Transterrestrial Musings

Comments

Bombing Iran is insufficient to achieve the objectives the author seeks. Only Iranian regime change would be sufficient to accomplish what Podheretz says we need to accomplish.

And our army is not large enough to accomplish that task, today. We need more infantry and nation-building specialists. THEN we can attack Iran.

We also need to counter Iran's strategic deterrent concerning petroleum. Move the world economy off oil and we can pound the Persians with impunity.

Otherwise, a bombing campaign would simply be a large scale re-run of what Clinton did bombing that Sudan factory or tossing Tomahawks at empty tents in Afghanistan. Except that the price of oil would skyrocket and tank the world economy.

Thus, we shoot our own foot and rather than showing our strength a "bomb Iran" campaign would merely demonstrate our weakness.

Posted by Bill White at May 16, 2007 08:24 AM

Bill, as usual, it's hard to tell whether or not you actually read the article you purport to comment on, or are just taking the opportunity, and my blog, to post your own opinions. One of the reasons we don't generally take your opinions seriously.

Posted by Rand Simberg at May 16, 2007 08:27 AM

Money paragraph:

In short, the plain and brutal truth is that if Iran is to be prevented from developing a nuclear arsenal, there is no alternative to the actual use of military force—any more than there was an alternative to force if Hitler was to be stopped in 1938.
Since a ground invasion of Iran must be ruled out for many different reasons, the job would have to be done, if it is to be done at all, by a campaign of air strikes. Furthermore, because Iran’s nuclear facilities are dispersed, and because some of them are underground, many sorties and bunker-busting munitions would be required. And because such a campaign is beyond the capabilities of Israel, and the will, let alone the courage, of any of our other allies, it could be carried out only by the United States.* Even then, we would probably be unable to get at all the underground facilities, which means that, if Iran were still intent on going nuclear, it would not have to start over again from scratch. But a bombing campaign would without question set back its nuclear program for years to come, and might even lead to the overthrow of the mullahs.

He makes the same mistake Israel did last summer in Lebanon.

He shirks away from doing the needful which was for the IDF dig the bad guys out with combat engineers, satchel charges and bayonets. (Oh, and flamethrowers.) Just like we did on Okinawa and Iwo Jima.

And if we bomb Iran we need to occupy Iran to resume its oil production. Therefore, we CANNOT rule out a ground invasion if we are to go to war with the Persians.

Posted by Bill White at May 16, 2007 08:30 AM

We have a lot better bombs now than we did at Okinawa and Iwo Jima, Bill...

Posted by Rand Simberg at May 16, 2007 08:32 AM

PS -- Could the British/French have stopped Hitler in 1937 or 1938 with airstrikes? I do not think so.

Posted by Bill White at May 16, 2007 08:32 AM

Could the British/French have stopped Hitler in 1937 or 1938 with airstrikes? I do not think so.

Sure they could. If they had our air power and PGM. They could have taken out their tanks and aircraft, and tank and aircraft factories. Hitler stopped.

Posted by Rand Simberg at May 16, 2007 08:35 AM

There are three problems with this article...in no particular order

First the political case has not been made for bombing Iran. That actually might be impossible for this administration to make under any but absolutly flat out obvious circumstances. The case made in this article is WEAK.

This administrations credibility with almost everyone, other then the true believers, on matters of foreign policy is completly gone.

Second there is no discussion in the article (and I suspect in the administration) of "what comes next" after bombing. It is amazing how these "start fighting" people work. JUST LIKE going into Iraq they seem to think that the execution of military power is a "game ender". Ie we do some bombing, invade, whatever and after it is over "they greet us as liberators" or whatever.

I think that bombing would do in Iran what it did in Sudan, ie end the threat. But the threat of the gadgets is not the last arrow in "President Toms" quiver. It certianly would unite Iranians against us and I dont think FAshion Plate Condi can explain what the world looks like after the rubble has stopped bouncing. It is probably a world darker rather then brighter.

Third this article is just more of this "we are desperate for a reason to explain why we went into Iraq...since there was no WMD". This quote is rather telling "What follows from this way of looking at the last five years is that the military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq cannot be understood if they are regarded as self-contained wars in their own right."

Yeah there we go. No one can understand why we went into Afland or iraq unless we start even larger engagements.

The fascinating thing about this administration is that they give new meaning to stupidity. They make the folks in Europe making policy that lead everyone into WWI...look fracken brilliant.

