into the future: it is obvious that the Falcon/Dragon combination will be making regular trips to the ISS before NASA even tests the first J2X engine. At that point there is no reasonable justification for NASA to continue pouring money into development of Orion or the CEV.

Posted by Ed Minchau at December 12, 2007 12:51 AM

I want SpaceX to succeed, but I think trying to cite SpaceX "progress" vs. Orion "stalling" is kind of over the top. SpaceX hasn't even had a fully successful launch yet, let alone rolled out a finished spacecraft.

Posted by George Skinner at December 12, 2007 01:34 PM

SpaceX hasn't even had a fully successful launch yet, let alone rolled out a finished spacecraft.

And NASA hasn't even gotten to PDR...

Posted by Rand Simberg at December 12, 2007 01:38 PM

George, SpaceX have designed and built two completely new rocket engines and have tested the Merlin 1-C on the BFTS for 170 seconds, the equivalent of a full burn to orbit. That particular engine has actually been fired something like 250 times for a total of around 3200 seconds. The J2-X engine hasn't been fired once - in fact right now it is totally vaporware. Considering that NASA's schedule for Ares has slipped by more than a year every year and that they so far have absolutely no bent metal, SpaceX progress vs. Orion stalling is not over the top, it is an objective assessment of the situation.

Posted by Ed Minchau at December 12, 2007 06:14 PM

Yet another thread where Shittington repeatedly, and in detail, demonstrated his utter ignorance about both the technical and political specifics surrounding NASA's implementation of the VSE.

This Shittington quote is especially precious:

"My knowledge of aerospace engineering is somewhat limited"

Try totally non-existant for this member of the Society of Armchair Aerospace Engineers With Bachelor Degrees in History.

Shittington needs to stick to Harry Potter updates and kitchen recipes in his blog, and keep his nose out of the educated and professional world of civil space programs and policy.

What an ignoramus...

Posted by WhittingtonIsAnUninformedIgnoramus at December 12, 2007 09:35 PM

I stand by my point. NASA has been orbiting spacecraft for close to 50 years. SpaceX hasn't done it once yet. The J-2X design is based on a well-developed turbomachinery system that has far more test & flight time than SpaceX's engines. It's also being developed by Rocketdyne, who know a thing or two about rocket engine design. And considering that Rocketdyne was only awarded the contract in July of this year, it's not surprising that they haven't produced much yet.

Posted by George Skinner at December 12, 2007 09:47 PM

"The J-2X design is based on a well-developed turbomachinery system that has far more test & flight time than SpaceX's engines."

Patently wrong. Per direct quotes from the recently released GAO report on Ares I problems and NASA's own independent review boards, the J-2X is a new engine development in every respect (parts changes, thrust level, nozzle design, and development time):

"...the extent of planned changes is such that both the ESAS and Ares I standing review boards reported that the effort essentially represents a new engine development. The scope of required changes is so broad, the contractor estimates that it will need nearly 5 million hours to complete design, development, test, and evaluation activities for the J-2X upper stage engine... According to Pratt and Whitney Rocketdyne representatives, these design changes will result in the replacement and/or modification of virtually every part derived from the J-2 or J-2S designs."

"Pratt and Whitney Rocketdyne is also redesigning turbo-pumps from the X-33 program that feed fuel and oxidizer into a newly configured main combustion chamber, to increase engine thrust to 294,000 pounds—the J-2S had 265,000 pounds of thrust. The element also faces significant schedule risks in developing and manufacturing a carbon composite nozzle extension in order to satisfy these thrust requirements. According to contractor officials, the extension is more than 2 feet—i.e., about one-third—wider in diameter than existing nozzles."

"the J-2X development effort is accorded less than 7 years from development start to first flight. In comparison, the Space Shuttle main engine, the only other human-rated liquid-fuel engine NASA has successfully flown since the Apollo program, development required 9 years… If the engine does not complete development as scheduled, subsequent flight testing might be delayed. The J-2X development effort represents a critical path for the Ares I project. Subsequently, delays in the J-2X schedule for design, development, test, and evaluation would have a ripple effect throughout the entire Ares I project."

It's worth reading the entire report, or at least the highlights, which are here:

http://rocketsandsuch.blog spot.com/2007/12/yikes-indeed.html

To sum up, Ares I is in deep doo-doo.

Posted by anonymous at December 12, 2007 10:58 PM

OK, here we go again. There is considerable evidence that the American political and military establishment is vehemently opposed to humanity's expansion into space. That sounds like the worst kind of tinfoil millinery, but consider:

The turf wars between the US Army and Navy, leading to the Russians getting a satellite into orbit first and the less useful launcher, the Navy one, going ahead after the Russians had already won that part of the race.

As a result of this, Kennedy made his famous speech - and Dyna-Soar got canned, and the USA went for the fifty-billion-dollar publicity stunt that was Apollo, instead.

At about the same time as this, the best (by a very long way indeed) way of getting really large loads - thousands of tons - into orbit and beyond was abandoned. I refer of course to the real Orion.

