Summits With Dictators

I sometimes wonder whether the first Gulf war would have happened if President Bush had met with Saddam instead of April Glaspie.

Anyway, I hope that Obama will follow the model of Rabin rather than Chamberlain.

"You don't make peace with friends. You make it with very unsavory enemies." -- Yitzhak Rabin

It didn't work for Rabin either. Some enemies stop being enemies with time but other enemies don't stop being enemies until you defeat them decisively. Obama's world-view does not acknowledge the latter possibility.

What should Rabin have done instead? Resort to "ethnic cleansing"?

Resort to "ethnic cleansing"?

Well, that was (and remains) his enemy's goal.

"Actually, one leader did have a talk with Hitler. His name was Neville Chamberlain. And we know how that worked out."

Yes, we do, don't we? There was another year during which the UK wasn't fighting a war - a year for re-arming, setting up the radar and fighter control systems that (with the considerable aid of a few hundred brave men, including a handful of Americans who were breaking American law by doing so) won the Battle of Britain, other things as well.

What happened because of that meeting? We won. What would have happened without it? If I'd ever existed (doubtful - I have a Jewish great-grandfather) I'd have been speaking German now, along with the rest of Europe and probably Russia.

Picking a fight you can't win is a very poor idea, for countries as well as individuals. Unless of course there is a larger issue at stake. Talking to keep the enemy busy while you recover, ditto.

I think one function of meeting with (or at least talking to) dictators is that the President can make clear his resolve while simultaneously working out a way for the dictator to save face. The Cuban Missile Crisis serves an example of this. For that matter, look at the "Red Phone" itself -- if meeting with dictators isn't a good idea, is the Red Phone a good idea, and if so, how is it different?

"Anyway, I hope that Obama will follow the model of Rabin rather than Chamberlain."

I hope he follows the model of Michael Dukakis or Walter Mondale.

Mr. Puckett's CIC Limbaugh helped Hillary! squeak by in Indiana. I'm sure some of you were thrilled.

It's so funny to watch the distraught Republicans take what little pleasure they can, trying to exert the miniscule influence they possess in the future politics of this country.

All they can do these days is attempt to make "trouble". A straightforward argument as to why anyone should pay attention to the party of Bush is of course quite inconceivable, so they rail at the margins, eking out minute pleasure.

How terribly childish and forlorn.

Fletcher, I strongly disagree. Germany had rearmed from a position of great weakness. Entering a war unprepared would have been better than the wait since it would have meant that Germany was similarly unprepared (and would have had much more trouble occupying its neighbors). By waiting not only did the UK strengthen the hand of Germany, but also damned eastern Europe to decades of slavery under the USSR.

Still having said that, it's worth noting that Chamberlain wasn't the only prime minister with his head in the sand. Stanley Baldwin, the prior one in the critical period 1935-1937, was far better positioned (along with France) to stop the German war machine. By failing to do anything significant, Baldwin insured that Chamberlain would have to face a much more powerful Germany.

A straightforward argument as to why anyone should pay attention to the party of dysfunctional leftist dogma of Pelosi, Reed and Obama is of course quite inconceivable, so they rail at the margins, eking out minute pleasure in locales such as the Daily Kook and the Glue Huffers post."

Fixed it for you, now it makes sense.

"How terribly childish and forlorn."

I know you are and so do the rest of us.

Mike Puckett said: A straightforward argument as to why anyone should pay attention to the party of dysfunctional leftist dogma of Pelosi, Reed and Obama is of course quite inconceivable...

Mike, I made a straightforward argument for why US Presidents should talk to dictators: to communicate the resolve of the United States, to warn against bad behavior and make the consequences of such behavior clear, and, optionally, to simultaneously give the dictator a way to save face, if it is the US interest.

I mentioned the disastrous Glaspie meeting with Saddam as an example of where a Presidential summit might have avoided a war, I listed the Cuban Missile Crisis as an example of where Presidential communication with a dictator did avoid a war, and I listed Yitzak Rabin as an example of a tough minded liberal who wasn't afraid to negotiate with his enemies.

