Huh?

Why does the Air Force think that their launch costs will go up with the new policy? Look at the caption of the picture:

Less demand could drive up costs for rocket propulsion systems used to launch Air Force satellites.

This makes no sense. How is flying additional missions for NASA creating “less demand”?

There are two factors that will affect the price of EELVs with the new policy. The first is that adding failure on-set detection to the vehicles may increase their production cost, but I can’t imagine it will be by much. Most of the cost will be in development, which could legitimately be charged to NASA. The second is that increased demand will provide a higher flight rate (which the system is quite capable of, in both production and operations), which will allow the amortization of fixed costs over a larger number of flights, reducing the cost (and presumably price) per flight. From that standpoint, the Air Force should welcome this (and always should have, and in fact not approved NASA’s Ares plans). Moreover, a couple years ago the Air Force was considering forcing one of the lines to shut down, to save fixed costs, which goes against the doctrine of assured access to space, because if there was a problem with the remaining vehicle (whether Atlas or Delta), the Air Force would have no ability to launch its satellites. Increasing the demand like this allows both lines to continue affordably. I just don’t understand the concern.

Is there anyone who can explain this?

[Update a couple minutes later]

I see that Clark Lindsey is scratching his head, too. I just don’t know what Gary Payton is thinking.

[Update a few minutes later]

Commenters over at NASA Watch can’t figure it out, either. So it’s not just me.

[Update a few minutes later]

OK, I’m starting to infer that the problem is the production base for the solids. Apparently, ATK and others have been sharing fixed costs between NASA and the Air Force, and if NASA is no longer purchasing SRBs, as Shuttle ends and Ares doesn’t begin, the Air Force will have to bear the full burden.

Well, boo frickin’ hoo. So the taxpayer will no longer be subsidizing the Pentagon with NASA’s budget, and the actual cost of maintaining our missiles and boosters for defense will become more transparent. Why am I supposed to be concerned about this?

50 thoughts on “Huh?”

  1. NASA has been the largest consumer of Solid rocket products via the Shuttle for decades. This is why the USAF signed off on Griffin’s plan several years ago. I do agree it is time that the NASA subsidy of the defense department’s need for solid fuel be reconsidered.

  2. General Kehler gave a talk (by phone) at the FAA Commercial Space Conference, embracing the then new NASA direction. He said in particular that more commercial transportation providers would be a good thing in terms of assuring greater USAF access to space.

    The only drawback he cited was that we will lose our ability to build large solid rocket motors, but that the Air Force is working on ways to preserve the corporate knowledge.

    I don’t see how this will affect Air Force space that much. The solid motor content of space launch vehicles is not that great to begin with. If it were, then the disappearance of Ares would make little difference anyway.

    The major impact would be seen if we ever needed to develop a new ICBM. But we have so forgotten how to do that, we’d already be starting over from scratch anyway. And I don’t see it happening under the current administration under any circumstances anyway.

  3. If the USAF wants ballistic missile class solids for their space launch vehicles, they can fund some more Minotaur launches. I think this kind of launcher actually makes sense for the USAF, since you can get very responsive launch capability using storable non-cryogenic propellants.

    NASA does not need this kind of highly responsive launch capability, not according to any of its current set of missions, so I do not see why they should be sharing in the expenses. NASA can wait an hour or two for the liquid propellant to finish loading just fine.

  4. This has nothing to do with solid rockets.

    See my comment at Hobbyspace RLV.

    The worry is that NASA will insist on EELV changes for human rating that drives up USAF costs.

  5. The worry is that NASA will insist on EELV changes for human rating that drives up USAF costs.

    What is the basis of the worry? What do they imagine NASA could do that would double their costs? Is this just a WAG, or is there analysis behind it?

  6. I’d be willing to bet that the increase in flight rate drops per-flight costs a lot more than any modifications for “human rating” increases them.

  7. Soyuz also launches crew and I never heard of it being called expensive. Even if they make it so there are two rockets models, the EELV version and the manned version, there will not be a lower flight rate for the USAF, plus there will most likely be a high common component count which should still drive down rocket costs.

  8. Godzilla,

    [[[If the USAF wants ballistic missile class solids for their space launch vehicles, they can fund some more Minotaur launches.]]]