When it came to Shuttle, the reusability element was largely thrown away, by abandoning the idea of a reusable first stage. As well as this, design decisions were made that led to a ground crew of forty thousand and a six-month turnaround.

Post-shuttle, for a replacement reusable launcher, a design not finished yet even on paper was chosen instead of a simpler, cheaper design, the Delta Clipper, that was already being successfully flown in half-scale tests.

And now we have the present mess, where once again the least efficient and affordable option has been chosen.

It is therefore at least arguable that NASA is specifically designed to block human expansion into space by any means available. And why should this be? Simple. It is perfectly obvious after a moment's thought that once there are significant numbers of humans living and working in space, America's supremacy over the rest of the human race is over for good. This idea would be about as popular with the leaders of America as a similar idea in the days of Imperial Rome would be to its Emperor.

The only hope now for the human race is that someone else is going to get the job done before environmental degradation and resource depletion makes it impossible. If this happens, the language spoken in the rest of the Solar System won't be English. Perhaps it will be Mandarin. If it doesn't? Well, maybe ETs will find the remains of our cities interesting.

Posted by Fletcher Christian at December 13, 2007 01:54 AM

As a counter-point to Fletcher's notion an argument can be made that the culture that opens up human expansion into space will be the primary influence on space-faring and space-living humans, their societies, and cultures.

I doubt the culture of the US government would be able to do such a thing under any circumstance; it's a part, either explicit or much more commonly simply implied by the approach, that most advocates and enablers including luminaries such as Von Braun and O'Neill get/got completely wrong. Unsurprising since few have given the unique problems and opportunities of various different locations in space and their corresponding possibilities all that much thought (even SF writers rarely skim the surface of the issues).

I mean how many people do you see reasoning about such things as what is truly the high ground not in relation to planets but the solar system itself? How many discuss possible direct implications on societal structures emanating from the structural design choice of a specific habitat type? I've been looking since I have thoughts on those two matters but I haven't found anything: there is a vast uncharted expanse of required thinking to do for those who want space-based civilizations.

Anyway back on track: the culture of entrepreneurial capitalism-based individualistic spirit usually (but not necessarily) with more than a small touch of libertarian or classical-liberal values and motivations is far more flexible and likely to succeed than any government.

Even if the US government culture was able to do such a thing despite my unbelief I would greatly appreciate it if they didn't and instead left it as a blank slate for private efforts, even if that means I won't get to see the beginnings of it myself.

Posted by Habitat Hermit at December 13, 2007 05:41 AM

Fletcher

History shows us that it was not the military that was against DynaSoar. It was MacNamara who, when he developed the MAD doctrine, saw any military presence in space beyond remote sensing and communications systems as "destabilizing" and therefore to be cancelled.

Posted by Dennis Ray Wingo at December 13, 2007 10:39 AM

Regarding J-2X - it's not surprising that turbomachinery elements are being redesigned based on a requirement for higher thrust levels. It's also not surprising that designs are changing after application of modern engineering analysis tools to a design originating in the 1950s. These changes are not actually a big deal - the same sort of process happens with virtually every upgrade of a gas turbine powerplant. An example would be the change from F-119 to F-135 cores.

The comments regarding development timelines are also slightly ridiculous. The SSME was pushing rocket technology to the limit and beyond, and the J-2X doesn't even come close. The "man-rated" qualification is also specious. There's little difference in the reliability expected of billion-dollar comsat launches and human passengers. Rocketdyne has also done development recently on the RS-68 (new design), and the J-2 development work done for X-33 (one element of that program that worked as planned.)

Posted by George Skinner at December 13, 2007 01:46 PM

These changes are not actually a big deal - the same sort of process happens with virtually every upgrade of a gas turbine powerplant.

Those gas turbines are test flown hundreds of times before they enter service. Do you think NASA is going to test launch hundreds of Ares rockets?

The investment is amortized over hundreds or thousands of engines, which fly millions of flights. Do you think NASA is going to fly millions of Ares missions?

Numbers matter.

There's little difference in the reliability expected of billion-dollar comsat launches and human passengers.

First, "comsat" is not a generic term for communication satellites. It's the name of a company (which no longer exists).

Second, communication satellites generally cost tens to hundreds of millions of dollars, not billions of dollars.

Third, there's an *enormous* difference in the reliability expected of billion-dollar comsat launches and human passengers.

The ELVs used to launch comsats have lousy reliability. They have catastrophic failure rates in the range of 1-10%.

Passenger aircraft have catastrophic failure rates of less than 0.001% -- not because they are "man rated" (they aren't) but because of good design and the learning curve that comes from high flight rates.

If airplanes failed at the same rate that ELVs do, there would be dozens of crashes at every major airport and Air Force Base, every single day. No airline would be able to remain in business.

Would you get into your car if you knew there was a 1-10% chance that it would blow up every time you turned the key, George?

