An email from Andrew Case informed me of an item that Clark Lindsey over at RLV News found. Homer Hickam (author of Rocket Boys, the book on which the movie October Sky was based) has an op-ed in today's Journal (subscription required, unfortunately), titled, NASA's Vietnam.

...when I put emotion aside, I can't ignore my engineering training. That training and my knowledge as a 20-year veteran of the space agency (and also a Vietnam vet) has led me to conclude that the Space Shuttle is NASA's Vietnam. A generation of engineers and managers have exhausted themselves trying to make it work and they just can't. Why not? Because the Shuttle's engineering design, just as Vietnam's political design, is inherently flawed.

He thinks that NASA doesn't have a culture problem, just a lousy vehicle design. He wants to build an OSP and fly it on an expendable. That will make everything all better!

Sorry, Mr. Hickam, with all due respect to your cherished agency, it has both. It has a lousy design partly because of a cultural problem, partly because of a policy problem, but there's much more to be fixed at the agency, that simply coming up with a different expensive and unsafe way to put people into space isn't going to solve.

I know that it pains a veteran like you, but we need to fundamentally break the connection in the minds of both the public, and policy makers, between NASA and space. They are not synonymous. It's time to open up the competition and let some other folks give it a shot.

Besides, I've always thought that Space Station Albatross was NASA's Vietnam, and that we should just declare victory and go home.

[Update at 4 PM PDT]

For those who want to Read The Whole Thing, there's a slightly longer version of it up at Spaceref now, with a different title--"Not Culture, But Perhaps A Cult."

[Update on Saturday afternoon]

It occurs to me that this piece, which I wrote last fall, is relevant to this topic.

A lot has been made of NASA "culture" problem, specifically defined at the present as failure to objectively handle problems when the problems impact schedule and budget constraints. I tend to disagree with this assessment. I'll cite two counter examples: how NASA handled the shuttle rewiring, and the cracks in the flow liners of the SSMEs. They did NOT handle the debree problem correctly, but institutionally they did have the demonstated ability to address safety problems.

On the otherhand, I must agree with Rand -- NASA has a huge policy problem. Which is a bigger diaster, the shuttle or ISS? Each one is about one order of magnitude above its projected cost, which was in the billions to begin with. Each one has failed to meet its stated requirements (but each one does meet its unstated requirement of generating massive pork spending in congressional districts). Because the shuttle is a launch vehicle, the engineering compromises forced on it for policy reasons are more dangerous to the crew.

The compromises forced on the ISS, while mind-blowingly stupid and expensive, haven't yet proven dangerous. The change to high inclination (including the Russians) results in less payload delivered per launch but has at least provided some alternative access via soyuz. Nevertheless, nothing remotely like science ( the stated mission ) has occured despite a price approaching $100 Billion dollars.

It IS high time to give others a shot. The space launch market is languishing due to a decrease in demand. NASA should be buying slots on existing launchers (Delta, Atlas, SeaLaunch) at low prices to stabilize the market. The Alternative Access to ISS program should have been followed through so we'd have a vehicle to put on those launchers. This diversity of launch options is what is needed to "replace the shuttle". Rand is dead on when he says monocultures are fragile.

I reject the premise of the OSP. I call for multiple person/cargo delivery contracts to ISS. Those who agree: we need to get this meme out into the world as it is clearly a marginalized idea at the current time.

In the interests of getting all the attributions straight, I got the link from RLV News, which should IMO be on all space enthusiasts blogrolls. I'm a bit biased since Clark Lindsey (the webmaster) is a friend, and I'm a semi-official contributor to some of the pages on the site, but check it out anyway.

Fred, if you don't think that NASA has a culture problem, just go look at all the anonymous posts from NASA personnel at NASA Watch...

Let's not forget than NASA has a problem because the people it works for haven't provided effective leadership for decades. Pick your president (I like to blame it on Nixon 'cause it feels so good), but everyone one of 'em since Kennedy, has, in effect, asked NASA "What next?" Effective leadership entails telling NASA: "Here's your next target."

More to the point, Hickam is wrong about the OSP. Wings on spacecraft that carry people and cargo to LEO are pointless. You can't fly in space. And the Shuttle has demonstrated that the lift wings provide during the last few minutes of re-entry doesn't equate to safe or cheaper.

We solved the problem of getting into and out of LEO fourty years ago. Let's decide that any human space travel beyond LEO will begin and end at LEO using spacecraft built at LEO. Let's decide to use big and cheap expendable boosters to put stuff in LEO, and smaller expendable boosters to put people in LEO.

In other words, let's focus on solving real problems, not the unnecessary problem of making winged spacecraft that are safe and cheap.

Well, enloop, I'm not real big on expendable boosters either.

Perhaps NASA management fails to act on all concerns raised by trusted technical employees, but we do know that it has acted on at least some concerns (see my post above).