Everyone has their place.

We will be lucky if we can get to another President without any more major national disasters on our hands, because almost everything exceeds the mental level of these people's ability to cope with them

Robert

Posted by Robert G. Oler at May 16, 2007 08:37 AM

Posted by Rand Simberg at May 16, 2007 08:35 AM

And if Custer's 7th had had the M-1's it has today instead of horses...he would be fine as well.

Robert

Posted by Robert G. Oler at May 16, 2007 08:38 AM

We have a lot better bombs now than we did at Okinawa and Iwo Jima, Bill...

Israel's experience last summer suggests otherwise.

And, you still ignore the petroleum angle. Bombs do not maintain and operate petroleum facilities.

= = =

Iran's nuclear program could be a true "win-win" for the mullahs - if we ignore it they get nukes, which is very very bad for us. And, if we remove that program with air strikes only we suffer a great many other bad consequences.

If I were an evil Iranian mullah, I'd FAKE evidence of a nuclear program just to induce Western air strikes.

Posted by Bill White at May 16, 2007 08:40 AM

PS -- Could the British/French have stopped Hitler in 1937 or 1938 with airstrikes? I do not think so.

Posted by Bill White at May 16, 2007 08:32 AM

no because the French and British had no will to fight in 37 or 38. They had no will for anything military.

For different reasons that is precisly where the US people are today.

If Bush started to mention bombing Iran...the odd thing is that the people who would run away the fastest from him, would be his own party.

Robert

Posted by Robert G. Oler at May 16, 2007 08:40 AM

The flaw in Bill's reasoning is that he equates stopping (or at leasting significantly delaying) Iran's nuclear drive with regime change. If you want to bring down the mullahs, you need far more than airstrikes, and we are in no position (nor, in truth should we be) to do so. Having said that, simply knocking out a substantial part of Iran's nuclear infrastructure is not a very big problem, and could be easily accomplished with what is in place already.

Now, one might argue about the wisdom of striking at the nuclear instructure (i.e. a sort of 'super-Osirak'), but from a purely technical point of view, it is well within the capabilities of either the US or the Israeli military.

In response to Bill's comments about effecting regime change vs. Hitler in 1937 or 1938 with airstrikes, his point is quite good, but utterly meaningless. In 1937 or 1937, the equivilent of a modern airstrike (or campaign of airstrikes) would be a limited intervention with troops, something that the French and British both considered during the Munich crisis. In point of fact, had not Chamberlin undercut the French in September of 1938, it is likely that they (the French) WOULD have intervened in the Rhine, which would have almost certainly brought about the collapse of the Nazi regime.

Posted by Scott at May 16, 2007 08:42 AM

If I were an evil Iranian mullah, I'd FAKE evidence of a nuclear program just to induce Western air strikes.

Posted by Bill White at May 16, 2007 08:40 AM

absolutly. The instant the bombs start falling President Tom is "in for life" and all of a sudden a country which is divided under him becomes 1) resolute and 2) starts viewing him as their Churchill.

This administration and its advocates are like people who sit down at a table and start eating with their hands, oblivious to the utensils which are sitting near the plates...what are plates?

Robert

Posted by Robert G. Oler at May 16, 2007 08:49 AM

Scott, you are correct. There were a number of German generals who were plotting to "remove" Hitler just prior to Chamberlains capitulation at Munich. They were sure that Hitler was pushing harder than the French/British would let him get away with, but Chamberlain proved them wrong so they canceled their plans.
It is amazing what a huge effect the lack of courage at a critical moment can have. A lesson we've yet to learn.

Posted by Cecil Trotter at May 16, 2007 08:58 AM

which would have almost certainly brought about the collapse of the Nazi regime.

Posted by Scott at May 16, 2007 08:42 AM

"certianly" is a big word for revisionist history 60 plus years after the moment.

Anything is possible of course, but the French in that era would have been incompetent against German forces at almost any moment. WWII started with the French "still" Having superior forces over the Germans, but completly inferior tactics and methods.

I agree the same "game" played with one thing different (ie the time) is open to entirely new soltuions. But the basic facts remain that the French army at the early part of WWII had no real combat "successes".

It is a stretch to come up with "certianly".

Robert

Posted by Robert G. Oler at May 16, 2007 09:16 AM

Except of course Bob he Scott didn't say simply "certainly". He said "almost certainly".

But then quoting him correctly would not give you the opportunity to pontificate.

