At GLEX, I just asked Mike Griffin from the floor what the payload was which demanded to be sent up in a single launch that demanded a Saturn-class vehicle. He responded by saying that this wasn’t the place to debate it, and then with a straw man about sending things up screw by screw. Buzz had previously softened him up with a comment about the need for more innovation and fewer jobs programs for the launch vehicles. He initiated the discussion with a slam at propellant depots.
[Update later evening]
I typed that from my phone. Here’s a fuller story. Mike (without prompting) stated that heavy-lift is the highest priority for space exploration, and that depots would be useful, but not immediately so. Ian Pryke agreed with him. Buzz responded (from the second row) as noted above. I then asked the panel (not Mike specifically) from the back of the (full) room the question above. His response (from memory, not an exact quote):
Rand, we’ve been arguing about this for years and this isn’t the place to debate it. It’s possible to break a vehicle down to individual nuts and bolts, and launch it that way. But there is a reason that we deliver crude oil in large tanker ships and [several more examples of large vehicles delivering stuff]. I don’t understand why space transportation is different than any other kind of transportation. We can argue about this forever, but at some point we just have to rely on common sense.
My response (here): Note that he didn’t answer the question, nor did he explain why a quarter of a million pounds was the right answer. The nuts and bolts thing is a strawman. Surely there is some optimimum, some happy medium between one fastener at a time, and a Saturn V delivering everything at once, fully fueled.
The reason that space transportation is different (at this time) than other kinds is because it is a new industry with a limited market, and there is insufficient traffic to amortize the development of such a large vehicle that will fly so rarely. It makes sense to build dozens of oil tankers to carry millions of tons of oil. For a vehicle that will deliver a hundred-plus tons once or twice a year, not so much. The first practical airplane, from an airline standpoint, was a DC-3, not a 747. There are other reasons it is different, but that one by itself should suffice.
Briefly, I refuse to concede to Mike’s condescending (and insulting) claim that he has a monopoly on common sense. And I understand that it wasn’t the right place for a debate. In his mind, there is no right place for a debate because a) he thinks there is no need for a debate and b) he knows that if he were ever to have one with me, he’d get creamed (at least judging by the last round between Space News and Competitive Space). Plus, he would never dare legitimize me or my arguments by debating me, just as Michael Mann and Briffa and Jones and Hansen refuse to come to the Heartland conference to debate.
[Bumped]
Launching in smaller pieces increases the on orbit assembly cost. But that needs to be weighed against the cost of developing and operating a larger vehicle. At some point a larger vehicle doesn’t make sense for just a few payloads.
Real economies of scale aren’t just the scale of the vehicle, but the scale of quantity of units delivered.
Yes. I think the preferences reflect underlying assumptions about various scaling factors. If you assume that any vehicle requires roughly the same amount of prep time and personnel to launch, then the flight rate would be fixed and a bigger vehicle increases the payload delivered. I would bet that NASA’s experience with the Space Shuttle feeds in to this line of reasoning, since they couldn’t really do much to increase the flight rate, and having a larger or smaller shuttle probably wouldn’t have changed the flight rate by very much.
Another possibility is that the complexity of coordinating the construction and assembly of the ISS, and the way the task was drawn out over years, has made them averse to the idea of repeating it for each mission beyond Earth orbit, as opposed to launching a big ship and having it go about its mission from the time it makes it into orbit, as the Shuttle did.
Their reasoning extends out to mean, we should all be ‘required’ to drive 16 passenger vans, because someday we may need to move 15 other people or 8 people and a bunch of gear ALL AT ONCE.
It’s too bad that the more you do “X” project, that we don’t get better at it, nor do we get quicker or more efficient at it, and there’s certainly no evidence that engineering gets better with practice or more studying and looking for better ways to complete “X” project.
Let’s face it, if engineering got better with time and research, we’d have gasoline powered vehicles capable of running 70 or 80 mph, getting 35 mpg, and we could control the passenger compartment so that it would be warm in Winter and cool in Summer.
Or airplanes capable flying NON-stop from NY to Tokyo, we’d have trains that could run well over 200 mph, or maybe some little research device capable of accessing most of the worlds current knowledge sitting right in our homes, or hows about a Dick Tracy ‘wrist radio’ thingy that we could use to call anybody, anytime, anywhere!
If only…but alas…we’re stuck well short of THAT kind of science fiction.
(my cheek is sore from my tongue pushing it out)
The alternative to assembling ISS in orbit would have been to build one vehicle capable of placing 1,000,000 pounds in orbit, then building an ISS that would fit in it and still work without being destroyed on launch.
Going to the moon was easier.
Launching in smaller pieces increases the on orbit assembly cost.
Which might be worthwhile if you consider it as investment in R&D against future missions. See commentary:
http://www.citizensinspace.org/2012/05/orbital-assembly-and-capability-building
this wasn’t the place to debate it
Because SLS is awesome, shut up!
Did you swing at them with a rubber chicken?
There’s really no need for a debate; the science is settled. /s
With the proposed Falcon Heavy stats, can the second stage itself make -any- reasonable orbit? How about if the ‘payload’ is primarily fuel?
