Here is what I wrote in the immediate aftermath of the loss of Columbia. You can follow the link to “Next Post” at the bottom to see subsequent posts in the subsequent days. My first speculative guess (TPS damage) turned out to be correct.
[Update a while later]
A golden oldie from that time.
I was down sick with the flu at the time. I remember my ex coming into our bedroom and telling me the news about Columbia. Soon we learned about the ice strike on the leading edge of the wing that doomed Columbia. (A reasonable speculation by Rand). It was also sometime later that we learned of NASA declining USAF offers of using National Reconnaissance assets that might have helped awaken NASA out of its presumptive slumber. But to what practical effect? To give the Columbia crew a chance to “put their affairs in order”? I still to this day remain unconvinced that this wasn’t a case of not wanting to know the bad news. In another scenario one could imagine the crew preferring a less painful death via CO2 asphyxiation and leaving the shuttle in orbit for follow on close damage inspections.
The net results to my mind were three distinct eras of the Space Shuttle legacy. The pre-Challenger era of the reliable & reusable “space truck”. Designed to carry cargo both to AND FROM orbit. Including fueled upper stages for exploration of our solar system (or for spying).
Then the post-Challenger era of far more modest expectations. Of a delivery system mainly focused on build out of the ISS but still reliable enough for crewed flight on a regular if less often basis. And the abandonment of Shuttle for EELVs by the military. Then finally the post-Columbia era of a flawed vehicle that is a dice roll every time it flies. That it had better be for a very good reason to risk crew aboard and that the sooner we decommission it (even if there’s no replacement) the better. Interesting that the flight architecture itself remained constant throughout these three eras. Only the perceptions changed.