Posted by Cecil Trotter at May 16, 2007 09:28 AM

I would leave the Iranians alone. They are on the cusp of another revolution and if we intervene it would short circuit that. We should be punishing the enablers who sell them the means to make a bomb.

Norman Podhoretz's assertions about WW4 are just plain stupid. His assertions fall apart because there is no "united islamic front" attempting to take over western civilization. We face nothing like global communism or fascism embodied in large nation states. What we have are a few dozen disparate, quibbling, embattled, grievance groups with an ax to grind. Surveillance and targeted assasination is how you deal with them.

Posted by Jardinero1 at May 16, 2007 09:30 AM

Robert didn't say "certainly". Read it more carefully to be "certian".

Posted by at May 16, 2007 09:31 AM

Yeah, yeah. The Iranian people (well, most of them--sounds like Iraq, doesn't it?) don't like their government. And might, theoretically, have a better shot against the government's thugs than Iraqi civilians did against the Republican Guard.

The problem is, we're in a race here. Will the revolution start before Iran gets nukes? Because once they have them, they can suddenly make all kinds of demands, the way that North Korea does. A few billion here and there in de facto tribute, and the grumbling (which appears to be as much about the economy as about liberty) may subside. Plus, who's gonna stand up against the thugs when no outside country will support you for fear of being nuked?

I'd rather see the mullahs taken down. But we can't allow them to get nukes, period.

Posted by Big D at May 16, 2007 09:51 AM

Jardinero 1 has it right.

Maybe as the footnote indicates, Israel is capable of an air campaign that achieves the needful. If the Israelis feel this has to be done I'm sure they will do it.

It's hard for us to be patting the Shia with one hand in Iraq and bomb their Shia brethren next door with the other. Gen. Petraeus may have to entirely revise or abandon his counterinsurgency theory for Iraq if we do the bombing. He may have to do so anyway should Israel do the bombing.

I'm sure the irony isn't lost on Podhoretz that if he had advocated restraint on Iraq, the bombing of Iran now would have been so much easier a sell. His audience has dwindled considerably since then.

The clear threat of an overwhelming response to an act of aggression is the right response.

Posted by Toast_n_Tea at May 16, 2007 09:53 AM

Posted by Cecil Trotter at May 16, 2007 09:28 AM

OK right.

there is not a lot of difference between "almost certianly" and "certianly"...indeed the mixing of "almost" with an absolute, like "certian", is a faulty concept in logic.

It is like saying "I am pretty sure".

What it displays is the "hope" for absolute with a modifier to try and get away from the requirements of an absolute.

And that has no place in assumptions either for history or real time analysis.

There is no data to support any view that the French army (or the British one for that matter) that existed pre the fall of Europe, would have at anytime after the rearming of Germany was well underway would have been able to successfully engage the Riech's armies.

To even suggest such is to not understand why the Frogs and Brits got creamed.

They got beat not so much by equipment, or in the case of the British motivation.

They got creamed because the Germans had better leaders who had innovated better tactics and were able to execute them in a new type of war, that the Brits and French barely grasp at the end of the war, and did not grasp at all at the start of the war.

That is the salient feature.

War to non professionals is all about "this side has X tanks and the other side has Y".

If superior numbers were the issue then Midway would have fallen to the Japanese and HMAS Sydney would not have been sunk by a vastly inferior opponent.

To boil it down, it is not the size of the cat in the fight, it is the size of the fight in the cat.

"Certianly" or "almost certiantly" it doesnt matter...there is no historical data to support such an analysis.

Robert

Posted by Robert G. Oler at May 16, 2007 10:04 AM

Posted by Toast_n_Tea at May 16, 2007 09:53 AM

Yes.

The irony of course is that while the Neocon dream of a quick invasion of Iraq coupled with a fast rise in democratic government there allowing the US to quickly turn, with a wind behind its back toward simliar "regime change" in Syria and then Iran; has faded into a nightmare.

The reverse of that dream is completly possible.

Bombing in Iran would "likely" make any "political process" in Iraq impossible. The absolute worst result is that it might help OBL in his drive to unify the various sects of Islam against an "invader" that would probably be seen more and more in the ARab mindset as "rogue".

It is not hard to see how a bombing of Iran would cause the nascent local armed forces that are emerging in places like Anbar to more or less start to unify AGAINST US.

