How they so badly misjudged it:
Russia and the West do indeed have competing interests in the post-Soviet space. The problem with the realists is that they fail to see the moral, tactical and legal disparities that exist between the aims and methods of East and West. When Brussels and Washington propose EU and NATO membership, they are offering association in alliances of liberal, democratic states, achieved through a democratic, consensual process. Russia, meanwhile, cajoles, blackmails and threatens its former vassals into “joining” its newfangled “Eurasian Union,” whose similarity to the Soviet Union of yore Putin barely conceals. The right of sovereign countries to choose the alliances they wish is one Russia respects only if they choose to ally themselves with Russia. Should these countries try to join Western institutions then there will be hell to pay.
Despite all this, Cohen complains of a “Cold War double standard” in the ways we describe Western and Russian approaches to the former Soviet space. The West’s “trade leverage” to persuade Ukraine is treated benignly, Cohen writes, while Putin’s use of “similar carrots” is portrayed as nefarious. A crucial difference, however, is that when a country turns down a Western diplomatic package, as Ukraine did at the November Vilnius Summit (thus sparking the massive protests in Kiev that ultimately overthrew Yanukovych), the EU does not invade.
It should not come as a surprise why countries like Poland, the Czech Republic and other former Warsaw Pact nations that lived under the heel of Russian domination for so long might want to join the NATO alliance, which, according to its charter, is purely defensive. NATO has no designs on Russian territory and never has. But in the fervid and paranoid minds of the men running the Kremlin (and, apparently, in that of Stephen Cohen and other opponents of NATO expansion), the alliance’s defensive nature is irrelevant. If Russia were a healthy, liberal, pluralistic society at peace with itself and its neighbors, it would have nothing to fear from America, the EU, or NATO. Indeed, as crazy as it may sound today, in the 1990s, some Russian and Western leaders spoke optimistically of Moscow joining the latter two institutions. But these hopes of a European Russia were dashed when Putin came to power.
If it hadn’t been Putin, it might have been someone else. There may be something in the Russian character that wants a czar.
Nevertheless, let them vote on partition. http://www.transterrestrial.com/?p=53751.
Yes – the Crimea has been a subject of territorial disputes forever. It is so hard to know what is the “right thing to do” in these cases of historical quarrels, where everyone has grievances going back for centuries. Our knee-jerk reaction seems to be to favor wherever things are right now, but I don’t know why that makes sense either.
I don’t think that any nation can be successful if a sizable bloc in one part of it feels that they are a different nation. You can try to duct-tape Iraq out of three hostile nations, but I don’t understand why anyone would imagine that it could be successful. India and Pakistan chose partition, plus massive population transfers. Way short of ideal, they suffered a lot in the process, lots of injustices, but at least they are pretty much settled. Israel never really dealt with the Palestinians, and it is totally unsettled.
Might as well post this again
http://www.buzzfeed.com/andrewkaczynski/gop-congressman-thinks-putin-is-being-demonized-in-the-us
On the other hand, the author of this piece still thinks that it is the US’s job to right all the world’s wrongs. He learned nothing from Iraq.
Again, I am not in the least surprised at what Putin is doing with Ukraine. I didn’t “get it wrong”. I don’t like Putin, or approve of him. None of that is relevant to my judgment of what we should be doing about Ukraine.
A long long time ago I read a great satirical Russian book called “The Island of Crimea”, an alternate history where the Crimea was an island instead of a peninsula, and thus managed to hold against the Bolsheviks and become a country much like Hong Kong or Taiwan.
A review in the New Yorker, since the book is once again quite relevant – and eerily accurate about a Russian invasion, even down to the leather-clad motorcycle gang.
There’s a reason that Moscow used to be called the “third Rome” (if not by the Tsars themselves then perhaps by the Russian Orthodox Church).
They really did consider that they were carrying on the heritage of Rome, which had moved to Byzantium/Constantanople with the start of transition to a Christian empire. One common heritage was of course autocracy.
In the days of the early emperors, some at least maintained a ‘faux’ collegiality with the Senate, but particularly during the “Crisis of the Third Century”, they tried anything possible to maintain power and dominance, one method being taking on the “Eastern” (Persian) exaltation of the King (Emperor) as above other humans. Even by the time of Valentinian (mid-3rd century) the Emperor might sit at an elevated throne, and stare forwards like a frozen figure, a stature…an idol…a god…while listening to his “consilium.”
Some have remarked upon Putin’s “Iron Face.” No western leader would put on that mask to his own people, but threaded through the memory of Russia is that that is the way the Emperor maintains his image of superior privilege and ability above all others.
It is more complex than that. Rome had issues with monarchies. They were under the thumb of the rule of Etruscan Kings for a long time during the early years. They only switched to a more autocratic regime once Augustus came to power and styled himself as Emperor. Even then the Emperor was supposed to rule only over foreign provinces. In this regard he was more like a Viceroy during the Age of Discovery than a monarch. The Senate ruled over Rome and most of the Italian provinces. Quite often Imperial succession was not based on blood lines either but the successor was nominated by the previous Emperor. Augustus started that tradition himself when he nominated Tiberius as his successor.
It is true that after Constantine things changed a lot. That was when the Empire changed to dynastic succession.
The Russian claim to be the 3rd Rome is based on a lot of things. After the fall of the Byzantine Empire they were the bullwark of Christian Orthodoxy. They also used to claim inheritance of Byzantium because Ivan III married Sophia Paleologue. This provided part of their justification in fighting the Ottoman Empire and other actions during that time.
Regardless of this Russia has had a long tradition of autocratic rulers. This goes all the way back when they were still the Duchy of Muskovy. There were more democratic regimes in what is presently Russian territory like the trade Republic of Novgorod but those records were mostly obliterated.
Ok, just a couple of points:
— Respectfully, I don’t know why you go on as if I was talking about Roman bloodline succession, I didn’t even mention it, and am well aware of the pattern of nomination (or, with increasing frequency over time, “nomination” by the Praetorians or Legion(s) ).
— I disagree about your analogy of Augustus with a Viceroy. OK, his reign probably was the least “faux” when it came to working with the Senate, but ultimately they could not cross him if he cared enough to pay attention to something. His _was_ the last word.
— Yup, I know that Rome had “issues” with monarchies… the “first Brutus” and all that. But it’s also why Augustus in particular – and at least some of his early successors to greater or lesser degree – were careful to put on the trappings of being servants to the Senate and People, albeit ones granted extraordinary powers.
Your comments on the ‘heritage’ of Rome into Russia, Orthodoxy, etc. are much appreciated stuff I wasn’t really aware of in a specific way.
“Putin has Obama’s number. And that number is zero.”
– Ralph Peters
Couldn’t have said it better myself.