    You do know Minotaur are surplus ICBMs don’t you? I don’t see how launching a few more surplus rockets will increase demand for solid rocket fuel, unless it forces the USAF to buy additional Peacekeepers to replace them.

    Tom

  9. It will be interesting to see how far out the ripples from President Obama’s space policy go.

  10. Payton’s pushback could be useful, if he is worried about expensive NASA directives to meddle with EELV designs. DoD heft may come in handy to beat back “SSS” or Symbolic Safety Syndrome where NASA safety mandarins come up with hundreds of proposed EELV mods that would make the boosters symbolically but not actually safer.

  11. Clearly, I think Payton’s fear is that the NASA human spaceflight “mafia” will be up to their old tricks. Unless the current NASA leadership makes it clear that the “SSS” (great name) won’t be tolerated, the fear is not misplaced.

  12. Aerojet makes the Atlas solids, so even if ATK were to disappear that wouldn’t mean the whole solid booster infrastructure would go away. And PlanetSpace’s COTS proposal included the Athena III which would use a Shuttle-derived 2.5 segment first stage.

  13. If SpaceX is successful with their Falcon 9 (as I sincerely hope), they’ll cut into any market for the Delta IV and Atlas V EELVs because the prices are so much lower. ULA will have to either change the way they build rockets to make them more competitive or depend on even fewer launches than they do today.

  14. Remember that when you human-rate a vehicle, you have a myriad of options between two extremes:

    1. Add some additional monitoring software and an on-board abort-trigger system. This was done quite successfully in the Atlas and Titan II boosters for Mercury and Gemini

    2. You can redesign the booster essentially from nose to tail (coincidentally, at a NASA center), squeezing perhaps a second or two of additional Isp from the engines, but otherwise adding mass and complications to a system that already worked. This was the approach underway for the RS-68 when it was under consideration for use in the Atlas V:

    http://www.redorbit.com/images/gallery/constellation_program/rs68_engine_hardware_tests_for_ares_v/169/269/

    Which method is more palatable to NASA as a whole? The Congress? To the Astronaut Memorial Foundation (who just wrote a letter criticizing the Obama approach)? To our currently serving astronauts, who have the option of working on “NASA’s future” or hitching a ride in a “taxi” that NASA had minimal involvement in?

    I think the Air Force would prefer #1, but thinks the answer will be closer to #2.

  15. Remember that when you human-rate a vehicle, you have a myriad of options between two extremes:

    No one knows what happens when you “human rate” a vehicle, because no one has done it since the 1960s. If it turns out to be number two (an interesting metaphor, no?) there will be a revolt from the community. As Mike Griffin once noted, what can you possibly do to EELVs that the insurance companies haven’t already demanded that they do for half-billion-dollar satellites, other than add FOSD?

  16. LarryJ:
    If SpaceX is successful with their Falcon 9 (as I sincerely hope), they’ll cut into any market for the Delta IV and Atlas V EELVs because the prices are so much lower.

    If SpaceX succeeds the DoD will have a lower-cost alternative to the EELVs. That is hardly bad for the DoD. The real problems DoD has are (1) keeping astronaut bureaucracy away from EELVs and (2) the solid rocket industrial base. Also there is typical politics (Payton for example seems to have his own personal biases that are interfering with his judgment). (1) is a big problem which may well prevent NASA from using the EELVs for Commercial Crew while (2) the DoD should take care of themselves instead of distorting NASA’s designs towards solids.

  17. Rand, the DoD had a very bad experience with the Shuttle in the 1980s with effects that lasted well into the 1990s. I’ve already seen astronaut fans propose “minimal” changes to *all* EELVs to support Exploration Directorate requirements. And nonsensical justifications such as that the DoD should welcome NASA requirements because they would make EELVs more reliable.

    The DoD know far better than NASA what reliability and other requirements they need. The last thing we need for national security is to go back to the 1970s and 1980s with NASA telling the DoD how to do its space business. The DoD is quite rightly worried that this would drive up costs to NASA levels without increasing value to the DoD.

    A good solution may be as follows: split off the ULA into two separate groups: one for the Exploration Directorate and the other for unmanned launches. Whatever modifications E.D. wants for EELVs are to be done *only* for the rockets E.D. buys — full stop. E.D. pays full freight for these modifications. This prevents up front NASA or its contractors lobbying to put stuff on the DoD’s EELVs that the DoD doesn’t want.