And to what result. We MIGHT put a dent in Iranian nuclear efforts and yet we might not. Worse absent overwhelming proof that could unify the rest of the non Arab world we might find that a lot of people are more aghast at the carnage such an event would cause then the potential it was averting.

I think that it would be hard to predict even the reaction of the American people, starting with the GOP candidates for President.

The tendency among them would be to support the President, but the recent debate showed that almost all of them are starting to quickly move away from them. It would be the death knell of ANY of them if the bombing started and then the "proof" for the bombing turned out to be as good as the "proof" for the WMD.

If President Tom got up and said "WE are arming the Shahaab with specials, watch this live video" then Bush might have the political support to bomb.

Absent that "unlikely" event. ????

Robert

Posted by Robert G. Oler at May 16, 2007 10:20 AM

"Restraint" on Iraq would have furthered the decay and dissolution of Iraq, and turned it into a Persian satellite -- thereby opening unrestrained ground transport links from the Qods force directly to Hezbollah.

The status quo ante bellum was NOT going in a direction that was in the US interests. The Coalition invasion in 2003 served as a "spoiling attack" on a strategic level against Iran's ambitions and actions.

The principal downside of Coalition action has been:

1. As an action (rather than inaction), it provided the Puritans among us a much more tractable way of engaging in self-flaggelation. Passivity in the face of evil, or omissions when action is possible -- well, that just doesn't attract quite so much outrage.

2. The lead military agency (the US Army) probably did not execute its responsibilities in accordance with the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. The consequence is a deeply flawed, much more extensive post-combat phase than might otherwise have occurred.

While historians will likely need to delve into this in the upcoming decades, here is a useful read:

http://www.west-point.org/publications/cushman/

In other words, General Franks did not fulfill important aspects of his responsibilities as CENTCOM commander. Neither did GEN Shinseki as Army Chief of Staff, nor did the JCS Chair, USAF General Myers.

Is LTG Cushman's analysis correct? I am in no position of to critique it competently or authoritatively. And, I suspect, neither are any other readers of this post. If you want to have a go at it... post your bona fides.

The institutional failures of the Army (and by extension, the DoD) has revealed institutional failures elsewhere in the federal government. If the DoD was ill-prepared for post-major combat activities, the rest of the federal government was even less prepared.

The revelation of these failures makes change possible. In the current political environment, I don't expect it to happen. A "loyal opposition" might be focusing legislative efforts on remedying these institutional failures. Instead, their efforts are clearly geared toward institutionalizing failure by ignoring the underlyingk, structural problems.

Food for thought -- now go eat!

Posted by MG at May 16, 2007 10:28 AM

Cushman is a smart guy and he puts out good words.

The unanswered question from Franks et al is "did this happen and no one listened" or " was it made clear no one would have listened" or more to the point "What was the attitude Rummy had in the DoD".

The actual history seems to be that the stumbling block was Rummy. When Shinseki was axed after correctly stating what the Iraq "occupation" was going to take, that sent a very very clear message to everyone else that "opposite viewpoints were not appreciated".

That is a Rummy problem.

If the military has a problem it is that when Rummy put the silence on professional military viewpoints (as expressed by Shinseki) the "flags" who really held the view that this was not being done well, should have started walking out the door.

If that had happened, if people who are not quick to make their statements public as retired officers were to "retire" and then speak out, that would have had some sort of affect on the effort.

Problem is that few were willing to do that. Colin Powell accepted making stupid statements at the UN instead of quitting. When Al Gore raised coherent opposition to the plan, the right wing twits villified him.

Anyone at any level who raised any voice of opposition to this "effort" pre Boots on the Ground was pilloried...

The reality is that when the nation as a whole is so fearful that reason stops prevailing, The Republic is at the mercy of the competency of its political leaders, especially the Administration.

We got what we asked for.

Robert

Posted by Robert G. Oler at May 16, 2007 10:44 AM

MG:

"The Coalition invasion in 2003 served as a "spoiling attack" on a strategic level against Iran's ambitions and actions."

One can easily argue just the opposite.

Your statement also implies that we are acting aaginst a single actor, namely Iran. Clearly we are not. There are so many actors, all of whom have interests different from ours, and all of whom have been enabled as a result of where we are in Iraq today. So I wouldn't hesitate to call it an "enabling attack."

Posted by Toast_n_Tea at May 16, 2007 11:22 AM

Concerning air strikes and Iranian nuclear capability we would have a really big problem with bomb damage assessment.

