A Good Old-Fashioned NASA Bash

NASA doesn't do very well explaining the goals and missions of its "missions."

Go check nasa.gov and see if you can rapidly find descriptions of the goals, mission, or accomplishments of the Shuttle and ISS Programs on their respective "home pages" on nasa.gov!

NASA has simply become a pork barrel enterprise.

> And before the station was even half-built, agency officials began complaining they had no mission and needed to fly off into the solar system.

Which "agency officials" were making such complaints?

Off hand, I remember John Young saying things like that when he was Associate Director of JSC; Sean O'Keefe during the White House space policy review and Gene Kranz voicing similar complaints in one episode of "Failure is Not an Option" on The History Channel (although he was retired by then, so not technically an "agency official").

According to "Dragonfly," many astronauts complained about not wanting to serve aboard ISS because of the long tours of duty. (Which, if true, raises questions about NASA's astronaut selection process. There's certainly no shortage of people who would give an arm and leg to go.)

The mistake of the Vision for Space Exploration was not in establishing a national goal of moving the nation (and humanity) beyond earth orbit. Such a bold and broad policy statement of our ultimate goals in space was in fact long overdue.

The mistake was in specifying in too much detail the means and schedule to do so, and in the failure to recognize that we never completed the job that was supposed to be performed by the Shuttle--developing affordable access to space.

Actually, the Vision as originally articulated had very little specified implementation detail. That was provided by the ESAS. The VSE simply pointed a strategic direction, laid out a few arbitrary dates to circumvent institutional stasis, and indicated that a major step-increase of funding for space was not in the cards. The corollary implicit in the dates (e.g., flight of first robotic flight and first human mission to the Moon) was the freedom to let the dates slip if technical issues arose -- that on this trip to the Moon, time, rather than money, was to be the free variable.

I don't think that "too much detail" was specified in the VSE, given that in response, NASA itself came up with an architecture whose details have been subject to endless debate ever since. The Vision was really a question to the agency -- given your historical, current, and likely future funding level (around 1% of the federal budget or slightly less) and a new strategic direction, can you build new spacefaring capability? The idea was to do this through new managerial approaches and new technology, including (but not limited to) the use of space resources (the only new technology specifically mentioned in the VSE speech).

The original idea behind the VSE (i.e., give the agency a new strategic direction and 'permission' to pursue it cleverly) was transmuted by NASA into the new "next program" from the beginning. The problem with 'affordable access' as a goal for NASA is that it's too nebulous ('affordable' to whom?). If we are to have a national space program (and given the nature of the federal government, it's not likely to disappear), that program should do something productive and useful with the resources it gets. Putting it on the path beyond LEO was thought to be the right direction because that's the path that the private sector would have the most difficulty pursuing, the high-risk, high-leverage things that enable human movement into the Solar System.

Paul, while ESAS certainly fleshed things out a great deal more, the VSE itself did suffer from too much specificity, in that it directed NASA to build a "Crew Exploration Vehicle," which provided it with the wedge it needed to morph the program into a monstrosity like ESAS (particularly since the VSE also confusingly gave it license to consider that the Shuttle replacement, when there should have been no "Shuttle replacement" in the sense of another NASA-developed vehicle to provide access to LEO). I also believe, in retrospect, that it was a mistake to put any time tables on getting back to the moon.

As for "affordable to whom," I would have said that it should have been NASA's goal to make it affordable for private entities to build a moon base with private funding.

I used to have a .sig on Usenet that said, "It's not NASA's role to put a man on Mars. It's NASA's role to make it possible for the National Geographic Society to put a man on Mars." I think that if we had that philosophy, we'd be a lot better off.

The problem, Rand is still a question of science, not will; although will is lacking. Heinlein's D.D. Harriman stories and even Ben Bova's Dan Randolph ouevre made the idea of commercial space exploration much more cost effective than it seems today. Maybe Branson and the other entrepreneurs will make it viable, but probably not anytime soon. That really is at the core of Whittington's criticism. You agree on so much, vitiating Henry Kissinger's line about the viciousness of academic politics. We're still at the Magellan stage, not
Drake or Hudson level of exploration; that's the real problem. Now would a Naval aviator (like most of the Mercury and Gemini astronauts; be more likely to push forward rather than an earth bound
urban activist or a rent seeking politico, Hell yes!