If your point is that spacecraft ought to have lousy reliability and economics like ELVs, rather than high reliability and good economics like aircraft, all I can say is, I disagree.

Posted by Edward Wright at December 13, 2007 03:13 PM

"Regarding J-2X - it's not surprising that turbomachinery elements are being redesigned based on a requirement for higher thrust levels. It's also not surprising that designs are changing after application of modern engineering analysis tools to a design originating in the 1950s. These changes are not actually a big deal."

I apologize for the bluntness, but so what? Per the GAO report and contradictory to the program's claims (and your earlier statement), the fact remains that there is practically no heritage between J-2 and J-2X, all the way down to "virtually every part" of the J-2X (per P&W and Rocketdyne), requiring some "5 million hours" of DDT&E. On top of that, there are also "significant schedule risks in developing and manufacturing a carbon composite nozzle extension in order to satisfy these thrust requirements."

The bottomline is that the heritage premise on which ESAS and the program based upper stage engine decisions turned out to be totally wrong. It doesn't matter whether you, I, or anyone else thinks these changes are a "big deal". It matters whether they are going to blow the assumptions behind the system's reliability, cost, and schedule figures and cause the program to underperform and overrun budgets and schedules.

"the same sort of process happens with virtually every upgrade of a gas turbine powerplant. An example would be the change from F-119 to F-135 cores."

Color me unimpressed by weak analogies to the less demanding and much more developed world of jet engines.

"The comments regarding development timelines are also slightly ridiculous... The "man-rated" qualification is also specious. There's little difference in the reliability expected of billion-dollar comsat launches and human passengers."

I agree, but tell that to NASA. Why the heck are we spending $14+ billion and a decade-plus developing Ares I when we have operational launch vehicles in the national fleet that are already designed to launch incredibly expensive comsats and milsats with some modicum of reliability that can far surpass Shuttle's safety record with just a decent escape system (forget adding some redundancy)?

Given NASA's track record with unnecessarily complex and ineffective human rating requirements and processes, the GAO is justified to harken back to the SSME experience. It's the last example we have of a _NASA_ human-rated rocket engine development. We can always postulate an ideally rational human-rated rocket development program, but ideal and rational are two words rarely associated with the NASA human space flight way of doing things.

"Rocketdyne has also done development recently on the RS-68 (new design), and the J-2 development work done for X-33 (one element of that program that worked as planned.)"

Just not relevant. Of course, P&W and Rocketdyne have rocket development experience. But that wasn't a key factor in the upper stage engine decisions. The key factor was the suppossed heritage between J-2 and J-2X, which, per the GAO report, has turned out to be totally false.

Posted by Anonymous at December 13, 2007 03:22 PM

operational launch vehicles in the national fleet... can far surpass Shuttle's safety record with just a decent escape system (forget adding some redundancy)?

Escape systems are not the infallible devices Mike Griffin thinks they are. Talk to the military pilots who sit on top of them every day. No one in the aviation world says, "Oh, reliability doesn't matter as long as we can eject." Pilots view ejection as a last resort when everything else has gone failed -- "attempted suicide to avoid certain death."

Even a "successful" ejection often leaves a pilot with a broken back or other crippling injuries. It can mean the end of a pilot's career. That's why Walter Schirra and Tom Stafford did not use the ejection seat when the engine shutdown on Gemini 6 (which the mission rules said they should have). They had seen the injuries sustained in animal tests of the Gemini ejection seat.

This is despite the fact that ejection seats have been tested *far* more extensively than any NASA escape system.

That said, the record of ejection seats, with all their problems, is quite good compared to the record of ejection capsules, which is so bad the Air Force abandoned the idea and went back to ejection seats.

Aircraft escape systems are intended to provide a last resort for unforeseen or uncontrollable occurances -- combat damage, bird strike, total engine failure, etc. Not to cover routine occurances that occur on 1% of all flights. The aviation community flies constantly; they can't afford to be crippling pilots and losing airplanes every day. NASA flies rarely and hopes the odds won't catch up to them. When they do, everyone acts surprised.

Posted by Edward Wright at December 13, 2007 04:15 PM

The only J2 part of X-33 that "worked" were the turbo pumps borrowed from spare J-2 engines and run for the first time in two decades.

Pretty good, and we want to redesign that for what reason?

The only part of the J2-X that is common with the old J2 design is the name.

Posted by Dennis Ray Wingo at December 13, 2007 04:57 PM

"Escape systems are not the infallible devices Mike Griffin thinks they are."

Relevance to the discussion? The debate wasn't about potential future RLV safety versus the safety of existing ELVs plus escape systems. The point that was being made is that either would provide substantial improvement over Shuttle without going to the idiotic expense of reinventing the ELV wheel with Ares I.

I'm all for RLV R&D, but let's try to stay on topic.

