While I'm a harsh critic of NASA in general, I've been withholding criticism of the agency with regard to what happened to Columbia until the facts are out. This is partly because, well, I don't know all the facts yet, and I actually want to provide some useful advice, but also because much of the criticism that they've sustained since February 1 has been (to put it as charitably as possible) uninformed and largely logic free. And basing policy decisions on flawed analysis paves a road to policy disaster (as we've seen with the space program down the decades).

My largest complaint, of course, is that people continue to whine about the loss in human life, and put forth ridiculous concepts like flying the vehicle unmanned, when that's not the issue at all (the real issue is the high cost and fragile nature of our fleet, given its pathetically small size and flight rate).

The astronauts are grownups and, as I've said repeatedly, they knew the job was dangerous when they took it. However, what if they didn't know quite how dangerous it was?

I'm not referring to the natural desire to not want to find bad news that seemed to prevail during the flight. I'm talking about the general state of knowledge about the system, even prior to the launch of that flight. Which is why I find this story quite troubling.

Whats sad, is that the criticism goes to NASA management, NASA technical problems. Shuttle design. What not.
But the space policy in general doesnt really get any public criticism at all. Nobody seems to ask why was the Columbia flying in the first place, and why should any of the shuttles or any NASA-operated manned spacecraft ever fly again.
Columbia disaster sparked a lot of public bullshit about "the space program", but no serious debate whether to have any space program at all or in what form.

This is the kind of thing that continues to give NASA an increasingly bad reputation.

I haven't commented directly on the Columbia accident. But I have made the point repeatedly in various fora that NASA has a fundamentally dysfunctional management culture. NASA is increasingly dominated by a rigid, authoritarian group that refuses to face reality. Coverups are the norm in cultures such as that. So are pressures to conform. Independence is viewed as a negative quality.

What's NASA's greatest value now? I suspect it might be as a bad example. We've been bombarded with claims that bullies are good, tough managers. NASA now demonstrates just how wrong that theory can be.

A lot of good points here - in both the article and comment section! I think it was kind of obvious they knew the risks involved: cracked fuel tubes and frayed wires seemed normal for them to find. Not sure I'd go myself if I believed it was a death trap, but it was reasonably safe.

Would obviously like to see the debate more centered around policy and perhaps a rehashing of why small congressional subcommittees have so much power to squash promising heavy lift boosters and NASP research. Technically, I'd like to see NASA just given 15 or so billion a year and let them decide whether to save it or spend it on what they want - not what they can get past an arrogant subcommittee chair person.

Subcommittees also squashed the Texas Supercolider after two billion was already spend and despite requiring another billion to fill in the whole. I'm not saying take off all controls but the problem isn't just with NASA alone. A set 'spend as you see fit' budget may make the difference and generate the type of policies we need!