Rather than attack the non-specific and nebulous "culture" I think it would be good to make an example out of specific managers. This would be a specific lever to change the "culture". For example, one could say:

Linda, for not correctly evaluating (or seeking other evaluation) of the foam impact you are fired. The correct action would have been to throughly investigate the severity of the impact using imaging reasources and ground testing. Furthermore, if it was determined that there was a large hole in the TPS, then it was incumbent on your to investigate possible solutions, not declare that "there's nothing we can do".

Note, this is not the same as "you are fired because the astronauts are dead".

Other managers involved in the decisions making process should also be fired. Managers involved in signing off on Bipod ramp problem should also be fired. (This problem was identified and "declared" not a threat to flight safety prior to STS107. I think that, even aside from the accident, this could have been seen as woeful bad judgement unsupported by technical analysis.)

Fred, the problem with that is that everyone ignored the foam issue for years, so it's not fair to single out Linda because she was unfortunate enough to be flight director on the flight in which the spinning chamber came up with a cartridge. Should we fire everyone who ignored the same thing on Atlantis earlier? After all, the crew and vehicle managed to survive that one.

Have you read the Gehman report? I have, and it's pretty damning of NASA management in general--you can't just pick out a few scapegoats.

I was wondering the status of the intellectual property associated with the shuttle program. Who owns it... the public? If so, couldn't a private company build a launch vehicle based on the shuttle engines (or perhaps F1's?)

I can't imagine anyone in their right mind wanting to do that. The SSMEs are terrible engines, from a cost and maintenance standpoint, and the F-1s are much too large for any rational private launch vehicle, but there's certainly nothing to preclude someone from building them, or buying them from Rocketdyne, if they really wanted to.

Rand, if the Shuttle program had demonstrated that putting wings on spacecraft to make them reusable resulted in cheaper LEO access than using expendable boosters, I'd have a different opinion. But, I don't think that's the case. A different design and a different vehicle might change that opinion. Likewise, one of the nascent private sector efforts.

It seems to me, though, that, to a degree, the argument has shifted away from the real objective -- cheap, reliable LEO access by whatever means -- to arguments about a few favorite ways of achieving that. As you've pointed out, the focus on the Shuttle's woes draws attention away from the real issues. One aspect of that is, perhaps, not enough emphasis on ways to cut costs besides putting wings on spacecraft.

Shuttle program had demonstrated that putting wings on spacecraft to make them reusable resulted in cheaper LEO access than using expendable boosters, I'd have a different opinion.

There are so many things that cause Shuttle to be high cost that it makes no logical sense to single out the wings. There's simply no basis for such a notion, and we cannot draw any useful conclusions about the utility or disutility of wings from a single flawed example.

The main source of high Shuttle costs is a) the fact that much of it is essentially expendable (and no, reusing SRB casings doesn't really count as reusable, since they have to be rebuilt every flight--it would be cheaper to toss them at the current flight rate) and b) the fact that we fly it so seldom. Whether or not it's winged is almost completely irrelevant.

Of course, I don't think that OSP should be built at all, capsule or winged, because at the flight rates that NASA plans, it won't be any cheaper than Shuttle.

Fred K. seems a bit naive. He wants to ferret out the specific individuals involved with bad decisions and give them the rope. This is a species of tunnel vision common among engineers. He doesn't see that the same problems are endemic in all agencies of the Federal Government. Why has no such thing, as Fred K. proposes, been done at the FBI or the CIA, or Immigration and Naturalization--at least not to my knowledge? Or, for that matter, at a hundred other agencies that are, at this minute betraying the public trust and mis-spending its money? Certainly the latter escape public scrutiny because the results of their "faux pas" are not as dramatic as the former. However, until the public gets the idea that the problem is integral to our modern bloated government, then expect no reforms in NASA. Until the people awaken to the fact that we are in dire need of reforming--if not alltogether jettisoning--the Civil Service System, NASA will continue on its present course. So will the FBI and CIA. All government agencies are ossified bureaucracies in which it is almost impossible to fire people even for the most egregious incompetence and malfeasance. All government agencies are totally infested with political correctness: from hyper-feminism to Kwaanza. Until this is changed don't hold out much hope for one's pet agency. The fact that NASA is staffed by engineers and scientists does not exempt it from the same kinds of foolish politicking and venality that one sees in, say, HUD.

The fact is "Linda" will not be fired. On the contrary, because she is a woman, and we need more women in upper management, she'll probably be promoted. "Linda" will be elevated to NASA's highest ranks as yet another icon to diversity. She'll be shaping NASA policy for years to come. Which is why I think other respondents to this blog have the better understanding that we need to get the government out of space (at least non-military space) and let free individuals take over. In the past they gave us our greatest achievements. Why can't they do it again? Personally, I'd love to buy a ticket to Mars and set foot on its surface as part of a free colony, the way our forefathers did in the 17th century.

http://www.cnn.com/2003/TECH/space/08/31/sprj.colu.space.sedan.ap/index.html

Imagine what Rutan could do with 2.4 billion?

Ken A:

Let's wait for Rutan to actually do something before we hand over the billions.

