Rocketman has a post on the X-Prize and related subjects that’s worth reading, but there are a couple problems with it.

This is the most egregious:

The difference in energy required for a vehicle to reach the 100 mile altitude necessary to achieve orbit is ~25 times greater than the energy necessary to reach an altitude of 50 miles (I leave it as an exercise for the readers to figure out the difference in energy necessary between 62.5 and 100 miles).

This makes no sense at all. The difference in altitude between 50 and a hundred miles is, well, fifty miles. It’s merely doubled, so it makes no sense that it would be twenty five times the energy.

The problem of course, is that there are two components to energy–the specific potential energy as represented by the altitude (approximated as gravity times the altitude), and the kinetic energy, corresponding to the velocity (half the velocity squared). By ignoring the latter, this statement comes out completely garbled (and the exercise left for the readers is utterly meaningless, and would be frustrating to any who attempted it). Energy is a combination of both altitude and velocity, and the big problem in getting into orbit isn’t the former, but the latter.

Orbit is harder because it has go faster, not because it has to go higher. X-Prize is probably achievable at Mach three or four (say, a couple thousand miles an hour), and getting to a hundred miles wouldn’t require much more energy. Orbit requires seventeen thousand miles an hour–that’s the real killer.

He makes another point that’s more arguable (as opposed to physical nonsense), and I’ll argue it, as I did in last night’s post and today’s Fox column.

The statement that the “‘harsh environment’ of space was less harsh than that imposed by the ocean on the submersible” is just silly. Deep Rover operates in the ocean at a maximum depth of 1000 meters (3280 ft). At that depth, you are surrounded by water that is at ~40 degrees F and ~120 PSI. In space you are in a vacuum and your vehicle is exposed to direct solar energy that heats up one side of the vehicle and the vacuum of space that cools off the other.

The temperature extremes that exist in space create some difficult engineering problems because of the differences in thermal contraction and expansion that occurs between dissimilar materials. I have had to deal with these problems in my designs, and it is not trivial to engineer effective solutions.

Unlike vehicles that operate in salt water, the choice of materials that can be used in space is extremely limited. Most common materials get brittle at cold temperatures, and they also outgas in a vacuum, which changes their material properties. Some materials have problems with salt water, but there are many common materials that can be used under the conditions Deep Rover operates at.

But the biggest difference between a submersible and a spacecraft is that submersibles do not have to fly. You can afford to have relatively large factors of safety and, if necessary, redundant components in a submersible because weight is not a big issue. Also, spacecraft are subjected to tremendous dynamic and acoustic vibrations during launch, vibrations submersible never see. Designing and testing components to handle the vibrations of launch is again not a trivial problem (I speak from experience on this as well).

No matter what Maryniak would like to believe, space is an extremely harsh environment to design for. It also is not cheap to test components to determine how they will handle that environment. You cannot just sail out to deep water and drop your vehicle in the ocean to test it like you can with a submersible. Environmental chambers with liquid nitrogen ?cold walls,? large halogen lamps and huge vacuum pumps are needed to conduct these tests. And even the largest of these chambers is incapable of testing a complete launch vehicle, so components have to be tested individually.

They’re both harsh environments–but they’re different kinds of harsh. The marine environment is extremely corrosive, and it’s much more difficult, from a structural standpoint, to deal with many atmospheres of positive pressure (the deep sea) than a single atmosphere of negative pressure (the vacuum of space). Yes, space has radiation and temperature extremes that the ocean doesn’t, but both environments are harsh. For example, the choice of materials that can operate in salt water are limited as well.

Many of the implications of expensive launch are subtle, but they validate Gregg’s (and my) point.

Every objection that he has would be obviated by cheap launch, a point with which even he agrees at the end. If launch were cheap, you could afford heavier satellites, because the additional mass wouldn’t be so expensive. If launch were cheap, you could afford more redundancy. Cheap launch systems will have relatively smooth rides (because they’ll have to in order to be reliable and affordably reusable) so the launch environment won’t be an issue. Cheap launch implies affordable test facilities on orbit, so the components can be tested more easily.

