I didn’t read this essay by Jeff Kueter when it first came out in June, but I wish I had, because we might have had a rousing discussion about it in August when we were both at a space policy meeting in DC. It starts off confused from the beginning:
Among the many questions that have arisen as the nation considers the future of the exploration is — should the U.S. invest in propulsion capabilities to travel beyond low earth orbit now or later?
On this question, the President identified his administration’s priorities – “Next, we will invest more than $3 billion to conduct research on an advanced “heavy lift rocket” — a vehicle to efficiently send into orbit the crew capsules, propulsion systems, and large quantities of supplies needed to reach deep space.
Note that the first paragraph seemingly has nothing to do with the second. “Propulsion capabilities to travel beyond low earth orbit” and a “vehicle to efficiently send into orbit the crew capsules, propulsion systems and large quantity of supplies needed to reach deep space” are two entirely different topics, though the former can influence the latter. And as usual, there is an implicit and unsubstantiated assumption that a “heavy-lift rocket” is identically equal to “efficient” delivery to orbit, when in fact, it’s just the opposite, if by “efficient,” you mean cost effective. But then, worshipers of the Apollo Cargo Cult (not to imply that Jeff is one) are seemingly completely indifferent to cost, and demand that the heretics be so as well.
He goes on to ask a number of questions about the 2011 White House budget proposal:
The approach is reasonable enough — Invest in the future in hopes of accomplishing the heavy-lift task more effectively and efficiently. Substantial investments in space-related research and development (R&D) are desirable and the administration’s emphasis on inciting innovation is commendable. But, it is not without questions and, according to some critics, lacks focus. What basic research will mature in five years time to be suitable for use in a deployable rocket? How will this research transfer into development programs? Is basic research the area of greatest need? Are any of the planned investments sufficiently radical to justify the delay in building a new heavy lift capability? What entities, organizations, laboratories, companies, or universities will perform this research? Who will decide which projects are funded, which are not, and when a project is terminated for failing to progress satisfactorily, simply failing, or because higher priorities have emerged? What happens to the industrial base and the workforce needed to build these systems during the five years? What are the implications of delaying the development of new capabilities by five years?
Most of them are good questions, and they arise because he doesn’t understand the real reason for the five-year delay, which was not to develop “new technologies” for heavy lift, which aren’t really needed. The purpose of the delay was to kick the can down the road far enough so that, via the time-honored technique of management by procrastination, the nation would come to its senses and realize that heavy lift is unnecessary to open up space, at least at the current stage of development, and that the false perception of a need for it is actually a hindrance to that goal. To answer his last question, the implications of delay are to a) save money and b) focus resources on those things we actually do need. As for the “industrial base and workforce,” what he really means, though he may not realize it, is the real reason that Congress wants a heavy lifter — to maintain the costly jobs program that has been in place since Apollo, is a legacy of the Shuttle program, and has kept government-provided space transportation unaffordable for decades, for anyone other than government (in perhaps now, even for government). In fact, there is no legitimate concern with a workforce and infrastructure that can provide heavy lift, as long as SpaceX and ULA remain in business, because either is capable of developing such a vehicle should it really be necessary. It just can’t (or at least, wouldn’t, absent incentives) do so in as inefficient and a job-producing manner as pleases those in Congress who make space policy.
He goes on to fret about whether or not the new technologies will pan out, and if they don’t, we won’t get heavy lift in time to go to an asteroid by 2025, yada yada, all of which is based on the false concern that we need heavy lift to do so. This next is amusing:
In 2020 or so, the Space Station will no longer be viable, we are told.
I love the anonymous passive construction. First, by whom are we “told” this? He doesn’t say. And what is the basis for such a telling? He doesn’t say. Yet much of the rest of the essay hinges on what we “are told” about the non-viability of ISS after 2020.
Granting for the moment the notion that what “we are told” is correct, why? What happens in 2020 that makes the ISS suddenly “unviable”? And what changed between 2009, when the plan was to end it in 2016, and 2010, when the new plan was to end no sooner than (note, not in) 2020 to suddenly render it viable to that date? Is there any basis in the literature for this date, either as a “no sooner than” or “must be ended by”? Is there some key, unreplaceable component that will wear out, or “no longer be certified” (the magical incantation used by the CAIB to justify ending the Shuttle in 2010)? Are there unreplaceable components at all?
