I did a thread on Twitter this morning.
It's worth noting that one of the reasons we never got space-based missile defense was that it was only recently that we've finally gotten launch costs down sufficiently to make it financially feasible, due to an almost demented policy failure for the past three decades. [1/n] https://t.co/ouaaIS9eUk
— Rand Simberg (@Rand_Simberg) January 18, 2019
The first serious proposal for space-based missile defense was Lowell Wood's concept of "Brilliant Pebbles": Kinetic interceptors in orbit. But in order to implement it, launch costs had to be reduced far below those of the Shuttle and conventional USAF expendables.
— Rand Simberg (@Rand_Simberg) January 18, 2019
The purpose of the DARPA DC-X program was to demonstrate the potential for reusable Single-Stage-To-Orbit, which many viewed as a requirement for low launch cost (SpaceX has since proven this to be mistaken).
— Rand Simberg (@Rand_Simberg) January 18, 2019
DC-X did demonstrate vertical take-off and landing of single vehicle in an atmosphere (the Apollo LEM was two stage in a vacuum). It also demonstrated relatively rapid turnaround of a LOX/LH2 propulsion system. But then NASA took it over.
— Rand Simberg (@Rand_Simberg) January 18, 2019
On one of the test flights of the NASA-modified vehicle, someone left a pneumatic hose off one of the legs, and it crashed and burned at White Sands, ending the program.
— Rand Simberg (@Rand_Simberg) January 18, 2019
Another thing that the DC-X program demonstrated before its demise was that traditional cost models for new concepts were utter crap. SpaceX has since validated that. NAFCON cost model has been shown to be worse than worthless for non-traditional activities.
— Rand Simberg (@Rand_Simberg) January 18, 2019
One of the biggest launch-policy errors of the 90s was to confine the military to expendables, and assign reusable space transports to NASA. It was nothing short of disastrous, setting us back over a decade.
— Rand Simberg (@Rand_Simberg) January 18, 2019
After the X-33 debacle, which no one saw coming except anyone who understood how to do X programs, the idiotic lesson (fallacy of hasty generalization) drawn from it by NASA was that reusable launch systems weren't practical. Tell it to SpaceX.
— Rand Simberg (@Rand_Simberg) January 18, 2019
X-33 should never have been awarded to Lockmart (their proposal wasn't compliant, in that the business plan was nonsense, but no one at MSFC would recognize a business plan if it kicked them in the ass). Also, should never have been a single award.
— Rand Simberg (@Rand_Simberg) January 18, 2019
A key rule of X programs is that a vehicle only tests one new technology, on a platform that is otherwise well understood. VentureStar was testing single-stage to Montana, with a linear aerospike engine, and a conformal composite hydrogen tank. Huge and obvious tech risk.
— Rand Simberg (@Rand_Simberg) January 18, 2019
X-33 was an example of NASA's Wile E. Coyote approach to technology development: Try some crazy thing, then when it doesn't work, don't try to figure out why and improve it, just assume it can't be done and go on to the next crazy thing.
— Rand Simberg (@Rand_Simberg) January 18, 2019
And so we entered the 21st century with no one, neither USAF or NASA, even attempting to get launch costs down. Former was focused on mission assurance of expendable EELVs, and latter had devolved into a jobs program for giant expendable rockets.
— Rand Simberg (@Rand_Simberg) January 18, 2019
But now, having done that, it's useful to go back and re-examine concepts for space-based missile defense that were financially infeasible with traditional launch costs of many thousands of dollars per pound. Cubesats are also a game changer.
— Rand Simberg (@Rand_Simberg) January 18, 2019
[Update a couple minutes later]
Trump’s missile-defense strategy.
As I noted above, if the space segment is now feasible, it’s despite, not because of government launch policy for the past three decades (except possibly for COTS).
Oh no! The missiles are in Alaska, so they must not be good for anything.
Maybe these chuckleheads should contemplate a little more why no one outside their tiny little bubble likes them.
Oh, come on. Just look at a map of the United States. Alaska is in an inset map down there southwest of L.A.
