I had a brief email exchange with Jeff Greason, CEO of XCOR Aerospace but also (and more importantly in the context of this post) member of the Augustine panel, to get his thoughts on last week’s SLS announcement.
RS: To what degree do you think that Congress’s and (by extension, because they have to, as numerous congresspeople have demanded, “follow the law”) NASA’s current plans conform to what the Augustine panel suggested? And do you think that they are the most effective ways of opening up space?
JG: As far as I can discern NASA’s SLS/MPCV architecture, it seems to fall within the parameters we studied on the Committee. An architecture like that needed something like $12B/year for human spaceflight in order to actually do exploration missions within NASA’s traditional cost structure. Right now it looks like the budget available will be more like $9B or even $8B/year. That suggests that NASA is repeating the Constellation mistake of beginning a development path that cannot be carried to a useful point without an increase in budget. The difference is that the last time we did that, there were serious policymakers who thought the budget might actually be increased, and this time, I don’t think there are.
I’m not saying that SLS can’t be built — only that if it is built, the cost of keeping it operating will be so high that NASA’s budget won’t support developing, for example, planetary landers that would be needed to make it useful.
Therefore, I don’t think the SLS approach is a very effective way to open up space, nor to show national leadership. Part of what it takes to do something effective is to match the program approach to the budget available. If NASA had a top-line budget of $25B/year and that could be sustained, this might be an executable approach. At $18B/year or less, I don’t think it is.
RS: Ignoring the issue of whether or not it is executable, is it the best use of NASA’s limited resources, assuming (and I understand this is a generous assumption) that the goal is to actually develop and settle space?
JG: Whether, as I think, opening a space frontier should be NASA’s goal, or whether NASA’s goal is simply human exploration of space, it is hard to see the SLS approach as the best use of limited resources.
Looking simply at exploration, the obvious destinations are low-gravity bodies such as NEOs or Phobos/Deimos, or the Moon, or Mars. Depending on the pace of missions and how the architecture is done, it takes at least 150-200 tons/year for some human exploration, 300-400 tons/year for a fairly robust program, and Mars exploration requires quite a bit more, unless you inject new technologies to reduce it.
The Committee found that while our existing 25-ton launch vehicles were too small or fly too infrequently for a robust human exploration program, 70 tons was ample. We did not thoroughly explore sizes in between but from what I learned there, my opinion is that 35- to 50-ton vehicles, if low cost and scalable to a reasonable flight rate, are probably sufficient. Doing an Apollo-class mission takes two or three launches of 50- to 70-ton vehicles, and with launchers that size propellant depots aren’t mandatory but it really does help to simply transfer propellant between spacecraft. It is tractable in the near term to do missions that way.
The U.S. can have 50- 70-ton vehicles that come from the same industrial base as existing launch vehicles — Atlas 5 Phase II and Falcon Heavy. NASA could fund both of those vehicles for a total of about $3-$4B, comfortably — a small fraction of SLS development costs. And the annual cost to keep the vehicles flying would probably be under $0.5B/year because they come from the same production lines as other, smaller launchers that have other customers. It is hard to say what SLS will cost to keep operating but based on what I saw on the Committee I would expect more than $2B/year. It would be far cheaper to launch two of the alternative vehicles than one SLS, so I cannot see how SLS offers good value compared to the alternatives.
The capsule picture is a lot more complicated and it is hard to say what makes a good capsule strategy without clear mission requirements. I can envision some architectures under which MPCV might be a good tool in the toolbox.
RS: Regardless of the tendency of those who make decisions on the Hill to favor pork over progress, how do you see things playing out over the next few years in terms of both the development of private space, and space development in general?
JG: Guessing what the future will bring depends a bit on policy choices by government that aren’t very predictable. I think suborbital providers will enter into service in the next few years. Orbital cargo, of course, has been done privately for all customers except NASA since 1986 and more recently all NASA science missions have been launched privately. One of the last bastions is ISS cargo resupply, and I think one or both of the private companies working on that will get there.
Commercial crew service for NASA is an arena where most of the programmatic risk is driven by NASA itself. There’s no doubt that some of the U.S. providers, which includes firms like Boeing and ULA, have the technical capability to provide commercial crew transportation to orbit. Whether NASA will choose to purchase those services on commercially reasonable terms remains to be seen. Commercial crew transportation to orbit is a classic situation where the demand, such as commercial habitats, won’t grow without the supply, and the supply won’t be built without the demand. A well-executed commercial crew program could speed up a commercial market considerably — a badly executed one, or the absence of one, could slow it down.
