…getting desperate.
I have a response to Loren Thompson’s latest load of bilge, over at the Washington Examiner.
35 thoughts on “Legacy Space Companies”
Comments are closed.
…getting desperate.
I have a response to Loren Thompson’s latest load of bilge, over at the Washington Examiner.
Comments are closed.
I think the bottom line is the blatant double standards. SpaceX is “risky” even though they’re bending metal and flying rockets versus NASA programs such as Constellation can spend vastly more while the risk and absence of concrete results is beneath notice.
Rand, could you clarify one point? In your response you imply that the amount of NASA money in SpaceX is $75 million. Then later, you say they spent $300 million on getting the Dragon capsule up and down. Here’s what you said:
NASA has little riding right now on SpaceX, except $75 million, and the bet is not risky because it’s spread it across the table.
and later
The company has received less than three hundred million from NASA
and later
Compare that to the mere $300 million that NASA has spent to get the Dragon test flight on the Falcon 9 last December
Thanks
BBB
Karl: SpaceX is “risky” even though they’re bending metal and flying rockets versus NASA programs such as Constellation can spend vastly more while the risk and absence of concrete results is beneath notice.
Constellation has flown a rocket, the Ares I-X. I recall some metal being bent to make that happen.
The reason that NASA spends vastly more money while flying fewer rockets is that much more effort is focused on risk reduction, both test and analysis. You can argue that the NASA methodology is inferior to the build-and-launch paradigm, but I think it is incorrect to argue that NASA is hiding risks while SpaceX is being open. I would argue that NASA is an organization obsessed with risk mitigation — sometimes it seems it’s practically all they do — while SpaceX is struggling to find a place for it in their organization. When my meds are titrated, I have hope that a sane middle ground can be found. 😉
Rand, could you clarify one point? In your response you imply that the amount of NASA money in SpaceX is $75 million. Then later, you say they spent $300 million on getting the Dragon capsule up and down.
The $75M is for the contract they just won for CCDev, none of which they have yet received (they are probably still in negotiations). The $300M is for the COTS program.
Constellation has flown a rocket, the Ares I-X. I recall some metal being bent to make that happen.
Yes, “bent” in a literal sense, since the Corn Dog’s parachutes failed to open properly, and the “reusable” solid booster casings became unreusable as a result…
When my meds are titrated, I have hope that a sane middle ground can be found.
While I can agree on principle, I think that the “middle” (at least if we want to have an affordable program) is a lot closer to SpaceX than traditional NASA.
I’m not sure the Ares design was based on a corn dog. I think it was inspired by a bomb pop, though a bombpop looks like it uses strap-ons on the upper stage.
The bottom line is that as Rand has pointed out space is unimportant on the national political scene – whether it be for things that make real progress or those that are pork projects for districts and companies with legacy interests still living off memories of the Apollo dead-end.
Therefore, the shills for the latter groups can shout any bs they want in public forums and if they do it loudly enough they will get as much of the meager attention that space gets at all politically. The rest of us can be perfect in our logic and astounding in our achievements, but the others’ bs will still stick far more and than any disinterested observer would expect
I think the article makes some excellent points about commercial crew that have not been presented in full previously.
It is odd that he suggests a thumb on the scale for CCDEV, which is rather silly, without mentioning the very open thumb on the scale at the beginning of COTS that kept out Boeing and Lockheed. Someone at NSF used to have a signature line that read, “sigh… OSP would be flying by now,” and that pretty much nails the “road not taken…”
The question remains, why is this the ONLY arena in technology or business where Obama “trusts” the private sector?
There is a high likelihood that, while Garver and Bolden really believe SpaceX and orbital will come through, the rest of the administration is using them as useful “false flag” tools that allows Obama to implement a strategy for spaceflight that he believes is win/win: 1) if SpaceX falls on its face and ISS has to be de-orbited, manned spaceflight will end, but not till long after 2012 election, and then it just frees up more money for domestic vote buying. 2) If spaceX succeeds, the administration gets a much nearer term “smart” boost, but is not tied to any additional need to keep manned spaceflight going, since it is privately supported. 3) number 2 can be minimized by keeping COTS and especially commercial crew funding at the minimum additional levels to still be considered “supporting”
When discussing the risky approach of allowing Elon Musk to sell his product to the government versus the safe path represented by Constellation, I think it’s appropriate that we also take into consideration the other past successes of the traditional big aerospace companies … such as the Lockheed Martin X-33. They never crashed a single vehicle!