Well, you tried…
Perhaps NASA should have focussed on building a payload for a big rocket and had a COTS/CCDEV type program for the launcher. This would allow for parallel development instead of having one or the other sit idle in a series development scenario.
He initiated the discussion with a slam at propellant depots.
Which “He” is that? Both of them have spoken in favor of depots in the past.
Nice try, Rand, but I’ve found that number of lunatics in audiences (once I saw a NASA employee ask Mike Griffin to review cancellation of their project in front of a crowd of ~500 people. The response was a curt ‘No!’) makes even a good question that’s out of the speaker’s comfort zone an easy target for the speaker to swat down (rightfully or wrongfully). Did you get a feel whether the crowd was sympathetic to your question?
There were some laughs at the nuts and bolts straw man.
Any screws we send into space should start with the loose ones inside of Griffin’s head.
As Mr Mackey once said “heh heh.. I don’t think you can, okay?”
Oh, here it is: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MfpWcXe_rug
I keep a link to Robotguy’s Lego article…
patented in 1958 and still compatible with pieces made today
Easily put together in almost unlimited configurations. This would be a good plan for space components, top to bottom. Why did the lunar module have different CO2 scrubbers from the command module? Because module was not a concept they understood very well. We still don’t. Otherwise they may someday need to find a Bigelow module to connect an American docking collar to a Russian collar (it has one or the other at each end.)
People keep getting lost in the weeds when a big picture is pretty easy to see.
Make your modules the size of your launch platform or less (not an ounce bigger) and make them all connect together in a reconfigurable manner. That way you can take a space station and turn it into a ship. You can take a ship for lunar transport and turn it into a mars transport. Your development cost gets paid once and forever. Just like lego, you can develop new pieces down the line and still get use out of old stuff. Ed nailed it. Why can’t others figure it out?
Premature standardization is the ideal way to kill innovation.. but no standardization can limit funding for innovation that would be possible otherwise. It’s a balancing act.
Something keeps nagging me about what you said Trent. I think because it pulled me off topic (I’m easily distracted.) The topic is ‘does the SLS make any kind of sense.’ My point about modules is not that we should cement in stone various standards. My point is analogous to Rand’s DC-3 point. If somebody had been handed over the blueprints for a 747 during that era it would have been ludicrous for somebody to try to build it (forget the technology that didn’t exist, I’m talking about the capability of a 747 for that era.)
Ask again when Falcon Heavy is flying … Ask loudly.
That is right on target. Imagine if SpaceX didn’t have the FH in the works? The SLS still wouldn’t make any sense, but we wouldn’t have this huge counter argument available to us. Reason is not persuasive when you fight the status quo power structure. You need to get rid of ALL those supporting that or they keep coming back.
It’s just unbelievable that so many can hold so tight to such an irrational belief.
Because that is just too easy and easy is not the hallmark of looking like great engineering. Nevermind that great engineering is all about making it easy – simple as needed but no simpler; complex enough but no more than needed.
This doesn’t mean killing innovation either. Not everything has to be a module. If he can get the funding, I’d love to see that guy build his ST enterprise ship.
There’s a lot of innovation possible by building to launch capacity. Bigelow has both a BA330 and BA2100. One doesn’t hurt the other (and I say once the FH is operational he think about a BA700.)
You are right Trent, but is that really the danger today? Today is more like when every nut and bolt manufacturer had his own unique threads. I don’t think that kind of standardization hurts. But I may have over stated my case. Balance, as you point out, is the key. SLS would be an extreme case of unbalanced.
Have a look at the attempts at docking standards.. they’re all build on known-bad solutions because there’s zero innovation. Having a standard would actually hurt people who wanted to try something new (not that I have any idea who that would be right now.. Jon Goff?)
Eh. A standard voltage onboard spacecraft wouldn’t hurt innovation much.
Speaking of heavy lift… I think a better question is; why do we need a massively expensive slightly bigger heavy lifter than one already likely to by flying long before SLS ever could?
Falcon Heavy: 120,000 pounds to LEO, SLS, 150,000 pounds. So, a 20% difference, *IF* both SLS and SLS live up to their projected abilities (I’d rank FH’s chances of doing so as greater than SLS, but…)
So, countless billions for at most a 20% payload increase plus massively higher cost per launch and cost per pound?
You’d be far better off to buy multiple FH launches to replace a single SLS launch. What’s an SLS likely to cost per flight? A billion?
I’ve long said that heavy lift makes sense if, and only if, it gives you a lower cost per pound. FH appears that it will do so. SLS doesn’t.
The only way I’ll ever support the Senate Launch System is if they convince me they’ll use it to launch the Senate on a one-way mission. A fact finding junket to the sun, perhaps? 🙂
Ask again when Falcon Heavy is flying.. it’ll be better received. Ask loudly.
“What’s an SLS likely to cost per flight? A billion?”
Worse. One projection I’ve seen is 1.6 billion dollars. That works out to $10,000 per pound of payload, not counting the +10 billion dollars of development cost.
An even better question regarding SLS, is why not spend the development costs on actual flight costs of existing vehicles instead? Even at a payload cost double the projected cost of SLS that equals half a million pounds of payload into LEO.