Sure, we can dig some really big holes into the Iranian countryside but withut adequate HUMINT both before and after we strike how do we know what we hit?

The Iranians have gone to school on Osirak and there are some superb methods of building undergriound bunkers that intersperse reinforced concrete with voids for blast deflection that have potential to withstand even low yield tactical nukes.

Also, how do we know that the real centrifuges are where our intel says they are?

Suppose we dig some holes and the mullahs say:

"Drats! You sank our battleship" and then the rumors start that we actually hit the wrong location and the "real" centrifuges were somewhere else altogether. Such as underneath a hospital or a mosque.

Without on-site inspections we will NEVER know exactly what the Iranians have and what we destroyed. And unless a few brigades of American soldiers are with those inspectors, it will be a Hans Blix re-run with white Land Rovers rushing about Iran on various wild goose chases.

Posted by Bill White at May 16, 2007 11:27 AM

PS -- IMHO, the most probable route to an Iranian bomb is that they buy one from North Korea or somehow acquire one from Pakistan. And if Pakistan's government falls to the radical Islamicists, its Katie bar the door, Iraq and Iran both just became irrelevant sideshows.

= = =

Also remember that uranium bombs are hard to make work, correctly. Plutonium bombs are far easier.

Iranian uranium enrichment has potential to be a giant red herring created to knot Western knickers.

Posted by Bill White at May 16, 2007 11:32 AM

Also remember that uranium bombs are hard to make work, correctly. Plutonium bombs are far easier.

Posted by Bill White at May 16, 2007 11:32 AM

I think that implosion gadgets are much harder to make work then "gun type". We tested the "gun type" in battle. Implosion we tried out before nagasaki.

There is a trick to enriching...but gun types are almost fool proof in their design.

Two of the cats are "Fat Man" and "Little Boy"

Robert

Posted by Robert G. Oler at May 16, 2007 11:39 AM

Pu versus Ur?

Ah, I may have this backwards. Off to google. :-)

Posted by Bill White at May 16, 2007 11:49 AM

Why not send Mr Oler to lead the way in his F-14 ?

All you have to do is Google 'Oler F-14' and you will see that people have already dug up the truth about this guy.

Posted by CL local at May 16, 2007 01:02 PM

Why not send Mr Oler to lead the way in his F-14 ?

All you have to do is Google 'Oler F-14' and you will see that people have already dug up the truth about this guy.

Posted by CL local at May 16, 2007 01:03 PM

Mr. Oler,

LTG Cushman's fundamental point is that a professional officer's mandate is to be undeterred by the political pressure, even if, as you assert, such pressure was coming directly from the SecDef.

That is NOT a "Rummy problem". That is a fundamental failure of the military profession.

The nation encountered that problem during LBJ's micromanagement of the Vietnam "Conflict".

This institutional problem includes the Senate, and therefore, the voter.

Who incorporates into their vote for Senator, questions about that Senator's ability to judge the warrior potential of nominees for promotion to:

Major / Lieutenant Commander
Lieutenant Colonel / Commander
Colonel / Captain
General / Admiral

The generals and admirals of 2002 were largely the colonels of 1993. Their rise through the ranks of generals existed in a political environment, both within the executive and legislative branch. That political environment did not select for boat rockers or change agents.

General Petraeus' most recent job was writing the counter-insurgency manual for the Army. How is it possible that said manual didn't exist in the 1990's? If it didn't, or if it required so much updating that GEN Petraeus had to oversee it rewriting, what does that say about the Army as an institution?

If then Secretary Rumsfeld saw these failures within the Army, and saw much more innovation in the USMC, is it any wonder his pre-existing prejudice (he is a Marine veteran) would hit the Army hard?

GEN Shinseki's (in)famous estimate of required troop levels was, I suspect, a "final straw", not an originating cause, of the early announcement of his replacement.

In that regard, GEN Shinseki is not the first such person. GEN Clark, then CinC of EUCOM, had his replacement announced months early.

Is it possible that neither of them "should" have been promoted as far as they were?

To the reader: My interest is in institutional structures, cultures and their failures. Personalities matter, but the personalities that arrive in a position of power typically do so only with institutional support. References to "Rummy" do nothing for me.

Posted by MG at May 16, 2007 01:16 PM

Mr. TnT,

"One can easily argue just the opposite."

To wit:

"There are so many actors, all of whom have interests different from ours, and all of whom have been enabled as a result of where we are in Iraq today."