Posted by Anonymous at December 13, 2007 07:08 PM

The point that was being made is that either would provide substantial improvement over Shuttle

It's not a substantial improvement. It might be a marginal improvement -- although you haven't demonstrated that -- but substantial improvements won't come until someone develops a reliable vehicle, rather than just cobbling on an escape system and telling astronauts to push the button at the first hint of trouble.

Assuming the ELV/capsule/escape system does provide a marginal safety improvement over the Shuttle, is that improvement worth the cost of developing the new system? How many lives do you expect to save for each billion dollars spent?

without going to the idiotic expense of reinventing the ELV wheel with Ares I.

If NASA is going to build Orion, they need to reinvent the ELV wheel. No current ELV is big enough to launch it. Yes, you could use an "EELV derived" heavy lifter, but that would not be an EELV any more than "Shuttle derived" is the Shuttle.

If NASA is not going to build Orion, then what? Build a smaller capsule that can fit on an existing EELV? In that case, why not just use Dragon, which Elon Musk is already building anyway? It might or might not be safer than the Shuttle, but it would be cheaper, and it would certainly be cheaper than any of the Shuttle replacements NASA has proposed.

Of course, by the time such a decision is made, we will likely have a new President. The next Administration will undoubtedly reevaluate space policy and might decide to emphasize something other than Apollo Redux. It could be environmental satellites, space solar power, or even military space plane. Why should I assume that the Bush Vision is the only possible option?

Posted by Edward Wright at December 13, 2007 08:09 PM

'The ELVs used to launch comsats have lousy reliability. They have catastrophic failure rates in the range of 1-10%.

And when was the last time a commercial satellite launch failed due to a turbomachinery failure? They've mostly seemed to have problems with avionics as of late. Even in the SSME, the turbomachinery problems seem to have been dealt with during the development phase and haven't caused a flight failure. It's also worth noting that the SSME has been upgraded with significantly improved turbomachinery during its lifetime, reflecting the benefit of improved engineering design over the past 20 years.

As for reliability comparisons, passenger aircraft don't fly at 16,000 mph. The level of energy involved in spaceflight means that there's going to be a high level of risk associated with ANY launch vehicle for the near future.

"Per the GAO report and contradictory to the program's claims (and your earlier statement), the fact remains that there is practically no heritage between J-2 and J-2X, all the way down to "virtually every part" of the J-2X (per P&W and Rocketdyne), requiring some "5 million hours" of DDT&E."

That sounds about right. Even if NASA were to produce a carbon copy of the original J-2, they'd be negligent to not do a detailed review of the original engineering and run an extensive test program. Also, the numbers you're quoting imply a team of 350 people working over the 7 year program. That's nothing compared to what an auto manufacturer devotes to a car engine upgrade.

Look - my regular line of work is developing hydrogen fuel cells, but my background is in combustion and mechanical engineering. I don't know where you guys come from, but I think you're making a big deal out of routine engine development.

Posted by George Skinner at December 13, 2007 09:36 PM

"As for reliability comparisons, passenger aircraft don't fly at 16,000 mph... I think you're making a big deal out of routine engine development."

Passenger aircraft are routine. Vehicles that fly at Mach 25 are not routine yet, by a long shot. That's why we're making a big deal out of this.

The fact remains that there are 5 million man-hours remaining in the J2-X development cycle, whereas SpaceX has already tested the Merlin 1-C.

-------------

On an unrelated note, to commenter WIAUI above: your entire comment is ad hominem. If you disagree with something that Whittington has said, state your reasons for disagreement and actually contribute to the discussion. Either what he says is correct or it isn't, and his educational background or your personal feelings about him have nothing whatever to do with whether his argument is correct or not.

Posted by Ed Minchau at December 13, 2007 10:15 PM

And when was the last time a commercial satellite launch failed due to a turbomachinery failure? They've mostly seemed to have problems with avionics as of late.

And that fact makes you feel better because -- ?

Yours is a fine argument, George, ***if*** you want spaceflight to remain rare and expensive. Again, I don't.

Perhaps "remain" is the wrong word, since you want to replace the Shuttle with a vehicle that's even more expensive (and would make human spaceflight, at least by the US government more rare).

You have the right to do what you want with your own money, George, but why should I consent to your using my tax money to make human spaceflight less affordable? I don't think that's a good thing, and it's not a goal I wish to support.

As for reliability comparisons, passenger aircraft don't fly at 16,000 mph.

They will someday, George. Perhaps someday soon.

Do you think that if something isn't done now, it can never be done in the future???

At one time, airplanes couldn't fly at 160 mph. Did that mean aircraft could never fly at 160 mph?

Or if they did, they would be more dangerous than horses -- because they have more energy than horses?

Do you think we should have forgotten about airplanes and stuck to horses?

The level of energy involved in spaceflight means that there's going to be a high level of risk associated with ANY launch vehicle for the near future.

That statement shows a fundamental mistake in engineering principles, George. The risk of failure does not depend on the level of energy; it depends on engineering margins and levels of redundancy.