You replied with partisan wishfulness (Dukakis and Mondale) and name calling (the Daily Kook, Glue Huffers).

Do you, or Rand, or anyone who thinks Obama is wrong, have a straightforward reply to my argument? Do you have an explanation for either why the Red Phone is a good idea but talking to dictators is a bad idea OR why the red phone is also a bad idea?

Anonymous,

If you wish to engage in a serious dialogue, I suggest you start by dropping the anonymous handle.

If not, don't complain about the 'kick me' sign on your back.

A serious dialogue?

Ha Ha. The man wants to talk. Direct talks no less. How appropriate.

CIC approved, I presume?

Yes, we do, don't we? There was another year during which the UK wasn't fighting a war - a year for re-arming, setting up the radar and fighter control systems that (with the considerable aid of a few hundred brave men, including a handful of Americans who were breaking American law by doing so) won the Battle of Britain, other things as well.

While it's true that the UK used that extra year to increase their weapons production, the Germans did the same and they were outproducing the British by a considerable margin. Britain was unprepared for war in 1938 but so was Germany.

There's something else to consider - Chamberlain bought that extra year (actually 11 months) by selling out Czechoslovakia. By forcing the Czechs to hand over the Sudetenland, Chamberlain cut the throat of a powerful ally. That isn't something to be proud of, IMO.

The Munich Pact set October 1, 1938, as the date for Czechoslovakian evacuation of the territory. German occupation of four specified districts was to take place in successive stages between October 1 and 7. Additional territories of predominantly German population were to be specified by an international commission composed of delegates from France, Germany, Britain, Italy, and Czechoslovakia. The international commission was also to conduct elections in other territories of dispute. It was also agreed that if the claims of Hungarian and Polish minorities in Czechoslovakia were not settled in three months, a new conference was to be convened. Britain and France agreed, in an annex to the pact, to guarantee the new boundaries of Czechoslovakia against aggression, as did Germany.

Poland and Hungary proceeded to seize much of the remaining Czech territory they coveted. By insisting that the international commission use the figures of the Austro-Hungarian census for 1910 instead of those of the Czechoslovakian census for 1930, Germany was able to claim much additional territory that was predominantly Czech.

In March 1939 the Germans marched into Czechoslovakia and subsequently made most of the country a German protectorate, thus nullifying the Munich Pact. On August 23 the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed a nonaggression pact with Germany in order to avoid war. On September 1, Hitler launched an attack on Poland, mistakenly believing that Britain and France would not intervene. Both countries, however, immediately declared war on Germany, marking the beginning of World War II.

Mike, I'm the first anonymous poster, who posted the 1st, 3rd, 6th, and 11th comments (in other words, only the respectful ones). I blew it with my first post, by forgetting to fill in the name field, but I figured it didn't make a difference because the ideas, not identities, are what matter. But then another person started commenting anonymously too, which confused things, so I apologize.

Anyway, I've listed the reasons I think Obama's policy is a good one in the 11th comment, and I'd be interested in hearing an argument from you, or from Rand, or from anyone, on why you think I'm wrong.

Karl, the problem was what happened during the Baldwin era, I tend to agree with Fletcher's position. Because of the vacillation and the complicity in Germany's rearming during the 30s, Britain was in no position to do anything - even after the start of the war the fairly disastrous European Expeditionary Force.

It was also not completely beyond the realm of possibility that Lord Halifax would have been selected as PM rather than Churchill which would have also led to a less than optimal result.

Fletcher,

Your grasp of history seems a bit weak. Germany was in terrible shape in 1938, and was in no position to actually follow through on their threats. The German military (which, in fairness, was badly cowed by Hitler) was adamantly opposed to a military showdown with the Western powers, largely because they were convinced that they would be anhiliated.