  18. In short, DoD wants a big firewall between themselves and the irrational lobbying pressures that come from being associated with Exploration Directorate. Today it’s proposals for “minimal” changes to the EELVs. Tomorrow it will be astronauts killed on EELVs and demands for wholesale Shuttle-like delays and changes to the EELVs. As in the 1980s when the delays after Challenger deeply compromised national security, politicians will demand sacrifices to national security to satisfy the insatiable demands that our precious astronauts be protected at all costs.

    Quite frankly, I strongly take the DoD’s side in this matter. Exploration Directorate must keep its hands off the EELVs unless it can guarantee that the firewall between the DoD’s EELVs and the E.D. will remain firmly in place. We should not compromise national security one iota for the sake of astronaut safety. If that means trouble for HSF, that’s too bad — national security is astronomically more important than HSF.

  19. I have to agree with this. There’s also the matter of various back room games that can be played which would be somewhat aggravated by participation of the NASA supply chain. For example, I’ve heard that the last Atlas II launch was delayed by a competitor who threw up a “concern” about some aspect of the launch (early on in the launch window, apparently). When the EELVs are used for multiple purposes, it is possible they will get more interference from competitors who leverage a role in manned space flight on the NASA side into an expert on EELV launches who can occasionally delay launches (via “concerns” about the launch) in order to weaken the ULA at convenient times.

    Say you have a big, expensive Dod bird that needs to go up in the next week or you lose access to the pad for months (allegedly the scenario with the Atlas II launch above). The villain of the hour (some NASA-side vendor who happens to have credible knowledge of EELV engines) calls right then, says they’re worried about, oh, the quality of some valve parts (which could lead to hydrogen leakage or other bad stuff) that showed up in the last EELV flight from NASA a couple months ago and which they just so happen to notice right now (say due to extensive tests in lab). Launch control now has to decide whether to go on in the face of warnings from an expert (who may well be right or may be bluffing) or take the rocket off the pad for a few months.

  20. The worry is that NASA will insist on EELV changes for human rating that drives up USAF costs.

    No more than the NASA changes to the Atlas or Titan led to higher USAF costs.

    This was discussed at length when Griffin came into NASA. NASA’s discontinuing to use solid rocket propellant would affect every single missile program that the USAF has, driving up the cost of every missile in the inventory.

    Minotaur is not part of the equation as those are old Minuteman’s, not new pours of solid propellants.

  21. As was pointed out, the U.S. actually has *two* solid rocket manufacturers, one of whom has gone through the process of downsizing and consolidating for a post cold war world, one of which has not. That’s not the issue as far as solid industrial base goes.

    The issue is ammonium percholorate; with the SRBs going away that will significantly reduce demand for that chemical and you can’t make decent solids without it. However, if the USAF wants to maintain ability to surge production of perchlorate in event of an ICBM restart it can do that in a targeted fashion less expensively then by maintaining SRB production.

  22. > Rand Simberg Says:

    >March 13th, 2010 at 3:25 pm

    > I’d be willing to bet that the increase in flight rate drops
    > per-flight costs a lot more than any modifications for
    > “human rating” increases them.

    Didn’t work out that way in the ’60’s for atlas or Titan. No reason to assume it will work out better for the AF now with EELV’s.

  23. Didn’t work out that way in the ’60’s for atlas or Titan.

    These are not the Atlas or Titans of the sixties. Think about it.

    No reason to assume it will work out better for the AF now with EELV’s.

    Yes, there is. Again, think about it.

  24. Also come to think about it, the companies getting EELV launch busness to taxi crews to ISS – are the same ones losnig the Shuttle launch busness. So they are going to be doing a lot fewer launches. EELV customers will need to pay more given they now carry those branches of Boeing and L/M alone.

  25. > Rand Simberg Says:

    > March 15th, 2010 at 5:34 am

    >> Didn’t work out that way in the ’60’s for atlas or Titan.

    > These are not the Atlas or Titans of the sixties. Think about it.

    It was never about the vehicles. Its not like the “manrated” Titans and Atlas’ were dramatical different craft. However injecting NASA buracracy “dedicated to looking like you doing something” into a production line ups costs and adds inefficency. Obviously NASA should pay the bulk of the extra costs- but it impacts the entire operation so everyone gets to carry a bit of the NASA demmanded overhead.