The problem, Rand is still a question of science, not will

It is neither a question of science or "will" (whatever that means). It is a question of flawed space policies for the past half century.

Rand,

it directed NASA to build a "Crew Exploration Vehicle," which provided it with the wedge it needed to morph the program into a monstrosity like ESAS

Actually, as originally envisioned, the CEV was to be the vehicle to take humans beyond LEO, thought an appropriate goal for NASA because there were not, as yet, commercial requirements for such missions. The purpose of affixing dates to milestones in the VSE was to get the agency over its usual bureaucratic inertia by setting time goals (nb. NOT 'deadlines') commensurate with the projected funding.

I take your broad philosophical point about what NASA should be doing and even agree with it, in part. However, I think that there are legitimate roles for the federal government in space, comparable to the ones played by the U.S. Army on the western frontier or the Royal Navy in the 19th century. These entities encouraged and protected commerce. I also note that a key role of both was to conduct exploration and reconnaissance whenever they were not otherwise engaged in keeping the peace.

Actually, as originally envisioned, the CEV was to be the vehicle to take humans beyond LEO, thought an appropriate goal for NASA because there were not, as yet, commercial requirements for such missions.

But it was very commonly understood that there would be a "gap" (albeit a shorter one) between shutdown of the Shuttle in 2010 and first flight of CEV in 2014, which implied to most people that CEV was a "Shuttle replacement" in the sense that in addition to being the lunar vehicle (and Mars vehicle, though that was always absurd) it was also going to carry NASA astronauts into space.

I'd add, Paul, that we certainly understand enough about what "affordable" means to recognize that we didn't get it from the Shuttle, though that was supposed to be one of the program goals. Like pr0n, we may not be able to define it, but we know it when we see it, and we know that ESAS won't give it to us.

I've never agreed more than with your final paragraph in this post, Rand.

Actually, as originally envisioned, the CEV was to be the vehicle to take humans beyond LEO,

Paul, as I'm sure you know, the CEV predated the Bush VSE. The acronym originally stood for Crew Escape Vehicle. Prior to that, it was called the "Orbital Space Plane." Its mission was to take humans to and from the ISS.

Even the Apollo Redux design for CEV predates the VSE (although the "Steroids" came later). John Young was one of the people pushing the idea.

All the Moonies contributed was an updated justification for the Shuttle replacement NASA already wanted to build.

thought an appropriate goal for NASA because there were not, as yet, commercial requirements for such missions.

There are a number of assumptions hidden in that statement, Paul. First, that people should only get what they "require" (and that the government should decide what they require). The Aldridge Commission did not think the American people required human spaceflight. It declared human spaceflight would "remain the province of government" for the foreseeable future -- the week after Mike Melvill earned his commercial astronaut wings. Not because anyone in the private sector required human spaceflight but because they desired it.

Second, you assume that if there's no commercial requirement for something, then it must be NASA's job to do it. There are many organizations that perform missions for which there is no commercial requirement, including private foundations, non-profits, churches, and government agencies. NASA is only one of those agencies.

Even if you assume the Federal government must undertake certain missions, it doesn't necessarily follow that NASA is the agency that must undertake them. It could be that the Air Force, NSF, or USGS is more appropriate, but neither the Bush Administration nor the Aldridge Commission ever considered such options.

Third, you assume that if something is an appropriate role for NASA, that means it must be done by civil servants. Another possible way to accomplish the same goal is by offering to purchase what the government wants (lunar missions, for example) from the private sector. That would create the "commercial requirement" you say is lacking.

I take your broad philosophical point about what NASA should be doing and even agree with it, in part. However, I think that there are legitimate roles for the federal government in space, comparable to the ones played by the U.S. Army on the western frontier

Bad analogy alert: The Army and Navy are military organizations, and the military (like private enterprise) is noteably absent from the Bush Vision of Space Exploration.