And assuming the cost projections for Falcon Heavy are accurate, it gets even worse for SLS if Falcon Heavy flights substitute for the development cost of SLS. Then you would get 10 million pounds of payload into orbit. More than enough mass for 10 manned missions to Mars!
The difference in assumptions explains the difference in answer.
If you assume that no matter how much money it costs, you will have it, Ares 5/SLS is the perfect solution — it “keeps the program sold” and any booster, launched in sufficient quantity, eventually gets affordable. If SLS were going to fly 8 times a year, it might well make sense.
Based on statements by Mr. Griffin while he was NASA administrator (a position he no longer holds, although I’m not sure anyone told him that), I believe he simply assumed that no matter how much it cost, he would get the money. The data no longer supports that assumption, if it ever did — but he seems to keep hoping for another chance to do the same thing over and over again, hoping for a different result.
I’d get more excited about this argument, but I think a successful first FH test flight within a year, while SLS is still mostly in the PowerPoint stage of gestation, is likely to close the debate fairly decisively. Is there anybody – except maybe Andy Pasztor – who actually thinks Elon won’t pull that off?
Yes.. no sensible person assumes a new launch vehicle is going to work until it flies. That goes for Mike Griffin and Elon Musk. Falcon Heavy is interesting, but even Rand has expressed concerns about certain elements (number of engines, for example) and, if anything, it’s a point for Griffin’s side of the table, not Rand’s.
The thing is, FH is on the SpaceX critical path. It will get done. It already has a payload of unmanned Dragons to go all over the solar system. One red planet in particular.
“and, if anything, it’s a point for Griffin’s side of the table, not Rand’s.”
It would be a point for “Bigger is better!” … But it also would be a very strong point in the “Have NASA buy flights – not rocket designs.” column.
Iff it works well.
And I keep not getting a straight answer to “So when does stage two have to separate?” Which I happen to think could well be sandbagging on a killer point.
No offense, Trent, but that is obviously not so. The people who noisily doubt SpaceX’s ability to succeed with FH weren’t shy about expressing the same doubts over F1 and F9. But they harbored no such skepticism about the ability of NASA to succeed with the preposterous Ares projects nor do they now with respect to their SLS successor. My peeve is about the obvious differential in expectations expressed by so many based solely on the private/commercial vs. NASA divide. This is an attitude based entirely on ideology as there are no facts that render it sensible. SpaceX has developed and successfully flown two vehicle types (F1 & F9) in ten years for a relative pittance. By the 11 year mark, that total is all but certain to be three (add FH). NASA, in contrast, hasn’t designed any successful new systems in over 30 years unless you want to count the Ares 1-X charade. I don’t. Every other significant NASA initiative since Shuttle has failed – most without even reaching a bent metal stage. The people who designed and built Saturn-Apollo and Shuttle are retired or dead. The legions of NASA fanboys are genuflecting to an organization with a glorious distant past, but a highly problematic intermediate and recent history.
Despite the fact that SpaceX rocketry has not progressed as rapidly as they initially hoped, (gosh! space travel is hard!) I think it is perfectly reasonable to assume Falcon Heavy will fly years earlier than SLS ever will.
Then the question is, how heavy “heavy lift” does space flight really need? Is an Ares V type behemoth really necessary? Or even a Saturn V? Why wouldn’t Falcon Heavy be large enough?
I think there is a logical sweet-spot when it comes to conventional expendable launch vehicles. I don’t think many would advise basing an ambitious space exploration program using something as small as Falcon 1 rockets for launching propellant to a space-based propellant depot. But on the opposite end of the scale, when sea transportation is required to ship a rocket stage from the factory to the launch pad, that rocket is probably too big.
Odds are Falcon Heavy is pretty close to the sweet spot of the maximum practical size, before it gets too large so that the logistics are counterproductive. A Falcon Heavy sized vehicle combined with a propellant depot (or other form of orbital refueling) is probably the quickest and easiest way for NASA to go.
Then the question is, how heavy “heavy lift” does space flight really need? Is an Ares V type behemoth really necessary? Or even a Saturn V? Why wouldn’t Falcon Heavy be large enough?
That’s very similar to the questions government officials were asking in the 70’s and 80’s. “How big a computer do we really need?”
In the mean time, microcomputers were about to change the world.
http://www.citizensinspace.org/2012/05/two-cheers-for-spacex
Well said.
…(padding this out because the phishing filter told me my comment was a bit too short)
Then the question is, how heavy “heavy lift” does space flight really need?
I’d say the requirement is to launch the largest non-severable (or indivisible) component for a given mission. For example, suppose the required mission architecture calls for nuclear power at a lunar outpost. If it turns out that the smallest reactor that meets the requirements can’t be made weighing less than X pounds and that’s the biggest component needed for the mission, then you have two alternatives:
1. Use that number X as the required heavy lift capacity, or
2. Change your architecture so that component is no longer the driving factor in booster design.
The other approach is to design your architecture based on the lift capacity of existing boosters to eliminate that R&D expense. If FH works as hoped, then the designers can launch some pretty hefty chunks into space. Technologies like orbital assembly and propellant depots will allow them to put together some pretty innovative and capable architectures without wasting billions developing a new booster.
