"anonymous.space" has some questions over at Space Politics for the Senate to ask NASA:

1) Given the Space Shuttle’s demonstrated loss-of-vehicle/loss-of-crew rate, what is the likelihood that NASA will lose another Space Shuttle orbiter and crew before ISS assembly is complete? Is that risk acceptable or unacceptable? Why?

2) How much does the Space Shuttle program cost the taxpayer per year and per month? What percentage of NASA’s annual and monthly budgets do those amounts represent? If the current schedule holds, will all the major international elements of ISS that require Space Shuttle launch be deployed by April 2008? If so, why not terminate ISS assembly at that time, shut down the Space Shuttle program, forgo the additional risks, and redirect the unused 2008-2010 Space Shuttle budget to its replacement vehicles? What will NASA do if the current schedule does not hold and some ISS elements remain unassembled at the end of 2010? What is the impact to other NASA programs if the Space Shuttle program and budget are extended beyond 2010?

3) Part of NASA’s Space Shuttle replacement strategy is the COTS program, where NASA shares costs with industry for the development of new launch and in-space vehicles to service the ISS. The USAF pursued a similar cost-sharing space vehicle development with industry in the recent past, the EELV program, where the USAF spent $1 billion for the development of two launch vehicle families, with commitments to purchase future vehicle flights, if successful. NASA, however, has allocated only $500 million to COTS with no commitments to future vehicle flights, but expects not only two new launch vehicles out of the effort, but also two new in-space vehicles. Given NASA’s smaller contribution to much more aggressive technical goals in COTS, how much industry cost-sharing is required to complete these vehicles? Is it realistic for industry to raise this amount of funding, especially given NASA’s lack of commitment to purchase flights on the resulting vehicles? Why? Are there any precedents? NASA recently had to terminate its development agreement with one of two COTS winners because that entity was unable to raise funding for its private cost-share. What is NASA doing to change COTS funding and/or content and/or future flight purchase commitmets to reduce the probability of another private fundraising failure?

4) The post-Space Shuttle U.S. human space flight gap has grown from three years (2010 to 2013) to five years (2010 to 2015) due to a combination of budgetary and technical issues. But despite the schedule delays, Ares I/Orion technical content is large enough that the budget only provides a 65 percent probability of fielding an operational Ares I/Orion system by 2015, meaning that there is approximately a 1-in-3 chance that the gap will grow even larger, absent any more budgetary or technical issues. Is a five-year gap acceptable? Why? Is the accompanying 1-in-3 risk of the gap growing even larger acceptable? Why? At the 65 percent probability of success, Ares I/Orion development costs through the 2015 operability date are estimated at approximately $20 billion. How much additional funding is necessary to boost that probability to the industry standard of 80 percent? After that, how much additional funding would be needed to accelerate Ares I/Orion operability by one month? Six months? One year? Two years? What is the earliest date that Ares I/Orion operability can be accelerated to, regardless of budget? If no budget increases are in the offing, how can ESAS requirements and Ares I/Orion technical content be reduced to increase the probability of achieving the 2015 operability date or accelerating the operability date? Assuming identical changes to ESAS requirements, are there less costly and more quickly fielded alternatives to Ares I/Orion for ISS resupply and LEO transport? What are the benefits and drawbacks of those alternatives to ISS resupply and LEO transport?

5) The decision to proceed with Ares I development was predicated on the high levels of reliability and safety that derived from its Space Shuttle heritage. But the current Ares I design is very different from the Space Shuttle systems it was originally based upon. The Shuttle SRB is a four-segment solid rocket, while Ares I uses a five-segment solid rocket. The Shuttle SRB stack has rigidity in flight because it attaches to the Space Shuttle stack, while the Ares I stack suffers from a lack of rigidity because it flies alone. The SRB is also recoverable, allowing critical engineering data trend analysis, while Ares I may have to be expendable, removing the ability to track trends that impact reliability and safety. Ares I also now employs a new J-2X upper-stage engine with limited Apollo, not Space Shuttle, heritage. What has been the quantitative impacts to Ares I’s reliability and safety resulting these and other changes since ESAS? How do Ares I’s current projected reliability and safety now compare to existing and alternative launch vehicles for ISS resupply and LEO transport?

6) To meet Ares I performance limits and ESAS requirements, the Orion project is currently considering a number of design changes to reduce the vehicle’s mass. Many of these proposed changes will reduce Orion’s reliability and safety, including: reductions from double- to single- or zero-fault tolerant systems; water landing limitations; and radiation shielding removal, among others. What are the quantitative impacts to Orion’s reliability and safety resulting from these changes? What changes could be made to ESAS requirements to reduce Orion’s mass without impacting Orion’s reliability and safety? Can Orion be made light enough to fly on existing or alternative launch vehicles other than Ares I without impacting Orion’s reliability and safety?

I had hopes (not high hopes, but hopes) that there would be a true space policy shakeup after the loss of Columbia. But it seems to be business as usual inside the Beltway and in Houston and Huntsville. The Aldridge Commission wrote a reasonable report, but NASA seems to have completely ignored it, and neither the Congress or the administration seem to give a damn.