Can you identify these actors, these interests, and the enablement?

Are their interests and actions in fact independent of Iran?

I am aware that there are many actors in Iraq besides Iran (or, the Persian Empire, my preferred descriptor). Some of them receive funding from (say) Saudi princes, acting with or without the knowledge / consent of the Saudi Monarchy. Others no doubt receive some sort of covert support from (say) Russia, China, France, etc.

Are these groups in fact more enabled by the events of the past four years? What is the evidence of this enablement? Were they similarly enabled in 2002, but working for Saddam instead of some other "high bidder"?

Regards,

Posted by MG at May 16, 2007 01:31 PM

Cecil Trotter:
It is amazing what a huge effect the lack of courage at a critical moment can have. A lesson we've yet to learn.

Exactly. So many of us forget how things looked before we invaded Iraq in 2003. If we had called off the invasion it would have been interpreted globally as a failure of nerve. We might now be dealing with both an Iran and an Iraq on the verge of obtaining nukes, and we would be in a much weaker strategic position since we wouldn't now occupy Iraq and might not have broken the A. Q. Khan network. So far we've gotten it about half right and are now backsliding on that half. I think that we're on a collision course with Iran and hope that the inevitable happens on our terms and sooner rather than later.

There are many measures we can take short of bombing. We have taken some of them but haven't gone far enough (e.g., to blockade Iran's ports and cut off its refined-fuels imports), and are giving out mixed signals. We may have to use direct force and should be prepared to.

BTW, do people who condemn Bush for being reckless/dishonest/evil in invading Iraq consider that they may be encouraging him to be excessively cautious WRT Iran? Probably not. Bush will be blamed for attacking if he attacks and for not attacking if he doesn't.

Posted by Jonathan at May 16, 2007 02:08 PM

I realize that the thread has moved on a bit, but I did wish to address the Brits and French in 1937/38 (really 1938, for that was when there was any possibility at all of intervention occurring) just once more. Robert's point (if I take it correctly) is that one can never be positive about anything 60 (really 70) years after the fact, and in that (if in almost nothing else) I must agree with him. With that said, however, given that even a relatively pessimistic scenario would have the Brits/French/Poles (and lets leave out the Russians for the time being, though they were EXTRA-eager to attack, for reasons that I am sure are obvious to everyone) attacking with something on the order of 52 divisions (not counting relatively immobile garrisons, which might be upgraded in an emergency) versus about 8 German divisions (and these were very weak divisions even by the 1939-1940 standards, to say nothing of what was seen later in the war) on the Western Front alone. There is virtually no scenario that I can think of that doesn't result in a military disaster for the Germans, and numerous German commentators (including many inside the Nazi regime, whose diaries we have as silent testimony) believed the same thing.

Obviously it isn't a matter of 'X tanks vs Y tanks', as any student of 1940 will attest to, but even then the odds were far closer and the results not nearly as clear-cut as some have later suggested. Short of the French (who would have been the backbone of this thing) wetting themselves and surrendering as they attacked, there simply isn't any way an invasion of the Rhine, for instance, would have failed. More to the point, it is highly debatable that the German military would have supported Hitler in any attempt to retaliate (we know from his discussions with Count Ciano that Hitler felt such an invasion would be a 'catastrophe for Germany' but considered it very unlikely, given Chamberlin's weakness), but rather they might (and I stress the word MIGHT, though I consider it more likely than not) have simply decided to depose him,a nd then negotiate.

Apropos Iran, this isn't a question of regime change, the original point that seems to be ignored, but rather simply a disarming blow to buy some time. Iran's problems are severe enough that even though the mullahs would gain some breathing space politically, it might not be sufficient to save them. Any conceivable airstrke scenario I have heard discussed includes a limited insertion of SF to conduct (very quick) on-site BDA. Given the nature of these facilities (which tend to be very large, profligate of electric power, and generate vast amounts of heat that simply must be disappated), it is frankly inconceivable that we would not be able to easily confirm a successful strike.

Once again, one might debate the value of such strikes, but suggesting that it cannot be done, or using the strawman of regime change as an argument against it is avoiding the issue at hand.

Posted by Scott at May 16, 2007 02:56 PM

Is it possible that neither of them "should" have been promoted as far as they were?

Posted by MG at May 16, 2007 01:16 PM

Hello:

A minor nit...I think Rummy (that is his DoD nickname because it was his nickname in the Navy) was in the Navy. He was a Naval Aviator who retired at the rank of O-6.

