Paul Spudis says that it’s time to restore the Vision for Space Exploration, and proposes a way to do it that is launch-system independent. Too bad that Mike Griffin couldn’t do that.
I never had a problem with the VSE per se, though I think that the Aldridge Commission erred in insisting on a heavy lifter. That recommendation was pretty much incompatible with the others, such as encouraging commercial development and promoting national security (not to mention living within the budget). But a new plan, based on Aldridge sans heavy lift, could be successful, and it looks like that’s what Paul and Tony Lavoie have come up with.
[Update a while later]
I’m skimming the paper now. Interesting stuff. I have a nit, though. On page 14, they write: “The WEFS has mass of about 1200 kg and requires about one kW per day to crack and freeze 4.5 kg of cryogen.” I think they mean “The WEFS has mass of about 1200 kg and requires about one kW to crack and freeze 4.5 kg of cryogen per day.” It makes no sense to talk about a daily power requirement.
One other point. I believe, but am not sure, that both NASA and the Augustine panel dramatically overestimated the costs of lunar lander development, which is a key factor that drove them to Flexible Path. I have never believed that lunar first was unaffordable, because I think that landers can be developed much more cheaply than many do, with people like Masten and Armadillo (and perhaps Blue Origin) leading the way. I suspect that it was the Altair cost estimates, foolishly based on LM estimatesactuals, that created this myth (if it is one). I also think that, based on announcements like this one from the past summer, that we’re going to see some interesting low-cost cryo engines coming out of XCOR, making for some interesting industry collaborations along those lines.
[Update in the early afternoon]
I haven’t finished the whole thing yet, but this is key:
This return to the Moon is affordable and can be accomplished on reasonable time scales. Instead of single missions to exotic destinations, where all hardware is discarded as the mission progresses, we instead focus on the creation of reusable and extensible space systems, flight assets that are permanent and useable for future exploration beyond LEO. In short, we get value for our money. Instead of a fiscal black hole, this extensible space program becomes a generator of innovation and national wealth. It is challenging enough to drive technological innovation (Table 4) yet within reach on a reasonable timescale.
Propellant and water exported from the Moon will initially be used solely by NASA, both to support lunar surface operations and to access and service satellites in Earth orbit and to re-fuel planetary missions, including human missions to Mars. Over time, other federal agencies such as the Defense Department (intelligence satellites) or NOAA (weather satellites) may need lunar propellant for the maintenance of their space assets. Additionally, international partners or other countries may require propellant for access to their own satellites and space platforms. Finally, lunar propellant would be offered to commercial markets to supply, maintain and extend the wide variety of commercial applications satellites in cislunar space as well as enabling other emerging space ventures.
The modular, incremental nature of this architecture enables international and commercial participation to be easily and seamlessly integrated into our lunar return scenario. Because the outpost is built around the addition of capabilities through the use of small, robotically teleoperated assets, other parties can bring their own pieces to the table as time, availability and capability permit. International partners can contemplate their own human launch capability to the Moon without use of a Heavy Lift vehicle. This feature becomes politically attractive by simply providing lunar fuel for a return trip for the international partners. This flexibility makes international participation and commercialization in our architecture much more viable than was possible under the previous ESAS architecture.
One issue that I see that he hasn’t addressed, at least up to this page. He’s proposing that the propellant be delivered in the form of water, and then cracked on orbit via solar power. Water is certainly a useful form in which to store it, in terms of payload density (no need for huge tanks for hydrogen), but it’s going to take a long time to electrolyze it with solar power. Also, what is he going to do with the excess LOX? Rocket engines prefer a 6:1 lox/fuel ratio for maximum specific impulse, which leaves two extra atoms of LOX, given the stoichiometric ratio of 8:1 for water. Does he propose to burn it inefficiently, or to use the remainder for breathing or other applications? A related question — is there sufficient lunar water to make attempts to crack breathing oxygen from the silicates not cost effective, compared to electrolysis?
Section 20302 of the newly signed act. But I don’t think those milestones will be met, except possibly number 3.
and proposes a way to do it that is launch-system independent
That was quick…
We assume that a medium heavy lift launch vehicle (~70 mT)
will be available during the later phases of our program (when humans are needed on the Moon.)
The advantage of this approach is that we launch what is needed to go to the Moon complete and no depots are required; the disadvantage is that there is some newvehicle development needed. The use of existing Shuttle piece parts keeps this to a minimum.
