An expensive solution to a problem we don’t have. It’s a good history of how we got into this mess over the decades:

SpaceX is advancing in all directions —a human-rated spacecraft, reusability and a million-pound-thrust LOX-methane motor—and despite normal setbacks, it has failed to fall on its face as many people believed it would.

Hence GenCorp’s concern. But its solution runs counter to the total-launch-service model used by most of the industry, where the prime contractor selects or builds its motors. As SpaceX President Gwynne Shotwell said last week: “It would be very unusual for us to buy a critical piece of our strategy and our technology from somebody else.” I think that she meant to say “are you out of your tiny mind?” but was trying to put it diplomatically.

Since Seymour expects a government-funded development program after a paper-and-components competition, too, the next question is: “What new technology is the government funding here?” High-chamber-pressure LOX-kerosene rockets may be new to U.S. industry, but not to the world.

If big U.S. government money is going to be spent on space launch, and if SpaceX can provide an “assured access” backup, why not spend it on reusability—the only strategy that promises dramatically lower costs. The X-33 did not fail, and the shuttle did not miss its economic goals by a parsec or two, because reusability is a bad idea: Lousy requirements did it for them both. A modern, intelligently sized two-stage reusable system is like G.K. Chesterton’s view of Christianity: It “has not been tried and found wanting; it has been found difficult and not tried.” It’s time to change that.

Yes. But expect policy makers to continue down the same failed well-worn groove.

Five years later, what does it think about SLS?

The country, with NASA’s budget, simply can’t afford to build a large rocket that will fly infrequently and cost as much as $2-$3 billion a year to maintain, Greason said.

“It’s hard for me, I personally haven’t been able to find a scenario in which a government funded and operated launch system, for which the government is the only customer, is a rational approach given the current budgets.

“Is that because I’m against big rockets? Of course not. But maintaining rocket production lines is a very expensive proposition. Trying to open another production line for a rocket that has almost no customers is a difficult thing for me to explain. The one argument I have heard that, if it were true, I would buy, is that there are no other ways to explore. I would buy that, but I don’t think it’s true.”

It’s not true.

Citing my Reason piece, the Washington Times comes out against the rocket to nowhere.

[Update a while later]

Dick Shelby is a uniter, not a divider:

It’s rare to get the Obama Administration and the conservative editorial page of the Washington Times in agreement on something. Yet, both have spoken out in opposition to report language in the Senate’s Commerce, Justice, and Science (CJS) appropriations bill—due to be considered by the full Senate this week—regarding cost and pricing data for commercial crew and cargo providers.

Well, it’s not like he has any political principles other than what will get him reelected.

Dale Skran has a review, that mirrors a lot of my own concerns with it:

There is no discussion at all that the prospect for increased traffic to LEO for all purposes, including tourism, might lead to significantly lower costs; or that it may lead to reusable spacecraft with superior operational characteristics relative to existing vehicles or the SLS. This glaring absence seems remarkable given the stated goal of SpaceX to develop just such lower-cost, reusable craft, as well as their considerable progress in this direction. Of course, the efforts of SpaceX, Virgin Galactic, Blue Origin, XCOR Aerospace, and others to greatly reduce launch costs may all fail. However, the NRC report is based on the unstated assumption that over the entire period considered, all the way out to 2054, there will be essentially no progress in rocketry other than that funded by NASA exploration programs, and that for the entire period the SLS as currently envisioned will remain the preferred method for Americans to reach space. It is difficult to imagine a more unlikely foundation for the planning of future space efforts than this.

It is extremely myopic, and therefore of little value, but it was probably doomed to be so by its charter.