They had twelve days to live, but they didn’t know it, and their fate was sealed.
7 thoughts on “Thirteen Years Ago”
I don’t agree with the premise that their fate was sealed the moment the foam struck, and I never have. Probably sealed, fine, I agree, but not certainly.
There were things that could have been tried if NASA hadn’t taken the ostrich approach. Things with a slim chance of working, but slim is better than none. For example, imaging the damaged area (they canceled a request to have the national reconnaissance office do this) or a spacewalk to view the damaged area. The latter (due to no RMS on that flight) would have required an astronaut doing a free drift on a tether, but that’s not risky.
Once the damage was seen, and *assuming* it actually was similar to what and where NASA later calculated (a hole about the size of a basket ball in the leading edge CC) there MIGHT have been a survivable option; a jury rigged repair. Essentially, the Carbon Carbon leading edge was a hollow dome (seen side on) in front of the front spar. So, fill a plastic bag with water, and place it in there. Then cover it with a piece of steel or whatever was available, both inside and outside. Tape it in place. Then cold-soak that wing on orbit (via shading it). The thermal mass of the ice, plus the delay to burn through caused by the sheeting, *might* have been enough to at least get to a bail-out altitude and velocity. A slim chance, but better than zero. And yep, doing a spacewalk to do that kind of work without a foot restraint would be very hard. Even just cold-soaking the wing could have improved their odds slightly (they were already past peak reentry heating when it failed).
Further things they could have done; altered the reentry ground track by landing on a different orbit, so that the ground track wasn’t over major cities (for example, Dallas, where the debris would have impacted had the shuttle broken up a few seconds earlier). In other words, use the sort of ground tracks every post-Columbia flight used. Also, Edwards would have been a better landing site for a vehicle that may well be experiencing control impairment. Instead, for no reason, and knowing there was a risk to innocent lives on the ground, they did nothing. That alone is inexcusable.
It wasn’t just the wing that failed, it was NASA, and it failed in many ways.
I agree with some of your sentiment. The primary disagreement is that it wasn’t just a lack of an arm, but also the lack of an airlock. A spacewalk would have meant using precious consumables, so that negates a spacewalk for inspection.
The thing is, the imagery would have been easy and cheap. It would have required the vehicle to be in the correct attitude as it passed over assets, but that data would have assisted the Columbia crew, and if it was too late for them, it would have given NASA key information for protecting future missions.
The biggest thing I agree with was the knowledge would have driven an effort to learn from the situation. NASA would have tried something, and each of those efforts would have taught many lessons. Some of those efforts might have gotten the crew closer to ground for bailout. It likely would not have been enough, but NASA would have gained valuable information.
There is also the concept that the imagery may have prevented a disintegration over heavily populated areas. It was amazing no one on the ground was killed.
As for the psychology of the crew knowing their fate may be doomed; one need only talk about the matter with the STS-27 crew. They thought their life was over, and they got lucky.
@ Leyland,
Are you certain there was no airlock capability? I know there was a spacehab in the cargo bay, and the access tunnel ran from Colombia’s usual airlock location, but I thought there was an airlock capability of some sort? What may be influencing my memory is the rescue option (Atlantis) discussed in the accident report would have required one in both vehicles.
And, though I can’t find a cite regarding an airlock capability on Columbia, I did just spot a repair option that was pretty much spot on for what I proposed regarding a water bag, though it included titanium tools (I didn’t think of that). That repair option, too, would have required an airlock.
Of course, if there was no airlock, everything I proposed that might have increased their survival chances, save for the wing cold soak, was utterly impossible.
CJ,
Airlock and airlock capability are perhaps too different things.
I’m going by memory, because I don’t want to go back through the CAIB report. Columbia was too heavy for ISS missions, so it didn’t get the update that moved the airlock from inside the Crew Compartment, to outside in the payload bay with the docking adapter for ISS. The SpaceHab module in the payload bay would have connected to the interface of the crew compartment, which would nominally be the exit for Columbia’s airlock.