So I’m not sure what his point is in arguing with Gregg on this issue.

Gregg Easterbrook gives a little history of the Biosphere venture, and how Columbia University has finally ended its affiliation with it. But in the process, he makes a glib comment about the affordability of a Mars mission:

It seems certain that as the space shuttle debate continues, some prominent person will advocate the bold new adventure of a trip to Mars. When someone advocates that, this blog will demolish the idea in detail. Here’s a quick preview. Last week the Wall Street Journal ran a letter to the editor blithely asserting that colonization of Mars could be accomplished “easily and cheaply.” The Russian rocket manufacturer Energia recently estimated that the hardware for a stripped-down manned mission to Mars would weigh a minimum of 600 tons in low-earth orbit. At current space shuttle prices, it costs $15 billion to place 600 tons in low-earth orbit. That’s just the initial launch cost for a stripped-down high-risk flight with a couple of people–spaceship and supplies are extra.

Sorry, Gregg, this does not compute. Why would you take the word of Energia for the mass of a Mars mission, and then make the insane assumption that it would be delivered with a Shuttle (probably the most expensive launch system on the planet, and one to soon go out of business, one way or another)?

If you’re going to go with Russian quotes, use Russian launch prices. Of course, any rational person, contemplating fifteen billion dollars in launch costs, might consider spending that money instead on reducing launch costs…

Don’t you just hate it when your multi-million-dollar satellite falls over and breaks?

Way to go, Lockmart…

Keith Cowing over at NASA Watch provides the following reader comment:

“It turns out that the POES group at GSFC had a training session for an ISO 9000 audit in July, 2003. Here’s the link to the briefing slides.

The accident appears to be LockMart’s fault, but once again we see the benefits of an ISO 9000 program…”

“‘Forget Mars!’ the president was heard to say.”

Clark Lindsey has a plan, in the unlikely event he’s put in charge of NASA.

It’s certainly a lot better than any of the current ones.

An email from Andrew Case informed me of an item that Clark Lindsey over at RLV News found. Homer Hickam (author of Rocket Boys, the book on which the movie October Sky was based) has an op-ed in today’s Journal (subscription required, unfortunately), titled, NASA’s Vietnam.

…when I put emotion aside, I can’t ignore my engineering training. That training and my knowledge as a 20-year veteran of the space agency (and also a Vietnam vet) has led me to conclude that the Space Shuttle is NASA’s Vietnam. A generation of engineers and managers have exhausted themselves trying to make it work and they just can’t. Why not? Because the Shuttle’s engineering design, just as Vietnam’s political design, is inherently flawed.

He thinks that NASA doesn’t have a culture problem, just a lousy vehicle design. He wants to build an OSP and fly it on an expendable. That will make everything all better!

Sorry, Mr. Hickam, with all due respect to your cherished agency, it has both. It has a lousy design partly because of a cultural problem, partly because of a policy problem, but there’s much more to be fixed at the agency, that simply coming up with a different expensive and unsafe way to put people into space isn’t going to solve.

I know that it pains a veteran like you, but we need to fundamentally break the connection in the minds of both the public, and policy makers, between NASA and space. They are not synonymous. It’s time to open up the competition and let some other folks give it a shot.

Besides, I’ve always thought that Space Station Albatross was NASA’s Vietnam, and that we should just declare victory and go home.

[Update at 4 PM PDT]

For those who want to Read The Whole Thing, there’s a slightly longer version of it up at Spaceref now, with a different title–“Not Culture, But Perhaps A Cult.”

[Update on Saturday afternoon]

It occurs to me that this piece, which I wrote last fall, is relevant to this topic.

An email from Andrew Case informed me of an item that Clark Lindsey over at RLV News found. Homer Hickam (author of Rocket Boys, the book on which the movie October Sky was based) has an op-ed in today’s Journal (subscription required, unfortunately), titled, NASA’s Vietnam.

…when I put emotion aside, I can’t ignore my engineering training. That training and my knowledge as a 20-year veteran of the space agency (and also a Vietnam vet) has led me to conclude that the Space Shuttle is NASA’s Vietnam. A generation of engineers and managers have exhausted themselves trying to make it work and they just can’t. Why not? Because the Shuttle’s engineering design, just as Vietnam’s political design, is inherently flawed.