I suspect that should the committee ask these particularly loaded (though perhaps because of that typical) questions for a Congressional hearing, NASA will have answers that will not satisfy Mr. Anonymous nor Mr. Simberg since those answers will not add up to, "Everything we're doing is idiotic and doomed to fail."

Question 3 is particularly interesting. It has been gospel from the New Space folks that small, entrepeneurial companies like SpaceX and even Rp/K can do more with less money than the big, bloated, bureaucratic corporations like Boeing and LockMart. The implication of Question 3 is that this is not so after all.

Rand, was it realistic to look to the Aldridge report (June 2004) for a "true space policy shakeup"..?

The bottom line from Columbia (and between every line of the CAIB report) was that 22 years after STS-1, we still didn't have a way to get people to LEO safely, cheaply, frequently enough -- not for ISS assembly, and certainly not for anything beyond.

The VSE announcement made it clear that the response to that was going to be not "Let's buckle down and do right what STS didn't do," but "Let's go beyond LEO again. Even if (when) it turns out unsustainable again, at least it'll be thrilling, so nobody can say we're risking astronauts for inadequate stakes."

That was the policy choice that started the long, stupid ritual dance we're in now. With all respect to the Aldridge commissioners, they were putting lipstick on a pig.

Rand, was it realistic to look to the Aldridge report (June 2004) for a "true space policy shakeup"..?

Apparently not.

I don't actually have a problem with the VSE itself, until it gets into specifics (it shouldn't have stated how the goals were to be accomplished, such as the CEV). I like to have a national policy that says we're going out into the cosmos. But the job should never have been given to NASA. If it had been deemed really important, a new entity would have been created to accomplish it (e.g., NASA in 1958, or SDIO in the eighties). The effort was pretty much doomed once it was determined that NASA would be the lead agency.

I think Monte is forgetting that along with VSE, which among other things involves NASA getting out of LEO operations, are initiatives like COTS which encourage private sector development of the market that the shuttle was supposed to and failed to open.

I really don't understand this statement from Rand:

"But the job should never have been given to NASA. If it had been deemed really important, a new entity would have been created to accomplish it (e.g., NASA in 1958, or SDIO in the eighties)."

I can see the reaction to such a proposal. "Why create a second NASA? Don't we already have a space agency?" I'm sure I know what Rand's answer will be, but I suspect it will not be something that any policy maker will find reasonable. It would be sort of like creating a second Army because you think the one we got is dysfunctional.

I'm all in favor of "going out into the cosmos," but I don't know any grown-ups who believe we'll go far, or often, with ELVs. So when VSE committed to the former without anything like a commitment to replace the latter, I found it fundamentally unserious.

Mark, I haven't forgotten about COTS at all -- I just think counting on that (or all of New Space put together) to yield CATS over the next couple of decades, while building markets and making enough money to attract further investment, is wishful thinking.

There's lots of NACA- and X-program-style R&D that needs doing but is going to be beyond their budgets for some time -- and won't be in NASA's budget as long as Boldly Going is front and center.

Rand, all things considered, would you be willing to concede that the problem is the Shuttle program, not NASA itself? Yes, the Shuttle program is a very large chunk of NASA, and yes, NASA's strategies are all strongly influenced by the needs and prerogatives of the Shuttle program, but isn't it possible that NASA has a useful role to play as a consumer of space launch capabilities rather than its current role as a provider? That is: 'mend it, don't end it.'

Also, I note that the AF has spent a lot more than a bil on EELV, even if you don't count infrastructure and fleet engineering that has been chalked up to specific missions. They got two vehicles that were built to top-level requirements that the contractors themselves wrote. About the only thing the AF asked for was 0.985 mission reliability. Does that compare to what NASA wants for COTS?

Monte, you run a serious risk of being run out of the Cool Kids Space Club for posting things like that. To suggest that the private sector can't perform in a timely fashion is herasy.

I happen to disagree with your sentiment, by the way. I suspect that we'll have a viable launch industry within a decade. It won't be one that a middle class guy will be able to afford a ticket to space on (that awaits something like a space elevator), but it will serve a considerable market.

It would be sort of like creating a second Army

Mark, I hate to trouble you with facts, but Congress did create a second army.

It's called the "United States Marine Corps."

I suspect that we'll have a viable launch industry within a decade. It won't be one that a middle class guy will be able to afford a ticket to space on (that awaits something like a space elevator),

As the late Dr. Maxwell Hunter used to say, "Anyone who believes that either doesn't understand the rocket equation or doesn't know how much rocket propellant costs."

Max showed his math. I'm waiting for you to show yours, Mark.

Or are you just spouting uninformed opinion?

Edward, calling the Marine Corps a "second Army" would be considered a deadly insult to any Marine. Shame on you.

Edward, calling the Marine Corps a "second Army" would be considered a deadly insult to any Marine. Shame on you.

Bravo Mark Whittington, you saved me the trouble of writing it, and it’s worth repeating.

