10 thoughts on “Kursk”

  1. Professor, I’m confused!

    What is ironic about a region where a pivotal battle was fought in WW-II would also be the site of a pivotal battle in the Ukraine war?

    The Germans invaded France early in the war through the Ardennes Forest, and they counterattacked the post D-Day Allied armies, again, through the Ardennes. No irony here, simply the facts of geography and a strategy to attack along a line of least expectation. Or was the irony that the Allies and especially the US didn’t consider that Germany would try the same strategy twice?

    Is it ironic that Ukraine is replaying history in the role of Germany, having the hubris to attack Russia in the Kurst region, only as with Germany, it will be the downfall of Ukraine? There is a bit of an anti-ironic circumstance in that then, England and the US were supplying the Soviets with materiel and intelligence reports, whereas now, England and the US are doing the same for Ukraine against Russia?

        1. I’m a Boomer (Truman baby) and I accept it. Of course I lived through much of the Cold War and remember the Soviet Union when it really was scary.

          Who seem to be having the problem you describe are all the pearl-clutching Millennials and Zoomers who think U.S. involvement – even as a weapon supplier – in the Ukraine War is a fast-track ticket to WW3.

          Putin started the war because he thought it would be a walk-over because everyone knew the Russian army was all that and a bag of chips – right? Not so much it turns out.

          Putin isn’t going to start WW3 because, having seen how poorly the conventional forces of Russia have performed, he doesn’t really want to see how badly the Strategic Rocket Force would do.

          That’s also why he hasn’t even trotted out the tactical nukes yet – when the ideal time to have done so was a week ago.

          And then there’s the evergreen problem of friendly fire which one does not want to see happen at nuclear scale.

          Plus the fact that Putin now distrusts pretty much everybody in the Russian regular military so handing the keys to any nukes – even small ones – to these iffy folks isn’t something I think he’s going to do until Ukrainian tanks are rolling across Red Square and maybe not even then.

          1. Plus the fact that Putin now distrusts pretty much everybody in the Russian regular military so handing the keys to any nukes – even small ones – to these iffy folks isn’t something I think he’s going to do

            I’m beginning to think I agree with you on this point. Nukes aren’t necessary when you can negotiate what you want. More importantly, negotiation involves subordinates who are not armed.

      1. Precisely.

        That is why I am confused about any irony here. Kursk just happens to be a place where a battle is being fought in two different historical contexts.

  2. To me, the Kursk operation is long overdue. That area was mostly undefended by Russia, unlike their lines in Ukraine. So, seizing Russian territory was a lot more viable that another failed assault into multi-layered defenses. Reminds me of McAurthur’s prefered tactics: hit ’em where they ain’t.

    The best part is this is quite harmful to Putin, especially if the Ukranians can hold onto a large area.

    Given the cards they had, I think Ukraine made the best play it could.

    1. Yeah, yeah and yeah, the old saying that amateurs talk strategy, professionals work on logistics.

      Our late, esteemed friend Mr. Prigozhin started out in the logistical hub of Rostov Am Don, where apparently the local Russian garrison was warm to his ideas of rebellion, from where he proceeded northwest towards Moscow. What if he had instead gone southeast towards the Caucasus? Fall Blau, bay-bee!

      With respect to irony, this path not chosen could have broken up the Russian Federation, toppled Mr. Putin and ended the Ukraine War, especially in light of the general unhappiness on the periphery of Russia more so than in Moscow its center. That and the Caucasus, then and now being, not the only but a significant oil-production region.

      But what was the deal with ol’ Yevgeny in accepting the all-is-forgiven from Putin and then boarding that plane? Given the history–of modern day Russia on the matter of grudges and old scores–why didn’t Mr. Prigozhin try and put as much distance between him and Mother Russia as possible and try and disappear?

      1. Yevgeny was Russian to the core. You have to be Russian to understand thinking as a Russian. To live in exile is unthinkable. Better to rule while one can and get the bullet to the back of the head than live as a beggar in a foreign land.

        The fine point he was trying to make to his old friend Vlad that the top of the military command structure was broken even though he thought he could bring Putin around to see the light was lost on KGB Vlad who obviously prefers lap dogs to loyal ovcharkas marching on Moscow.

        As a former chef, he was probably grateful to get that special case of wine with a little extra kick.

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