In fact, the best time for the creation of propellant depots is after we are able to supply them with lunar propellant.
Nope, he still doesn’t get it.
…he still doesn’t get it.
That’s OK, he does say that he can do it with existing vehicles, which pretty much implies early depots. He’s just expressing an opinion about what’s optimal.
Well, he is also saying that the ideal time for depots is once we have lunar water. From the point of view of promoting cheap lift that’s a very bad time to do it, because it eliminates much of the potential traffic. Of course, I think he does get it, but like so many others he appears to have a hidden agenda. He is silently making certain choices (related to politics and funding I presume) and hiding them among technical decisions.
I also think that, based on announcements like this one from the past summer, that we’re going to see some interesting low-cost cryo engines coming out of XCOR, making for some interesting industry collaborations along those lines.
Especially if the prices of PWR engines are going up spectacularly after SSME dies as people are saying over at NSF.com.
Yes, that’s a problem that surely keeps ULA folks awake at night.
Are you being sarcastic or do you mean that? People are saying much of PWR fixed costs are being paid for by Shuttle. A hidden subsidy that very few people seem to have noticed until now.
No, I’m serious. I don’t know, but I’m guessing it’s what spurred the relationship between ULA and XCOR. They may be thinking they need a second source for both the RL-10 and RS-68 in the face of potential price increases.
I would add that Boeing selling Rocketdyne to P&W is what made this possible. It would have been a lot harder for ULA to do it if Boeing was still manufacturing the RS-68.
Interesting times indeed!
Interesting article. Wonder what you think of the following?
From the paper you linked to:
Page 6/7
“At least three different studies examined the cost problems of the ESAS architecture and offered alternatives that cost less, take less development time, and are adequate for lunar surface return. One approach uses the commercially available Delta IV and Atlas V Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicles (EELV) and orbital propellant depots to perform lunar return (Zegler et al., 2009). This approach has the advantage of using existing launch vehicles but development of propellant depots is required to permit journeys beyond LEO. Two other approaches use existing Shuttle hardware to create new launch vehicles capable of launching lunar spacecraft in two or three pieces, which are then assembled in low Earth orbit for trips outward. Two concepts – DIRECT and Shuttle side-mount (SSM) – take advantage of the existing space industrial base, including tooling and assembly facilities, as well as the existing processing and launch infrastructure at Kennedy Space Center, to create new vehicles that can deliver tens of metric tonnes to LEO. The advantage of this approach is that we launch what is needed to go to the Moon complete and no depots are required; the disadvantage is that there is some new vehicle development needed. The use of existing Shuttle piece parts keeps this to a minimum.”
Then on Page 7
“The development of a heavy-lift vehicle adds capability to our architecture but is not an absolute requirement for early missions, although we recognize that other strategic considerations (such as preservation of HLV infrastructure) may require the near-term development of such a vehicle. A Shuttle-derived vehicle has the least impact on existing facilities and the least amount of new development and thus, lower total cost. A single Shuttle side-mount (SSM) can launch about 70 mT to LEO and place 8-9 mT on the lunar surface. Two SSM launches can fly an entire human lunar mission; this is an important capability in the lunar return program. Once we have established a foothold on the Moon and have the capability to at least partly supply ourselves from lunar materials, the need for a very heavy lift vehicle lessens. In fact, the best time for the creation of propellant depots is after we are able to supply them with lunar propellant. Such an approach makes human planetary missions easier; the dead weight of propellant (at least 80% of the total mass of the spacecraft for a human Mars mission) need not come from the deep gravity well of Earth.”
Also on page 7
“Because we must scope the total effort within an assumed budget profile that would be available to NASA for any launch vehicle development as well as all mission hardware development, we developed an architecture that accomplishes the goal while fitting under the budget. We assume that a medium heavy lift launch vehicle (~70 mT) will be available during the later phases of our program (when humans are needed on the Moon.) Our particular architecture uses such a vehicle and reflects the cost of its development and operations, but other solutions are possible within the assumed budget wedge used by the Augustine Committee (2009).”
While I have some reservations about the level of up front work to be done by robotics (even teleoperated, for example, the cable stinging required to establish the solar power system would be a “challenge”.), these are exactly the points I have been trying to make about boosters for a real lunar program.
Unfortunately, I still think it is delusional to talk about NASA landing humans on the Moon affordably. Yes, if they ran a COTS-like procurement they could get cheap cargo landers and that could lead to cheap crew landers… but they’re not going to do that. So long as their requirements are “redo Apollo, but bigger”, they’re going to get the same LOR inefficiencies and horrible big aerospace costs.