Yeah, but then you can make the argument: since you’re spending several $B to develop the heavy lifter anyway, why not spend it on making the payload more severable?
How heavy “heavy lift” does space flight really need?
This implies a meta-question. What is the best way to determine this need?
You can let government workers with no skin in the game make that decision or you can let free enterprise do it. Am I biased? You bet.
I look at the launch frequency. Unless the missions are unusually high value (save the Earth from destruction, Bruce Willis-style), a high launch frequency indicates some staying power. My view is that anything less than ten launches a year is fundamentally not serious.
To reiterate, the need I was talking about was the quickest and easiest path forward for NASA. The need is shortest time and lowest cost.
I believe Falcon Heavy will provide the lowest cost per pound of payload to LEO, and the earliest availability for flight. In a perfect world a reusable launch system might provide lower launch costs, but what of the time spent to make such a system work? If anything time seems to be the toughest obstacle to NASA, since too much delay tempts Congress to pork up NASA and NASA never gets anywhere beyond LEO.
I have no objection to NASA plowing forward into space even at suboptimal efficiency just as long as they are actually making progress. But what’s the point of NASA manned spaceflight if all they do is nothing more than merry-go-round in LEO with eyes fixed inward on Earth? I want NASA to send American astronauts to the moon, Mars and beyond. If the International Space Station is the be all and end all of NASA (which I think is a serious danger, with ISS as the new white elephant absorbing all of NASA’s resources just as the Shuttle once did) then why have NASA manned spaceflight?
At the same time I want to see the baby of private manned spaceflight protected and allowed to grow, no matter how slow the pace. I have confidence that in the long run much of the promise of new-space will be fulfilled.
Regarding the update, since Griffin is bound to repeat his oil tanker comparison, supertankers are tankers above 250,000 tons, with the largest (built in 1979) displacing 564,000 tons. It’s been scrapped and the two largest still in operation are 440,000 tons. But the average size of new tankers is only 64,000 tons, only 4% of new tankers are supertankers, and 80% of new tankers displace less than 80,000 tons.
Griffin’s tanker argument, aside from ignoring the vast difference in requirements and markets, also ignores the actual sizes of tankers. It reminds me of Jack Horner’s observation that museums didn’t have any baby dinosaurs. Nobody wanted to see little ones, and so they didn’t.
It’s like an economist talking about hamburgers.. someone stands up and says “I work in the hamburger industry, and this is just bunk!” All the economists laugh, because it’s not actually about hamburgers.
Good catch George. The problem of course is that reason has nothing to do with it.
What percentage of an annual oil shipments does a single supertanker load represent?
There’s the fallacy. Supertankers are not really all that large, relative to the size of the market — which is the only comparison that matters.
Taking the analogy that far does allow a snarky comeback though:
“So… you’re saying we need a pipeline, er, space elevator?”
A supertanker can deliver 2 to 3 million barrels of oil, and world consumption is around 82 million barrels a day. Supertankers typically make the long transoceanic voyages, so it takes a lot of them in transit to meet demand. World supertanker construction is about 20 a year, around 80 a year if you include the slightly smaller tankers that can transit the Strait of Hormuz and the Suez Canal (60-80,000 tons). We build hundreds of even smaller tankers each year, and for an extra penny or so at the pump, we could use nothing but these smaller tankers.
The analogy itself is a fallacy. The reference points are arbitrary. The supertanker can just as easily correspond to the medium lift segment. There has, after all, been an evolution in rocketry from small irbms to something the size of the top end of medium lift.
ie. We use supertankers to transport oil, not superdupertankers 5 times the size of current market supported tankers.
George,
That’s very interesting about the smaller size of the newest oil tankers.
But what makes Griffin’s crack about oil tankers even more inane is that oil pipelines are the preferred way to move oil great distances, and not oil tankers.
That’s a great point, but it’s also worth to point out that Griffin wants to build the supertankers first.
Imagine building supertankers in the 19th century because we’ve correctly anticipated that we’re going to need them to satisfy the demand for oil in the second half of the 20th century.
The analogy is just arrant nonsense.
As Trent already said. FH supports heavy lift approach, vs docking modules on orbit and fueling them up there.
Btw, “orbital assembly” in these discussions is often used distraction, a bit of a strawman. Gemini astronauts were not on EVA with wrenches to dock with Agena target.
One could build a large vehicle stack on orbit without requiring any EVA or even human presence up there. See Astro-NextSat, etc.
Well, I agree entirely with you about Griffin and his strawmen, but I think it as understandable that Mann, Briffa etc. wouldn’t want to get into debating climate science with the Heartland flakes just as you probably wouldn’t want to bother debating the merits of alternatives to SLS with Moon landing troofers (or whatever it is they call themselves). debating with fanatical flakes is usually pointless.
Mann and Briffa et al are doing science? That’s news to me. Fraud, deception, propaganda and lies is more like it.
Briefly, I refuse to concede to Mike’s condescending (and insulting) claim that he has a monopoly on common sense.