    Certainly NASA isn’t under less pressure to show how safty consious they are by visibly doing something, and they are not talking about big purchases; but they might add weight to keep both EELV lines open even though there is not enough busness to support 2.

    And again, with the EELV vendors looking at NASA spending about $4B a year less on their services – even assuming EELV picks up all the crew taxi busness (and there is obviously a gap of a few years), they have a MUCH smaller market infrount of them.

  26. Its not like the “manrated” Titans and Atlas’ were dramatical different craft.

    Actually, it’s exactly like that. But it won’t be for EELVs. As I said, think about it.

  27. > Rand Simberg Says:

    > March 15th, 2010 at 6:26 am

    >> Its not like the “manrated” Titans and Atlas’ were dramatical different craft.

    > Actually, it’s exactly like that.

    ;/

    Funny how no one else in the last 50 years has agreed with that.

  28. Funny how no one else in the last 50 years has agreed with that.

    What are you talking about? Do you have any idea?

    A lot of things had to be done to unreliable ballistic missiles in the 1960s to make them reliable enough to put people on top of them, including better pedigree of materials, additional redundancy, etc. Very little need be done to already reliable launch systems in the twenty-first century, designed to carry billion-dollar payloads. I don’t understand your obtuseness, or historical ignorance on this point.

  29. historical ignorance on this point.

    If you read the historical literature of the period you will find that the major difference was in testing and the traceability of that testing back to the manufacturing process. It took years of testing and failures to come up with valves that would work properly at cryogenic temperatures. The development of the RL-10 in the early 60’s cost $3 billion dollars according to Aviation Week. We had to invent the materials, the manufacturing processes, and many other things in order to build the Saturns and the large production runs of the 60’s across all of the rocket types allowed for a robust industrial base that lent itself to statistical process improvement.

    Most of these things are deeply embedded in the entire aerospace industry today, though a good deal of it is not well understood by its practitioners.

    I would argue, as am sure that Rand does as well, that the EELV of today have a far higher comparative quality rating than any of the early to mid 60’s Atlas’s and Titans that the Mercury or Gemini astronauts flew on.

  30. > Dennis Wingo Says:

    > March 15th, 2010 at 8:36 am

    > If you read the historical literature of the period you will
    > find that the major difference was in testing and the traceability
    > of that testing back to the manufacturing process.==

    Agreed. The craft were unmodified, but NASA added significant extra layers of testing adn buracracy to “their birds”. This unfortunately slowed down production rates for the Mil missles, and generaeted some friction between the AF and NASA.

    I’ve also seen some debate as to if there was ever any actually safty or relyability improvement as a result of the NASA overhead – but that could just be sour grapes.

  31. > Dennis Wingo Says:
    >
    > March 15th, 2010 at 8:36 am

    >==
    > Most of these things are deeply embedded in the entire
    > aerospace industry today, though a good deal of it is not well
    > understood by its practitioners.

    Not nearly as deaply ingranied as you might think.

    🙁

    > I would argue, as am sure that Rand does as well, that the
    > EELV of today have a far higher comparative quality rating
    > than any of the early to mid 60’s Atlas’s and Titans that the
    > Mercury or Gemini astronauts flew on.

    Obviously. Also both weer designed to be “man rated” from the start just incase that proved messisary. Course they also realized you needed to be that good to reassure commercial sat customers anyway, so you might as well get it out of the way.

  32. Also both weer designed to be “man rated” from the start just incase that proved messisary.

    No, they weren’t. They were designed to be reliable. Like most, you have no idea what the phrase “man rating” means.

  33. Also both weer designed to be “man rated” from the start just incase that proved messisary.

    Uh no.

    Also, the circa 1975 Saturn 1B system was deemed to be only 88% reliable, that is after 27 in a row successful launches.

    They were more honest about this stuff back then.

    (source is the Saturn 1B familiarization manual for the Apollo Soyuz Test Project)

  34. Not nearly as deaply ingranied as you might think.

    Over 60+ successful launches of three major variants of the Atlas since a failure would argue otherwise.

  35. Kelly, your lack of proofreading seems more “messisary” than necessary. I’d love to read your posts but it’s rather awkward.

  36. Kelly, your lack of proofreading seems more “messisary” than necessary. I’d love to read your posts but it’s rather awkward.