The German panzer force had approximately half the combat effectiveness it would have by 1939, smaller absolute numbers and far inferior hardware. The infantry and artillery branches of the Wehrmacht were far smaller than they would be the next year, and lacked anything near the kind of training for mobile warfare. The Luftwaffe had no fuel reserves worth discussing, and had not yet deployed its most modern aircraft. The Kreigsmarine lacked several of the heavy units it picked up over the next year, and its U-boat force was less than half the size that it was by 1939. If all of this was not enough, deferring any response to Hitler in 1938 gave him the initiative in 1939 (giving him time to cut a deal with Stalin in August) that provided Germany with yet further advantages in taking an aggressive stance.

Worse still, by meeting with Hitler (and cravenly caving into his demands), Chamberlin make it clear that Britain had no stomach for war, a lesson not lost on Hitler or his generals. Chamberlin's actions undercut the Frnech, who were actively pressing for an intervention in the Rhine to demonstrate to the Germans once and for all that the West would not accept Hitler's revaunchism. Chamberlin actually managed to achieve that rare feat of making the French look bellicose and steadfast!

Larry J., Interesting comment. Why did Hitler assume Britain and France wouldn't defend Poland? Could Britain and France have communicated their intentions more clearly?

(And what would Hitler have done if he had been convinced that Britain and France would act? Although I'm arguing in this thread that increased leader-to-leader communication is beneficial, I can imagine a case where Hitler avoids war for another year, and thus has another year to prepare. If I understand the history of the war correctly, Hitler lost because he bit off far more than he could chew. Perhaps if he had chewed more slowly, he would have done better.)

Robert,

I understand that your last question was directed to Larry J, but please excuse me for jumping in:

Hitler was convinced only AFTER talking to Chamberlin that the man had no stones, and simply wasn't going to go to war no matter what. Note that he was wrong in this assessment (Chamberlin did go to war eventually), but Hitler's understanding of Chamberlin wasn't improved by a face to face meeting, nor was he deterred.

Some leaders act on their own set of convictions, and simply ignore inconvenient facts (or simply integrate them into their own preconcieved framework) and thus will not be affected by any outside sources of information. A face to face conversation is simply another attempt to lie to their putative enemies. Hitler is a superb example here, as does Stalin for that matter, but Vladamir Putin also seems to be an excellent (somewhat more recent) example.

Regarding the notion that Hitler would have been better off waiting longer before starting the war seems to me to be almost axiomatic. The German military was growing far stronger as time went on, particularly since the army was so very new, and had not had a chance to digest any of the new weapon systems yet. The Brits and French, on the other hand, were not introdocuing new systems (radar is a very important exception, but only an exception, and an isolated one at that), and their militaries were already as large as they were likely to get in peacetime. There is some argument to be made that economic difficulties might have forced the Germans to move as early as 1941, but given that the Germans didn't switch to a wartime economic model till late 1940, this would have meant that they would have enjoyed a full extra year of production and integration beyond what they already had, while the Western powers would have achieved very little.

You ask why a Red Telephone is a good idea and dialog with dictators is not. I might suggest that the problem here is that you assume that the Hotline is for dialogue, when it is not. The Hotline is to communicate directly IN A CRISIS, typically when a war or near-war state exists. This is a very different thing from Summitry, as summitry presupposes more 'relaxed' circumstances where dialogue (literally a back and forth discussion) can be undertaken with a bit more room for error. The Hotline was designed under different circumstances to cope with different problems (Herman Kahn wrote extensively about these differences in On Thermonuclear War, if you are interested), and was never intended for (nor never used for) dialogue or negotiations.

I just did a little more reading on the lead-up to WWII, and apparently Chamberlain only decided to go to war under political pressure -- he couldn't have communicated his resolve earlier because he had no such resolve.

Scott, thanks for the thoughtful comment. You are right, of course, about the hotline, and I'll focus on summitry rather than red phone.

I think that this discussion of Hitler and Chamberlain shows only that a President Obama had better not be like Chamberlain. I don't think the discussion shows why meeting with dictators is a bad idea. Scott, as you say, a face to face conversation just gives the dictator another chance to lie, but it also gives the President, Prime Minister, etc, another chance to communicate resolve (presuming they already have resolve).

