I earlier noted the irony that the one part of the Shuttle that has actually been reliable (the Orbiter) is the one that Mike Griffin wants to retire. Both Shuttle disasters were caused by the non-Orbiter parts (SRB in the case of Challenger, ET in the case of Columbia), and those are the pieces that he wants to build the new vehicles out of (SRB as a lower stage for the crew vehicle, and SRB and modified ET for the heavy lifter).

Of course, the response will be that the only reason those failures were a problem was because of the overall system configuration with the Orbiter. Since both the new concepts will have the payload on top, where blow torching from joint leaks, and falling foam won’t cause problems, that makes it OK (though that’s actually not true with the heavy lifter, since the ET was the first casualty from the SRB failure, before the Orbiter broke up).

Which brings up a question: how much side forces were detected during the Challenger launch from the SRB leak (presumably from attempts by the TVC to keep the vehicle straight)? Does anyone know (I assume that the data may be in the Rogers Commission Report)? Would it have caused a problem with “the stick”?

Just a few random thoughts before crashing.

I haven’t had time to read much about the fleet grounding thing, but I’ve often said that when government occasionally does the right thing, it’s almost always for the wrong reason. If we end up retiring the Shuttle now, it won’t be because it costs too much for what it does, and soaks up a lot of money that could (at least in theory, though probably not in practice, given the way our space policy seems to work) be used for something more productive in terms of moving humanity into space. It will be because we got better cameras so that we could finally see the rain of debris that’s been falling from every ET every time we fly, and we’re nervous about killing astronauts (even though taking such risks is, at least in theory, part of their job description). Ignorance was bliss, at least if you make a healthy living off operating Space Shuttles.

I frankly think that it’s a dumb reason, but if it happens, I also think it’s a good outcome, so I won’t complain too much. But here’s the problem. There’s an old saying about some businesses being “too big to fail” (e.g., Lockheed, various banks in the eighties, perhaps GM)–that is, the political consequences of letting them go out of business are viewed as sufficiently dire that the government will continue to prop them up, a la Weekend at Bernies, even when the carcass begins to stink. Shuttle, I’m afraid, is like that.

What I suspect is going on is that the declaration of fleet grounding is to piously show NASA’s contrition over Columbia, and to demonstrate that they have a new “safety culture.” What it really means is that they’ll do some kind of kabuki dance to come up with another “solution” to the foam-falling-off problem, and then launch again. And when it falls off again, they’ll say, “time to ground the fleet again, back to the drawing board.” And then they’ll do another test flight. It could plod along in this manner for years, if JSC and Huntsville are lucky, and the rest of us (those who pay taxes and care about a serious space program, anyway)…less so.

Anyway, off to bed, and (oh, joy) another airplane ride at the crack of dawn.