A Cessna has less energy than a Boeing 747. So, according to your argument, a 747 should be much more dangerous than a Cessna. It isn't. It's much safer. That's because of the 747 has better margins and more redundancy.

A nuclear reactor has more energy than an ELV does. Do you think nuclear reactors should explode as often as ELVs do? They don't. In fact, they never explode at all. Margins and redundancy. Nuclear engineers don't just throw up their hands and say, "The level of energy involved in a commercial powerplant is so high, let's forget about safety for the near future."

That's nothing compared to what an auto manufacturer devotes to a car engine upgrade.

How man people will drive those cars, George? A few dozen? Or millions? Don't you think the auto manufacturer asks those questions before it invests money in a new engine?

You want the American taxpayers to invest tens of billions of dollars in a transportation system that will serve how many people? Eight to twelve astronauts a year? For how many years?

Why is that a good investment? How do the benefits outweigh the cost?

Really, George? Do you routinely ship fuel cells that have a 1% chance of blowing up every time they are used? Do you spend billions of dollars developing a fuel cell that has very limited application, without doing any cost-benefit analysis?

I doubt that very much. When people do things routinely, they care about cost and reliability. I want spaceflight to be routine. That means we must care about those things, too.

Posted by Edward Wright at December 13, 2007 10:39 PM

"Either what he says is correct or it isn't,"

As others have already repeatedly shown, Shittington failed to get even one fact right in this whole thread. All I did was point out his shitty performance. It's par for the course for Shittington.

"and his educational background or your personal feelings about him have nothing whatever to do with whether his argument is correct or not."

Shittington's educational background has everything to do with his ignorance, and Shittington deserves to be called out on it. Shittington throws labels like "Internet Rocketeers Club" at trained, working aerospace professionals when Shittington has ZERO education or experience in any related field.

When Shittington grows up, acknowledges that he's not the expert that he thinks he is, and stops throwing labels at experts who disagree with his amateur opinions, he won't deserve posts like this. But until then, Shittington will continue to be a member of the Society of Amateur Armchair Aerospace Engineers With Bachelor Degrees in History.

No offense towards you, Ed.

Posted by WhittingtonIsAnUninformedIgnoramus at December 13, 2007 10:40 PM

This is still going off-topic, but...

"It's not a substantial improvement. It might be a marginal improvement"

STS LOC is about 1-in-60. Assuming an ELV LOC of 1-in-20, tied to an escape system with 1-in-10 LOC, total LOC on the new system will be 1-in-200. That's almost a factor of four improvement over Shuttle using pretty average and accepted figures. Compared to Shuttle, I'd say that's substantial.

But I'd also agree that compared to future RLV standards (a hoped-for 1-in-1,000 figure), it's a marginal improvement. But NASA doesn't need a 1-in-1,000 figure to support a handful of ISS and lunar flights per year.

You may argue that NASA should be developing systems that can support a much higher flight rate. I'd agree with that statement, too. But that's an entirely different discussion, and it's not terribly relevant to VSE implementation.

"telling astronauts to push the button at the first hint of trouble."

That's a huge exaggeration of how even Apollo-era escape systems worked. We should know better.

"If NASA is going to build Orion, they need to reinvent the ELV wheel."

NASA doesn't need to build Orion just to ferry crew and some cargo to/from ISS/LEO.

And Orion is practically light enough now to launch on EELVs anyway.

Aside from preserving Shuttle jobs, there's no rational basis for Ares I's $14+ billion cost and decade-plus schedule detour. If one of the major points of the VSE was to get astronauts back to the Moon with a modicum of speed and efficiency, then we should have used existing commercial/military launch systems that were more than capable of doing the job, rather than wasting limited taxpayer dollars and Bush II years reinventing that capability. It would have put us a lot closer to the Moon and laid a lot more groundwork for a revitalized commercial launch industry.

"If NASA is not going to build Orion, then what? Build a smaller capsule that can fit on an existing EELV? In that case, why not just use Dragon, which Elon Musk is already building anyway?"

Either is a much better option than Ares I, which was my point. We've come full circle. There was no need to go so far off-topic to make the same point.

"Why should I assume that the Bush Vision is the only possible option?"

I didn't tell you to assume anything. Your analysis is your analysis.

I assume VSE because that's still what's on the table. Until we know who the new President is and what their new civil space goals are, if any, we're just throwing darts in the dark.

Posted by Anonymous at December 13, 2007 11:15 PM

"I think you're making a big deal out of routine engine development."

For the second time, it has nothing to do with whether or not J-2X is a "big deal" or whether or not it's a "routine engine development". The J-2X project was sold and priced one way, and now the government auditors are telling us that the technical and cost basis for J-2X is utter bilge. That's how budget overruns occur, schedules get blown, and reliability figures get thrown out the window. It's what happened on Shuttle, and it's what's been happening practically everywhere on Ares I/Orion since the beginning of this year.

A Detroit engine or one of your fuel cell developments may be easy and routine, but if Detroit or you don't have your arms around the technical details and don't budget and schedule accordingly, you're still screwed.

