23 thoughts on “Ukraine’s Invasion Of Russia”

  1. Just *one* unaccounted for tactical nuke with keys known outside KGB control makes for a very strong Wagner-type commando group that is likely assassination-proof.

    1. I think that would be extremely dangerous for the group concerned.

      Both from the groups and states trying to remove/destroy the thing, and also other groups trying to steal it.

    2. Agh, no edit.

      Now if the group had two or more of them, and stored them in different places, that gets somewhat more secure. Because neutralizing the threat becomes much more difficult.

  2. “One wonders if Vladimir Putin knew that not only would his three day “special military operation” in Ukraine drag on for at least two and a half years, but that Ukraine would launch a successful invasion of Kursk oblast, if he might have reconsidered ordering it.”

    Yes, because he thinks he is answering the call of destiny in reclaiming former Soviet buffer states. The only difference would be timing. But does that mean he can conquer Europe? Nope.

    Just as there was ambiguity with Biden saying things like a limited incursion would be ok, thinking Russia wont use nukes is a miscalculation. The question is under what circumstances they would use them and as this war has shown, predictions aren’t so predictive.

    1. I would have thought invasion of Russian territory would have been reason enough…

      But time and again, with this war we see all sorts of red-lines being constantly crossed.

      2. IIUC, Russia has a formal policy of when they would use nukes and that is when there are enemy actions that put the state at risk. The Kursk incursion isn’t putting the Russian state at risk.

        I believe that the main goal of the Kursk incursion was to draw Russian troops away from the Donbas. Russia has decided that they aren’t going to fall for that. So, they continue to make progress in the Donbas and will have to reclaim the Kursk oblast territory at a later time. If they complete the taking of the entire four oblasts that they annexed and secure them then they would be in a good negotiating position and Putin could reasonable proclaim a substantial victory.

        1. That analysis entirely ignores the vastly greater danger to which Russia’s interior logistics lines are now subject.

          The Ukrainians don’t have to go anywhere near either Moscow or St. Petersburg to make a thorough mess of the Russian railroad system, for example. A lot of it is electrified. The Ukrainians have very recently introduced a new domestically-produced cruise missile/drone with a much longer range than anything they’ve previously had. They’ve already used it to smear some Russian air bases and petroleum products depots. Russia seems to have no effective anti-air defense in most of its interior marches as witness the mayhem Ukraine has been able to inflict with its older drones that are basically pilotless Piper Cubs. The new missile-drones move several times faster. Even as I write this, the Ukrainians may well be making a response-in-kind to Russian attacks on their own electrical grid. I hope so.

          Knocking out both the generating stations and transmission infrastructure of Russia’s electrified railroads and burning up the diesel fuel used to run the rest of it could make it impossible for Russia to keep its troops already in the Donbas supplied and to keep any additional troops it can scrape up from putting in an appearance there. The number of Russian fighters is quite a bit less important than the number of adequately-supplied Russian fighters there are. An army, no matter how large, that runs entirely out of bullets, beans and bandages loses all status as a consequential threat.

          I think the Ukrainians are looking to make it impossible for the Russians to continue the war at a scale that offers even a faint hope of victory. I think the plan is to achieve this state of affairs as quickly as possible so as – ideally – to present to whomever the U.S. President turns out to be next year, a fait accompli that is all in their favor.

          1. You make many good and relevant points. The original post discusses nukes and the reasons why they are not being used. I simply point out that their own criteria isn’t being met by the Kursk incursion. Russia has also not been treating its annexed regions as Russia proper. So, the significant disruption of logistics as you point out is still a long ways from there own nuke use criteria of the Russian state being threatened. Ukraine has made it clear that it doesn’t even intend to hold onto Kursk territory forever and is saying nothing about overthrowing the Russian state. So, given the considerable consequences of using nukes even in a limited way explains, IMO, why they are not being used.

  3. “Yes, because he thinks he is answering the call of destiny in reclaiming former Soviet buffer states.”

    NATO nuclear missiles in north east Ukraine means the flight time to Moscow puts them inside the decision cycle time of the Russian nuke control system. Very dangerous for Russia and the world.
    If I were Vlad I’d do an underground test at my test site. He would not have to say anything but everyone would know – Russian nukes work. Do ours? It would be popcorn time to see how the Brits, French and USA sell nuke tests to their own populations.
    Note the Brits ran the last two test launches of Poseiden missiles from their boomers and both failed.
    I don’t get the Russia hate. Vlad asked to join NATO when he got into power, Bill Clinton was OK with it but the stupid neocons in Washington rebuffed him.