He thinks that NASA doesn’t have a culture problem, just a lousy vehicle design. He wants to build an OSP and fly it on an expendable. That will make everything all better!

Sorry, Mr. Hickam, with all due respect to your cherished agency, it has both. It has a lousy design partly because of a cultural problem, partly because of a policy problem, but there’s much more to be fixed at the agency, that simply coming up with a different expensive and unsafe way to put people into space isn’t going to solve.

I know that it pains a veteran like you, but we need to fundamentally break the connection in the minds of both the public, and policy makers, between NASA and space. They are not synonymous. It’s time to open up the competition and let some other folks give it a shot.

Besides, I’ve always thought that Space Station Albatross was NASA’s Vietnam, and that we should just declare victory and go home.

[Update at 4 PM PDT]

For those who want to Read The Whole Thing, there’s a slightly longer version of it up at Spaceref now, with a different title–“Not Culture, But Perhaps A Cult.”

[Update on Saturday afternoon]

It occurs to me that this piece, which I wrote last fall, is relevant to this topic.

An email from Andrew Case informed me of an item that Clark Lindsey over at RLV News found. Homer Hickam (author of Rocket Boys, the book on which the movie October Sky was based) has an op-ed in today’s Journal (subscription required, unfortunately), titled, NASA’s Vietnam.

…when I put emotion aside, I can’t ignore my engineering training. That training and my knowledge as a 20-year veteran of the space agency (and also a Vietnam vet) has led me to conclude that the Space Shuttle is NASA’s Vietnam. A generation of engineers and managers have exhausted themselves trying to make it work and they just can’t. Why not? Because the Shuttle’s engineering design, just as Vietnam’s political design, is inherently flawed.

He thinks that NASA doesn’t have a culture problem, just a lousy vehicle design. He wants to build an OSP and fly it on an expendable. That will make everything all better!

Sorry, Mr. Hickam, with all due respect to your cherished agency, it has both. It has a lousy design partly because of a cultural problem, partly because of a policy problem, but there’s much more to be fixed at the agency, that simply coming up with a different expensive and unsafe way to put people into space isn’t going to solve.

I know that it pains a veteran like you, but we need to fundamentally break the connection in the minds of both the public, and policy makers, between NASA and space. They are not synonymous. It’s time to open up the competition and let some other folks give it a shot.

Besides, I’ve always thought that Space Station Albatross was NASA’s Vietnam, and that we should just declare victory and go home.

[Update at 4 PM PDT]

For those who want to Read The Whole Thing, there’s a slightly longer version of it up at Spaceref now, with a different title–“Not Culture, But Perhaps A Cult.”

[Update on Saturday afternoon]

It occurs to me that this piece, which I wrote last fall, is relevant to this topic.

There’s a very depressing example of how sterile and mindless the debate about space remains in the wake of the CAIB report over at the WaPo today. If not a full-blown fisking, it requires an almost line-by-line analysis.

Administration officials disclosed in an interview that the White House will begin work next week on a blueprint for interplanetary human flight over the next 20 or 30 years, with plans calling for Bush to issue an ambitious new national vision for space travel by early next year.

Ahhhh, no timorous five-year plans for these central planners–we’ll have a thirty-year plan!

The officials said they will wrestle with the military’s role in space, as well as with whether to emphasize manned or robotic missions, whether to build a base in space, what vehicle should replace the shuttle and what planets should be visited.

That’s interesting, but how can they do that, when no one seems to be discussing what we’re trying to accomplish? How can one decide whether to “emphasize manned or robotic missions” when we don’t know what the the hell we’re trying to do?

Guys?

“The question is: What do we say to the president about why we should continue humans in space and in what vehicles and to what ends?” a senior administration official said.

Yes, that is the question, but there’s a wide array of answers, and I seen no indication, at least not in this article, that there’s any discussion of anything beyond “exploration” and “science.”