Yes, I know that we will no longer have the Shuttle to take components up to it and help with construction/maintenance, but how necessary is it, really? Any component carried by a Shuttle could be lofted with an Atlas or Delta, which can in fact have larger fairings than the fifteen-foot constraint of the payload bay. We have plenty of time to develop a tug with the capability to maneuver it within range of the station, and the ISS and its own Canadarm will remain, along with crew EVA capability. So I’m skeptical that what “we are told” is really true. It’s simply a matter of how much money it will cost to extend its life, and whether or not we perceive the value of that extended life to be worth the investment (also taking into consideration the value of the development of such orbital infrastructure beyond that needed to service ISS, which I would think quite high, given affordable launch costs).
Continuing with the flawed premises, he goes on:
Are there technologies worth waiting for? A breakthrough technology that could radically change the cost or efficiency of space travel might be worth the wait. The Augustine Commission identified solar and nuclear propulsion technologies as promising. On-orbit refueling stations are another concept frequently mentioned. That capability changes the size and mass of the lift vehicle (because it will not need to carry as much fuel into space), but the technical characteristics of the vehicle itself may change very little.
My one-word response: huh?
If the “size and mass of the lift vehicle” aren’t “technical characteristics” and significant ones, what in the world (or out of it) does he think are? If the “size and the mass” (I’m not exactly sure what he means by this — the payload mass? The fairing size? The gross-liftoff mass?) are changed, doesn’t this imply that it could be changed in such a way as to (wait for it) no longer be classified as heavy lift? Why, I think it does!
He then continues on, reverting to the earlier non sequitur:
Certainly, a breakthrough propulsion system has the potential to revolutionize space travel, but the probability of such breakthroughs emerging in a five-year R&D program is low; a view validated by informal discussions with space experts over recent weeks. At a minimum, it appears safe to say that it is equally likely that there will be no breakthrough in propulsion that will require a reconfiguration of the basic approaches to heavy lift in the timeframe established by the President.
That is, he continues to confuse advances in in-space propulsion (e.g., nuclear thermal, VASIMR) with propulsion advances needed for heavy lift itself, when in fact what such advances do is to further minimize the need for heavy lift by reducing on-orbit LEO propellant (the vast majority of the payload for deep-space exploration missions) requirements.
Finally, late in the essay, he gets to the real issue, which obviates most of what came before:
Others suggest the delay in developing a new launch vehicle is justifiable because there is no mission for which such a capability is required. Developing a launch vehicle without knowing what it will carry and to where is problematic. Such an effort would lack focus and is potentially wasteful if the mission never materializes. These concerns have validity, but they speak to a broader issue — what does the United States expect from its human space exploration program in the decades to come?
Gosh. What a concept. Trying to figure out what we want to do before laying out specifications for the transportation systems with which to do it. Also note, like Lou Friedman, he can’t conceive of any purpose to send humans to space other than for “exploration.”
Here’s his bottom line, though he doesn’t save it for the end:
This period of uncertainty still leaves the stark choice — should the U.S. pause the construction of a new heavy lift launch vehicle for the foreseeable future? The balance of the evidence suggests “no” is the appropriate answer.
My response, again, is: huh?
He has really provided no useful evidence, other than what we “are told,” and flawed assumptions about the need for heavy lift, and associated “infrastructure” and “work force,” and confusion about in-space and launch propulsion technologies. Yet this kind of stuff represents the prevailing what-passes-for wisdom in DC and in the so-called “think” tanks. We really need to get a serious, and informed discussion going on these subjects, lest we continue to waste billions of dollars on the continuing delusion that such expenditures are accomplishing real goals in space, as opposed to within the Beltway.
[Update a while later]
I have a follow-up post, based on some comments here.
Rand,
First let me start by saying that I really do not mean this to start one of the inevitable “flame wars” that seem to happen whenever someone disagrees with someone on these boards.
But in critiquing Kueter’s article you said the following:
“The purpose of the delay was to kick the can down the road far enough so that, via the time-honored technique of management by procrastination, the nation would come to its senses and realize that heavy lift is unnecessary to open up space, at least at the current stage of development, and that the false perception of a need for it is actually a hindrance to that goal.”