    1. Jesus, Mike, you’re older than I am – far too old to fall for that Putin-joining-NATO line of crap. Plenty old enough to remember when the Russians – in the form of the erstwhile Soviet Union – really were trying to take over the world by force.

      As we have seen repeatedly since he took power, Putin has never given up the goal of restoring Russian territorial control to the Soviet-era maximum – even more if he can get it. So far as I can find, the only one who ever made this NATO claim was Putin himself – in an interview with Oliver Stone of all people. Putin has a pretty obvious motive to get this cock-and-bull story out there. The only thing Russia is still as good at producing as the Soviets ever were is disinformation.

      But I’ll make you a deal. If Bill Clinton ever agrees to sit and be polygraphed about this alleged matter – and flunks the test after denying the story – I will humbly beg your pardon.

    2. NATO nuclear missiles in north east Ukraine means the flight time to Moscow puts them inside the decision cycle time of the Russian nuke control system. Very dangerous for Russia and the world.

      Why would there be NATO nuclear missiles on the Russian border? What advantage would that give NATO nations?

      I don’t get the Russia hate. Vlad asked to join NATO when he got into power, Bill Clinton was OK with it but the stupid neocons in Washington rebuffed him.

      I agree with Dick that that’s merely fiction. But consider if it were true. We see now that it would have been a good call.

  4. Russia’s nuclear bluster was always just a bluff. Any actual use of nuclear weapons would trigger a process of escalation that Moscow could not control. It would also convince the Ukrainians that Putin intended to exterminate them completely, so after that they would never surrender or negotiate under any circumstances.

    It’s also likely that Putin will no longer have any certainty about who or what he can rely on. He must be wondering if the nuclear forces are now as corrupt and incompetent as the conventional forces, whether their equipment still functions, and whether they will obey orders. If he presses the button, is it still connected to anything?

    1. Agreed. The Ukrainians discovered, early on, that most of the tanks they were capturing had had the explosive charges for their reactive armor removed and replaced with comparably-sized blocks of wood. The explosives thus removed had presumably been sold, possibly years before, on the black market. It isn’t just a few top guys in the Russian military who are corrupt. There is rot at every level.

      Every type of nuclear explosive, no matter what its size or rated yield also has chemical explosives to initiate the nuclear or thermonuclear reaction. Putin should have concerns about what – if anything – might happen should he push certain buttons. Such concerns are well-founded.

      1. If you have a nuclear weapon fleet and are serious about keeping it functional, the maintenance procedures are well-developed and reliable. The bulk of the weapon is conventional (safe and arm subsystem, fuzing, detonator subsystem, and high explosive implosion subsystem), and can be tested as a system without a nuclear pit. The implosion subsystem performance can even be verified using real-time radiography to get a movie of a surrogate pit being imploded. The only things that make it nuclear are the pit, which needs to be remanufactured periodically, the boost tritium supply, and the trigger. The latter two can be tested as subsystems, and the pit doesn’t have to be. If one of them ever worked, the same design pit will always work. It’s actually eerie how few duds there have ever been – and how many that were supposed to be duds, weren’t.

        It is difficult to imagine that the Russians wouldn’t have such a maintenance program in place. If they do, their weapons will definitely work.

        1. Testing piecewise along with validated computer modeling is why we don’t underground test anymore. Neither do they. I have to agree. But there is a point when you go below the strategic weapons how rigorous are the tactical weapons in the Soviet arsenal are being maintained. I can remember the Army’s eagerness to get rid of the aging VX munition stocks at Rockville.

        2. and how many that were supposed to be duds, weren’t.

          After all the Li-7 impurity surely cannot have a sustainable fusion capability, right? Should make for a good tamper, right?

  5. Even testing a tactical nuclear weapon could result in the loss of Chinese support and a very significant increase in NATO support for Ukraine. But, if Ukraine starts threatening Moscow then the Russian state is at risk and tactical nukes are definitely on the table.

  6. “Even testing a tactical nuclear weapon could result in the loss of Chinese support”
    Why? The Chinese would use it as an excuse to test their own so they know they work.

  7. The only land based nukes that nato has in continental Europe are a few dozen B61 freefall bombs.
    They’re a 6 bases, all over 2,000km from Moscow.
    That situation hasn’t changed in 50 years, and will not change anytime soon.
    Russia will not use nukes because China said no.

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