The book has been out for over a year now, so it’s nice to see them finally acknowledge its existence with a review. It’s not really new, though. It’s the same thing from Fodroci that AAS and The Space Review published a few months ago.

[Update a couple minutes later]

Actually, in reading, it looks like it may be an updated version. Here’s one area with which I disagree, and it’s key to some of his critique:

Individuals flying on private carriers are, of course, free to accept whatever risks they mutually deem acceptable, something which Mr. Simberg spends considerable time on, but which I believe to be a red herring: The exploration of the solar system will almost certainly be carried out by international partnerships, not by daredevils, and they will insist on a methodical approach to risk identification and mitigation.

I don’t believe that is true. The “international partnerships,” I mean. I think that private individuals are much more likely to venture into the solar system.

[Update a few minutes later]

I’d also note that he completely avoids discussion of my point of the value of the activity at ISS. And then, there’s this:

Mr. Simberg seems to think that “Safety First” is a bad notion somehow. I’d be interested in an example of a successful program where this was not held to be the ideal.

He must have missed the example that I gave in the book itself. If “safety first” had been the motto in Apollo, we wouldn’t have flown Apollo 8.

[Afternoon update]

I suppose I should address this, too:

Mr. Simberg also questions the need for a lifeboat for each crewmember on the ISS – here it’s impossible not to imagine the fun headline writers would have comparing the ISS to the Titanic – and suggests as an alternative that we could use a co-orbiting platform of some sort as a temporary safe haven. How this would benefit someone suffering from a heart attack, a ruptured appendix, or the bends, he doesn’t say. Nor does he address the cost of such a venture.

I’ve often noted (though I admit, I didn’t really address it that much in the book, except to say that we accept the need not to have it at places like Amundsen-Scott in the winter) that the ambulance requirement set is so different from that of a lifeboat as to pretty much demand a completely different vehicle. NASA’s CRV plan was always to have one vehicle do both, but a lifeboat must evacuate the whole station, whereas an ambulance only has to get a subset down (if the whole crew requires hospitalization, things are already pretty disastrous). And it would be crazy to have to evacuate the entire station (which you’d have to do, unless there was a spare lifeboat aboard) in order to return an injured crewperson. Also, an ambulance has to provide a more gentle ride entry and recovery, for someone suffering from broken bones or burns. So if it were to be developed, it would probably be much smaller (one or two passenger) and of a different design. In fact, an X-37 might be a reasonable basis for such a vehicle.