I do not know Obama, however, if forced to guess I think the intent of the delay was to kill off any chance of this country to develop an HLV; not because he thinks one unneeded for a vigorous human space flight program, but because he does not want this country to have a human space flight program. I base that on a number of previous statements and positions of his (among other things during the 2008 campaign he told the Houston Chronicle editorial board he was not convinced “sending bodies into space” was the best way to proceed with space exploration).
Can you explain to me why you believe (with such seeming surety) that Obama’s intent is as you describe above? I know the above rationale is the reason you would like to see HLV development delayed (and eventually cancelled) and that is fair enough. But, based on what do you attribute those motives to Obama?
Cordially (I hope),
Joe
I have no idea what Obama’s intent was, and I don’t care. The plan was not put together by Obama, and I doubt that he gives a damn about space one way or the other. I am describing my guess as to the intent of the people who actually put the plan together.
In general, I don’t much care about intent with government policies; I only care about their actual effects. An HLV would be a huge waste of money, if one is interested in actually opening up space, and any policy that puts it off as long as possible (and preferably forever, or at least until there’s enough demand to justify it) is better than one that insists on doing it now.
Rand are you saying Obama wasn’t being entirely honest? Wouldn’t that also call into question many of the other aspects of Obama’s plan?
I could buy that argument. There are two similar situations. One where under Constellation the ISS would be de-orbited. I never thought of that as a reality but as a way to make the funding numbers work out when the reality would be that the ISS would get additional funding from another administration.
A second one is with the Obamacare bill cutting $600 billion from Medicare. I don’t think Obama or the Democrats have any intentions of actually cutting $600 billion from Medicare but it was necessary to make the overall bill look like it could be afforded.
I do not know the people who put the plan together either, but when I first went though it seemed to me to be an (intentionally) underfunded “wish list” of everything any space advocate could want (orbital fuel depots, multiple types of nuclear propulsion, HLV “research”, etc.).
This I truly believe was intended to distract (from the termination of the existing program – because look at all the great things that are coming) and divide (when the built in funding shortfalls begin to become apparent and various areas of research are about to be shut down – the real “flame wars” begin).
So again the question becomes: I know you want the program to work the way you describe and are sincere in your belief that this is the best strategy. On what do you base your belief that John Holdren and his minions (acting on Obama’s orders) share your beliefs? I ask this because if they are not acting in good faith, they will not allow the outcome you desire; and thus their intentions are important.
On what do you base your belief that John Holdren and his minions (acting on Obama’s orders) share your beliefs?
I don’t know why you and others imagine that I possess such a belief.
I ask this because if they are not acting in good faith, they will not allow the outcome you desire; and thus their intentions are important.
It is quite possible for them to allow/create the outcome I desire, regardless of their good faith or lack of it. I don’t really understand your question. They have stated what they want to do. If they do so, I believe that is a vastly improved policy over the past one. If they don’t, I still fail to see the downside. What do you imagine they will do instead? At least they’ve ended Constellation, which was a clear path to disaster for anyone who actually wants to open up space.
If this clarifies things at all, I believe that a) this plan is mostly Lori Garver’s and b) she is not Holdren’s “minion.”
Your mileage may vary, but if so, it’s likely based on ignorance of most of the personalities involved.
“Your mileage may vary, but if so, it’s likely based on ignorance of most of the personalities involved.”
And so the “flame wars” begin (sigh).
For whatever it is worth I have worked in the industry for over 20 years and been interested in it since childhood. I am as familiar with the personalities as you are (unless you are going to tell me you are Garvers personal friend).
“It is quite possible for them to allow/create the outcome I desire, regardless of their good faith or lack of it.”
Only if they fail in what they are trying to do.
“What do you imagine they will do instead? At least they’ve ended Constellation, which was a clear path to disaster for anyone who actually wants to open up space.”
So, as long Constellation in ended; you are happy if the outcome in no American Space Program at all? Again a serious question.
unless you are going to tell me you are Garvers personal friend
I am.
…you are happy if the outcome in no American Space Program at all? Again a serious question.
If by “American Space Program,” you mean NASA no longer spending billions of taxpayer dollars a year to send a few people into space, then yes. But that is a false choice, and there will be commercial spaceflight in a few years, and it won’t matter what NASA does. Apollo is over.
If you are Garvers friend, the next time you are talking ask her why the “Flagship Demonstrations” were funded at $7 Billion (over 5 years) while the wish list would have cost a minimum of $10 Billion (as this would have pitted orbital fuel depots against NTR, VASIMIR, Inflatable structures, etc. – while by the way the HLV funding was in a separate account).
