In researching a piece on tomorrow’s VSE anniversary, I just started to reread the commission report. You know what isn’t mentioned in the Executive Summary of recommendations? Heavy lift.
15 thoughts on “The Aldridge Commission”
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Look under Finding 4 with the list of 17 enabling technologies.
What part of “in the Executive Summary” are you having trouble comprehending?
The executive summary highlights the importance of “the successful development of identified enabling technologies…”, while no technologies are mentioned specifically in the executive summary, to be expected since it is a summary, the very first item in the enumeration of enabling technologies is, as Mark points out, heavy lift.
Granted, it is “affordable heavy-lift capability” and the entirety of the report makes it abundantly clear that something like the Falcon Heavy is to be preferred by a huge margin over something like SLS. Indeed, the SLS is basically the antithesis of what this report asks for.
The point is that the fact that it was not specifically mentioned in the executive summary is irrelevant. As for “affordable” it is a matter of uninformed opinion that SLS is not that.
The point is that the fact that it was not specifically mentioned in the executive summary is irrelevant.
And yet, the fact remains, that’s all that I said. And the fact remains that you don’t know how to read. And in fact, it is not irrelevant. And if it was such a vital thing, it might have been mentioned in the Executive Summary.
“As for “affordable” it is a matter of uninformed opinion that SLS is not that.”
So now you’re claiming that a launch vehicle with a $38 billion development cost and a $1.5 billion / launch recurring cost is “affordable”? Really?
The SLS is so “affordable” that there’s no money to develop any other payload than the Orion capsule ($5+ billion and counting for that monstrocity). So, we need a heavy lift booster to carry a 4-person space capsule? To do what?
On page 28 (page 30 of the PDF) I see
“Affordable heavy lift capability – technologies to allow robust affordable access of cargo, particularly to low-Earth orbit.” [em. mine]
That completely rules out the SLS, but might describe the Falcon 9H.
While making no mention of heavy lift, the executive summary does list the antithesis of SLS-style heavy lift; affordability.
Rand, I’m curious; do you oppose heavy lift per se, or are you (like me) opposed to it more on a cost per pound (including all associated R&D and infrastructure) basis?
I’d be very much in favor of SLS if it was going to realistically be able to launch payload at $200 per pound. (inclusive of all involved costs). Obviously, it won’t come within multiple orders of magnitude of that, but if it was going to, I’d support it. It won’t , so I oppose it.
I bitterly oppose the SLS boondoggle, but I’m in favor of Falcon Heavy (which has a comparable payload to LEO of SLS block 1). The main reason I favor one and oppose the other is cost; FH promises to be even cheaper per pound than F9. I don’t think we need heavy lift but if it’s cheaper per pound, I think it’d be nice to have.
As an aside on cost; I don’t think NASA has any hope of ever being affordable when it comes to hardware (So IMHO, keep them out of it). An eye-opener for me (that merely reconfirmed my opinion) was seeing cost figures for ISS construction. NASA spent well more than 10 times (I think it was more like 15X) what Russia did, and each side built roughly half the station. And, I don’t think that counted launch costs (And the Russian launch costs were a heck of a lot less than Shuttle.)
I’m not opposed to heavy lift per se. I’m opposed to the notion that we can’t go beyond LEO without it, and that it should be done by NASA. If it makes economic sense, I’m all for it. SLS does not.
Sounds like we are in violent agreement. 🙂
I favor fuel depots (which I learned of from you) as a road to BEO. Even with heavy lift, they’d still be needed.
“NASA spent well more than 10 times (I think it was more like 15X) what Russia did, and each side built roughly half the station.”
Not even close.
NASA’s space station budget from 1985 – 2015 is $58.7 billion. Russia’s is $12 billion.
The Russians have four modules: the Service Module, Docking Compartment 1, Docking Compartment 2, and the Docking and Stowage Module (or whatever they renamed it to).
The Americans have 17 modules: the FGB, Node 1, Node 2, Node 3, the U. S. Lab, the Joint Airlock Module, the PMM, the Z-1 truss, the S-0 truss, the S1 truss, the S3/4 truss, the S5 truss, the S6 truss, the P1 truss, the P3/4 truss, the P5 truss, and the P6 truss. 18 if you count the cupola.
That doesn’t count the contributions of the other Western nations. Since you mentioned each side built roughly half, one might conclude that the EuroLab, the Japanese lab, the Japanese Exposed Facility, the Pressurized Logistics Module, the SSRMS, the Mobile Base System, and the Special Purpose Dextrous Manipulator should count toward the American total, since they’re part of the USOS (United States Operating Segment). But I didn’t include them, since they are not part of the $58.7 billion total mentioned above.
Whether you compare mass, pressurized volume, electrical power (8 kW Russian vs 266 kW American), or data throughput (near continuous American Ku vs. Russian S-band while over Russian territory), the American side dwarfs the Russian side.
In reality, the Russian side of the station is not “roughly half.” In fact, it’s quite modest in comparison.
> The Americans have 17 modules: the FGB…
You do know that FGB expands to Функционально-грузовой блок, don’t you? See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zarya .
“You do know that FGB expands to Функционально-грузовой блок, don’t you?”
So?
It remains an American module paid for by the U. S. taxpayers and owned by the U. S. government.
I know I’m not Rand — but that’s not going to stop me from answering.
I’m neither for nor against heavy lift itself. I am for rational decision making, which generally means deciding what is to be done first, and then choosing the best means to do it. The US Congress has chosen precisely the opposite: build a particular means (SLS) and consider only later, if at all, whether anything productive can be done with it.