It’s surprising that some people think that the only way you can do good end-to-end Systems Engineering is to generate powerpoints de-jure and mountains of analysis output.
The doubters ought to google “Agile Systems Engineering”
Please note that NASA does NONE of ASE.
I would also argue, based on reports from the ARES PDR, that the folks running the reviews had little practical knowledge of Systems Engineering. Nothing like putting your thumb on the entry and exit criteria to get a “successful” PDR.
Charles: Therefore, the shills for the latter groups can shout any bs they want in public forums and if they do it loudly enough they will get as much of the meager attention that space gets at all politically. The rest of us can be perfect in our logic and astounding in our achievements, but the others’ bs will still stick far more and than any disinterested observer would expect
Here’s a suggestion: maybe people would take your side more seriously if you could wean yourself from describing the other side with words like “shill”, “bs”, “load of bilge”…. just a thought. I wonder if you see this as the appropriate response to words like “risky”, “unreliable”, “mixed track record”, because it doesn’t seem appropriate to me.
I wonder if you see this as the appropriate response to words like “risky”, “unreliable”, “mixed track record”, because it doesn’t seem appropriate to me.
If that’s what we were responding to, you might have a point. But we (or at least I) was responding to the one-sided nature of the critique, and blatant lies (e.g., “SpaceX has gotten most of its funding from NASA”). I think that if you look up “shill” in the dictionary, you’ll see a picture of Loren Thompson.
Here’s a suggestion: maybe people would take your side more seriously if you could wean yourself from describing the other side with words like “shill”, “bs”, “load of bilge”…. just a thought. I wonder if you see this as the appropriate response to words like “risky”, “unreliable”, “mixed track record”, because it doesn’t seem appropriate to me.
That depends on what the intent of the speaker is. Writing an article critical of SpaceX is fine, and may be laudable if it adds critical information about a situation, which has been hitherto unknown.
However, we are talking about someone who is being paid by traditional aerospace contractors to create fear, uncertainty, and doubt about SpaceX, to paint that company in the worst possible light. Furthermore, the fact that he is being paid to do this by SpaceX’s competition is NOT being disclosed. That is very deceitful behavior, and THAT is why he’s being referred to, correctly IMHO, as a shill.
And here’s a suggestion for you: if the concept I’ve just explained is too complex for you to wrap your head around, then perhaps this is the wrong site for you.
Even a paid shill makes a valid point now and then. This isn’t the Pepsi Challenge, where it’s shills for one side vs the other.
It’s obvious SpaceX has a fairly large phalanx of unpaid but vociferous defenders. As does the administration on every front.
Good marketing, but the points the “paid shill” makes about schedule and logistical risks of the current approach are devastating and have not made it into the discussion otherwise. It’s the validity of that criticism that makes the shill-y nature of false implications like the one about man-rating effective.
“Shill” is appropriate when it is being used to describe someone who disseminates misleading statements for money. “Load of bilge” and “BS” are appropriate when they are being used to describe grossly misleading statements. All okay. “Risky”, “unreliable”, and “mixed track record” are inappropriate when discussing alternatives to “riskier”, “unreliable, even in mockup” and “no track record”, unless the latter facts are all mentioned.
If you care more about politeness than honesty, there is no shortage of people willing to mislead you politely…
Tom Cuddihy Says:
May 24th, 2011 at 6:59 am
Even a paid shill makes a valid point now and then. This isn’t the Pepsi Challenge, where it’s shills for one side vs the other.
It’s still deceptive. Being paid to decieve makes you a shill. I see no reason not to call someone out on such behavior.
