Ray, over at VSE Restoration, provides the subtitles:
Once the White House embraces a direction for U.S. human spaceflight, Stanley said NASA should then be allowed to conduct a thorough architecture study to include apples-to-apples comparisons of the cost, safety and risk of the Augustine panel’s options, as well as alternative scenarios the panel might not have considered.
May I use my cynical filter to translate?
Once the White House embraces one of the Augustine committee options, NASA human spaceflight management should then be allowed to do an “apples-to-apples” comparison of the Augustine committee options, as well as alternative options the panel might not have considered that happen to serve NASA interests really well. They should then be allowed to discard the selected Augustine option, and pick one that benefits certain portions of NASA rather than the people of the United States.
In addition, Stanley urged that NASA be allowed to determine the true cost and risk of commercial crew transport in low Earth orbit.
In other words, NASA should be allowed to ignore the potential of commercial crew transport in low Earth orbit, and instead continue to buy crew transport services from Russia while NASA spends decades and tens of billions of dollars to build a government-designed and government-operated crew transport “business” to compete with U.S. commercial space business, but that does nothing to address national needs like security and commerce.
There is no need for a NASA evaluation of “the true cost and risk of commercial crew transport in low Earth orbit”. We already know that such a generic NASA evaluation of “commercial crew transport” is sure to conclude that a NASA-designed and NASA-operated crew transportation system is by far safer, simpler, sooner, better, faster, and cheaper than any imaginable commercial crew transportation. Why even bother with the evaluation when you know its conclusion in advance?
Obviously, Dr. Stanley has a lot of ego (if not a lot else) invested in this mess, and it’s understandable that he’d want to do everything he can to preserve the status quo that he created. But if I were General Bolden, I wouldn’t let any of Mike Griffin’s former minions anywhere near evaluation or policy going forward.
[Update mid morning]
Speaking of Doug Stanley, he was one of the speakers at a half-day symposium on the Augustine results, held at the Space Policy Institute a week ago. Dwayne Day has an interesting report in today’s issue of The Space Review.
I’m struggling to understand the logic here:
According to Stanley, the architecture that emerged from ESAS was the result of a number of assumptions they made when they started their evaluation. Had some of those assumptions been different, their architectural design would have been substantially different. As an example, if the Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV, now named Orion) had not been required to go to the International Space Station, then they would have produced a requirement for only a single launch vehicle rather than the Ares 1 and Ares 5 combination that they ultimately produced. On the other hand, if the requirement had only been for the CEV to go to the International Space Station, they would have selected an EELV (i.e. the Atlas or Delta). Stanley said that now that the assumptions have changed, it was entirely legitimate to question if NASA was developing the right architecture.
So, he’s saying that the concerns about “human rating EELVs” were bogus? That it was safe enough to send crew to ISS, but not to LEO on the way to the moon? And that if they were only going to the moon, they would have gone with a Saturn V-like architecture? But doesn’t that violate the (dumb) rule about not mixing crew and cargo? I’d like to see an elaboration on this.
I found Tom Young’s comments quite tendentious (that’s the nicest word I can come up with off the top of my head):
Young connected those past efforts at acquisition reform to what he considers the current claims that commercial crew is the way to substantially decrease costs to the government. “There is no magic,” he warned. “When someone comes along and says ‘I’ve got this new magic solution,’ my advice is to run for the hills.”
I’m aware of no one who proposes a “magic” solution. I am aware of a number of people who have proposed solutions based on solid engineering, and not driven or constrained by the need to maximize employment in Huntsville and other places. Now it may be that it requires political magic to make that happen, but if that’s the case, we should be honest and say that, instead of setting up straw men and denigrating people who propose it as technical and accounting charlatans.
Young took several questions that were focused upon his remarks about the lack of a credible commercial crew-to-orbit industry. How can such an industry become credible without government supporting it? “You really have to be careful about what you mean by ‘commercial’,” Young replied. “You cannot have government provide 100% of the funding and do no close monitoring.” The only way to do it is to put private money at risk. “The private sector invests in providing a service that somebody comes along and buys. I don’t see an industry that is investing the capital that is necessary, and to the extent. I’m also skeptical of providers where there is only one market.”
First, no one has proposed that government provide 100% of the funding for COTS-D or commercial exploration. Nor have they proposed that there be no government oversight. But the government oversight in this case comes from the fact that progress payments are based on achieved milestones, rather than cost plus profit. My mind is continuously blown by people who don’t seem to understand this concept, and think that the latter provides better value to the taxpayer than the former. As for not seeing an industry investing what is necessary, he needs to take off his blinders. Elon Musk and his other investors will be very surprised to hear that they haven’t been investing what is necessary. And the notion that there is only one market (as another panelist said as well) is nonsense on stilts. What is Bob Bigelow? And ISS? Not to mention Space Adventures? Chopped liver?
There’s a lot more to comment on from the other panelists, but that’s all I have time for right now.
Do anybody really need to point out the inherent conflict of interest in letting an organization with billion of dollars at stake in the outcome make a determination of the “true cost” of a competing option? If the Augustine Commission’s calculations are not considered sufficiently expert or objective, then OMB or OSTP should oversee such a review, using impartial experts. Aerospace Corporation of RAND are both potential sources of such expertise (using independent numbers, not NASA-provided numbers.)
This kind of problem has been faced, oh, once or twice before in history. Maybe even more. Objective reviews, rather than self-interested reviews, have generally given more successful outcomes. We’ve got a process. Let’s use it.
In addition, Stanley urged that NASA be allowed to determine the true cost and risk of commercial crew transport in low Earth orbit.