I the "main" I agree with what you are saying. But only so far.

There is a great exchange from my youth. McGovern (who was a combat vet) was arguing in the summer of 72 about massive cuts in the Pentagon, leaving Vietnam etc, and Mel Laird goes to the Senate or House (probably the latter) and is testifying before one of the standing committees and someone asked him "What would happen if McGovern's DoD plan was implemented" (that is a paraphase) ...the paraphrase response from Laird was that he thought that there would be mass resignations from the uniformed flag ranks.

I was a child then and agreed with him, but now I am not so sure.

The concept of civilian control of the government and the military has come to mean, in the post WWII years in particular that few few military men have resigned over policy or strategic differences with the civilian leadership.

The last real "revolt" of the military brass came in the late 40's with the Revolt of The Admirals over the post war "unification" plans and the bomber/carrier battles that came out.

Several officers then did things that today would be unheard of. Dan Gallery who was an extremly flambouyant figure (his carrier group had captured a UBOAT at sea) wrote some articles as a line naval officer that cost him his career. He was almost court martialed for it. It was amazing that 31 KNot Burke survived. .and that largely on his wartime reputation.

The military in this country has, even during Vietnam as you point out, and it continues today of acting as "the good soldier" to quote Colin Powell, saluting smartly and doing whatever the civilian leadership says to do, with what the civilian leadership says to do it with.

The irony here is that there are really "two Rummys". There is the peacetime Rummy who was trying to do (to quote a current admiral) the revolution in military affairs. And there is the Rummy who fought the war.

The reorg Rummy would probably have made a pretty good secdef. The Army in particular has an M-1 answer to every problem. The problem is that Rummy had to fight a war. And what he didnt quite grasp are three features.

One reorganization does not go so well while in active battle. The US armed forces in WWII fought a more or less delaying action while they transitioned from a peacetime to a wartime environment.

Second wartime doctrine has to be implmented with political objectives. Zinni addressed this. And it is his view that Rummy and his staff were simply not intereted in the political objectives. Just proving out their theories of a reorged military.

Third, battle plans rarely survive contact with the enemy, and the essence of adaption is looking at results. Rummy watched as Iraq descended into chaos and made little or no changes to his plan. He reminds me of Nagumo on the flag bridge during Midwary.

Truth is that the goals of this administration in Iraq, democracy were not obtainable in my view. They certianly were not obtainable with the forces and political plans as they were executed.

The only guy whose resignation might have stopped going into Iraq was Colin Powell. And he is a product of the US military. He never thought of it.

(great discussion BTW)

Robert

Posted by Robert G. Oler at May 16, 2007 03:09 PM

Posted by Scott at May 16, 2007 02:56 PM

Scott:

A well done post. I would address your two points this way.

First about Iran. My concern is not "can we do it", it is "what happens after we do it". Looking back over the last five years it strikes me as quite clear that the folks in this administration who are "gaming this" are not thinking many moves ahead. The most optimistic assumptions are that the Mullahs in Iran gain some strength, but it isnt a "barn burner" in terms of soldifying it and eventually things steady down and we go back to business as normal.

That could happen. I dont see it. LIke Hitler in 38 President Tom has gamed the fact that this country and its people are 1) weary of war and 2) weary of this administration. I also think that he (tom) believes that a lot of politicans in the country on both sides of the political aisle and the American people are looking for a way out of "continual war". I think that he is correct in that. I think that most Americans have come to the conclusion that the thing into Iraq was a mistake and many of them are inching to the conclusion that we could just "go" and things will go back to "normal" (for us anyway).

Just as most French, British and POles didnt see the urgency to stop HItler over the Sudatenland. I dont think most Americans see the urgency in Iran right now.

Was there an urgency in the 38 time period? Yes of course. But that wasnt obvious to all "in real time". A strong stand might have changed things as you suggest, but there was a reason that not many in power politicans were urging it.

On your main point. My position on "could it have worked" is that while the Germans were weaker in 38 then later... The same problems would have plauged any combined French, British, and Pole effort against Germany that caused the defeat in 40.

Your point is well made and to some extent I agree with it. The problem is that what looks obvious in hindsight isnt in real time, and what looks like foresight in real time might simply be trying to mesh the past with the future.