It’s obvious SpaceX has a fairly large phalanx of unpaid but vociferous defenders. As does the administration on every front.
As does the traditional aerospace community–including some big guns. When someone like Armstrong or Cernan defends traditional aerospace, those on the other side may criticize them or their ideas, but I’ve never seen them be referred to as shills. Thompson deserves no such respect or deference.
roystgnr Says:
May 24th, 2011 at 7:19 am
If you care more about politeness than honesty, there is no shortage of people willing to mislead you politely…
Well said. I wish I had your gift for brevity.
I would argue that NASA is an organization obsessed with risk mitigation — sometimes it seems it’s practically all they do — while SpaceX is struggling to find a place for it in their organization. When my meds are titrated, I have hope that a sane middle ground can be found.
Really???
Was NASA “obsessed with risk mitigation” when it refused to listen to Scott Crossfield about using pure O2 at >14 psi in the cockpit?
Was NASA “obsessed with risk mitigation” when it refused to listen to its own engineers about the dangers of launch Challenger in subzero weather?
Was NASA “obsessed with risk mitigation” when it refused to listen to requests for photographs of Columbia following a debris strike?
Was NASA “obsessed with risk mitigation” when it decided to abandon the development of reusable vehicles and stick with ELVs and space capsules forever? A technology that historically has always killed about 1% of its crews (yes, even with escape systems)?
Yes, do call back when you get your meds adjusted. 🙂
Ed Wright: Really???
The shuttle program, despite killing 14 astronauts, has a cumulative MTBF around 66 (on a per-flight basis) and an estimated instantaneous MTBF around 95. Delta has a CMTBF around 24. SpaceX, around 2.33. And Shuttle is being retired in part because 95 is not good enough.
Yeah, bad decisions are made, sometimes by people wearing their “management hat” instead of their “engineer hat”. But pretending that NASA failures are comparable to SpaceX is a fallacy.
So, yeah, really.
bs
Well, to a man, y’all responded as I expected, not as I had hoped. I hope that someday you realize that an ad hominem argument is a fallacy.
kayawanee: However, we are talking about someone who is being paid by traditional aerospace contractors to create fear, uncertainty, and doubt about SpaceX, to paint that company in the worst possible light.
If that’s really what he is being paid to do, he’s doing a poor job. There is a lot more to the SpaceX story that could be used to paint the company in the “worst possible light”. Dr. Thompson makes a number of favorable statements about Elon Musk and SpaceX. It would be easy to go negative on Musk, for example, or on the inexperienced work force he has hired, or to elaborate on the rookie mistakes his team has made. I’m not saying those should be fair criticisms for a column like his, just that your portrayal of Thompson as an agent of darkness is exaggerated.
When I read the column, it seems like a pretty reasonable risk assessment. If I believe Rand (which I always do) then some of the statements about SpaceX’s cash flow are factually incorrect, or at least not specific enough. Rand, in turn, is a little sloppy with his piece, turning Thompson’s words “key administration figures” into “senior administration figures” — and adding quotes to boot, so that a casual reader would assume that the words were Thompson’s. (True, Thompson later refers to “senior… appointees”, “senior… officials”, and “senior leaders”, but in different contexts). I’m not saying Rand was deliberately misleading, but then I wouldn’t conclude that Thompson was deliberately misleading, either. SpaceX has won a lucrative series of contracts, and frankly, if you think this happened without the input of people in the Bush and Obama administrations, you’re being naive. And I think it’s pretty clear that the push is stronger under the Obama administration, if only because the O-man needs a patsy^H^H^H^H^Hcredible alternative to NASA in order to kill^H^H^H^Hmove manned space exploration forward.
Some of you seem to be upset that the column is not a risk assessment of NASA or Boeing instead of SpaceX. Well, IIRC, it’s not NASA or Boeing which is being “disruptive”. Disruptive technologies always merit strict scrutiny of risks. And frankly, NASA and Boeing both have significantly better launch records than SpaceX.
perhaps this is the wrong site for you.