How many Russian or North Korean nukes are going to come from that direction?
The other thing we got from our investment in missile defense was the collapse of the Soviet Union. A Soviet economist testified to congress that at the end they were spending over 30 percent GDP on defense.
If starship meets its cost targets, I wonder if you could keep a fleet of brilliant pebbles interceptors on standby and launch them on demand? You could have guaranteed replenishment of the consternation. You could also agument the base number in a time of crisis.
“Consternation” for constellation is a great autocorrect in this context.
At least we are finally moving past the era of launch constipation.
It’s remarkable how many mediocre people in the anti-anti-ballistic missile camp have made careers out of refusing to have a serious debate. I wonder if more than a handful of them read the book “High Frontier” when it was published almost four decades ago. (https://tinyurl.com/y76pqq8v) Most of them clearly have not considered its the arguments of the pro-defense side with due diligence.
“Most of them clearly have not considered its the arguments of the pro-defense side with due diligence.”
That’s because their purpose was to keep that portion of US resources from being used for things the USSR could not do nearly as fast. For instance, when we had a debate on SDIO here in Portland in 1983, one of the most persistent arguments by the “con” side debater was that the imminence of a successful US BMD system would cause the USSR to attack just *before* it became operational. He ignored continually that he had previously denounced the suicidal nature of ballistic missile and nuclear weapons when both sides in WW3 had them together.
This speaker was arranged for the debate by a young “activist” male, who also harangued me outside the debate about “Able Archer”, and how the networks he was in were saying people should watch for it being the start of a nuclear surprise attack. It was 15 years later that I learned that Able Archer, as a NATO exercise, was real, and was a high concern of the Soviet KGB, because they thought it was a ruse to disguise the beginnings of a nuclear war with the USSR.
The “activist” you describe pretty obviously got his talking points from the CPUSA or one of its innumerable front groups. These people seemed to make up the majority of the ‘Ground Zero’ and ‘Nuclear Freeze’ “movement” leadership during the early 80’s hubbub anent both “Star Wars” and the retaliatory stationing of Pershing 2’s and cruise missiles in Europe by the Reagan administration as a response to the Soviet SS-20’s aimed at Western Europe. I was involved in pro-SDI activism in those days and ran into these people a lot. The turnouts for public demos were sizable until the Pershing and cruise deployments were actually done. At that point, the whole “movement” magically dried up and blew away – a bit like those
“caravans” of “asylum seekers” in Mexico that did likewise once the Congressional midterm election was over. Lefties are quite prompt about cutting their losses once a given ploy has failed.
Why not write a counter piece for the Atlantic Rand?
It was a pretty lazy article with a bunch of crude cost assumptions based on old data.
I bet you could mass produce a shit ton of interceptors cost wise compared to an ICBM.
After all, all ICBMs are fundamentally expendable launch vehicles. One use and therefore have an irreducible cost.
We’re now learning to mass produce sats. That will be a cost game changer.
There’d be little point in Rand wasting his time. The Atlantic was once a fairly heterodox publication, but that was a long time ago. For most of the last two decades it has been a reliably left-only publication like The New Republic, and The New Yorker.
I meant to say New Atlantis, I don’t know why I said Atlantic.
“I bet you could mass produce a shit ton of interceptors cost wise compared to an ICBM.“ Interceptors look expensive because it has taken a lot of R&D to get one to work. So if you spread that cost over a small production run you get sticker shock. Economic illiterates take that cost as a given then compare it to ICBMs which have have been in use much longer and conclude that more ICBMs would always be cheaper than more interceptors. However, economics suggests that the cost of ICBMs are probably not going much lower while the cost of missile interceptors will come down quite a bit. This doesn’t even include using lasers.
You can also go big. What kind of battlesat could you build with 9m (folded) and 100 tonnes?
(Smaller and more numerous, of course, has a significant advantage in system survivability, but still…)
100 tones is almost two Main Battle Tanks, you can start armoring the fuck out of things with that kind of throw weight.