Posted by Anonymous at December 13, 2007 11:23 PM

The key word there is "assume." Based on the history of escape capsules, 90% reliability is probably optimistic.

Assuming your assumptions are correct, you're still talking about something that's more dangerous than professional bull riding. I wouldn't call that a "substantial" safety improvement.

Mercury and Apollo had the same kind of escape system, and the test pilots at Edwards Air Force Base still thought they were insanely dangerous. "Spam in a can." When Chuck Yeager is afraid of a vehicle, that says something to me.

Well, I hope RLVs will be a lot better than 1-in-1000.

Whether NASA needs 1-in-1000 reliability is another question.

You're making the usual NASA assumption that the lives of the crew are the only thing that matter. What happens if you have one of those 1-in-20 loss-of-vehicle events after the lunar base has been established?

Even if your escape system saved the crew, you now have guys on the Moon waiting for supplies. You just dumped their groceries in the ocean, and your launcher probably has to stand down. There's no Soyuz to serve as backup in this program. The guys of the Moon are not going to be too happy. Do they starve? Go on half-rations indefinitely? Abandon the base?

If NASA's doing two or three flights a year for 10 years, that scenario is not only possible, it's likely.

The same is true of the lunar lander, transfer stage, etc. NASA's lunar architecture has multiple single-point failure modes. Over a 10-year period, the chance of something failing is pretty close to 1.

NASA doesn't need to build Orion just to ferry crew and some cargo to/from ISS/LEO.

Obviously, since the Shuttle does that right now.

It doesn't need to exaggerate the reliability of ELVs and escape systems, either.

If one of the major points of the VSE was to get astronauts back to the Moon with a modicum of speed and efficiency

Speed and efficiency were never one of the major points. President Bush stated that the first landing was to occur no later than 2020 and no earlier than 2015. (Specifying a "no earlier than" date always seemed odd to me, but there it is.)

There was no need to go so far off-topic to make the same point.

Why am I off topic? The topic isn't "ELV vs. Ares." It's "Is VSE Dying?"

I'm talking what should happen after the wake. I don't see why my comments are any more off topic than yours.

Posted by Edward Wright at December 14, 2007 01:19 AM

"A Cessna has less energy than a Boeing 747. So, according to your argument, a 747 should be much more dangerous than a Cessna. It isn't. It's much safer. That's because of the 747 has better margins and more redundancy."

No, a 747 is a bigger, faster, heavier aircraft flown by experienced commercial pilots. Put a Cessna in the hands of a trained professional and it'll be safer as well. Put a 747 in the hands of a Cessna pilot, and you're probably going to end up with a crashed 747. The Cessna is a bit of a straw-man argument in any case because it represents 50 year-old technology. If you built a low-speed aircraft with all of the technology in a modern airliner, you'd have a much safer aircraft overall because its flight profile is so much less demanding. The important thing about the comparison is that it flies slower, things happen less quickly, and there's less energy to manage when something goes wrong. One of the key lessons of the X-15 and SR-71 programs was the need to careful planning to deal with high energy flight profiles - you can't fly by the seat of your pants, and events happen faster than the pilots can react.

"The J-2X project was sold and priced one way, and now the government auditors are telling us that the technical and cost basis for J-2X is utter bilge."

And I still say that you've misinterpreted the report. The J-2X IS a development of the older engine. You seem to be under the mistaken impression that NASA was just going to dust off the blueprints and start manufacturing Apollo-era engines.

I was trying relate my engineering background to explain that although I'm not a rocket engine designer, my experience in developing high technology products (and not computers or electronics, thank you - this is stuff that has to perform at 5-nines reliability and involves considerable fluid mechanics and thermodynamics) suggests that what NASA plans is a reasonable amount of work for what they're doing. Although I don't work as a turbomachinery designer, I've done graduate-level work in fluid mechanics and have several classmates who do work in turbomachinery design, and the J-2X redesign is reasonable and expected.

Posted by at December 14, 2007 09:11 AM

"you're still talking about something that's more dangerous than professional bull riding."

It should be -- it's exploration on a frontier, not entertainment in an arena.

We shouldn't take stupid risks as we've done with the Shuttle. But neither should beat ourselves senseless at great cost trying wring every risk out of an inherently dangerous activity like exploration. If we do that, no frontiers will get explored.

Now, if we want to make human space flight safe for other, non-exploration applications, I'm all for that, too. And that will require launch vehicles with a lot more reliability than Shuttle or today's ELVs. But that has little to do with exploration, frontiers, or the VSE.

"When Chuck Yeager is afraid of a vehicle, that says something to me."

It would have been interesting to see a quote from Yeager about Shuttle safety and whether he'd prefer flying on Shuttle or on an ELV with an escape system.

"I wouldn't call that a "substantial" safety improvement."

On this we'll have to agree to disagree. I'd argue that a factor of three or four -- even before taking inexpensive steps to improve an ELV's reliability -- is a substantial safety improvement over Shuttle and good enough for a handful of manned NASA missions per year.