Will we ever get to a time when Congress seriously says no to multi-billion dollar, decade long cost-plus contracts? It’s too hard to imagine.
to burn it inefficiently
And very hot too.
I never had a problem with the VSE per se, though I think that the Aldridge Commission erred in insisting on a heavy lifter. That recommendation was pretty much incompatible with the others, such as encouraging commercial development and promoting national security
Commercial development was not a goal of the Bush Vision of Space Exploration. Bush couldn’t bring himself to utter the word “commercial” even once during his policy address. (Nor was there any mention of a significant role for the military, or even funding for Military Space Plane. Billions for bread and circuses but not one penny for defense.)
The Aldridge Commission declared that human spaceflight would “remain the providence [sic] of government” for the foreseeable future — and that was *after* SpaceShip One. Their notion of commercial space was limited to paying companies to build hardware for NASA’s space monopoly.
I believe, but am not sure, that both NASA and the Augustine panel dramatically overestimated the costs of lunar lander development
Why do you believe that? Surely, it would be possible for NASA to design a lunar lander that cost that much to develop. Spudis wanted to spend nearly two billion dollars on a single robot — it’s not hard to imagine a manned lander costing five times as much.
At the X-Prize Cup, I told Dennis Wingo that if NASA wantedto succeed, they should design the simplest, cheapest, lightest lander possible — similar to the open-cockpit Gemini and HLR designs. He told me that open-cockpit landers “did not have enough margin” (a strange statement, I thought, since a lander can afford much more margin if it does not have to carry a heavy pressurized habitat both ways) and how they wanted a lander that was capable of carrying huge cranes, etc. Ultimately, of course, the lander they wanted couldn’t carry anything because it was never built. The Moonies were not willing to settle for half a loaf, so they got nothing.
I’m sure a lunar lander could be built for much less than the Aldridge Commission estimated (just as a space station could have been built for much less than ISS), but there’s a difference between “could” and “would.”
This plan is depot based; LEO depots operated in synergy with lunar orbit depots. I strongly support this approach.
EML or LLO depots? The paper declines to choose and proposes to study the trades. Higher delta-v to EML but far less orbital maintenance and better thermal environment for cryogenic fuel storage.
This paper is horrible. It contains factual claim after factual claim without a single reference. It isn’t scholarly, it’s a blog post in pdf format.
The Moonies were not willing to settle for half a loaf, so they got nothing.
That seems to be a widespread ailment.
Yes, if they ran a COTS-like procurement they could get cheap cargo landers and that could lead to cheap crew landers… but they’re not going to do that.
Trent, I’ve seen the cargo lander Armadillo is building for JSC right now. Don’t take Spudis’s rants at face value. “There are more things in heaven and earth…..” The fact that the Moonies are whining instead of supporting such practical, low-cost steps shows why the Moonrush has made so little progress.
Ed, Armadillo is building a terrestrial prototype for an unfunded program. If you read the Project-M whitepaper you’ll see how far away from success they are. Don’t get me wrong, I’m a big fan of their work but they’re doing it without official support.
The big problem with robotic exploration of the Moon is that the robotic exploration program is completely uninterested. The decadal survey has consistently ignored the Moon, and even the news of lunar water wasn’t enough to get them interested. If you can’t get your funding from the robotic exploration program, who do you turn to? Well, the human exploration program of course, but they only fund orbiters.
To fund actual *development* of the Moon, which is what Spudis is talking about, would require some new source of funding.. or a major shake-up in the way NASA sees their roll. Good luck with that.
Trent, did you miss the report that NASA is examining merging SOMD and ESMD? We’re getting ready to support a big push to do exploration research on the ISS, as well. There are plenty of people in NASA management who recognize that the shake-up is coming and are trying to get on the right side of it.
As for Spudis’ paper, it’s a concept white paper and proposes some ideas worth considering with more rigorous trades. And, yes, they do have a list of references on pages 22-23 that were cited in the paper, so your claim that there isn’t a single reference is just wrong.
Justin, read those references.. you’ll discover at least half of them are Spudis referencing himself. In any case, every claim he makes about launch vehicles is without reference, as are many other claims of fact. A peer review process would reject this paper with “needs scholarly review” because its full of unsubstantiated claims. I write stuff like that monthly, it’s called a blog.