I am a little surprised that the importance of commercial crew for exploration missions hasn’t been more widely appreciated. Once there is a commercial crew transportation service, it is no longer necessary to “man rate” exploration boosters — you can ferry the crew up to the spacecraft on a different launch. So even if something like SLS were used to launch exploration payloads, NASA’s released information suggests that it would be used for cargo well before would be available for crew. Using commercial crew to orbit as part of an exploration strategy could therefore be a very valuable part of accelerating human exploration, but it is seldom considered in mission architectures that I’ve seen.
As usual, very reasonable opinions from a very reasonable person. If only the U.S. Congress was filled with such people, maybe then we might have a space program for which we could be proud.
Good stuff, probably mostly obvious to everyone reading that here.
One nit:
>>assuming (and I understand this is a generous assumption) that the goal is to actually develop and settle space?
The assumption is beyond generous : None of the parties involved, the lawmakers, the administration and NASA leadership itself has ever articulated this as a goal, its not even in NASA charter.
Once one acknowledges that, things happening within and around NASA start making much more sense. And also become immediately of much smaller relevance ..
I think he makes an important point in the last paragraph:
I am a little surprised that the importance of commercial crew for exploration missions hasn’t been more widely appreciated. Once there is a commercial crew transportation service, it is no longer necessary to “man rate” exploration boosters — you can ferry the crew up to the spacecraft on a different launch. So even if something like SLS were used to launch exploration payloads, NASA’s released information suggests that it would be used for cargo well before would be available for crew. Using commercial crew to orbit as part of an exploration strategy could therefore be a very valuable part of accelerating human exploration, but it is seldom considered in mission architectures that I’ve seen.
Given the stupidity of government, if they’re going to go ahead with the SLS boondoggle, avoiding the expense of “man-rating” SLS would make a lot of sense. You could launch an Orion capsule sans crew and send the crew up on a separate vehicle. That would save money on developing an LES for Orion and on “man-rating” SLS, likely reducing program costs by several billion dollars. Except to the porkers, the extra expense is a feature, not a bug as it means more jobs in their districts.
“reader” hit it on the head. Congress is not stupid– they simply have different objectives than the readers here. Their goal is to employ people in their districts for the next decade or two, not to colonize space. The SLS succeeds for them.
Larry J, if Orion/MPCV is launched ‘sans crew’, we don’t need SLS, ‘man-rated’ or otherwise. LockMar plans to launch the first unmanned tests of MPCV using Delta IV Heavy. So, launching with a full crew becomes necessary as part of the justification for SLS.
I have an idea. How about we get de-socialize the space program and let the market figure out the transportation business?
No disagreement, Dean. I’m just saying that if the morons in Congress are going to force NASA to build the SLS boondoggle (hint: I don’t want them to do it), then dropping the man-rating (whatever that means) for SLS will save a lot of money. The fact that they can use a Delta IV Heavy to launch an unmanned Orion just makes the case even stronger. If they’re going to build the SLS monstrocity, use it for cargo only. It’d be an even bigger waste of money to man-rate SLS. Of course, IMO they shouldn’t build SLS at all because it’s unnecessary and a big waste of money.
It makes more sense to use an SLS for launching crew only, directly to L1/L2 as there are real (but minor) advantages to using a single launch in stead of LEO rendezvous. This would leave cargo (including propellant) to commercial launchers, which will help more to establish cheap lift.
Man-rating SLS also increases the probability of cancellation.
MPM,
In that case lets demand it be man-rated! Anything else we can do to get it cancelled faster?
It makes more sense to use an SLS for launching crew only…. This would leave cargo (including propellant) to commercial launchers,
Using what for money?
NASA doesn’t even have enough money to build SLS — let alone funds left over to buy commercial launches.
If NASA had a dime for every time someone proposed that NASA should “just do everything” — completely ignoring the cost — well, they probably still couldn’t afford it, but they’d be a lot closer. 🙂
Anything else we can do to get it cancelled faster?
It has to do 130mT in one go, no incremental development of a 70mT version first, 10m fairings on the first flight, J2 engines, 5 seg composite boosters.