Since Rand inspired me to move from aeronautics to astronautics, I think I owe it to him to make my best effort to bring rationality and perspective to the discussions here, no matter how much of an echo chamber it seems like sometimes. 😉
Constellation has flown a rocket, the Ares I-X. I recall some metal being bent to make that happen.
Ares I-X was a one time expenditure of $400 million that had nothing to do with the rest of the program aside from sharing the name, Ares I-X.
Karl: Ares I-X was a one time expenditure of $400 million that had nothing to do with the rest of the program aside from sharing the name, Ares I-X.
That’s one of those persistent falsehoods that SpaceX fans like to repeat, like a periapt….
Delta has a CMTBF around 24. SpaceX, around 2.33. And Shuttle is being retired in part because 95 is not good enough.
You misuse statistics by failing to note the differences in sample size. You also assume that failure rates are linear over time. In the real world, failure rates generally decline according to something called the “learning curve.”
Inferring future reliability from past results without considering sample size or learning-curve effects is invalid.
Ares 1-X had a failure rate of 100%, so if we applied your method to Constellation hardware, we would get a CMTBF of 1 — much worse than Falcon.
The only way you can claim that Constellation is more reliable than Falcon is by comparing the real performance of Falcon to the theoretical performance of Constellation — i.e., ignoring the Constellation test data.
All that proves is that paper rockets are more reliable than real rockets.
Yeah, bad decisions are made, sometimes by people wearing their “management hat” instead of their “engineer hat”. But pretending that NASA failures are comparable to SpaceX is a fallacy.
Attacking a strawman once again, I see.
I never claimed “NASA failures are comparable to SpaceX.” You made that up.
Rather, I presented evidence to refute your claim that “NASA is an organization obsessed with risk mitigation.”
I note that you didn’t even try to refute the evidence I presented. Instead, you simply changed the subject and presented a (statistically flawed) argument to refute something I never said in the first place.
I take that as a tacit admission that you couldn’t refute my actual argument.
[I am resubmitting this with fewer hyperlinks because it’s not appearing in the comment thread].
Edward Wright: You also assume that failure rates are linear over time.
Where did I assume that?
Inferring future reliability from past results without considering sample size or learning-curve effects is invalid.
Well, let’s talk reliability growth. It’s usually a good working hypothesis that complex systems that are subject to reliability improvement programs obey Duane’s law. For example, here is the Duane plot for Delta. I didn’t bother making a Duane plot for Shuttle because it’s only had two failures. And you’re almost right — SpaceX has so few launches that a comparison to Shuttle or Delta is problematic. Not so much because it’s “invalid” as that the uncertainties for SpaceX reliability are very large. And by itself that’s a significant contributor to risk. This was all dissected to death last month in Rand’s post “SpaceX Thoughts”. The bottom line is that if you estimate the parameters of a Duane plot for SpaceX, the reliability will not be acceptable for manned space flight for quite a while. Of course, as Rand occasionally hints, an “acceptable” loss rate is a function of how cheap the flights are. And Rand is clearly willing to accept a much higher loss rate than the Astronaut Office. Maybe you are, too.
And Ares I-X was a success, BTW, just as the two Falcon 9 flights were successes, despite mishaps in booster recovery. I don’t know how many booster recovery failures Shuttle has experienced (it usually doesn’t appear on lists of launch failures), so I haven’t studied it. If anyone has access to a list, I’d be more than happy to look into it.
Instead, you simply changed the subject and presented a (statistically flawed) argument to refute something I never said in the first place.
I’m sorry if my point wasn’t clear. The point is that NASA expends an inordinate effort on risk mitigation, and the result has been that the STS is the most reliable launch vehicle in the world, orders of magnitude better than SpaceX has been able to demonstrate. If you spend any amount of time with risk mitigation, though, you will know that no risk mitigation plan can eliminate all risks, especially when decisions have to be made in real time (and those decisions are made by management, not engineering). You’re able to point to 3 mistakes from the last 45 years of NASA leadership; only 2 of them from the last 25 years; and only 1 from the last decade. (I confess I really don’t understand the point of your comment on ELV’s and capsules; perhaps you could elaborate). Out of 134 Shuttle flights, this is considered a fairly good record, compared to the alternatives — though not good enough to keep flying Shuttles.