“there will be commercial spaceflight in a few years, and it won’t matter what NASA does. Apollo is over.”
I wish (believe it or not) I shared your confidence in the former and am glad I do not share your hatred for the later.
As for Flagships, no one knows what they will cost, and budgets had to be apportioned. Some of them will probably fall by the wayside in the future, but they had to place a stake in the ground for the current budget. HLV was in a separate account due to political sensitivities on the Hill.
And I don’t “hate” Apollo (why do people so often attribute irrational emotions to me that I have never expressed?). It was a magnificent technical achievement, and victory in the Cold War. I simply recognize that, as a means of opening up space, anything resembling (NASA spending billions to send a few astronauts to orbit) it is a dead end.
Rand has quite a non-diplomatic style, but he’s right on this one.
People should understand the false assumptions and false choices they are presented. Or they even present themselves.
Here are some of the assumptions I honestly think some commenters should ponder (while listening to Jeff Greason talks):
No heavy lift == no beyond LEO missions
Good that we don’t continue Apollo == Person doesn’t appreciate Apollo’s achievements
The Flagship Demonstrations listed 25 target operations (including Orbital Fuel Depots) listed as costing a minimum of $400 Million each (maximum $1 Billion each). That’s a minimum of $10 Billion, by their own “accounting”. That would mean some 42% (at a minimum) again by their own accounting would have to “fall by the wayside”. Would you be feeling so magnanimous if the Orbital Fuel Depots were among the ones to “fall by the wayside”?
“And I don’t “hate” Apollo (why do people so often attribute irrational emotions to me that I have never expressed?).”
Again I am not being sarcastic in saying this (believe it or not): Has it ever occurred to you that if multiple people attribute to you things that you believe you are not expressing, the problem might be with your presentation and not those people’s perception?
Would you be feeling so magnanimous if the Orbital Fuel Depots were among the ones to “fall by the wayside”?
Of course not. They have to be prioritized.
Has it ever occurred to you that if multiple people attribute to you things that you believe you are not expressing, the problem might be with your presentation and not those people’s perception?
Of course it has. So I go back and reread what I actually wrote, compare it to what people imagine that I wrote, and realize that that’s not the problem. Hint: if I really hate something, I’ll tell you. Please don’t try to attribute imaginary emotions to me.
Many who are mistaken for hating Apollo actually just want something better and different while those who want to cling on to repeating Apollo think they are hating it.
I have to agree with Joe on this one. The intent of Obamaspace is to end publically operated space flight (likely commercial as well.)
As the saying goes, people see the world not as it is but as they are. Communication is inherently imperfect with regard to new concepts foreign to the listener – the message will always get corrupted from what the speaker intended into something the listener can more easily understand. The greater the dislocation, the harder the communication, at some point, communication becomes next to impossible.
A good example of such message corruption by the listener is the word “fact”, a “belief” equivalent word that is incompatible with science and yet was attributed to science by those unable to see the world except through a system of beliefs. The use of the word “fact” persists to this day.
Point being, do not expect clear communication – communication will always be hard work for both parties and generally fraught.
Rand has quite a non-diplomatic style
Yes, he says what he actually means. Thank god for that (thanking god an atheist is honest and direct… now that’s diplomatic!)
Diplomacy is what? Saying ‘nice doggy’ while reaching for a rock? Lying for fun and profit? We have a government full of diplomats. That’s the problem.
Rand,
Well said, in the article and in the comments. Heavy Lift should only be funded out of necessity, only after that necessity is proven to everyone, and the timing is correct. Using it as a job shop for Marshall and others is wrong.
Thank you for your wisdom.
“Of course not. They have to be prioritized.”
According to you (and maybe even me), but would they be? They were not given any priority status in the budget. The “budget plan” did not even acknowledge the need for prioritization; much less describe how it would be done. If Garver somehow assured you that she would assure that the Orbital Fuel Depots would be selected, how is that different from Griffin selecting the Ares I/Ares V configuration (other than the fact that we might agree with this arbitrary selection)?
“So I go back and reread what I actually wrote, compare it to what people imagine that I wrote, and realize that that’s not the problem.”
Ahh, so the fault must be with the listener. Maybe we better just let this line go, as I doubt it will lead anywhere constructive.