    If what he has to say is not important enough to him to at least do superficial proofing, Why should it be important to anyone else? I still read some of his stuff, but I resent him taking my spot as having the worst spelling.

  37. > Rand Simberg Says:

    >March 15th, 2010 at 11:49 am

    >> Also both were designed to be “man rated” from the start
    >> just incase that proved messisary.

    > No, they weren’t. They were designed to be reliable.==

    Not what I remember the builders saying when they designed them in the ’80’s

    >== Like most, you have no idea what the phrase “man rating” means.

    Hey Griffen said he didn’t know what man rating really ment!

    😉

  38. > Dennis Wingo Says:

    > March 15th, 2010 at 3:24 pm

    >> Not nearly as deaply ingranied as you might think.

    > Over 60+ successful launches of three major variants of the
    > Atlas since a failure would argue otherwise.

    I wasn’t refering to L/M specifically – just a get called into a lot of aerospace companies to help them, get up to speed with things like testing, traceability etc – and its sometimes shocking to see the gaps on even high profile projects.

  39. > Poorboy Says:

    > March 15th, 2010 at 7:16 pm

    > Kelly, your lack of proofreading seems more “messisary” than
    > necessary. I’d love to read your posts but it’s rather awkward.

    Glad you like them – and sorry my proofreading is crappy. Sometimes I’m just in a rush – nicreasingly I just don’t see tehm in when proofnig them.

    🙁

  40. …nicreasingly I just don’t see tehm in when proofnig them.

    arg

    ..increasingly I just don’t see them in when proofing them.

    Ok, this was hiting return when I didn’t mean to — Sorry.

    8{

  41. > john hare Says:

    >— I resent him taking my spot as having the worst spelling.

    Yes I’m famed for my bad spelling across the nation and industry. .. and for more usedfull abilities.

    😉

  42. Not what I remember the builders saying when they designed them in the ’80’s

    As with this subject in general, your memories are false. They were designed in the nineties. And they weren’t designed to be human rated. Had they been, they would have had failure onset detection. They don’t, and will need to have it added to carry passengers.

    Hey Griffen said he didn’t know what man rating really ment!

    Assuming you mean Mike Griffin, he never said that.

    Don’t you ever get tired of being continually corrected on historical fact? Just about everything you’ve so authoritatively said in this thread is wrong. I’d be embarrassed, if I were you.

  43. > == they [EELV’s] weren’t designed to be human rated. Had they
    > been, they would have had failure onset detection.

    ulalaunch.com/docs/publications/HumanRatingAtlasVandDeltaIV.pdf

    >> Hey Griffen said he didn’t know what man rating really ment!

    > Assuming you mean Mike Griffin, he never said that

    Specifically he said the term was no longer relivent for things like EELV.

    nasawatch.com/archives/2008/02/mike-griffins-eelv-thoughts-before-he-was-administrator.html

    Then he followed it with a jaw droping “…and given a separate escape system with an assumed reliability of even 90%, ..” statment. Given mil aircraft ejection systems noly have about a 75% survival rate adn booster escape systems so far have a 50% — 90% is really optimistic.

    > Don’t you ever get tired of being continually corrected on
    > historical fact? Just about everything you’ve so authoritatively
    > said in this thread is wrong. I’d be embarrassed, if I were you.

    What I’m embarased about is havnig once recomended you for a job on Orion.

  44. ulalaunch.com/docs/publications/HumanRatingAtlasVandDeltaIV.pdf

    Do you have some kind of point? Simply linking to a document isn’t particularly useful.

    Specifically he said the term was no longer relivent for things like EELV.

    Yes, which is not saying that he doesn’t know what it really meant. I agreed with him at the time. It remains true, even if he later changed his mind.

    What I’m embarased about is havnig once recomended you for a job on Orion.

    Not sure why. I haven’t changed.

  45. You wouldn’t respond to everything like a catty 12 year old, and you were more thoughtful / rational in responses. Now, more likely to just go for personal attacks on folks.

    It does not give the impression that what you’re someone worth listening to, or your opinions likely to be valuable.

  46. You wouldn’t respond to everything like a catty 12 year old, and you were more thoughtful / rational in responses.

    Not that I agree with that characterization, but I would have responded exactly the same then as I do now to the same thing.

  47. > ..I would have responded exactly the same then as I do now to the same thing.

    I’ve been reading here for a few years now, and no its a VERY noticable change. .

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