Taylor Dinerman says that the administration has to start getting serious about space weapons. I agree.

[Update late afternoon]

There are several good critiques of the piece in comments, that I don't necessarily disagree with. My only point was that I agree with his bottom line.

I'm puzzled by the examples given of enemies using space assets. Namely, the author gives a couple of examples of terrorists who used commercially available services (satellite photos or satellite phones). This seems irrelevant to the discussion of the need for an anti-ballistic missile defense system or the ability to destroy space-based systems.

Yeah, the article gets a little muddled when he tries to make the transition from NMD to space weapons. Note: missile interceptors and ASAT weapons (and satellite jammers) are not the same thing. They have different political repercussions and different policies. The author seems to want to lump them all into a single category and claim that those who oppose space weaponization are automatically anti-NMD and vice versa. That is too simplistic and just, well, wrong.

Another problem with the article is his failure to mention just who "they" is. For instance, he mentions the Canadians, but the Canadians have not really taken a position against "space weapons." They have simply decided to not participate in a NMD system that is ground-based. Who are these evil opponents of space weaponization that the author is warning us about? Why doesn't he name any of them?

Furthermore, tossing in things like the European position on the Galileo navigation system muddies the waters even further. One of the things that made the US negotiating stance over Galileo weak was that the US wanted to preserve spectrum, but gave no indication that it was actually going to fund the GPS III system that required that spectrum. If the USAF had put its money where its mouth was, then claims that Galileo was a potential threat to national security would have had a little more weight.

Question: Does anyone think that it is politically possible to simultaneously argue for space weaponization and against ITAR?

'Cause if so, they're smoking crack.

The question isn't about being "for or against" ITAR. The issue is whether we can get some sanity into ITAR, so that it recognizes that there is a difference between a Canadian and a North Korean.

The article also refers to General Lance Lord, of Air Force Space Command as "one of the most intellectually courageous senior officers in the whole US military establishment..." This is the same General Lord who recently gave a speech where he said that the Air Force's space procurement system is not broken and told critics to "get over it." Is that an example of Lord's courage?

Frankly, I'd be more willing to listen to the guy if he wasn't producing satellite programs that are 400% over-budget and years behind schedule, and then insisting that nothing is wrong. Such talk indicates a disconnect from reality.

(To be honest, there is nothing new--or "courageous"--about Lord's comments concerning space weapons. Practically every head of Space Command for the past two decades has talked about needing space weapons. Usually saner heads at the OSD level prevail.)

That said, Dinerman has set up a poorly-constructed strawman and soaked it in kerosene. And the flaming carcass serves as a convenient distraction from more serious issues that the military space community _is_ discussing.

For starters, in addition to the previously mentioned problem of who "they" is among the space weaponization critics, one also has to ask who "they" is when it comes to the targets. Who are these space weapons supposed to shoot? One of the things that has helped prevent the weaponization of space is the fact that first of all, there are not a lot of ideal targets to shoot, and second, the United States is more vulnerable to being shot at than anyone else, so we need to be careful about causing something to happen that can hurt us more than it hurts them.

For example, the number of foreign imagery satellites has increased considerably in the past few years, and will continue to increase. But although that might call for the United States to develop ASATs, it also highlights the problem--how useful is it to shoot down one foreign reconsat when another can step in to fill the gap? Or when you are not quite sure where the adversary is getting his pictures? And what do you do if you learn that a Chinese (or Russian) satellite is providing imagery to the Iranians? Shoot the Chinese (or Russian) satellite, even though your conflict is with Iran? This is why non-lethal options can be more appealing than lethal ones, because they give you more options. And it is why spending a lot of money to acquire a weapon that might not be useable is not a good idea.

In the past, the US has developed space weapons in large part to serve as a deterrent to the Soviet Union. It is not clear that they can really have this effect now. Would Iran or North Korea be deterred from attacking American satellites because the US has an ASAT? No. However, if the US chooses to develop space weapons, and make a big noise about that fact, it could actually _encourage_ other countries to follow our lead, and we are more vulnerable than them because we have more satellites and use them more.

That flaming strawman argument also distracts from another big hole in Dinerman's endorsement of a Brilliant Pebbles-type approach to NMD. Space launch is still expensive. There has been no substantial USAF investment in reducing its cost. So Dinerman has proposed orbiting a lot of satellites, and hasn't explained how we can afford to do this at current launch costs. Back when SDIO was in existence, the people pushing BP understood that it really only made sense if you could bring launch costs down. That's how they justified things like the DC-X program to their bosses.

Furthermore, getting back to my original point about General Lord, I will be so impolitic as to point out that the space systems that are currently showing such huge cost overruns include missile warning satellites that were originally conceived as the warning systems for space-based NMD. When it was conceived in the later 1980s, Brilliant Pebbles required both the high-altitude warning system that became SBIRS-High, and a low-altitude "Brilliant Eyes" system that has now been reduced to a demonstration program after experiencing cost overruns and schedule delays. One could say that we _already_ have phase one of Brilliant Pebbles, and it is a complete mess. So why should we trust these guys to get it right?

This is not to say that space weapons are unnecessary, or "bad." But the Dinerman piece does not seem to be based upon a well-reasoned argument that proceeds from a clearly defined requirement to a solution. Instead, it seems to be primarily based upon emotion: Let's go strap on some six-guns and shoot somethin' because it'll cheese off the French!

"Another problem with the article is his failure to mention just who "they" is."

Imagine if tomorrow, GWB announced that the US was pulling out of all treaties concerning the uses of space and the Moon and that we intended to develop our space weapons to the fullest - or even just the latter. Imagine the shrieking. I would venture that the only countries *not* opposed to US space weapons would be Israel, Australia, and perhaps the UK. I'd only put money on the first of those.

"Who are these space weapons supposed to shoot?"

The assets of whoever might become our enemies in, say, the next 25 years, given the rate of actual development and deployment.

"the United States is more vulnerable to being shot at than anyone else"

This hardly removes the need to shoot at our enemies - if anything, it calls for more work into protecting our own assets, and not just by hoping that our enemies won't shoot at them, because we won't or can't shoot at theirs.

"For example, the number of foreign imagery satellites has increased considerably in the past few years, and will continue to increase."

Well, there's the first list of targets.

"how useful is it to shoot down one foreign reconsat when another can step in to fill the gap? "

Keep shooting.

"And what do you do if you learn that a Chinese (or Russian) satellite is providing imagery to the Iranians?"

I'm more concerned about the time when a Chinese satellite is providing imagery to China.

"This is why non-lethal options can be more appealing than lethal ones, because they give you more options."

Having *both* lethal and non-lethal measures is more options.

"And it is why spending a lot of money to acquire a weapon that might not be useable is not a good idea."

Might not be useable? Of course it's useable. 'Useful' might be a more arguable point. And to that I would say that it's better to have it and not need it, than the other way around.

"Would Iran or North Korea be deterred from attacking American satellites because the US has an ASAT? No."

I'm not too concerned with deterrence. If it's a side effect, that's great. I'm concerned with destruction and denial.

"However, if the US chooses to develop space weapons, and make a big noise about that fact, it could actually _encourage_ other countries to follow our lead, and we are more vulnerable than them because we have more satellites and use them more."

First, then let's not make a big noise about it.

Second, depending on the sloth of our enemies isn't terribly wise. Better to get a head-start on our systems, and if others do develop their own, make sure ours are superior.

"Furthermore...why should we trust these guys to get it right?"

Excellent points. However, who else are we going to trust to get it right?

Second, depending on the sloth of our enemies isn't terribly wise.

Or their good graces.