"What happens if you have one of those 1-in-20 loss-of-vehicle events after the lunar base has been established?"

Any marginally competent logistician will have pre-placed extra supplies and spares for just such an eventuality. Although there's an upper limit to how long a crew could go without a resupply flight, ISS logistics today have such margins built in. There's no reason to believe that a lunar outpost wouldn't be run the same way.

And churning out a spare set of ELV hardware (even a different set of ELV hardware in the case of EELV in case one EELV is grounded) and mission hardware ahead of time for a rapidly fielded emergency resupply mission is not a hard lift, either.

Again, I'm not against next-gen RLV R&D, but lunar outpost logistics are not a good rationale for RLV expenditures. It's much, much cheaper build margins into the logistics train and churn out a spare set of ELV and mission hardware for an emergency resupply flight.

"It's "Is VSE Dying?" I'm talking what should happen after the wake. I don't see why my comments are any more off topic than yours."

Right, the topic of analysis is whether the VSE is dying or not. The topic is not what should replace the VSE or whether RLVs have some part to play in that.

This sub-thread started when I and another poster were discussing whether or not the J-2X upper stage engine for Ares 1 is in deep doo-doo or not. J-2X is the long pole in the VSE/ESAS tent. That's a very relevant topic for analyzing whether the VSE is dying or not.

You took it off-topic by bringing in discussions about RLV reliability that have little to do with the VSE/ESAS or lunar exploration in general. That's fine, but those comments are certainly not more on topic than discussions about whether the critical path item for the VSE/ESAS is in big schedule trouble.

I've said my peace on this. You can obviously respond, but I'm done with this part of the discussion. Thanks.

Posted by Anonymous at December 14, 2007 11:21 AM

"And I still say that you've misinterpreted the report."

I don't mean to offend, but I'm the one quoting directly from the GAO report. You're the one trying to reinterpret and play down very clear language from the report about how different J-2X is from J-2 and the schedule and other implications thereof.

In all bluntness, you don't seem to understand the basis on which NASA sold J-2X and built its cost and schedule assumptions. For the third time, aside from weak analogies, I'm not debating your assessment of whether J-2X is relatively hard or not. I'm debating whether or not NASA sold itself, its budget, the Ares 1/Orion schedule, and its stakeholders a bill of goods by claiming that J-2X would have a lot of heritage from J-2. From the GAO report, J-2X has practically zero heritage down to the component level with J-2, not to mention significantly higher performance characteristics to achieve and an unprecedented nozzle to build, all of which are driving a longer and more costly development effort than NASA estimated.

I'd note that in your first post on this subject, it was a bill of goods that even you appeared to have bought into.

"The J-2X IS a development of the older engine. You seem to be under the mistaken impression that NASA was just going to dust off the blueprints and start manufacturing Apollo-era engines."

I and a lot of other people in the business were never under that impression, and we've been calling NASA on it for many months now. The GAO report is the first official, independent document to put that (intentional or unintentional) lie to the test.

We may have to agree to disagree, as I don't know how to make it any plainer than that.

Posted by Anonymous at December 14, 2007 11:39 AM

No, a 747 is a bigger, faster, heavier aircraft flown by experienced commercial pilots. Put a Cessna in the hands of a trained professional and it'll be safer as well.

No, George, it won't be. If you look at the statistics for airline pilots flying Cessnas, you'll find they have more accidents than they do flying 747s.

One of the key lessons of the X-15 and SR-71 programs was the need to careful planning to deal with high energy flight profiles - you can't fly by the seat of your pants, and events happen faster than the pilots can react.

Who said spacecraft would be flown by the seat of the pants, George? You're making up red herrings.

The Atlas A and X-15 had similar energies. If we accept your belief about high-energy vehicles, the X-15 and the Atlas A should have had a similar failure rate.

In reality, the X-15 had a dramatically lower failure rate. That fact that was confirmed by two separate independent studies, one by General Dynamics and one by the Air Force, employing different study methods.

Neither the X-15 nor the SR-71 was a death trap, despite the energy involved. With proper engineering, it is possible to build high-energy vehicles that operate safely and reliable.

That's the problem, you're not relating rocket-engine design to your own engineering background. You say your stuff has to perform at 5-nines reliability, but when it comes to space, you want us to forget about reliability and just accept the fact that ELVs are shoddy deathtraps.

Why is that?

Posted by Edward Wright at December 14, 2007 01:27 PM

"you're still talking about something that's more dangerous than professional bull riding."

It should be -- it's exploration on a frontier, not entertainment in an arena.

It *should* be??? Why is that?

What about exploring other frontiers? Caves, oceans, etc.? Do you think those activities should be as dangerous as strapping an astronaut on top of a guided missile?

We shouldn't take stupid risks as we've done with the Shuttle.