The rescue options I recall has the cabin being depressed to vacuum. The crew could don their ascent and entry suits for survival. I recall rumors that an EVA suit may have been onboard, but can’t recall the veracity of those claims, because it depends on if you believe NASA saved all unnecessary weight or carried a suit as a precaution. I do recall that rescue with another vehicle would have been from the crew hatch on the side with some sort of rope system between orbiters.
From this memory, I could see how repair may have been tempted (lacking other options), but I professionally would not have supported an inspection by EVA without other evidence. But I also have a bit of knowledge to know that obtaining imagery would have been relatively trivial. I didn’t have clearance, so I’m giving no secrets. But a simple concept is to understand that these specialized assets required trained operators, and those operators practiced on vehicles they could later inspect on the ground to judge their analysis accuracy. In short, it would have been a literal training exercise.
I may be wrong but I recall reading that for every Shuttle flight, the crew was trained to be able to do an emergency EVA in the event the bay doors didn’t close properly. That would imply that an airlock was available on every flight.
They were past peak heating when the wing failed, but they were moving into the part of the flight where mechanical loads were becoming larger. The wing had already been fatally structurally compromised, with much of the internal structure melted away behind the breach.
There is a highway that runs from Spokane to Cheney, where Michael Anderson went to highschool. It was a narrow rutted two lane highway that was dangerous in good weather and worse with fog or in winter. There is a lot of commuter traffic and there were frequent serious accidents and far too many fatalities.
After the Columbia disaster, they widened the highway, upgraded the surface material, added rumble strips along the centerline, put lights up for most of the distance, and renamed the highway after Anderson.
Exiting Cheney, heading to Spokane there is a sign that reads how many days since the last serious accident. Its been a while since I was out there but I think its been up in the 600s before so serious accidents are much less frequent.
Maybe some kids will be inspired by the buildings named after him or see the statue and think that if he could do it, they can too but its nice to see a memorial that actually had measurable beneficial effects on people’s lives.
Sadly though, they didn’t upgrade the road going out the other end of town and a kid got killed a few years back.
There is a little something you won’t find on Wikipedia.
I don’t agree with the premise that their fate was sealed the moment the foam struck, and I never have. Probably sealed, fine, I agree, but not certainly.
There were things that could have been tried if NASA hadn’t taken the ostrich approach. Things with a slim chance of working, but slim is better than none. For example, imaging the damaged area (they canceled a request to have the national reconnaissance office do this) or a spacewalk to view the damaged area. The latter (due to no RMS on that flight) would have required an astronaut doing a free drift on a tether, but that’s not risky.
Once the damage was seen, and *assuming* it actually was similar to what and where NASA later calculated (a hole about the size of a basket ball in the leading edge CC) there MIGHT have been a survivable option; a jury rigged repair. Essentially, the Carbon Carbon leading edge was a hollow dome (seen side on) in front of the front spar. So, fill a plastic bag with water, and place it in there. Then cover it with a piece of steel or whatever was available, both inside and outside. Tape it in place. Then cold-soak that wing on orbit (via shading it). The thermal mass of the ice, plus the delay to burn through caused by the sheeting, *might* have been enough to at least get to a bail-out altitude and velocity. A slim chance, but better than zero. And yep, doing a spacewalk to do that kind of work without a foot restraint would be very hard. Even just cold-soaking the wing could have improved their odds slightly (they were already past peak reentry heating when it failed).
Further things they could have done; altered the reentry ground track by landing on a different orbit, so that the ground track wasn’t over major cities (for example, Dallas, where the debris would have impacted had the shuttle broken up a few seconds earlier). In other words, use the sort of ground tracks every post-Columbia flight used. Also, Edwards would have been a better landing site for a vehicle that may well be experiencing control impairment. Instead, for no reason, and knowing there was a risk to innocent lives on the ground, they did nothing. That alone is inexcusable.
It wasn’t just the wing that failed, it was NASA, and it failed in many ways.
I agree with some of your sentiment. The primary disagreement is that it wasn’t just a lack of an arm, but also the lack of an airlock. A spacewalk would have meant using precious consumables, so that negates a spacewalk for inspection.