Yeah, that was the thing that jumped out at me. I’m afraid there are no two ways about it, Mike Griffin is simply a liar. A failure and a liar.
Mike (without prompting) stated that heavy-lift is the highest priority for space exploration, and that depots would be useful, but not immediately so. Ian Pryke agreed with him.
Actually, neither would be immediately useful. Both require a spacecraft first in order to be useful. If that spacecraft is refuelable, then it can be useful straight away by itself, without either the depot or the HLV. Infrastructure should be left to the market, depending on traffic levels. A spacecraft is our top priority.
A refuelable spacecraft that doesn’t go down gravity wells. I’ve been calling that a general purpose spaceship. It could be put into orbit now for profitable service.
Somebody with $250m should consider it. Crew of six for lunar excursions. Upgradeable to any place in the inner solar system for a modest cost.
A refuelable spacecraft that doesn’t go down gravity wells.
Exactly, gravity wells are a job for commercial crew, for the Earth’s gravity well at least. L1/L2 is the most practical home port location for the deep space spacecraft, but GEO wouldn’t be crazy either.
Market forces determine the size of launch vehicles just as they do with bulk carriers, trucks etc. The onus is on Griffin to explain why space transportation should be different, why a civil servant with a conflict of interests should be the one to decide what size of launch vehicle is required, based on dubious evidence.
It is interesting to note that freight trains can move thousands of tons at a time, with far better fuel economy per ton, and yet trucks eat their lunch for most classes of cargo. IMO, freight trains vs trucks might be a better argument with many people if you just ask them the last time they sent anything at all via freight train, or even rode in one as a passenger.
But freight trains are an example of the modular technology Griffin is against. Think of a train that was purpose built to be a mile long; not very practical. And have you never seen an intermodal train with truck trailers on a flatcar? Intermodal is the way to go; launch fairing cargo moduls picked up by a reusable orbital tug that then become logistics and habitation modules in orbit.
Maybe it would be more apt to compare the DC-3 with the “Spruce Goose”, as I’m sure Howard Hughes would have put it into commercial service if there had been sufficient demand (i.e. the market in 1947 was just too small/insufficient).
Reports say the Spruce Goose vibrated quite badly during its one and only flight. The wartime requirement that it built out of wood probably made it unsuitable for commercial service in any case.
That didn’t stop the British from proceeding with the Bristol Brabazon, however, which was also a notable (if far less famous) failure. The Brabazon was so huge that the British government had to relocate an entire village for the construction of a new runway just to get it off the ground. The analogy to superheavy lifters, with their huge infrastructure requirements, is obvious.
I’m getting here late to this thread, but thank you both for mentioning the Spruce Goose and the Bristol Brabazon. Other examples of mammoth planes that were much-ballyhooed and expensive flops were the Dornier Do-X and the Tupolev ANT-20 Maxim Gorky.
Any one of them should serve as a cautionary lesson for SLS enthusiasts.
I saw a TV documentary about the Brabazon years ago. What a mess. They were so certain that it represented the future of air transportation.
I had to delete the Spruce Goose link because it made my comment “spammy”. 😉
Mr. Hare – There are very few types of cargo for which freight trains are the best option, simply because the handling equipment required is only worth building for a few types – as things are right now. Examples are bulk ore and coal, perhaps. I believe, for example, that most coal fired power stations have dedicated rail links.
Transhipping standard shipping containers for the last few miles might work, also.
Not at all sure that any of this is relevant to lofting loads to orbit. We don’t have any fixed-infrastructure, ultra-heavy load transport system to orbit right now, although such things as the Beanstalk might provide that. The argument is more like the difference between 18-wheelers and 7.5 ton vans; trying to run a transport system with either exclusively would be ridiculous.
What about all of those double-stack trains carrying shipping containers?
Ironically, Griffin has a bit of a point, but not in the way he thinks. Supertankers and huge railroad trains make sense when shipping bulk commodities. Thus, since SLS will be a supertanker sized HLV, if we want to extend Griffin’s own analogy, it would seem that SLS’s primary job should be to ship propellant–the only conceivable bulk commodity. But to where? To depots!
Nice way to get flight rates up.
Not just propellant. Structural components would also be a suitable load for a heavy-lift vehicle.
Which leads to another point. A heavy-lift vehicle designed for such loads doesn’t need the reliability level of one carrying critical, expensive equipment – or people for that matter. I’m no engineer, but it seems to me that lowering reliability standards would lower costs. Mercedes are more expensive than Fiats for a reason.
Space Systems/Loral proposed this with Aquarius… A rocket so cheap and UNreliable that 1/3 of launches could fail and you’d still save money
http://www.thespacereview.com/article/146/2
The fallacy there is the assumption that human lives are worth more than money. The reason that’s fallacious is that money can buy human lives. That’s what the medical industry does, after all.
If you lose structural components worth $N, which could have saved 10 lives if you had donated the money to medical research or health insurance or better police protection, then you’ve lost 10 lives you could have saved. From a PR viewpoint, those deaths are invisible (unlike astronauts who on a rocket that fails) but that doesn’t make them any less real.
It’s not completely fallacious. More people would buy a ticket on a safe and reliable rocket than on an unreliable one. The same would not be true for cheap cargo.