“Many who are mistaken for hating Apollo actually just want something better and different while those who want to cling on to repeating Apollo think they are hating it.”
So anybody who disagrees with you is “clinging on to repeating Apollo” now there is an open mined way of phrasing things. Again, for what is is worth, I want something better as well. I just do not think Obama’s proposal will acheive that or that it was intendeed to achieve it.
Joe –
A question – how much money do you think is required to figure out whether we MUST have some form of Super-Heavy lift to do BEO human spaceflight? Not how much is needed for gamechangers, but how much is needed to determine whether Super-Heavy is needed for BEO spaceflight, or whether there might not be a more sustainable model?
Rand – Sorry I didn’t email you back. Short answer – I don’t have any brilliant ideas, and because of my situation, will probably remain on the sidelines & be unable to make any concerted effort on any space projects until after Dec 21.
Joe – Why would OMB do the prioritization? Thats NASA’s job
“They were not given any priority status in the budget. The “budget plan” did not even acknowledge the need for prioritization; much less describe how it would be done.”
The first flagship technology described in the FY2011 budget is In-Orbit Propellant Transfer and Storage. The others likely to be started in FY2011 were Lightweight/Inflatable Modules and Automated/Autonomous Rendezvous and Docking. That’s good enough for me. I don’t think the budget needs a priority list. Later details outlined a possible set of 4 initial flagship demonstration missions to demonstrate 6 technologies (SEP, propellant transfer/storage, inflatables, ECLSS, tug/autonomous rendezvous and docking, aerocapture). The propellant depot demo was the 2nd one, to be initiated in FY2011. It seems to have sufficiently high priority in the “point of departure” sequence. (The SEP demo may have gotten higher priority because of DARPA interest or the AR&D vehicle sequence).
I think we’d be in great shape if we could get these first 4 missions done – and unlike the HLV, there would be little cost to maintain the advance (e.g.: because other agencies, SMD, ISS, comsats, etc would use the capabilities).
“The Flagship Demonstrations listed 25 target operations (including Orbital Fuel Depots) listed as costing a minimum of $400 Million each (maximum $1 Billion each). That’s a minimum of $10 Billion, by their own “accounting”.
What are these 25 target operations? I know they listed more than the initial 6 technologies, and some of those initial 6 technologies had follow-ons (e.g.: greater aerocapture mass in a 2nd mission, more capable in-space propulsion, etc). I also know the ETDD technology suite would feed into the flagship missions according to the success/failure experience during the ETDD phase. So the initial 4 missions ($400M-$1B each) wouldn’t have used up their initial hoped-for FY2011-2015 flagship budget, but they wouldn’t have been able to do it all by FY2015. I don’t think FY2015 was a deadline for getting all of the flagship technologies done.
Anyway, most of the flagship exploration technology budget (and other important items like general space technology, exploration technology research and development, commercial crew, robotic precursors, human research, propulsion/heavy lift R&D) was cut to feed SLS and MPCV, so I guess we won’t know how most of the flagship missions would have turned out.
The reason for the delay in building the HLV in Obama’s proposals was the following:
The cost to turn the space shuttle into a HLV is so great, that that sum can turn any of the other launch vehicles into a HLV. Since these other vehicles are not being retired, we do not lose out on the capability to build an HLV if we wait.
Furthermore, if you are familiar with the subject, those other HLV vehicles are likely to be a more affordable proposition than a SDHLV, so a vehicle derived from the Shuttle would not even be the vehicle chosen were an HLV built today. The question then comes of what is the pressing need for building that HLV immediately?
There are no missions for a HLV in the near term. Building missions for an HLV will take time. An HLV built immediately will largely sit idle waiting for missions. During that time, it will consume financial resources that could be spent on other worthwhile endeavours. By not building an HLV just for the sake of it, we can devote precious resources to other activities, like foundational technological research for exploration missions.
During the period we are not building a HLV, research was to be conducted into heavy lift propulsion systems, as well as reasearch that would have an impact on the scope of the HLV needed(fuel depots), as well, certain industrial players(SpaceX) who are contenders for building an HLV and who offer the promise of more efficient operations would have been given time to further mature. An HLV built 5 years from now, will likely be a smaller cheaper vehicle than the type of vehicle built if a HLV program were embarked upon today. This means it is more affordable for NASA, and more can be accomplished with a more affordable vehicle than a more expensive vehicle.