The thing is, the imagery would have been easy and cheap. It would have required the vehicle to be in the correct attitude as it passed over assets, but that data would have assisted the Columbia crew, and if it was too late for them, it would have given NASA key information for protecting future missions.
The biggest thing I agree with was the knowledge would have driven an effort to learn from the situation. NASA would have tried something, and each of those efforts would have taught many lessons. Some of those efforts might have gotten the crew closer to ground for bailout. It likely would not have been enough, but NASA would have gained valuable information.
There is also the concept that the imagery may have prevented a disintegration over heavily populated areas. It was amazing no one on the ground was killed.
As for the psychology of the crew knowing their fate may be doomed; one need only talk about the matter with the STS-27 crew. They thought their life was over, and they got lucky.
@ Leyland,
Are you certain there was no airlock capability? I know there was a spacehab in the cargo bay, and the access tunnel ran from Colombia’s usual airlock location, but I thought there was an airlock capability of some sort? What may be influencing my memory is the rescue option (Atlantis) discussed in the accident report would have required one in both vehicles.
And, though I can’t find a cite regarding an airlock capability on Columbia, I did just spot a repair option that was pretty much spot on for what I proposed regarding a water bag, though it included titanium tools (I didn’t think of that). That repair option, too, would have required an airlock.
Of course, if there was no airlock, everything I proposed that might have increased their survival chances, save for the wing cold soak, was utterly impossible.
CJ,
Airlock and airlock capability are perhaps too different things.
I’m going by memory, because I don’t want to go back through the CAIB report. Columbia was too heavy for ISS missions, so it didn’t get the update that moved the airlock from inside the Crew Compartment, to outside in the payload bay with the docking adapter for ISS. The SpaceHab module in the payload bay would have connected to the interface of the crew compartment, which would nominally be the exit for Columbia’s airlock.
The rescue options I recall has the cabin being depressed to vacuum. The crew could don their ascent and entry suits for survival. I recall rumors that an EVA suit may have been onboard, but can’t recall the veracity of those claims, because it depends on if you believe NASA saved all unnecessary weight or carried a suit as a precaution. I do recall that rescue with another vehicle would have been from the crew hatch on the side with some sort of rope system between orbiters.
From this memory, I could see how repair may have been tempted (lacking other options), but I professionally would not have supported an inspection by EVA without other evidence. But I also have a bit of knowledge to know that obtaining imagery would have been relatively trivial. I didn’t have clearance, so I’m giving no secrets. But a simple concept is to understand that these specialized assets required trained operators, and those operators practiced on vehicles they could later inspect on the ground to judge their analysis accuracy. In short, it would have been a literal training exercise.
I may be wrong but I recall reading that for every Shuttle flight, the crew was trained to be able to do an emergency EVA in the event the bay doors didn’t close properly. That would imply that an airlock was available on every flight.
They were past peak heating when the wing failed, but they were moving into the part of the flight where mechanical loads were becoming larger. The wing had already been fatally structurally compromised, with much of the internal structure melted away behind the breach.
There is a highway that runs from Spokane to Cheney, where Michael Anderson went to highschool. It was a narrow rutted two lane highway that was dangerous in good weather and worse with fog or in winter. There is a lot of commuter traffic and there were frequent serious accidents and far too many fatalities.
After the Columbia disaster, they widened the highway, upgraded the surface material, added rumble strips along the centerline, put lights up for most of the distance, and renamed the highway after Anderson.
Exiting Cheney, heading to Spokane there is a sign that reads how many days since the last serious accident. Its been a while since I was out there but I think its been up in the 600s before so serious accidents are much less frequent.
Maybe some kids will be inspired by the buildings named after him or see the statue and think that if he could do it, they can too but its nice to see a memorial that actually had measurable beneficial effects on people’s lives.
Sadly though, they didn’t upgrade the road going out the other end of town and a kid got killed a few years back.
There is a little something you won’t find on Wikipedia.