The mission of the Army in the American West was to protect settlers, not to declare that only the Army has a "requirement" to be there.

If your Vision was truly analogous to the opening of the West, you would create incentives for private enterprise to move into space and the Air Force would protect them.

I also note that a key role of both was to conduct exploration and reconnaissance whenever they were not otherwise engaged in keeping the peace.

*HOW* did the Army do that, Paul?

Noy by sending Army officers to ride over every foot of the American West. Whenever possible, the Army hired private-sector scouts and guides (Indians and mountain men) to do their reconnaissance and exploration for them.

Why couldn't NASA do the same thing? Instead of deciding that all exploration must be done by NASA astronauts, NASA could offer fixed-price payments for exploration goals it wants to see accomplished.

Also, Paul, I will note that the ESAS architecture did not originally come from NASA.

It was developed by Mike Griffin and his colleagues at the Planetary Society. Griffin brought it with him when he came to NASA.

Edward,

The nature of government agencies is not to go gently into that good night. The VSE was conceived around the immutable law of government bureaucracy -- if we are to have a NASA and to spend ~1%/year on it, it should do something useful. We never had a blank sheet of paper and were asked "What shall we do in space and how shall we do it?"

I think the real problem is not means, but ends. All the players project a different meaning/objective to the Vision (including myself). NASA has always looked at it as an agency perpetuation mechanism and naturally looks to their previous days of glory (Apollo) as a template. Hence, to them, the VSE is "Apollo to Mars."

One of your comments:

Whenever possible, the Army hired private-sector scouts and guides (Indians and mountain men) to do their reconnaissance and exploration for them.

Much of the original mapping of the west was done by regular army officers; guides were just that - guides. Not mappers and not explorers. Moreover, the Royal Navy charted the oceans largely in self-contained vessels. My point stands.

I know where the ESAS came from. So what? Griffin adopted it because it served his desire to build the big HL booster.

The VSE was conceived around the immutable law of government bureaucracy -- if we are to have a NASA and to spend ~1%/year on it, it should do something useful.

Useful to whom, Paul?

The NACA helped make America a world leader in aviation. It did a lot of basic research that supported the development of commercial and military aviation. A lot of people considered that useful, and a lot of people think NASA should be doing the same thing for human spaceflight.

Sending astronauts to the Moon just to send astronauts to the Moon might be useful to NASA employees who want more funding for their labs, but how is it useful to the taxpayers?

We never had a blank sheet of paper and were asked "What shall we do in space and how shall we do it?"

The White House did have a blank sheet of paper, Paul. The problem is, they were the only people allowed to write on it, and they only listened to NASA. The "Vision" was decided behind closed doors, and no one else was allowed to have any input. All information was funelled through two tame "journalists," one of whom was actually a lobbyist for a company that wanted to build the CEV. Then the Aldridge Commission declared that (unlike previous space policy commissions) it would not consider any alternative goals. The American people were invited to offer ideas on how you could achieve your goal, but our ideas on what the goal should be were not welcome.

Much of the original mapping of the west was done by regular army officers; guides were just that - guides. Not mappers and not explorers. Moreover, the Royal Navy charted the oceans largely in self-contained vessels. My point stands.

You're cherrypicking your data. The fact that some explorers were army officers does not mean all explorers were army officers. The Royal Navy was not the only organization that made maps. The American continent was named for an Italian pickle vendor, Amerigo Vespucci, who was one of the first to chart it. He was also the first to map the constellation of the Southern Cross. Even space science not a government monopoly in those days.

The idea that guides never made maps or explored new areas is, quite frankly, goofy. The reason the military hired guides was because they had explored the area *before* the military. Only a fool would hire a guide who didn't know the area they planned to visit.

I think you're also redefining exploration. The dictionary does not say that it is something only mapmakers or government personnel can do. It says that exploration is "travel for purposes of discovery" -- regardless of who the traveller is. If you pick up a book like "Exploring San Francisco," you'll see isn't written solely for military personnel.