Yes, I saw the report about merging.. it would seem to indicate either a greater focus on exploration – which I hope you’ll agree, Spudis’ paper is not about – or nothing at all. A push for exploration research on the ISS just underscores that the tiny amount of development of space that was being done at NASA is now dying.
And btw, a whitepaper is writing about stuff you’re actually doing. At best, this is a trade study.
Interesting article. Wonder what you think of the following?
I think he’s mistaken.
Trent, Project M is dead. Armadillo is now being funded by Project Morpheus (a very odd project name, if you ask me but no one did). The hardware I saw looked very real.
You do realize that a “terrestrial prototype” that has to operate in a one-gee field is in many ways harder than actually landing on the Moon, right?
I agree that robotic exploration is not very interesting, but neither is Spudis’s vision in which no one but NASA employees (and very few of them) get to explore space. I don’t think NASA should have the money to develop the Moon. Building mines and colonies is not NASA’s job. It’s not something they’re good at. Just look at ISS. NASA should stick to science and exploration. Trying to turn it into a Soviet-style Ministry of Mines and Development is a recipe for disaster.
Ed, the change is name is irrelevant.. Armadillo is *still* not making a robotic lunar lander which is what we were talking about.
Robotic exploration is plenty interesting, thank you very much. What I said was that the robotic exploration program *wasn’t interested* in the Moon. They never have been.
The first mission of Spudis’ proposal (is that the right word?) is robotic exploration.. the rest of it is development of cis-lunar infrastructure. There’s no reason why NASA shouldn’t be developing cis-lunar infrastructure, but there’s currently no part of NASA charged with doing that (as far as I’m aware).
There’s no reason why NASA shouldn’t be developing cis-lunar infrastructure
There are plenty of reasons why NASA shouldn’t be developing cis-lunar infrastructure. For one it is inefficient to develop infrastructure up front. Another reason is that such infrastructure should not be entrusted to a single organisation. Thirdly, NASA would be horrible at developing affordable infrastructure, or even just infrastructure that doesn’t get cancelled before delivering anything. What NASA can do however is to create an environment in which industry will “spontaneously” develop such infrastructure as it becomes necessary / practical. And there is more than one way to go about that.
I think we’re going to have to agree to disagree, Trent, including on the definition of a “white paper.”
There’s no reason why NASA shouldn’t be developing cis-lunar infrastructure
There are plenty of reasons — unless you want to argue that NASA has done a good job of developing LEO infrastructure (ISS).
Or you go Spudis/Zubrin and say this will be different because it’s the Moon/Mars. In which case, the only possible response is to roll the eyeballs and smile tolerantly….
Ed, at least ISS exists.. of course they didn’t do it affordably or sensibly, so what? The question is not “could it be done better?” the question is “if not space development, what should NASA be doing instead?” If the answer is “technology development” then I suppose Spudis could make the argument that some of the demonstration missions are exactly that. The Human Exploration Destination Systems roadmap has Lunar ISRU on it around 2013.. maybe it’ll get funded 😉
Justin,
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Whitepaper
yes, I was a little harsh there. What else are you disagreeing with? You really think the paper is adequately referenced?
I thought the numbers for a heavy lift launch vehicle were pretty light, I can not imagine NASA doing it for the numbers he is using.
It looks like every mission gets pulled off with a 100% success rate. What not one rover break down? Where are the numbers for a LOM replacement? For a rover/sat breakdown.
Are there any margins for 20% traditional cost overrun? Or schedules that get blown?
I would prefer he include funding for some Xprizes and Centential programs and straight out data purchase rather than NASA be the designer/developer/builder of everything.
Ed, at least ISS exists.. of course they didn’t do it affordably or sensibly, so what
Are you arguing the USG should spend billions (tens of billions? hundreds of billions?) to develop unaffordable infrastructure? If so, why?
the question is “if not space development, what should NASA be doing instead?”
Science? Exploration? Fundamental technical research? Why are you repeating a question that’s been answered so many times in the past?
I suppose Spudis could make the argument that some of the demonstration missions are exactly that. The Human Exploration Destination Systems roadmap has Lunar ISRU on it around 2013
How does that make any sense whatever? ISRU isn’t exploration, it’s mining and processing. Why would you give that job to an agency that has never operated a mine and has no particular expertise in the field? Wouldn’t it make more sense to offer a prize, so that people and organizations who are mining experts could compete? Spudis could even compete, if he wanted to.