Although no one has brought it up, I would have expected that one objection to summitry would be that public pronouncements can also be used to show resolve. Senator Clinton recently promised to "obliterate" Iran if they attacked Israel. The problem is that Iran presumably understands that the Senator from NY is speaking for domestic consumption. If she ever became President and looked the Iranian leaders in the eye, and said "I am willing obliterate Tehran", they might actually believe her.

Larry J:

Your point about Czechoslovakia is taken, However, sometimes in war (and in the period before wars, when it is becoming obvious war is coming) one has to do distasteful things. What good would it have done Czechoslovakia if Britain (and possibly France) had attacked in 1938 - and lost?

Scott: In 1938, Hitler had not yet built up his forces - but Britain's standard "fighter" of the time was a biplane of 1924 (I believe) vintage. Britain was even more unprepared. I also think that the whole business of the Few is one of those stories that is not just a matter of mystique. The extra year gave Britain time to build the control system without which the air defense of Britain would probably have been impossible. Knowing where the enemy is always helps the battle, especially when you are outnumbered.

There is also another point, one which could not possibly have been known to the Allies in 1938. It is now known that Hitler was a drug addict, and quite likely that he had syphilis, and was becoming more deranged as the war went on. There is little doubt that Hitler lost World War II because he made grievous errors of which the worst was probably attacking Russia (although there were others, such as not building strategic bombers). If he had been more rational for each decision that had to be made, the war might well have gone the other way for that reason alone.

In any case, the real point is that talking to a dictator is never a bad idea. Believing what he says - now that is a different matter.

Actually, one leader did have a talk with Hitler. His name was Neville Chamberlain. And we know how that worked out.

Thus we return to the world of nationalist anti-diplomacy in which every enemy is another Hitler and every diplomat is another Neville Chamberlain. This cannot be used to take out every bad guy in the world, it is instead used to justify a failed but convenient foreign policy towards most adversaries: the silent treatment. Are you a tyrant and a menace? If we can't afford to invade your country, then nyah, nyah, we won't talk to you. No carrots, no sticks, just a refusal to meet, as if the one thing that despots pine for is a handshake with Americans.

As Obama said, neither Roosevelt, nor Truman, nor Kennedy believed in the silent treatment as a diplomatic strategy. And Obama could have added Reagan, who spoke to Leonid Brezhnev in 1980, before Reagan even took office. Roosevelt sent diplomats to Japan, and to Germany. Even after direct war broke out and unconditional surrender became the policy, Roosevelt still saw no value in the silent treatment. It would have been childish.

It is true that Neville Chamberlain was a terrible diplomat and a coward, but if anything the silent treatment was closer to his thinking than to Roosevelt's. Chamberlain never had anything to say to the Soviet Union, for example, because he hated Communists. In Chamberlain's approach, either world leaders have nothing to say to each other, or they might as well be pals. This is rather like President Bush's approach, who refuses to talk to Hugo Chavez --- Chavez is one of the ones with cooties --- and then turns around and calls Putin a "friend". And King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and several others who are anything but friends.

If neither Roosevelt, nor Truman, nor Kennedy, nor Reagan believed in the silent treatment as diplomacy, another American politician did: Joseph McCarthy. It took an alcoholic demagogue to declare that all diplomacy with enemies is treason. This critique of Obama is standard McCarthyism. It is not that Obama doesn't know his history, because he does. Tom Maguire et al are C students of history, and maybe F students, lecturing an A student.

"I blew it with my first post, by forgetting to fill in the name field, but I figured it didn't make a difference because the ideas, not identities, are what matter. But then another person started commenting anonymously too, which confused things, so I apologize."

This is precisely why anonymous posting is a bad idea.

But some anonymous posting by Mr. Graveyard Strolling Puckett might be a good idea: we wouldn't have to associate the general idiocy he spews with the Puckett name. Especially on a low traffic blog like this one. The only area of semi-expertise the poor man has is some limited number of firearms, a knowledge he flourishes like a twirling baton, complementing the blog owners complete lack of knowledge on the issue. That of course assuming one does not count crappy sandals as firearms.