It seems from reading the comments that most people still fixate on the hardware or NASA as the problem with NASA. I propose that this is just one problem.
Yes NASA is flying 30 year old "planes" but the Air Force is flying a 50+ year old B-52, 40+year old tankers and I drove a very reiable 40 year old 5 ton in my guard unit. I think that NASA engineers could do wonders---if allowled to.
NASA's problems come from: their administration (who would have guessed?) a very ignorant and apatheic public and a very hostile congress/adminstration.
We, as a country have no goal for NASA or space exploration. We have no excitement for space, no dreams and no idea what we are doing up there.
Students leaving any school today have no clue what NASA is about, parents don't fret that students will not become space scientists, and state acheivement tests don't care if you know anything about NASA (one exit exam recently had the order of the planets wrong).
Congress cuts the budget for NASA and anyone in Washington talks about turning space flight over to a private organization. I haven't seen any ads on tv for space flight tickets lately.
NASA will never get "fixed". Our government doesn't want it, the public doesn't care, scientists can't agree on how to explore and no one will wake up to the fact that we were first on the moon and faded in the end....the Chinese will probably be first to somewhere and will stay.
Until we fire the managers, get some clear goals, have political backing, (commitment!) so good-bye to NASA.

To reconstruct a quote from Einstein,

"I know a little about nature(NASA) and hardly anything about men."

It seems to me that most Americans and most politicians are not interested in space science. Our society doesn't seem to be challenged by the adventure of space like it was when I was a kid in the 60's. I think we have lost our sense of wonder about the universe unless it is package in Madison Avenue way that the average American can drive to the local mall and buy.

The society has changed, our children have changed, the universe goes on, but we need those men and women who have the vision to help us find that lost something we had before and is now gone. Let's hope we can find it again and find it soon.

My little paper on NASA's dysfunctional management culture seems to have been overtaken by events. Hopefully I'll be able to add a little illumination to this topic.

Suffice it to say here very briefly the out of control authoritarian hierarchy is screwing up across the board. Even if we drop human space activities completely, we'll still need to address a mess that affects all aspects of work in the industry. I noticed it as a computer geek on the robot side. People I worked with were all too often quite crazy. Some were exhausted workaholics, some were abusive bullies, some were religious fanatics. And more.

Sad, way too sad.

Can NASA be reformed? I have some optimism on that regard. I've seen how the U.S. military has undergone some positive changes as a result of the Vietnam debacle. They're not perfect, but they're a hell of a lot better than they were. OTOH, NASA looks even more screwed up, with the dominant crowd not even beginning to recognize reality.

To those that took issue with my suggestion to hold specific managers responsible for the inaccurate decisions made in the shuttle accident I say this: I do understand that most beaucracies (including NASA) managers are very rarely fired. I also understand that "Linda" was not the root cause of the problem, that is, that others also passed over the foam problem and (luckily) didn't have a shuttle go down on their watch.

I don't think that the shared circumstance between other bad decisions and the STS-107 bad decisions should be a reason to avoid severe consequences for bad management. In the Navy, for example, a severe accident on a ship will often result in "cratering" of the captian's career. This is just, even when the captain can point to 37 other reasons why things went wrong, because it creates a "culture" of success, and culture of accepting responsibilty. I think it wrong that top managers aren't sacked (or resign) when their organizations fail due to poor organization and leadership.

I know, I know, it isn't going to happen this way. The modern equivalent is a promotion to DC.

I don't mean to be harsh; I believe that those involved acted in good faith. They have contributed positively to NASA and can make positive contributions elsewhere in the future. I simply think rewarding failure is not a good institutional policy.

Cheers

--Fred

I simply think rewarding failure is not a good institutional policy.

Sadly, it's the norm for government bureaucracies. Note that when NASA succeeded in putting a man on the moon, its budget was cut. Every time it fails, its budget is increased. (The same occurs in education, poverty fighting, etc.)

It's nice to blame shuttle and ISS on a 'culture' at NASA, but the fact remains that those programs were not selected by some ethereal NASA 'culture,' but by specific indivduals.
The current flawed space station design and inclination were selected from the three NASA proposals because of a political DECISION by the administration. The shuttle program was explicitly CHOSEN over the Saturn and Apollo programs by the Nixon administration, not by the 'NASA culture.'

Agreed what we need is not another shuttle, just as we do not need a trillion dollar F-22 for our military. But the solution is not to throw out the baby with the bathwater. There's a wide distance between a Learjet outfitted with guns and a F-18E/F. Neither is the billion dollar next generation fighting machine. You can buy 10 Learjets for the price of a single F-18E/F. But I don't see foreign militaries lining up to buy Learjets. That's essentially the type of 'tradeoff' you're asking the space program to accept.

Programs like the F-18E/F--showing incremental improvement in all areas, for less cost than development of a new vehicle--are exactly the type of efficiency government should reward. No privately funded X-prize vehicle is going to orbit in this decade. That should be self evident. There's room for achievment in sustainable, incremental improvement of the type a flexible government program(like OSP), offers. It doesn't have be bootstrapped from pennies to add value. It just has to be judicious and efficient in its use of our funds.

Tom Merkle