My Freedom of Information Act request to verify OSIDA’s claim that they are on target for December 2005 did not net any documents (all marked proprietary), but it did net a confirmation of the existence of the documents and a confirmation that the scheduled release of the environmental impact statement (EIS) is December 2005.

Ben Chertoff and Carl Hoffman at Popular Mechanics are live blogging the public announcement of NASA’s exploration architecture from NASA HQ. Chertoff’s calling it NASA’s “lunar retread.”

[Update at 1:15 PM EDT]

Griffin on commercial contractors:

…when you use a prime contractor in the traditional way it IS more expensive, but at least you know that you’ll get what you ask for. We don’t want to get in a position where we ask for something and they can’t make it happen.

Yeah, they cost more, but we all know that prime contractors never fail to come through.

I’m with Hoffman:

Only one question about commercial space activities – Rutan, X prize, Bezos, Elon Must [sic], who’s about to launch his first rocket with commercial payload into orbit for a reported $16 million – that was never mentioned by Griffin himself. And that has to make you wonder whether anything has changed at all…

This article describes why NASA’s plans are probably fiscally and politically unsustainable, though you have to read between the lines:

NASA

Henry Vanderbilt isn’t very happy with NASA’s exploration plans:

This Apollo redux has the same fatal flaw as Apollo: The specialized throwaway systems invented to get (back) to the Moon ASAP were (will be) far too labor-intensive at far too low a max flight rate to allow affordable followup. The new ships are not only based in significant part on existing Shuttle components and facilities, but they are to be operated in significant part by the existing Shuttle organization. IE, tens of thousands of people narrowly specialized in various aspects of flying a handful of astronauts on a handful of missions a year – at, by the time all this fixed overhead is added up, billions of dollars a mission.

Like Apollo, NASA’s new ESAS plan has built into it the seeds of its shutdown by some future Congress, once the warm glow of the first few daring missions has once again faded…

…Once what’s come out unofficially so far becomes official, we will have no choice but to decline further support for new NASA exploration funding, and if as seems likely we can’t persuade our fellow SEA members to join us, we will have to regretfully resign.

Sadly, I find nothing at all here with which I can disagree.

[Update a few minutes later]

Aviation Week also says (correctly) that it’s Apollo redux, and is skeptical about its political prospects.

…basically using a replay of the Apollo approach of the 1960s, with updated electronics.

And here’s another problem:

Rewriting the exploration-hardware development plans drafted under his predecessor, Griffin will exert tighter control over hardware design, leaving much less to the imagination of the contractors and perhaps building the new vehicles in NASA facilities.

Shades of X-38…

Henry Vanderbilt isn’t very happy with NASA’s exploration plans:

This Apollo redux has the same fatal flaw as Apollo: The specialized throwaway systems invented to get (back) to the Moon ASAP were (will be) far too labor-intensive at far too low a max flight rate to allow affordable followup. The new ships are not only based in significant part on existing Shuttle components and facilities, but they are to be operated in significant part by the existing Shuttle organization. IE, tens of thousands of people narrowly specialized in various aspects of flying a handful of astronauts on a handful of missions a year – at, by the time all this fixed overhead is added up, billions of dollars a mission.

Like Apollo, NASA’s new ESAS plan has built into it the seeds of its shutdown by some future Congress, once the warm glow of the first few daring missions has once again faded…

…Once what’s come out unofficially so far becomes official, we will have no choice but to decline further support for new NASA exploration funding, and if as seems likely we can’t persuade our fellow SEA members to join us, we will have to regretfully resign.

Sadly, I find nothing at all here with which I can disagree.

[Update a few minutes later]

Aviation Week also says (correctly) that it’s Apollo redux, and is skeptical about its political prospects.

…basically using a replay of the Apollo approach of the 1960s, with updated electronics.

And here’s another problem:

Rewriting the exploration-hardware development plans drafted under his predecessor, Griffin will exert tighter control over hardware design, leaving much less to the imagination of the contractors and perhaps building the new vehicles in NASA facilities.

Shades of X-38…

Henry Vanderbilt isn’t very happy with NASA’s exploration plans:

This Apollo redux has the same fatal flaw as Apollo: The specialized throwaway systems invented to get (back) to the Moon ASAP were (will be) far too labor-intensive at far too low a max flight rate to allow affordable followup. The new ships are not only based in significant part on existing Shuttle components and facilities, but they are to be operated in significant part by the existing Shuttle organization. IE, tens of thousands of people narrowly specialized in various aspects of flying a handful of astronauts on a handful of missions a year – at, by the time all this fixed overhead is added up, billions of dollars a mission.

Like Apollo, NASA’s new ESAS plan has built into it the seeds of its shutdown by some future Congress, once the warm glow of the first few daring missions has once again faded…

…Once what’s come out unofficially so far becomes official, we will have no choice but to decline further support for new NASA exploration funding, and if as seems likely we can’t persuade our fellow SEA members to join us, we will have to regretfully resign.

Sadly, I find nothing at all here with which I can disagree.

[Update a few minutes later]

Aviation Week also says (correctly) that it’s Apollo redux, and is skeptical about its political prospects.

…basically using a replay of the Apollo approach of the 1960s, with updated electronics.

And here’s another problem:

Rewriting the exploration-hardware development plans drafted under his predecessor, Griffin will exert tighter control over hardware design, leaving much less to the imagination of the contractors and perhaps building the new vehicles in NASA facilities.

Shades of X-38…

Defense Industry Daily has a rundown on current plans for SpaceX, and their leap directly from Falcon 1 to Falcon 9. They don’t mention the recent engine test failure, though.

It’s also amusing that they describe Mike Griffin as “…a former NASA exec and president of the venture-capital firm In-Q-Tel.”

I’m pretty sure he has a new job now.

He’s talking about the DHS, but Cliff May may have an explanation for NASA:

When bureaucracies become sclerotic, they don

If this story is true, it looks like Prometheus is dead. No nuclear propulsion for the foreseeable future.

This part, though, is a little puzzling:

NASA had hoped to develop the nuclear propulsion system to carry spacecraft beyond the solar system, according to a June 19 story in the Times Union.

That’s news to me. I thought the program’s purpose was to enable easier exploration of the solar system, not to go beyond it.

Jon Goff has some interesting speculation about the recent changes in SpaceX payloads. There are some even more interesting comments to the post, including one from the horse’s…errrr…Falcon’s mouth.