ISRU is a technology.. one that has yet to be demonstrated in space. Thus the reason why they don’t call it “mining”.
Stop it, you’re not this stupid.
Trent, you don’t need to be so harsh, ISRU is just a more specific term for what could be considered a type of mining (in some cases indistinguishable.)
BTW, you were exactly right when you said underground is the way to put people on the moon.
I think the paper is adequate for what it sells itself as – a starting point for more rigorous trades. It’s a conceptual outline for a mission-oriented lunar exploration & development architecture. Yes, it needs a lot of work, but Spudis and Lavoie acknowledge that.
With regards to the ISS, the exploration research is being examined in parallel to National Lab utilization. So, no, I don’t agree that space development at NASA is “dying on the vine.” The whole point behind the National Lab NPO is that it will be able to cultivate the researchers and capital investment that NASA legally cannot.
Wow guys, pile on why don’t you…
I have to give Paul some props on this one. Everyone beat up on him about his stance with Constellation so he took his lumps, looked at where the new architecture was going, and proposed a trial balloon for how to accomplish something using more sustainable methods.
What we should be doing is figuring out how to help Paul fill in the blanks, seeing what parts can be done outside of NASA, and putting some industry oomph behind it. Its definitely more sustainable and doable than anything anyone else is proposing.
ISRU is a technology.. one that has yet to be demonstrated in space. Thus the reason why they don’t call it “mining”.
Trent, where is it written that no one but NASA is allowed to demonstrate new technologies in space?
Inflatable habitats are a technology that hasn’t been demonstrated in space. Does that mean Bigelow shouldn’t be allowed to develop them?
GPS was a technology that had never been demonstrated in space. Does that mean it should have been developed by NASA instead of DoD? What about Military Space Plane? SpaceShip One? Should they have been done by NASA?
What is the purpose of ISRU, in your view? Is it to prove that someone can spend billions of dollars to mine — excuse me, “ISRU” — a few pounds of material unaffordably? For what purpose? Merely to scare anyone else away from trying it again? So Kirk Sorenson can gloat and say NASA “proved”
ISRU was impossible, just like X-33 “proved” SSTO was impossible?
Negative demonstrations are of no value. IMO, demonstrating technologies like ISRU is only interesting if you demonstrate that they can be done affordably, so there will be a follow-on. Do you disagree?
What we should be doing is figuring out how to help Paul fill in the blanks,
People have tried doing that for a long time, to no avail. With respect, I see this as a minimalistic retreat from his previous position. Too little too late. Yes, his ideas for ISRU are good, as they always were. On transport infrastructure they are not so good and they have not meaningfully changed either. I see this as a highly political paper. Understandable perhaps, but let’s not mistake it for something it isn’t.
What lumps did Spudis take? His lab got a big non-competitive, sole-source contract, at a time when all other space science was being gutted. He never once criticized Constellation, until his own funding was cut. Now he wants to kill the flexible path, go back to the Bush Vision, and destroy any chance for NASA to go beyond the Moon.
Spudis never supported commercial space when he was in power. Even today, his Vision remains entirely NASA-centric. Is there any reason to expect he would behave differently if he got back into power?
destroy any chance for NASA to go beyond the Moon.
Why are you singling out beyond the moon? If the plan fails because it is overambitious then it won’t get to the moon either. If it succeeds it will help exploration beyond the moon too.
Nice to see actuall discussions of engineering details rather than only politics!
Here, here!
If it succeeds it will help exploration beyond the moon too.
You mean, NASA can resume exploration after Paul achieves True Communism on the Moon?
Somehow, that’s not encouraging.
And what happens if an asteroid strikes the Earth while Paul is building his Lunat Soviet?
What someone needs to do is to take Spudis’ general idea, drop the HLV & use that money for incentivizing in a COTS-like manner, use a SpaceDev minimalist manned lander, and see how much the $88 billion is reduced.
Trent, my “nonsense” comes from long conversations with Jeff Fiege. I was the one who came up with the name of the company. Where does your nonsense come from?
drop the HLV & use that money for incentivizing in a COTS-like manner, use a SpaceDev minimalist manned lander, and see how much the $88 billion is reduced.
The Human Lunar Return study, performed by JSC in the 1990’s, found it could be done for ~$2 billion.
Unfortunately, the Moonie Church never had any interest in such low-cost approaches. Not when Bush was holding out so much money.
Edward, I’m curious what you think the policy should be.