I feel uncomfortable saying that what might have worked against Hitler in 38 works with President Tom in 07 or 08...

take care

Robert

Posted by Robert G. Oler at May 16, 2007 03:30 PM

BTW, do people who condemn Bush for being reckless/dishonest/evil in invading Iraq consider that they may be encouraging him to be excessively cautious WRT Iran?

At this point, the only way that Bush and Cheney could show enough caution in the Middle East would be if they both resigned.

Posted by at May 16, 2007 05:21 PM

Mr. White:

Bombing Iran is indeed sufficient to terminate the Iranian nuclear weapons programme - permanently. It's all a matter of which bombs you use.

Posted by Fletcher Christian at May 16, 2007 07:39 PM

At this point, the only way that Bush and Cheney could show enough caution in the Middle East would be if they both resigned.

Posted by at May 16, 2007 05:21 PM

LOL since Wolfy wont even take the hint and leave The World Bank...what a zero.

Robert

Posted by Robert G. Oler at May 16, 2007 09:59 PM

Robert:

I am not sure that I agree with your assessment of the outcome of a US (or Israeli) strike on Iranian nuclear facilities. Whether we like it or not (or whether we even acknowlege it or not) we are at war with those people, and this is most unlikely to change. Iran could indeed create some problems with oil supply/transport in the short term, but it is unlikely in the extreme that they could do much in the straits for more than a week or two (two carrier groups have a way of suppressing just about anything given time), and they aren't going to be able to cut off their own exports (which don't go to the US in any important quantities) without cutting their own throats economically. Certainly they can make things unpleasant enough in the short term to make us think carefully about attacking, but in all honesty, even if we did attack, they might perfer not to do anything other than absorb it. After all, if they shoot back, they are combatants, if they absorb it and complain (preferably providing some mutilated children for the Western Media(tm)) they are victims...

You are correct that the natural Iranian 'play' here is to simply bank on American (and Western) weariness/wariness, but I suspect that they may be underestimating both the Israelis (and I have a few contacts there who tell me that they are going absolutely APE over the prospect of an Iranian nuke) and the Americans (not to mention the EUniks, some of whome - notably Germany - are beginning to get very uncomfortable with the Iranians over the nuke issue) by assuming no cost for continuing their current path. Both sides 'game', after all....

Regarding 1938, the French, Brits and Poles all felt this was a VERY crucial issue (note: for the French to be willing to go to war on the offensive in 1938 - and they certainly were ready to - gives you some idea of how seriously they took it), and it was only the vanity of Chamberlin (reminds me a great deal of a combination of the worst features of Clinton and Kerry, with a dash of Carter's arrogance thrown in for seasoning) that pulled the rug out. As for the success of the Germans in 1940, most of that was due to two humongous strategic blunders (the advance into Belgium, and the failure to withdraw from the exposed position following the breakthrough in the Ardennes), the avoidance of either of which would have left the Germans in a very bad position rather than triumphant. Only in a few very isolated places did the Germans enjoy any serious tactical advantage over the allies, and it likely that the allies on the OFFENSIVE might have avoided some of the difficulties faced in the Ardennes in the 'real' 1940 (such as very weak fortress units, panzer scares, etc.) which were the result of second line units (which wouldn't be involved in an offensive strike) facing front-line German units.

Finally though, this isn't about overthrowing the Mullahs, it is simply about knocking out the Iranian nuclear infrastructure. Can it be done, and can it be done without a reasonable risk envelope? Very likely. As to whether it should be done (and I admit that I am strongly on the side of 'yes') is an entirely different question.

Regards

Posted by Scott at May 17, 2007 01:23 PM

Let me ponder this for a bit. I just wanted to make sure you were aware I saw it and havent left it.

Robert

Posted by Robert G. Oler at May 17, 2007 07:03 PM

Shinseki was replaced because he was a very conventional army officer, at a tim of a
very unconventional war. He was replaced by
Schoomaker, who like boykin, come from the
Special Forces, and whose experiences in
Iran, Colombia, Mogadishu, et al; were very
much on point. When people say we should have
gotten more troops for Iraq; one asks where
from. Practically every unit we have has been
in whole or in part rotated through there; from
Baptiste's 4th ID to Swannack's 101st Division,
the 10th Mtn Division, the Green Berets et al. To have completely abandoned Afghanistan would not
have solved the problem. Pulling out of the Balkans; which is yet another AQ stronghold, wouldn't have helped either.

Posted by narciso at May 21, 2007 12:14 AM

Post a comment