Finally, you're misrepresenting the Army and Navy as early analogs of NASA -- a civilian research organization. In reality, of course, they were *military* organizations. Even if you insist on believing that the military did 100% of all exploration, that does not explain why you think space should be explored only by NASA and *NOT* by the military or the private sector.

The proper analog for military exploration would not be Apollo but DynaSoar. DynaSoar, of course, was cancelled, along with the entire military manned space program (contrary to your belief that government programs are "immutable" and can never be cancelled), and as far as I can tell, the Aldridge Commission never even considered allowing the military to play a role in the new vision of space exploration. Why not?

I know where the ESAS came from. So what? Griffin adopted it because it served his desire to build the big HL booster.

Paul, did you read the Aldridge Commission report before you signed it? Building a giant heavy-lift vehicle was one of your top recommendations:

pp 29-30:

"Although the Commission has not tried to prioritize a list of enabling technologies, we have been particularly concerned that NASA pay close attention early to assessing options for a new heavylift space launch capability. Decisions about heavy lift will guide fundamental options about how to design and implement the early stages of the space exploration architecture, and will have long-lasting impacts upon future development costs and capabilities.

"Since completion of the Apollo program and the last launch of a Saturn V, the United States has relied on the Space Shuttle for placing large payloads (roughly 55,000 pounds) into low-Earth orbit. Saturn V carried a far greater payload, approximately 250,000 pounds to low-Earth orbit. The heavy-lift variants of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELV) will soon come on-line with a capacity of lifting up to 50,000 pounds into low-Earth orbit or 30,000 pounds into geosynchronous transfer orbit.

The missions to be undertaken as part of the exploration vision will likely require a lift capability beyond today’s Space Shuttle and EELVs. There are numerous technologies and subtechnologies
that need to be developed, matured, and demonstrated to achieve the desired goals of future heavylift launch vehicles. These technologies include: hydrocarbon and hydrogen propellant engine development; lightweight, high-reliability actuation systems; low-cost range tracking systems; durable, lightweight organic, metallic, or composite structures; miniaturized avionics; integrated health monitoring and management systems; and advanced sensors for structural and environmental monitoring. Heavy-lift capability is a critical enabling technology for mission accomplishment and a plan for achieving this capability needs to be developed now."

Given your goal (landing astronauts on the Moon just to land astronauts on the Moon), that recommendation is not surprising. As you say, the problem is not the means but the end.

Unfortunately, while you're now willing to consider alternative means (almost too late), you're still stuck on the same end -- and it's a dead end.

IIRC the Shuttle's costs have improved a lot since its inception. The main engine was redesigned and it now takes more flights between engine overhauls. Also, some of the tiles were replaced with thermal blankets which are easier to maintain. Most of the costs are now related to the APU/OMS/RCS systems which use toxic hypergolic fuel.

Still, the SSME is an expensive engine. Little wonder they scrapped it from Ares, after initially using it all over the place. If I was in charge of NASA (yeah right) I would never have done 'Ares I' since the EELVs can do it just as well. As for 'Ares V', it is necessary to do manned Moon or Mars missions, but IMO the use of such missions is debatable. Why should we bother doing manned Moon or Mars missions at this juncture if it is so bloody expensive?

This would be my 20 year plan:
- make crew and ressuply capsules for EELV to ressuply ISS.
- keep Shuttle working for at least 5 more years.
- fund booster engine work: either license RD-180/RD-170 (if P&W did not do it already) or make some new indigenous hydrocarbon staged combustion engine. work on solid rockets will never lead to cheap spaceflight given they are slow to manufacture and not reusable for all intents and purposes.
- fund upper stage engine work: to allow NEO or Mars robotic sample return mission. perhaps solid core nuclear thermal or ion engines. use new upper stage in Atlas V (what the heck happened with Atlas V Heavy?).

Given your goal (landing astronauts on the Moon just to land astronauts on the Moon), that recommendation is not surprising.

That is not and never has been my goal, as you would know if you had read anything I have ever written on this. But I can now see that its clearly a waste of time discussing anything with you. Believe whatever you want.