Pardon me if I am mistaken, but it seems like the depth of your statistical sophistication is not profound. As you pointed out, though, the SpaceX sample size is small. As I pointed out, that doesn’t mean that you can’t make comparisons, it just means that the uncertainty interval is large. There are several ways of discussing the confidence interval for the failure rate, given their short launch history. We’ve been through this all before; see the link above. (If you’re curious, I suggest you try to estimate a confidence interval for the current CMTBF for SpaceX and then project this into the future using Duane’s law, with an exponent in the range of 0.3-0.6).
bbbeard Says:
May 24th, 2011 at 11:43 pm
And Ares I-X was a success, BTW, just as the two Falcon 9 flights were successes, despite mishaps in booster recovery.
I guess in the most broad definition of success, you may be able to say that. But from what I understand, almost none of the working hardware on Ares I-X was destined for use in the the actual Ares I launch vehicles.
– The guidance system was from an Atlas V, purcahased from ULA.
– The roll control system came from decommissioned Peacekeeper missiles.
– The first stage was a four segment SRB purchased from the Shuttle program.
– The fifth segment of the SRB was a mock-up.
– The second stage with the J-2x engine was a mock-up.
– The Orion command/service module was a mock-up.
– The Launch Abort System was a mock-up.
From what I understand, the only piece of actual working Ares I hardware on the entire test was the parachute recovery system for the SRB (original system needed modifications due to mass of 5 segment SRB), and that failed.
The only success was that they validated that the shape of the rocket was a viable one. That type of demonstration is just not in the same class as launching a payload to orbit.
That’s like saying an Armadillo tethered test is the same as what occurred during the Ares I-X test. Yeah, they’re both tests, and maybe they were both successful, but that’s where the similarity ends. The Ares I-X test is in a different (higher) class than the tethered test. And the two orbital SpaceX launches were in a MUCH higher class than the Ares I-X test.
If I were trying to play the games you play, I would say at this point
I note that you didn’t even try to refute the evidence I presented. Instead, you simply changed the subject and presented a (statistically flawed) argument to refute something I never said in the first place.
I take that as a tacit admission that you couldn’t refute my actual argument.
But that would be meaningless…. Let’s see your Duane plot for SpaceX. That would give us something to talk about.
Edward Wright: You also assume that failure rates are linear over time.
Where did I assume that?
It’s implicit in your argument. You would not have cited that “CMTF” unless you wanted us to believe it was accurate and meaningful.
SpaceX has so few launches that a comparison to Shuttle or Delta is problematic. Not so much because it’s “invalid” as that the uncertainties for SpaceX reliability are very large. And by itself that’s a significant contributor to risk.
Unfortunately for you, the alternative has even fewer launches.
This was all dissected to death last month in Rand’s post “SpaceX Thoughts”. The bottom line is that if you estimate the parameters of a Duane plot for SpaceX, the reliability will not be acceptable for manned space flight for quite a while.
In that case, Constellation will not be acceptable for manned space flight for an even longer while. Yet, Constellation was baselined by NASA, and neither you nor Mr. Thompson have objected. You are displaying a double standard.
Of course, as Rand occasionally hints, an “acceptable” loss rate is a function of how cheap the flights are. And Rand is clearly willing to accept a much higher loss rate than the Astronaut Office. Maybe you are, too.
No, my acceptable loss rate is much lower, which is why I don’t believe in the ELVs and capsules that the astronaut office — and you — are willing to accept.
That is irrelevant, however, because I am not the one making the decision and RLVs are not one of the alternatives being considered here.
And Ares I-X was a success, BTW,
You have an interesting definition of “success.” Ares I-X was a “success” that would have killed the crew, had it been carrying a crew.
That is an undesirable sort of “success,” in my opinion.
just as the two Falcon 9 flights were successes, despite mishaps in booster recovery.