Rand,

The septic tank has backed up again, the shit thad does not know what it does not know has backed-up out of the drain.

"But some anonymous posting by Mr. Graveyard Strolling Puckett"

I remember you know, you are the retard that whistles past the graveyard. The one known as TLE.

Fletcher, two things. First, a prompt attack would have benefited the UK rather than Germany because Germany was builfing up its military forces faster than the UK and France. Even if Britain and France had difficulties while invading Germany, they would have the initiative, permanent naval supremacy (and a blockade of Germany), and Germany wouldn't have the reources to invade all those countries.

Second, I keep hearing the platitude that Germany's greatest mistake was to invade the USSR. The alternative was to let the USSR invade Germany. Guess which mistake would have been bigger?

Anonymous [Robert] wrote:

What should Rabin have done instead? Resort to "ethnic cleansing"?

Why do you bring up only the most extreme and unlikely alternative? The Israelis should have insisted that the PLO uphold previous agreements, stopping terrorism and anti-Israel and anti-Jewish incitement, for several years before the Israeli govt would consider negotiations. Failing that, the Israelis could have decided to sit tight - accepting that there would be no negotiations and no formal settlement - until the Palestinians tired of stalemate. Finally, the Israelis could have started assassinating PLO leaders including Arafat (i.e., the people responsible) in response to terror attacks against Israelis. The strategy Israel actually followed was a combination of bribes (appeasement), and limited military responses (while protecting Arafat and the top PA leadership) when the bribes only encouraged bad behavior by the Palestinians. Not talking to dictators, in this case the PA/PLO, would have worked better in the long run.

OHB was being both silly and ignorant (and arrogant), but while the leaders on opposing sides did not talk directly with each other there were "back-channel" communications throughout WWII - and indeed most wars.

Deals were struck in Spain involving industrial diamonds. Japanese military were invited to a test of "a powerful new explosive" (The A-Bomb) but declined, dismissing it as a propaganda move.

Come to that, how could offers of surrender be made without communication between the belligerents?

Jonathan, I brought up the specter of ethnic cleansing only because I was trying to imagine different ways for the current state of affairs to finally end.

until the Palestinians tired of stalemate.

Unfortunately, the Palestinians don't seem to get tired of stalemate, and that seems to sum up the last 40 years of history in the region.

Your suggested approach maintains the status quo, and as usual, there is no endgame. Rabin, to his credit, was trying to arrive at a final settlement.

Unilaterally putting up a wall seems to have helped. But having enemies armed with rockets on the other side of a wall from you is no way to live. A final settlement is needed, and it is going to require negotiations.

Robert wrote:

Unilaterally putting up a wall seems to have helped. But having enemies armed with rockets on the other side of a wall from you is no way to live. A final settlement is needed, and it is going to require negotiations.

Your conclusion is a non sequitur. It is also what a plurality of the Israeli political establishment was thinking in the '90s. They were wrong. Attempting negotiations with an enemy who doesn't accept your existence and who uses negotiation mainly as a military tactic to achieve its own victory is worse than doing nothing.

"Fletcher Christian
Hitler lost World War II because he made grievous errors of which the worst was probably attacking Russia
May 8, 2008 4:19 PM"

Yes, Hitler was an idiot and interfered in areas of Germany's military development and strategy that he had no business being involved with. You can tell he thought long and hard about immediate surrounding territories and France where he showed great success. Once, he started to improvise then things fell apart.

However, I feel that Germany could have handled a 2 front war if they had first gone after Russia's rich oil fields instead of a protracted siege of Stalingrad. Then, not wasted valuable troops, tanks, and fuel in the Battle of the Bulge instead using those resources in a stodgy defense along the western front. Finally, Hitler should not have wrestled with the designers of the Me-262 over whether it should be a Bomber or an interceptor. If he had let them design the aircraft as it was originally intended as a high-speed, high-altitude interceptor then Germany would have had an operation jet fighter in the air several years earlier.