Since the essential elements of commercial crew transport to LEO are relatively close at hand (I’m thinking primarily SpaceX here) would it not be best to let commercial space itself determine the “true cost and risk of commercial crew transport” through demonstrations that provide hard data? Let’s give them 18 to 24 months to state their case and see where things stand. Or are numbers from pencil pushers looking at everything through political colored glasses to be more trusted?
NASA be allowed to determine the true cost and risk of commercial crew transport
If NASA wants to determine cost and risk they can just approach ULA or SpaceX for a fixed price contract and/or performance-based milestone payment program. If procured like COTS, there are no sustaining funds or cost-plus contracts for NASA. If the launch provider fails to meet milestones, NASA doesn’t have to pay them.
What is the point of being on one of these commissions if the result always gets ignored? Do they consider it a civic duty to make such token efforts and not so token enemies?
Unlike NASA, it is not mixing cargo with crew that I consider dumb. What I consider dumb is requiring a human crew in all flights, as some sort of relic from a romanticized spaceplane concept, when an automated or remote controlled system can do the same without putting people’s lives at risk, nor requiring expensive training of astronauts. Most space payloads are delivered without human crew just fine.
I can understand the need for having a backup transport system in case something goes wrong. But this can be done by selecting multiple (say 2 or 3) private launch providers rather than developing a new rocket no one else will use (Ares 1). The EELVs have a proven launch record and IMO ULA should be selected as one of the launch providers.
If high lift is required, I believe it should be procured in the market and selected by a competitive flight program that demonstrates real hardware rather than paper. The competitors should be allowed to market the vehicle for other purposes.
I believe that people serve on such things because they are trying to help the country make good choices.
As for “always being ignored” — while that might happen, it ain’t over ’til it’s over…
There is no reason a crewed vehicle need be more expensive than one that is fully automated, and in fact reason to believe otherwise. Our experiences with aviation certainly suggest that it is cheaper to build vehicles that are manually controlled, and for nearly a century after the advent of flight, indeed it was the only way to fly. Careful consideration of the difficulties of automated rendezvous and docking/berthing suggest that human pilots are the way to go (and in fact, the U.S has never docked to ISS or another crewed spacecraft using anything but a human at the controls).
My caveat is, of course, that such vehicles must be built with the cost-benefit approach of commercial aircraft, not as NASA science projects.
But I do agree that EELVs (Atlas, specifically) are the vehicle of choice for ISS re-supply and even lunar operations.
As for “always being ignored” — while that might happen, it ain’t over ’til it’s over…
There are worse things than being ignored.
Careful consideration of the difficulties of automated rendezvous and docking/berthing suggest that human pilots are the way to go (and in fact, the U.S has never docked to ISS or another crewed spacecraft using anything but a human at the controls).
Does this require the pilot to be on board?
“Careful consideration of the difficulties of automated rendezvous and docking/berthing suggest that human pilots are the way to go (and in fact, the U.S has never docked to ISS or another crewed spacecraft using anything but a human at the controls).
Does this require the pilot to be on board?”
Basically, yes. Teleoperation has its limits. If comm goes down, you’re back to automation, software, or luck. Look at the failure rates of UAVs, for example.
I am somewhat suspicious of the reasons for choosing the name “Orion” for one of NASA’s boondoggles. The nasty, paranoid and IMHO correct version of that reason is that it neatly buries the other Orion.
Getting beyond cislunar space (and quite possibly getting beyond LEO) is going to require something other than chemical rockets, unless the country that does it wants to bankrupt itself. And the most obvious option is the nuclear one. If a propulsion-modified Polywell reactor (that Bussard himself thought would probably work) gets built, then great – but we don’t have one yet.
There is one way of using nuclear power for propulsion that we are pretty sure will work. All the physics so far investigated says so, and there is certainly enough energy available!
One of the SF greats said something like this: “There is enough energy in one H-bomb to lift a million tons to Mars. If we can’t find a way to make use of that fact, then it’s our own damn fault.”
And the most obvious option is the nuclear one.
I think SEP is the more obvious one, given that it can be done with existing technology. By all means develop other technologies as well, but keep them off the critical path.
SpaceX – is this the same SpaceX that set their test stand on fire in February because of fuel tank leak? http://www.wacotrib.com/news/content/news/stories/2009/02/21/02212009wacwebcop3.html
Do we really want to entrust astronauts to rockets that aren’t even safe on test stands?
Do we really want to entrust astronauts to rockets that aren’t even safe on test stands?
Note the word test. A test stand is the only acceptable place for a rocket to fail. Not in flight, like the SRBs which have killed more than 80% of all US astronauts lost to date.
Do we really want to entrust astronauts to rockets that aren’t even safe on test stands?
Would you rather entrust astronauts to rocket engines that aren’t tested on test stands? Because that is the alternative to organizations that occasionally set their test stands on fire.
My previous comment was edited from what I orginally wrote and only part of my comment was shown on the website.
The Augustine committee review did exclude launch risk as a significant factor in evaluating the hazards to astronauts. Just a reminder that Columbia Accident Investigation Board recommended that the next crew launch system should “give overriding priority to crew safety”. We need to keep our crew safety and reliability above, and balanced with, cost, reusability and capability.
I prefer rockets that are demonstrated successfully.
Ares I First Stage builds on the knowledge of the Shuttle’s solid boosters. More than 200 Shuttle’s solid boosters have flown safely since the redesign after Challenger. The solid rocket motors have not cause a delay in a Shuttle launch since 1993.
ETM-3, a five segment solid rocket motor, was successfully tested in 2003. A second successful test of a five segment solid rocket motor was completed in August of this year further demonstrating Ares I capability and development success.