More people would buy a ticket on a safe and reliable rocket than on an unreliable one. The same would not be true for cheap cargo.
I’m not aware of any customers who deliberately seek out unsafe and unreliable cargo carriers.
J.R. Ewing might view the Exxon Valdez as a smart business move, but J.R. was only “smart” by Hollywood standards. In other words, dumb. 🙂
The ship Exxon Valdez, later renamed and sold many times, was a very safe and reliable cargo carrier that sailed until just a couple of months ago. The oil spill named after the ship was not caused by the ship but by the incompetent crew. If you want to talk about unsafe and unreliable ships, look up the USS San Antonio.
We actually need soundbite arguments in some cases, such as Rands’ question to Mike. Soundbites like, ” How many cargos do 747s carry that cannot be handled by C130s?” I’d bet that the unique cargos could be counted on fingers and toes. It might be a good thing if some of us worked up a few hard questions of this nature for those circumstances. “How many F9H flights and astronaut assembly hours could you buy for the development cost of your Griffenschaft?”
The real problem here is not the argument. The problem is institutional funding that goes to flim-flam artists. They aren’t trying to win any arguments. They’re just trying to keep the money flowing. They don’t have to win any arguments to do that. They just need us to keep feeding the money and nothing more.
During this entire administration they’ve talked cuts and all that has happened overall is another trillion in spending. These people have to be eliminated from the reigns of power. Nothing short of that will work. Winning a battle here and there will not work. If the defeat is not decisive and complete it’s a loss.
I am constantly amazed at the ability of Mike Griffin to get under the skin of Rand and, if the comments herein are any indication, a lot of other people.
My advice to the fuel depots crowd is to learn how to engage in an argument besides using the Dr. House “Because you’re an idiot!” method. Come up with some actual real world numbers to support your position. Above all, do not leap the length of your chains because someone like Griffin talks down to you. So far you have not given people like Griffin any reason to treat you like adults,
Eyeballs rolling.
Is this the same Mark Whittington who once cited Dr. House as an example of realistic medical drama???
You can’t buy irony like that anymore.
DIRECT did precisely this using NASA-internal pricing and simulation software to calculate failure rates and costs for using an ‘upper stage’ as a de facto fuel depot.
It was still brushed off as ‘unnecessarily risky’.
So Mark, “this wasn’t the place to debate it” is a good argument? What is the right place and how do we drag their ass to it?
The lack of adult argument isn’t coming from the depot people.
Mr Whittington asks us to “Come up with some actual real world numbers to support your position.” so I assume he’s unaware of this NASA study…
http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewnews.html?id=1577
Given these ‘real world numbers, does Mr Whittington still think Dr Griffin has a valid point?
Many did, to no avail. The argument in favour of propellant transfer over heavy lift is almost trivial. You have to be really, really stupid or more likely in deep, deep denial not to get it once it’s been explained to you.
He doesn’t get under my skin. I got under his.
Mark
Really? Accusation rejected.
The tone of your own post is insulting and demeaning. You have indulged in the very behavior you have accused us of. Talking down to us.
Virtually all of the comments in this thread have been substantive and well considered. But you condemn all with a shotgun accusation, “if the comments here are any indication”. If you are going to be so combative have the decency to make your accusations specific. Name names or hold your tongue.
Do you really believe the approach you are taking here is going to sway anyone to your point of view?
Here are some real world numbers for you: Falcon Heavy, first flight 2013-2014, $1,000 per pound payload to LEO, taxpayer cost to develop – zero dollars ; SLS, first flight 2018 (yeah right), $10,000 per pound payload to LEO, taxpayer cost to develop 10 billion dollars (if we are lucky).
Case closed. Griffin loses.
Everyone knows that US dollars are the payload for the SLS.
Tons of them, carried straight to the right districts.
Mr. Wright – I don’t think that human lives (at least those of volunteers) are more important than anything else. However; nobody, but nobody, is going to be able to sell the idea of deliberately risking human lives (volunteers or not) to save money by decreased reliability. It would be a PR disaster.
It would almost certainly work, however, for bulk cargoes – fuel and oxidiser, water, structural beams, food. Using this approach for structural components might even make it possible to use cheap materials for them and accept the weight penalty, thus further reducing the cost of a cheap launch. Note: I said “might”. The calculations are something I’m not trained or qualified to do.
However; nobody, but nobody, is going to be able to sell the idea of deliberately risking human lives (volunteers or not) to save money by decreased reliability. It would be a PR disaster.
Every project has its constraints and tradeoffs. For example, Apollo was artificially constrained by time (“by the end of this decade) and not so much by money (“waste anything but time”). It was also in an era when spaceflight was new and everyone knew it was risky. From what I’ve read, NASA was actually happy when Apollo 17 splashed down because they were running so many risks. They were afraid of losing another crew.
How safe is safe enough? Any flight carrying people into space will still be risky (e.g. Challenger and Columbia) and rational people can accept that if we keep doing this, odds are more people will die. How many “9s” do we need to have in the reliability figure, 99.9, 99.999, 99.9999999? Each additional 9 adds a lot of cost. At what point to we say, “that’s good enough?” How much safety can we afford?