But those answers will not come as swiftly as Congress would like, and lawmakers and some administration officials said they do not see how Bush will find the money to pay for any meaningful expansion of the space program given the costs of his tax cuts and the demands on the budget from the Pentagon, homeland security and possibly new Medicare benefits.

Well, look, not that I necessarily favor an increase in NASA funding (and in fact, right now I’m in the “abolish NASA” camp), but this is just fiscally stupid. We are spending less than one percent of the federal budget on NASA. We could double it and it wouldn’t even make a blip in the deficit. There may be, and in fact are, good reasons to oppose an increase in funding, given the current plans, but “we can’t afford it” ain’t one of them.

That could turn his aides’ study of options for future astronauts into something of an academic exercise.

“You can’t fight a war on terrorism and stimulate the economy and put billions and billions of new dollars into the space program,” an official said, adding that the end of the Cold War had made mastery of space a less pressing priority.

Well, some would argue that putting billions and billions of new dollars into the space program would be part of stimulating the economy, though how well it does so depends in part on how you actually spend the money.

But what does he mean when he says that “the end of the Cold War has made mastery of space a less pressing priority”?

Is he talking about civil space? If so, it’s pretty appalling that, almost half a century after Sputnik, policy makers still think that the only reason to go into space is to flex our technological muscles to impress other countries.

If he means from a military standpoint, I don’t know if he’s noticed, but we’re engaged in a hot war right now, and one in which space assets played a critical role that will only increase in future battles.

I would really, really love some elaboration on this comment.

Sen. Sam Brownback (R-Kan.), chairman of a Senate subcommittee that oversees NASA, said he will seek a presidential panel to examine the future of the space program, including whether to shift resources from the shuttle in order to resume the exploration of the moon.

Rep. Nick Smith (R-Mich.), a member of the House Science Committee, is calling for a shift from manned to unmanned flight “for both safety and research value.”

See, instead of “it’s all about ooooiiiiillllll,” when it comes to space it’s all about “exploration” and “research.”

Of course, one does not intrinsically increase “research value” by leaving people at home. I disagree with Bob Zubrin about a lot of things, but he’s certainly right when he says that you’ll learn a lot more about a planet by sending a geologist than you will a robot. And for those who obsess about “safety,” I’m sorry, but I have nothing but contempt. Yes, we should try not to kill people, but ultimately, the only way you can avoid it is to not let them go at all, which seems to be Rep. Smith’s goal here. As the old saying goes, a ship in a harbor is safe, but that’s not what ships, or explorers, are for.

A senior administration official said a White House group will meet at least weekly to assess “the benefits to the nation and the world of continued human spaceflight by the United States.”

“We know we can do it. What do we seek to achieve through it?” the official said. “Where and how does human spaceflight fit into national requirements and national priorities over the next several decades?”

Yes, those are good questions. Even better one are “is human spaceflight going to continue to be performed only by NASA, or are we going to encourage the nascent private human spaceflight industry?” “What role will they play?” “Are there things we can do to help make that happen that don’t require expenditures of taxpayer dollars to a bloated, sclerotic civil space agency?”

But I’ll bet those kinds of question won’t get asked, at least based on anything I read in this business-as-usual article.

Officials said the new panel on human spaceflight, led by the White House and involving several Cabinet departments, is scheduled to have recommendations ready for Bush in the next several months. Aides said they hope Bush will make decisions by the end of the year so that the ideas can be included in the administration budget for 2005, which will go to Capitol Hill in February.

The official said the interagency group will look at the space program’s relationship with national defense, as well as with the advancement of science, and at “the question of how this relates to national goals that, at first blush, have nothing to do with spaceflight.”

OK, this does look a little more encouraging. I would hope that those departments include (at the least) Commerce, Transportation, Energy and Defense.

The rest of the article pretty much focuses on NASA and its budget and the CAIB.

You know, it would help if reporters themselves, like Mike Allen and Eric Pianin, would bring up these issues, but they’re sadly apparently unaware as well, and stuck in the same NASA-centric mindset. Maybe they should read this weblog once in a while…

Laughing Wolf has some ideas.