Frank Sietzen, over at the Space Transportation Association, has responded to this week's Fox column. I think that Frank is a good guy, but bear in mind in reading this that his organization survives in large part from donations from Boeing and Lockheed Martin, and other smaller beneficiaries of the SLI program.

Fox News' article by writer Rand Simberg concerning the space shuttle program and the NASA Space Launch Initiative (SLI) demonstrates a fundamental misunderstanding of both programs, and of the nation?s space transportation policy and industry.

Contrary to the writer's whims, the space shuttle system was never "dramatically overspecified".

"Whims"? It's not whims, it's an opinion, shared by most objective observers in the industry, and strongly supported by the historical record.

Anyway, this seems to be a key point of contention. Let's see how he supports it.

The original design, of a first generation partially reusable vehicle was modified to conform to the political and budget realities of the 1970s. Given the actual system as built, the shuttle has performed magnificently across more than two decades. A national policy decision made some thirty years ago called for the shuttles to fly commercial, military, and civil space payloads and cargoes. But that process was ended by President Ronald Reagan following the 1986 Challenger accident.

Let's see, it was going to fly commercial, military and civil space cargoes.

Actually, it was designed to do much more than that, and its original 65,000 lb, fifteen-foot diameter payload capability was (if I recall correctly) driven by a (secret) requirement from the Air Force. Note that he ignores the cross-range issue. He also ignores the capability to do week-long missions, and the ability to carry science racks, and act as a temporary space station.

Oh, and by the way, it was supposed to do this with about half the development budget that NASA originally requested.

I'm still waiting for the part in which he refutes my contention that it was overspecified...

Since that time, the nation's fleet of four shuttles have flown increasingly complex missions.

Note, like many in the industry, he says this as though it's a feature, and not a bug. Complex missions, particularly when NASA prepares for them with months of training, are one of the reasons that Shuttle flights are expensive.

Following a transition to a commercial operator, millions of dollars have been saved from previous operational costs, and returned to the federal treasury.

How many millions of dollars, Frank? This sounds like a verbal sleight of hand.

Even a generously low estimate for the cost of a Shuttle launch is still several hundred million. "Millions of dollars" could be, say, five million dollars. In an annual budget of three billion or so, this would be chickenfeed. It's hard to tell if it is or not, because he's not very precise.

I'd like very much to think that he's not just tossing out the word "millions" and counting on people to be impressed because it sounds like a lot of money...

And note again that he still hasn't refuted my contention that the Shuttle was overspecified.

In these recent years, space shuttle flights have been increasingly safe, have launched more to a pre-set schedule than ever before, and increased flight safety. By whatever measurement one may choose, this system, now entering its third decade, has been a programmatic success for America and the space industry that builds and operates it.

I give up. I guess he's not going to support his statement. He's just going to change the subject. He must be just assuming that simply saying that I'm wrong makes it so.

I assume that he's now transitioned to rebut my statement that Shuttle was a policy failure. He does so by setting forth his own criteria.

It's safe(r), and it keeps a schedule better than it used to.

That's the sole basis on which he claims programmatic success. He doesn't mention cost, because that would blow his argument out of the water.

The original spec for Shuttle, in terms of flight rate and cost, was, if I recall correctly, sixty flights a year, and fifty-five million per flight. Instead, it's about four flights a year, and an order of magnitude greater.

I guess you can call Shuttle a success if you decide to move the goal posts after the fact. I think that to do so is disingenuous. Your mileage may vary.

But no machine can or should fly forever. To begin the long term planning for a future generation of more advanced reusable craft, NASA has initiated a follow-on program called the Space Launch Initiative. Often referred to as "SLI", the project has brought millions of dollars of government funding for technology advancements in spacecraft structures, propulsion, and vehicle operations. The SLI program has been- and we at STA hope it will continue to be ?a place within the federal budget where much needed research and development funding occurs for future launch technologies.

For much of the past decade, NASA and the Department of Defense have underfunded its technology and research programs with respect to launch systems. Both SLI, and the Defense Department's Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle programs have been efforts to reverse that decline in federal investments. But continuous investments, and system enhancements to both reusable as well as expendable systems are needed.

Note that he says nothing about what the actual goal of SLI is. He also assumes that the only thing holding us back from cheap access to space is the fact that NASA and the Air Force haven't been spending enough on that magic talisman of the NASA and Air Force engineer--"technology."

There is no discussion of the institutional barriers, which are much more formidable. If SLI is only about technology, then the money would be better spent elsewhere, because technology development per se is neither necessary or sufficient to provide more routine access and lower launch costs.

Note also that he ignores the issue of replacing one single-point failure--Shuttle--with another one--Shuttle II. That was the wet dream of SLI, and that is why the program must be restructured.

Contrary to Mr. Simberg's contentions, there is a space transportation industry. It consists of space shuttle operations, commercial expendable launch vehicles, a space propulsion industry element, and the need for long term research for the future.

Even if I grant his point that there is an industry (I was really referring to manned space), a "need" is not part of an industry. And "space shuttle operations" is a monopoly--hardly a sign of a healthy industry.

I have no objection to long-term research--it will eventually produce immeasurable benefits. It's what NASA should be doing. What NASA shouldn't be doing is dictating what the next generation of space transports will look like. I'm not as concerned with "eventually" as with the near future, and our continuing inability to affordably deliver passengers and cargo to space en masse, and return them.

If that's a criterion for a space industry, then we most assuredly do not have one.

The nation can best assure its access to space by a balanced role of industry participation and federal investments.

This is just vague motherhood. Who could argue? The issue is the nature of that participation and those investments.

Both shuttle and SLI are vital elements of that access.

I read nothing prior to this statement to support it.

Basically, this whole thing comes across as boiler-plate PR pablum. I suspect that it was stenography from a Boeing flack in Crystal City, to try to salvage the disappearing SLI budget. I'm disappointed in Frank, because I would have hoped that STA would have had a more thoughtful response on this critical public-policy issue. We need to have a serious discussion--not regurgitations of NASA PAO and industry disgorgements.

I agree, Rand. I have yet to see a coherent argument in support of the SLI, and to deny the Shuttle program's vast inefficiency is only possible if you are employed by it.

Sietzen appears to argue in his second paragraph that "conform[ing] to the political and budget realities of the 1970s" resulted in good engineering, rather than dramatic overspecification; he also apparently holds that the performance of "the actual system as built" is justification for the design requirements. Neither has anything to do with the aerospace-related engineering I've practiced for some thirty years!

I was in college, watching the process, while the Shuttle was repeatedly redefined, reengineered, and then crippled (for budgetary reasons) to the point where Challenger-type disasters were inevitable. That it is defended by the same crowd which created the beast to begin with, is no surprise... but neither is it a believable justification.

NASA's repetition of the process with respect to the ISS has convinced me that NASA is the problem, and has been for a long time.

The "original" NASA cost per flight goal for Shuttle was approximately $160/pound for a cost per flight of about $10.5 million (1970 dollars). While I don't have immediate access to my files from this time, I recall these were the numbers used by the famous "Mathematica, Inc." study on Shuttle pricing performed in the early 1970s. Flight rate was to be as high as 160/year with developmental cost recovery at 44/year.