Some people claim you can’t put a price on a human life but we do it all the time. Would society (or an insurance company) spend a million dollars to save a life? Quite likely. How about 100 million or a billion dollars? Not very likely. At some point, we have to say that we can’t afford to spend above X amount of money to save that life, and at that point, we’ve put a price on a human life.
Each additional 9 adds a lot of cost.
Evidence, please? You can’t plot a trend line using a single data point (the Shuttle).
According to General Dynamics, the X-15 had more 9’s than than the Atlas A (which had similar performance) but cost 40% less. Can you show the flaw in their analysis?
There’s plenty of evidence that good design can simultaneously reduce costs and increase reliability. There’s also the standard learning curve, which shows that costs decrease and reliability increases with flight rate — i.e., a positive correlation between economy and reliability.
True, if we try to achieve reliability stupidly, it’s going to be expensive, but there’s no law that says we have to be stupid.
Validating each additional “9” requires a lot of testing. Achieving higher reliability can require more expensive materials and more verification processes during production. All of that comes at a cost and this has been proven for decades with “mil spec” components.
Validating each additional “9″ requires a lot of testing.
The X-15 was test flown a lot more often than the Atlas A. It still cost less.
Achieving higher reliability can require more expensive materials and more verification processes during production. All of that comes at a cost and this has been proven for decades with “mil spec” components.
Did the X-15 use more expensive materials than the Atlas A?
Even if what you say is true, you’re only looking at part of the cost equation. Unreliability costs money. It might seem cheaper to buy $10 tires for your car from Joe’s Fly By Night Tire Sales — until you discover Joe’s tires only last 500 miles and you have a $2800 repair bill after your first blowout. That’s called a false economy. A quality tire is cheaper than Joe’s re-re-recaps.
Where are the examples of successful companies providing cheap transportation with unreliable vehicles?
Did the X-15 use more expensive materials than the Atlas A?
Yes, in fact it did. The X-15 was largely built of Inconol X, a nickel alloy to withstand the high temperatures of Mach 5+ flight in the atmosphere. The Atlas A was built of thin sheet stainless steel. Being manned, the X-15 called for higher reliability and even then, there were accidents including one fatal one. The general (Schriever) behind the development of the first ICBMs believed that if you weren’t having failures, then you weren’t pushing the state of the art far enough. And boy, did they have failures but they learned a lot.
You’re making simplistic arguments about low reliability verses high reliability with your auto tires analogy. I’m talking about the proven track record of the price for high reliability (>99%) verses very high reliability (>99.999%). Decades of military procurement history prove that pushing for very high reliability drives up cost considerably. Consider a critical component like an explosive bolt or nut. Failure to separate on command will likely result in mission failure or loss of life so those components have to have very high reliability (99.9999% or greater). How many tests are required to validate that level of reliability? How much additional processing during manufacture is required to ensure that every single component has that level of reliability? How much do you think that drives up the price of the part?
You’re making simplistic arguments about low reliability verses high reliability with your auto tires analogy. I’m talking about the proven track record of the price for high reliability (>99%) verses very high reliability (>99.999%).
Larry, Larry, Larry….
99% is not considered high reliability except in the “special olympics” of expendable rocketry. The worst tires you can buy are a lot more than 99% reliable. 99% reliability would mean replacing a tire every few weeks — or even days, depending on how often you drive your car.
Decades of military procurement history prove that pushing for very high reliability drives up cost considerably.
Is that procurement history classified? I ask you again — what transportation system has the military procured that was simultaneously cheap and unreliable? Or anyone else? Don’t just keep repeating the common wisdom, give me examples where the common wisdom worked.
I ask you again — what transportation system has the military procured that was simultaneously cheap and unreliable?
That seems a rather silly question. The military pushes for high reliability and pays premium prices for it. Quite often, the systems fail to meet the reliability requirements (F-22, F-35, LCS to name but a few recent examples) so the price gets even higher.
You can buy a set of tools at Harbor Freight that might meet your household needs. If you’re a professional mechanic, you’re not likely to do that except perhaps for tools you won’t need very often. Quality costs. It’s as simple as that in the real world. What color is the sky on your planet?
That seems a rather silly question. The military pushes for high reliability and pays premium prices for it.
Do you think that only the military cares about reliability? Do you think commercial airliners are less reliable than the C-5 Galaxy? Or more expensive?
The problem with military procurement is not that it pushes for high reliability but it does so *badly*. There is no question that many military requirements are badly written or badly implemented, or that quality requirements which are written badly or implemented badly can increase cost.
That isn’t an argument against doing quality, however. It’s an argument against doing quality badly.
If you’re a professional mechanic, you’re not likely to do that except perhaps for tools you won’t need very often. Quality costs.
Have you asked a mechanic why he buys those tools? He’ll probably tell you that a quality tool *saves* money in the long run. It’s cheaper to buy a $10 wrench that lasts forever than a $5 wrench that has to be replaced every six months.
I’m not sure why you find that concept so hard to understand.
