A book review, of an old book:
On War is shaped by Clausewitz’s encounter with the history and ideas of his times; it is also shaped by his experience in one of the first truly modern bureaucracies. (One of the achievements of Frederick the Great that so impressed contemporaries was the meticulous organization of the Prussian army and state.) The relationship of individual genius and vision to bureaucratic routine is a serious strategic problem in the modern world. The virtues that make a great military commander are, as Clausewitz notes, intensely personal: imagination and moral courage being perhaps the rarest and most valuable. These are perhaps the worst qualities for an aspiring bureaucrat to have.
There are desk generals and battle generals, and the unequal struggle between them is a recurring problem — and not just in military organizations. Desk generals excel in the arts of bureaucratic warfare, stick close to the conventional wisdom in all ways, and were brilliantly described in two unforgettable Gilbert and Sullivan songs: Modern Major General and The First Lord’s Song. In times of peace these timeserving mediocrities rise inexorably to the top; wars usually begin with a painful shakeout while the beribboned and bemedaled lunkheads demonstrate their hopeless incapacity at the true military art. Then and only then do the unclubbable and unconventional officers whose only virtue is their ability to somehow win battles gradually edge to the fore and the Grants and the Shermans elbow past the Popes and the McClellans.
In terms of space, NASA has been at peace since the late sixties, and hasn’t had the necessary crisis to bring forth the war-fighting generals, though the current budget crunch may make it happen. We’re starting to see some signs of it (e.g., Phil McAlister). The problem remains, though, that space isn’t important. Until it is, we won’t take it seriously.
I am doubtful the current budget crisis will bring creative energy to NASA. Instead, the current budget crisis is more likely to persuade bureaucrats that meaningful space exploration is too expensive, for now.
What NASA needs is a competitor. An entity outside NASA to challenge NASA.
That can be a foreign nation (or nations) a scenario not necessarily in American interests or it can be the American private sector (NewSpace) that undertakes to do space exploration by going around NASA rather than through NASA.
Its not surprising given that NACA was created in response to a foreign threat in 1915 and continued in that vein between the World Wars and the Cold War until NASA replaced it in response to a foreign Threat.
In an ideal world NASA would to be down graded to a mere science agency, like the NSF or NIH and taken off the path of space development. This would include closing most of the centers, leaving JPL, Goddard and perhaps ARC.
Goddard = Earth and space weather research
JPL = Planetary research
ARC = Robotic & lunar research
You could call it the National Space Science Institute (NSSI). A budget of $4-5 billion would probably be plenty.
The ISS should probably be transferred to the DOE and managed under contract just like the national labs (Sandia, Lawerence Livermore, etc, are managed. This would include any logistics service needed.
But it will never happen as you would upset the pork to too many Congressional Districts and the welfare to too many corporations. Of course if the Tea Party is serious about cutting the federal budget this would be one way to do it!
Excellent point about NACA, Thomas.
I knew that NACA was created in 1915.
I also knew that the United States, the birthplace of aviation, was the unquestioned leader in the first decade of the 20th century, up to about 1909. The first flight in Europe took place in 1906, but they quickly caught up and surpassed us. By the outbreak of World War I in 1914, European aircraft were state-of-the-art. No American-designed and built planes saw service in the war. All of the American pilots who served flew French or British planes.
But I never put two and two together before.
Rickl,
You could thank the Wright Brothers. After they got their patents they sued anyone who even thought of building a plane. Their fight with Glen Curtis over control surfaces was legendary. Part of the Act that created NACA, actually an appropriations bill for the Navy also provided a resolution of the patent issues involved, in the interest of national defense.
Thomas, you make a great point about NASA. I really don’t see much use for it as it currently is for space development or exploration. Unfortunately, it’s got a lot of positive connotations associated with it that probably will prevent it from being downsized or repurposed, even in the case of a strong Tea Party victory.
Interesting analogy, military leadership = space leadership.
I can’t help but wonder though, that the real problem with NASA is the way it centralized space endeavors. Before NASA all the military services were busily trying to outdo each other in rocket development, and it was the legacy of that furious activity during the 1950’s which NASA used to get America to the moon.
It was claimed that the military efforts were duplicative and wasteful, but maybe the competition from interservice rivalry more than made up for that.
I would sum up the different outlooks as whether you try and manage an organization or whether you try and use an organization to accomplish a goal.
Prior to William Casey (under Reagan), most CIA directors viewed their job as managing an agency, making sure it runs smoothly and efficiently. Casey viewed his goal as the destruction of the Soviet Union and the CIA was merely a tool under his command to accomplish that goal.
With generals, is their objective to run the army smoothly and efficiently or is it to defeat the enemy? Are you there to maintain the tool or use the tool?
I would wager that at some point NASA’s management culture shifted from using the agency as a tool to one of running the agency smoothly. Viewing the Shuttle as their flagship program, I would say, “Yeah, we maintain the heck out of that tool. It looks spit shined and ready for inspection.”
It’s worth noting that desk generals are necessary in modern militaries due to the value of logistics and intelligence.
I would wager that at some point NASA’s management culture shifted from using the agency as a tool to one of running the agency smoothly. Viewing the Shuttle as their flagship program, I would say, “Yeah, we maintain the heck out of that tool. It looks spit shined and ready for inspection.”
I see NASA management as wanting to maintain the appearance of a well executed Shuttle program more than anything else. How many times did NASA management overrule the concerns of the engineers in order to maintain appearances? I know of at least two: Challenger and Columbia. Before the Challenger accident, a series of flight cancellations was making the program look bad, so they forced a launch when the engineers said it was too cold. We all know the result. On Columbia, the engineers requested special satellite observations of the Shuttle to look for damage. The request was denied. We know the result of that, too. How many of those managers suffered any career consequences other than being allowed to retire early? I know of none.