Entertaining video of the senate debates: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uVBHPEoEByU&feature=player_embedded
Greason’s way smarter than me, but I still think he gets one key thing wrong: Even with a budget of 25 billion a year, NASA will be “underfunded” and running failed/failing programs. That’s simply the nature of government agencies. Look at the DoD. It gets anywhere between 500-700 billion (depending on who you’re reading) and their boosters, contractors, Congress reps, still cry poverty. “We need 13 carriers!” “We need 6 DDG-1000s!” “We need F-35s *and* F-22s!” And on and on and on.
In an alternate universe where NASA banks 25 billion a year, you can be guaranteed they’re still be struggling to land a man on Mars (“We need 30 billion a year!” and still struggling to pull off sample-return, flagship missions, space telescopes, etc.
It’s the nature of the beast because it is a beast.
Polya (I wish I still had my copy of ‘How to solve it’) points out that many problems are best solved backwards.
If we say we are going to put a base on the moon (settlement is still too big a word for NASA) then you do not start with the launch system; you start with the lander. Imagine the respect NASA would get if they did that.
Instead, we have political power as their objective. Suggesting that elimination should be our goal and forget having anything to do with NASA+space.
Not the best quality but here ya go Ken http://serl.iiit.ac.in/cs6600/book.pdf
>> Anything else we can do to get it cancelled faster?
Yes. Field another alternative that flies sooner and cheaper. With stellar flight record, a full flight manifest, and hitherto unseen flight rates.
I’m afraid that the current space tech industry base is too small, there are too few companies trying too few things. It certainly seemed there were far more competitors around in the early days of aviation.
Point being, all of the currently proposed commercial alternatives may fail, or get turned into part of the borg ( see the SAA vs FAR )
Point being, all of the currently proposed commercial alternatives may fail, or get turned into part of the borg ( see the SAA vs FAR )
It gets worse. The plan is to downselect to a single provider, not for the next round but the round after that. That defeats the whole purpose of course. I’m sure that’s not by accident, the bad guys want to be able to say we need a backup. Of course they’ll do their best to sabotage the downselected “commercial” supplier so their “backup” can step in – as they always intended.
I hope SpaceX and Boeing get significant funding in the next round and that Boeing wins the downselect since SpaceX will likely develop a manned Dragon anyway. In that way we still have a chance of getting competing crew launch options.
Of course, we should continue to fight these machinations too.
>>I hope SpaceX and Boeing get significant funding in the next round
I actually hope they dont. I hope the “commercial” providers can figure out how to make a business without needing government involvement or cash injections.
Novel viewpoint ? I think not.
I hope the “commercial” providers can figure out how to make a business without needing government involvement or cash injections.
What if that’s not possible at today’s launch prices?
Thanks Wodun.
>>What if that’s not possible at today’s launch prices?
It obviously is not possible at _todays_ launch prices.
The entire hoopla is about lowering launch prices. SpaceX took a stab at it, it will remain to be seen that their price points will create a market. Their launch manifest seems to indicate that, but they are not actually flying any paying payloads now, so i guess the jury is out.
And if it nobody can work it out, then the current methods for getting to orbit are a dead end anyway, much like Zeppelins were for air travel. Perhaps an equivalent of an airplane ( orbital RLVs, skyhooks, who knows ) will come along eventually.
The entire hoopla is about lowering launch prices.
But commercial crew by itself isn’t a promising way to do that. If we’re optimistic we can hope that availability of two commercial crew taxis would allow Bigelow to tap funding by various governments and increase flight rates by enough to reduce launch prices by enough to get some extra commercial clients. I don’t think we can get there from here within ten years without government funding.
But commercial crew by itself isn’t a promising way to do that.
In its SAA form, it was a reasonable market-like stimulus for accelerating development of supply side of the orbital human spaceflight market.
From the sounds of it, FAR rules may twist the incentives enough that the eventual outcomes could be actually negative, from actually developing such markets point of view. ( although there are claims around that the change isnt actually that much of a deal, and all the important incentives will be kept )
Sadly, most of the people voting in the poll at nasaspaceflight think SLS makes sense.
http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=26792.0
I wonder if that is an accurate prediction of the percentage of members that will jump ship to the new NASA Watch forums if the overwhelming pro-SLS bias on NSF persists.
I don’t think we can get there from here within ten years without government funding
It makes sense to pursue govt. funding, but the big push will come with a change of mindset that makes govt. funding almost to totally irrelevant. A mindset change that is not likely to happen until after we demonstrate certain capabilities. So today we wait.