“It would almost certainly work, however, for bulk cargoes – fuel and oxidiser, water, structural beams, food. Using this approach for structural components might even make it possible to use cheap materials for them and accept the weight penalty, thus further reducing the cost of a cheap launch.”
‘Relaibility’ isn’t just a matter of minimizing risk to human lives, it means a high probability of getting stuff where you want it, *when* you want it.
Yes, things like water, fuel, oxidizer, food are not terribly expensive items, but that only loosely reflects their value. If you’ve got an on-orbit work crew that needs these ‘cheap’ things now, not just for their own life-support, but because work can’t continue without them, they will continue to be paid (likely very well paid) while on the work site, your project costs won’t tolerate many late or failed deliveries.
Oh, and if that fuel or reaction mass is for a vehicle under assembly that’s going to leave LEO, then in addition to the above, you also have a ready-or-not launch window bearing down on you, and the next one may be many months away…well, Cold Equations, and all that. A cheap-but-less-reliable launcher isn’t helpful for unchangeable deadlines, even if the provider offers a replacement launch for free.
It’s only because of the high reliability of most forms of Terrestrial (including air) transport, that warehouse-free, ‘Just In Time’ operations are possible.
(Of course, that philosophy has its own kind of fragility, but that’s another story…)
but nobody, is going to be able to sell the idea of deliberately risking human lives (volunteers or not) to save money by decreased reliability.
Okay, for about the millionth time — you don’t save money by decreasing reliability. That’s called a false economy. Do you see Southwest sacrificing safety to reduce fares?
It would almost certainly work, however, for bulk cargoes – fuel and oxidiser, water, structural beams, food…. The calculations are something I’m not trained or qualified to do.
You haven’t looked at the numbers but you’re almost certainly right? How does that work?
General Dynamics looked at the numbers and found that reusable vehicles like the X-15 were more reliable than expendable rockets with similar performance *and* cheaper to develop. The Air Force looked at different numbers, in an independent study, and came to, the same conclusion.
In the real world, almost anything you do to improve reliability also reduces cost. Even bulk-cargo carriers care about reliability — and not just because they’re concerned about the crew.
And structural components are not as cheap as you think. Even Bigelow modules aren’t dirt cheap — and no one’s going to be building modules in space from sheet steel and bar stock any time soon, regardless of Dr. Griffin’s strawman.
Okay, for about the millionth time — you don’t save money by decreasing reliability. That’s called a false economy. Do you see Southwest sacrificing safety to reduce fares?
But there is a point (sometimes called the knee in the curve) where spending additional money is no longer cost effective in increasing reliability. Airlines (among others) make that decision all of the time. For example, they could perform maintenance far and above what the manufacturer calls for in the hopes of increasing reliability but the additional cost isn’t worth it. The systems are already so reliable and redundant and the crews so well trained to handle problems that spending the additional money isn’t worthwhile.
Southwest does do maintenance far above what Boeing calls for. They have to in order to get the dispatch reliability and turn times they need. Some other airlines may only do the minimum. They tend to have higher ticket prices and make less money. It isn’t obvious that Southwest made the wrong decision. 🙂
In economics that is called the law of diminishing returns.
My car works fine.
It would be safer if I performed a full inspection, engine test, brake test and tire examination.
It would be even safer if I performed such a test daily.
It would be even safer if I performed that test every time the car was turned on.
But the entirety of the “additional safety” is basically completely bogus. So I do no such thing.
Your analogy is that it isn’t analogous. Your car is not a space capsule or a Shuttle. Your car doesn’t have a history of blowing up and killing its occupants 1% of the time. If it did, you’d probably take a few more precautions. Or we wouldn’t be having this discussion.
Numbers matter, Al.
Okay, for about the millionth time — you don’t save money by decreasing reliability.
Proof by repetition? No need to be dogmatic about it. The Aquarius approach was to save costs by mass-producing single stage expendables. This would require very low margins to even make orbit, so low that winds aloft could lead to a breakup or simply running out of gas before achieving orbital velocity. Maybe this would work, maybe it wouldn’t. It isn’t obvious to me it couldn’t work.
Perhaps I wasn’t being quite clear. Sure, a vehicle designed from the start for high reliability is quite possibly going to end up actually cheaper to operate than a one that isn’t. But (pulling numbers out of a hat) let’s say that running additional checks on an already-built launch vehicle – and also carrying out a launch hold for probably non-critical problems – costs an additional 20% compared to being a bit sloppier. And the additional checks raise the reliability from say 95% to 99%.
How does the maths work out then?
Mr. Glover – One way of reducing the possibility of lost-opportunity costs such as the ones you describe is simply to keep more stock on site – essentially the reverse of the JIT philosophy. I suspect that logistics experts (military ones?) could tell what levels of apparent overstock on site are required to allow for the possibility of delay in delivery. I say “military experts” because, of course, they have to allow for catastrophic loss of delivered goods. By enemy action, in that case, rather than mechanical failure – but I don’t see how that affects the problem.
I’m not aware of any customers who deliberately seek out unsafe and unreliable cargo carriers.
Heheh, no, but I meant they might choose substantially cheaper ones for transporting relatively cheap commodities like propellant, even if they were much less reliable.