"Stupid risks"? Statistically, the Shuttle is no riskier than expendable capsules and guided missiles. There are plenty of reasons to criticize the Shuttle but "capsules are safer" is not one of them. Don't let your hatred of the Shuttle lead you to exaggerate its faults (or minimize the faults of space capsules).

But neither should beat ourselves senseless at great cost trying wring every risk out of an inherently dangerous activity like exploration. If we do that, no frontiers will get explored.

Safety is not a boolean 0 or 1 function. We can't wring out "every risk," but we can eliminate some of them.

Building a new capsule won't substantially improve safety. Based on the safety record of past capsules (rather than assumptions), it won't improve safety at all. If you want to argue for building a new capsule, you have to do it on other grounds.

It has everything to do with exploration and frontiers. Making spaceflight safe and affordable for "non-exploration applications" will make it safe and affordable for exploration, also. Historically, explorers have always been concerned with transportation costs. They've always been concerned about safety, too (at least the successful ones). Columbus never would have made it to America if he hadn't been able to buy three used ships at low cost.

Again, past capsules have not been three or four times safer than the Shuttle, so I don't take it for granted that the new one will be. Even if it is, how many lives does that translate into, for how many billions of dollars? How does that compare to the number of lives the US government could save if it put the same money into improving emergency medical services, stop smoking programs, or medical research?

"What happens if you have one of those 1-in-20 loss-of-vehicle events after the lunar base has been established?"

Any marginally competent logistician will have pre-placed extra supplies and spares for just such an eventuality.

Although there's an upper limit to how long a crew could go without a resupply flight, ISS logistics today have such margins built in.

Ahem. Haven't you noticed how NASA starts to panic whenever there's a problem with the Shuttle? Not to mention "what happens if the Progress doesn't arrive"?

NASA nearly had to abandon ISS after the Columbia accident. Without the Russian Soyuz and Progress, they would have had no choice. And logistics in LEO are relatively easy (and cheap) compared to logistics on the Moon.

There's no reason to believe that a lunar outpost wouldn't be run the same way.

I'm sorry, but that straight line's just too easy. Yes, no reason to believe it won't be run just like ISS... :-)

So, you have a spare set of ELV hardware, which is grounded for two years while NASA does an accident investigation? How is that useful?

Show your math, please.

Even NASA's massively oversized and overengineered as it was Second-Generation RLV was estimated to cost $5-6 billion. By comparison, Orion is $10 billion and Ares I is now up to $14 (?) billion. Delta IV Heavy is over $200 million per flight, if you're honest about the costs, and it still isn't big enough to launch Orion. How many billions to develop a new EELV that can?

Right, the topic of analysis is whether the VSE is dying or not. The topic is not what should replace the VSE

Then why are you talking about EELV, which not currently part of VSE? I don't object to your discussing alternatives. Why do you object to my doing it?

You took it off-topic by bringing in discussions about RLV reliability that have little to do with the VSE/ESAS or lunar exploration in general.

It has a lot to do with it. Max Hunter did a paper on reusable vehicles and lunar exploration. Apollo Redux is not the only possible architecture for lunar exploration or even the best.

As to whether VSE/ESAS is in big trouble, all I can say is that it depends on whether or not Bush gets a third term. Short of some miracle like that, nothing will be finished by the time Bush leaves office and there's no particular reason for his successor to care about "supporting the Bush Vision."

Posted by Edward Wright at December 14, 2007 03:10 PM

I would disagree here and agree with Ed (this happens sometimes). This does require a rethink of the ESAS architecture which is the current implementation of the VSE. Let's say for a moment that we don't gore the sacred cow of ESAS but cast this in a supporting role.

An RLV of moderate payload capability could be used to ferry these payloads to ISS where they would be loaded onto an in-space RLV called a solar electric tug. These payloads would be things like motors, computers, electronics of all types as well as other specialty gear. The e-RLV would then proceed from ISS to Low lunar orbit, where an ESAS descent stage would be waiting in orbit to take the cargo and ferry it down to the lunar surface.

This would work ONLY if there was a focus on In Situ Resource Utilization. As I postulated in the article this is the current greatest disconnect between ESAS and the VSE. With a robust ISRU system in place that allowed for metals to be produced in multi-ton quantities per week we would see the development of a lunar industry whereby things like rovers, habitats, cranes, bulldozers and other heavy equipment would be built in situ.

With robust ISRU then the payload mix to the Moon changes from complete systems to the high value parts that cannot be made on the Moon (until later of course). These parts are perfect payloads for RLVs (as well as the xenon for the e-RLVs).

Therefore I submit that ISS, RLVs, e-RLVs, and ISRU is the key to opening the solar system, no matter what happens to the ESAS architecture, although this system that I just postulated would probably make the Ares V obsolete, but maybe not as a really robust commercial economic development of the solar system would allow for an Ares V type system to take up very heavy payloads that could then be taken to NEO's and other locations in the solar system for developing those areas.

Posted by Dennis Ray Wingo at December 15, 2007 07:12 AM

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