Invalid comparison. Every ELV mission has failed to recover its boosters (by design) and, as you acknowledge, NASA has sometimes failed to recover the Shuttle SRBs. The astronaut office has never considered that unacceptable or even a safety concern.
I’m sorry if my point wasn’t clear. The point is that NASA expends an inordinate effort on risk mitigation,
Expending an inordinate effort on risk mitigation on one occasion does not prove that NASA is “obsessed” with risk mitigation. Obsession implies a constant, overriding concern at all times. If NASA was unconcerned with risk mitigation on even one occasion, then it is not obsessed with it.
and the result has been that the STS is the most reliable launch vehicle in the world, orders of magnitude better than SpaceX has been able to demonstrate.
Irrelevant because STS is not an alternative being offered, nor is it the only launch system NASA has been willing to allow astronauts to fly on.
If a demonstrated reliability level equivalent to Shuttle was a requirement, NASA would either continue flying the Shuttle or insist on a high-flight-rate vehicle that can demonstrate equivalent reliability in a short period of time (i.e., an RLV).
However, that is not a requirement. NASA is not insisting on a demonstrated reliability level equivalent to the Shuttle in the Ares/Orion/SLS program. It is willing to commit to flying astronauts on systems that have no demonstrated reliability and, by virtue of their low flight rates, will never have the demonstrated reliability of the Shuttle.
You’re able to point to 3 mistakes from the last 45 years of NASA leadership; only 2 of them from the last 25 years; and only 1 from the last decade. (I confess I really don’t understand the point of your comment on ELV’s and capsules; perhaps you could elaborate).
I can point to many more mistakes than that. Those are simply the mistakes that caught up to them. For example, Griffin’s assumption that escape systems are 100% reliable, or close to it, was another mistake.
My point about ELVs and capsules is simply that choosing to fly astronauts on ELVs and space capsules is yet another mistake, for someone who claims to be “obsessed with risk mitigation.” Rejecting an architecture that is capable of five 9’s reliability or better, in principle, for one that can never do better than two 9’s, is a bad decision from a safety standpoint. That single decision outweighs all other possible risk mitigation steps. There might be other considerations but, again, if other considerations override safety at NASA then it is not correct to say NASA is “obsessed” with safety.
Out of 134 Shuttle flights, this is considered a fairly good record, compared to the alternatives — though not good enough to keep flying Shuttles.
In that case, NASA should be replacing the Shuttle with something that has a better record, but it is not. It is replacing the Shuttle with something that has no record which, even in the best case, will never fly often enough to equal the Shuttle’s record, let alone exceed it.
Again, an organization obsessed with risk mitigation would not be doing that.
As you pointed out, though, the SpaceX sample size is small. As I pointed out, that doesn’t mean that you can’t make comparisons, it just means that the uncertainty interval is large.
No, you did not point that out. You simply tossed out 2.33 as if it were a high-confidence figure capable of basing decisions on. It isn’t.
If you’re curious, I suggest you try to estimate a confidence interval for the current CMTBF for SpaceX and then project this into the future using Duane’s law, with an exponent in the range of 0.3-0.6
I’ll do that when you do the same for Ares/Orion and stop pretending that failures are “successes.”
Obsession implies a constant, overriding concern at all times.
Get real. “Obsession” denotes domination and preoccupation of one’s thoughts, not exclusion of other thoughts or actions. A person obsessed with hygiene still eats, sleeps, and goes to the bathroom.
You would not have cited that “CMTF” [sic] unless you wanted us to believe it was accurate and meaningful.
Nonsense. There is a confidence interval around all sample-based estimates. That’s STAT 101. If you read something else into anyone’s statements about data, that’s your problem.
Unfortunately for you, the alternative has even fewer launches.
Again, nonsense. The alternative to SpaceX is NASA/Boeing/Lockheed/Roscosmos. All of whom have hundreds of launches under their belt.
The culture of risk management at NASA (and, one assumes, Boeing/Lockheed) has evolved over the decades and has been informed by failures large and small. One of the many risks associated with SpaceX is that they have no such culture. Some of their launch failures reflect an inability to harvest the lessons learned from previous NASA/Boeing/Lockheed failures. Rand assures me that the culture has changed and I hope he’s right. But it’s still a risk.