>It has been gospel from the New Space folks that >small, entrepeneurial companies like SpaceX and >even Rp/K can do more with less money than the >big, bloated, bureaucratic corporations like >Boeing and LockMart. The implication of Question >3 is that this is not so after all.

Completely off the subject; comparing the Army to the Marine Corps is an insult to the Army, the Marine Corp can’t even support themselves in battle for much more than 2 weeks, the Army can do so indefinitely.

Edward, calling the Marine Corps a "second Army" would be considered a deadly insult to any Marine. Shame on you.

Congratulations, Mark. Just the right blend of braggadocio and raving nuttiness to deflect attention from your obvious mistake. Robert Oler couldn't have done it better himself. :-)

You still haven't shown any math to support your belief that affordable space transportation is impossible without some science-fiction device like a space elevator.

I wonder why that is?

Edward, I dare you to say what you said to a Marine. As for the other, I will be prepared to eat my words the day that a trip to orbit on a rocket costs the same as a ticket by air across the Atlantic.

yay, another pissing contest thread with zero information input ! dont you folks ever get tired of this ?

Edward, I dare you to say what you said to a Marine.

A man fights his own battles, Mark. I know quite a few Marines. They have better things to do than defend your foolish rants.

Like trying to develop Marine space capabilities without any budget. In case you've forgotten, the Bush vision of space exploration gives NASA $100 billion for ESAS and the USMC nothing at all for SUSTAIN.

Why is reenacting Apollo more important than providing a USMC global quick-reaction capability? I've asked you that question at least half dozen times, and each time you refuse to answer.

I'll bet dollars to donuts you run away without answering again.

As for the other, I will be prepared to eat my words the day that a trip to orbit on a rocket costs the same as a ticket by air across the Atlantic.

That's not an engineering economic analysis.

Do you think the only possible price points are "the same as a ticket by air across the Atlantic" and unaffordably expensive? You can't imagine any number in between?

Once again, I asked you to back up one of your statements with numbers. Once again, you responded with a childish taunt.

Why is that, Mark? Because the numbers don't support your dogmatic beliefs?

Our beloved cousins in the Marine Corps?

I always thought they were supposed to be NAVAL infantry! ;)

Question 3 is particularly interesting. It has been gospel from the New Space folks that small, entrepeneurial companies like SpaceX and even Rp/K can do more with less money than the big, bloated, bureaucratic corporations like Boeing and LockMart. The implication of Question 3 is that this is not so after all.

Actually, the content - no need to wonder about the implication - of question 3 is to wonder why, if a guarantee of a certain level of purchases of a given good or service is okay for the aforesaid "big, bloated, bureaucratic corporations," as an incentive to first produce said good or service, something comparable is not equally good for those small, furry NewSpace mammals that seem to distress the dinosaur lovers in this crowd so much.

I think comparing NASA of today to what NASA could be, and then looking at the historical record of the Amry itself and how it has been completely transformed from what it was like in the mid to late 1970's is something very appropriate.

Keep in mind that it was very common in the early 1970's (almost to the point of not even getting in the news at all) for ordinary soldiers to kill their commanding officer, often with the very weapons they were issued with to wage war. Morale was awful due to the Vietnam War and went downhill from there, particularly during the Carter administration. Basically, the U.S. Army at that time was nearly worthless as an instrument of national/foreign policy and at best was a horribly wasteful jobs program for the poor. Not really a good one at that.

A huge transformation of the Army took place from nearly every doctrinal position on how to wage war, training procedures, equipment, and practically every other aspect of how the Army was put together. The end result of that was seen in the Gulf War in 1991, and again during the actual military engagement combat of 2002 in Iraq. On the open battle field, there isn't a military organization in the world that can challenge the U.S. Army with organized military units.

NASA needs to have this level of top to bottom organizational change, and that is unfortunately going to require substantial leadership from the very top of the organization.... meaning not just the NASA administrator but the President of the USA to actually give a damn and acknowledge that there is a huge problem with the current state of NASA at the moment. Until that happens (and that did happen with the U.S. Army in the 1980's), it will be the same old problem.

But at the same time, if the Army could transform itself so much in just a couple of decades, I don't see why another major federal agency couldn't have the same thing happen. Perhaps a "threat" from China and India might be the final trick to force a reformation of NASA to turn it into the agency that nearly everybody reading this knows it could be.... provided it had the proper leadership to move out from under the Kennedy Administration.

It appears NASA's manned space program is in dire straights. NASA management had a golden opportunity to turn-it-around and it’s looking like they may have blown it.

I still believe that VSE is the correct goal for NASA. The fact that NASA's strategy to carry out the VSE goal is flawed does not reflect on its worthiness. Meanwhile private space needs to focus on LEO and getting there in a sustained economical modular way.

Unfortunately there again NASA has come up short with the COTS program. The funding is way to low and the financial expectations are unreasonable. NASA should not allow the "Silver Dart" lifting body design to whither away in the hands of Planet Space. If I were NASA I would acquire it at all possible cost. It’s a brutal design and a world beater concept. Future ISS resupply needs it desperately and so does NASA. Should the Ares 1 and CEV fail NASA would still have a viable manned program to fall back on.