Chaired by Berin Szoka, head of the new Institute for Space Law and Policy. Other panelists are Kerry Scarlott, of Posternak, Blankenstein and Lund LLP (a Boston law firm), Dennis Wingo of Orbital Recovery and Skycorp, and Randall Clague , government liaison of XCOR Aerospace.

Scarlott talks about how ITAR works, and how it serves as an impediment to what we’re trying to do. Three export control paradigms in US. Export Control Act (munitions items on the munitions list), Export Administration Act (dual-use goods), and other ad hoc presidential orders.

In 1999 all controls from Administration Act were moved to Export Control Act, which had profound effects on how it affects our industry (there’s a lot of history behind this, but he doesn’t discuss it, and I don’t have time to go into it right now while I’m trying to transcribe). It’s administered by the State Department, Director of Trade and Controls. They have a stringent attitude on how ITAR is applied. Small set of regs (forty pages of text). US Munitions List is the heart of it. Has twenty-one categories. Space technologies are covered by Category 15. Includes some basic catch-alls–anything that can be designed, used by a space vehicle or satellite (including technical data and defense services). It serves to pretty much capture everything we do. The “Deemed Export Rule” provides that you can be subject to licensing requirements of ITAR even if you don’t actually export–sharing of tech data with a foreign national within the US is sufficient (e.g, plant tour, meeting, etc.) which has become an onerous licensing requirement. Under ITAR, and export subject to ITAR requires an export license, including the “Deemed Exports” described above. These are granted through applications submitted to the State Department, and can take from weeks to months to a year, with no certain outcome. It’s a very anal bureaucratic process (paraphrasing here). It applies even to data that’s in the public domain–that’s been excepted out of Category 15, making it more onerous than any other category. He doesn’t understand why this category is subject to higher control, but this is a key point to make in lobbying. There is a Canadian exception, but few others. Most allies are treated almost exactly like North Korea.

After this intro, Randall Clague talks about the prospect of XCOR being an “arms dealer.” It costs them a lot of money to remain compliant and out of jail, and they view it as a protection racket. Propellants are on the list as well as hardware, and liquid oxygen, and kerosene cannot be exported. Candle was is on the list, technical data about them cannot be put on a web site where a foreign national can read it. You can buy Sutton, the canonical rocket book, in Syria, but you can’t put excerpts on your web site, where foreigners might read it.

Dennis Wingo follows. Founded Orbital Recovery to extend life of geostationary satellites. Company morphed from an American one to a European one because that was where the money and market was. They wanted to choose Dutch Space as a prime contractor, and contract with Arianespace for launch, and use German robotics. They had to find a law firm with an ex State Department guy on their staff to make things go smoother. He has technical assistance agreements to talk about people within his own company, and to talk to European suppliers, and to overseas customers. He has trouble talking to many companies because they don’t want to have to deal with signing the various agreements that the State Department requires.

He describes what would happen if Intel had to deal with this (ITAR Inside). For EACH processor sold to Lenovo (a Chinese company), they’d have to hire lawyers for the paperwork, instruct each customer, etc. Each meatting would only be able to take customer requirements, and answer direct questions associated with that requirement. (“Does it have an L2 Cache?” “I can’t tell you that.”)

They wouldn’t be able to include Windows (that would require a separate agreement). They’d also have to have another agreement to include Office.

The American computer industry wouldn’t be what it is today had such regulations been applied to them.

European industry has a stated policy of becoming ITAR free. Hundreds of millions of Euros are being spent to implement this. Sensors, actuators, antennae and software development underway, costing us huge European markets.

A brand new 21 Gigaflop process and computer running advanced mathematic software can be built and sold in Hong Kong for a few thousand. An antique actuator requires a technical agreement from the State Department to export one.

Need to go back to Reagan-era policy–Rohrabacher’s “Free Trade With Free People’s” approach. Deny advanced technology to our declared adversaries (sell them the old stuff). Free trade with everyone else.

This would vastly improve export sales in the US, and render moot the money that ESA and the EU is spending on ITAR remediation. He also points out that we have no appreciation of just what an irritation this is to Europe.

Point in discussion that has to be made over and over. This is not about space. It’s about national security, and the current regime is making us less, not more safe, and is resulting in a loss of our technological edge.

The major space companies don’t mind it that much, because they view it as a cost of doing business, and it presents a barrier to entry for newcomers, so they won’t lobby against it.

Clague notes that he’s not opposed to true useful export controls. What he opposes is the artificial and arbitrary definition of what they’re doing as export of advanced technology, when it is not.