And somehow you seem to think that when I say NASA is obsessed with risk mitigation, that I mean that as a compliment. I don’t. I intend to convey the negative connotations of “obsession”. I think it’s apparent that NASA’s culture risks organizational paralysis (the layers are dizzying, I know). In any case, the risk assessment for NASA is quite different from the risk assessment for SpaceX.
You have an interesting definition of “success.” Ares I-X was a “success” that would have killed the crew, had it been carrying a crew.
Go read the mission objectives.
I can point to many more mistakes than that. Those are simply the mistakes that caught up to them.
As can I. I think you don’t understand the meaning of the terms “obsessed”, “risk”, and “mitigation”.
You simply tossed out 2.33 as if it were a high-confidence figure capable of basing decisions on. It isn’t.
The CMTBF is a data-derived figure which is associated with an uncertainty that I quantified in gory detail in the afore-mentioned thread “SpaceX Thoughts”. I’m not going to repeat all that here. Go search the site archives.
And yes, this figure plays a role in the risk assessment associated with SpaceX. Some SpaceX supporters get irrational when the subject of risk is discussed. They haul out the invective and the ad hominems and the silly arguments about Ares I-X vs Falcon 1/5/9. But if that’s all you have, well, I suppose you go to [flame] war with the tools you have.
I’ll do that when you do the same for Ares/Orion and stop pretending that failures are “successes.”
It’s okay to admit that you don’t know how to do a reliability growth projection. It’s not your job. But it is mine.
Rand: it seems like WP is not accepting my posts unless I delete the hyperlink to the thread “SpaceX Thoughts”, which is why I haven’t put in a link. Is that a known feature of WordPress?
Is that a known feature of WordPress?
It’s not known to me. There is a limit to how many links a comment can contain (five) but I don’t know why it would filter a link to the blog itself.
Hmm. I just tried a couple of more times with very simple posts and a single link to the thread. No joy.
Have you tried just pasting the URL, not as a link? I’m not even seeing it show up in the spam filter.
I just now tried cut-and-paste of just the URL, hit “Submit Your Comment” — and poof! it disappeared.
Here’s a different URL:
http://bbbeard.org/
Just pasting your home URL …trans… makes my post disappear.
Well, I just went in and cleaned out everything from my blacklist. If it doesn’t work now, I have no idea what’s going on.
That’s one of those persistent falsehoods that SpaceX fans like to repeat, like a periapt….
bbbeard, I thought something had to be false first, in order for it to be a falsehood. As I see it, the only point of Ares I-X was to create the pretense that the Ares program was doing something concrete. It had the shape of the eventual Ares I and shared the name, but was otherwise unrelated to the intended final rocket. To be blunt, I don’t consider Ares I-X part of Constellation aside from funding.
Tom Cuddihy wrote:
Good marketing, but the points the “paid shill” makes about schedule and logistical risks of the current approach are devastating and have not made it into the discussion otherwise. It’s the validity of that criticism that makes the shill-y nature of false implications like the one about man-rating effective.
The problem is that these criticisms are presented in a vacuum, particularly without consideration of recent events. NASA has a number of program failures under its belt. It has yet to come up with a successor to the Space Shuttle, for example, despite numerous tries over the years including the Constellation program I criticize above. As I see it, risk is relative.
There is considerable risk to a commercial approach since SpaceX (which I consider currently the frontrunner in the competition for providing launch services for NASA) still has yet to show that it can provide reliable service and the other providers have their own problems (Orbital Sciences has reliability problems, ULA has cost). That’s not pretty, but it’s better than what NASA has managed and there’s tremendous potential for improvement in these commercial launch providers that never has been present in a NASA program since its earliest days.
Rand, it’s still not working. I attempted a post which contained a link to the main Transterrestrial site. It failed as bbbeard described. When I submitted post, it didn’t print an error message and instead returned to the comment thread. My message did not appear.