Given all that, building a HLV today, for no pressing mission, while being a more expensive HLV than the HLV of a few years from now, and robbing the budget of resources for things like foundational technological research for exploration missions, is simply plain stupid.
Delaying building a HLV was rational policy. It was sound policy under its own terms that an HLV is a good thing to build the exploration program around, which I most certainly could not disagree with more. It was just objective, in that it held no special preference for a SDHLV. Delaying an HLV saved money, and has dividends in the affordability of the resulting future HLV, which makes accomplishing the exploration path envisioned more achievable.
Perhaps the administration can be faulted for not better explaining their rational. However, responsibility also lies in people like Joe to give the policy due consideration under its own terms. That it could be an honest attempt to achieve the things it sets forth to achieve. That it’s motivation is something other than malice or stupidity. But his antipathy will give no quarter to such possibility.
Ahh, so the fault must be with the listener.
Well, sorry, but when just a select few, and it’s always the same people, say that I hate things, and many others seem to understand what I mean, then yes, the most reasonable assumption is that people are reading what they want to read, rather than what I actually write.
Prime example, Mark Whittington, who regularly, in his apparent autism and inability to read emotions, claims that I “snarl” and am “enraged,” and “leap the length of my chain.” This is simply nuts, and most of my readers agree, which is why they wonder in comments why I link to him when I do. I heard them, and rarely do any more.
Again, when I hate something, I’ll let you know (and it won’t happen often, because hate is not an emotion I find particularly useful). Don’t try to read my mind, or emotions. I’m pretty sure it would annoy you if I did this to you, as much as it does me when you do it to me.
Or we could just charter NASA to develop, within the decade, a means of transporting ordinary people into orbit and back for a price they could afford.
NASA thinks only it can do hard things. Well, here’s one. Arguably, it’s harder than going to the moon.
But the astronaut office wouldn’t hear of it! They’d lose the only advantage they have over the people who pay for their status…
Hmm. Austism. Rand, maybe people think you hate things and are constantly angry because you constantly suggest people who disagree with you have some kind of mental disorder. Some might call that direct. Others find it belligerent in the extreme. It does not do your cause any good to behave in such a way.
“So, as long Constellation in ended; you are happy if the outcome in no American Space Program at all?”
This is a gross characterization of policy. So deep is your antipathy, you will not even afford a basic recognition of the aims of the space policy of the administration.
“Obamaspace” funded the development of new domestic human spaceflight capability in multiple commercial crew providers, extended a major human spaceflight program in the ISS for an as yet unlimited period, and invested in the development of technologies to be used in human space exploration.
These are substantive domestic human space program components. They will give America a human spaceflight program unmatched by any other nation. On what basis do you completely disregard these initiatives?
At the end of Apollo, there was a gap while a new initiative was developed after the previous one was canceled. Did this constitute the abandonment of American human spaceflight? Unlike that gap, Americans will continually live in orbit during the duration, supplied by new domestic human spaceflight support systems coming online, so even still America maintains a human spaceflight program.
Yes, you are buying seats from a program partner in the interim. So does Canada, Europe, and Japan. Do they not have human space programs?
Yes, Obama continues with the retirement of the Shuttle while embarking on these initiatives. But this was policy of the previous administration and President under Constellation. Were they ending the American human spaceflight program? The Soyuzes American astronauts will ride over the next few years were bought for such purpose under their direction, not as any new feature of Obamaspace. Constellation even anticipated the cessation of the ISS in their budgetary projections, so Obamaspace has gone farther than Constellation in maintaining a level of human spaceflight program activity.
The structure of Obamaspace is no different from any other previous initiatives. It seeks the establishment of new capability from which the human spaceflight program will be construed with. This is the same structure as in the establishment of the Shuttle, it is the same structure as in the Constellation program, it is the same as what the Congressional authorization committee initiative enacted.
The Congressional authorization is a lesser candidate for the level of space program Obamaspace intended to pursue. It cuts exploration initiatives to the bone in the slashing of the robotic precursor and exploration technologies budget. It slashes the commercial crew provider program leading to a lesser level of activity than proposed. It brings a HLV program, a new initiative, to the fore for reasons I think poor as partially outlined in a post above, but it too continues with the retirement of the space shuttle, continues ISS, and fund commercial crew providers at a lesser amount. Is the Congressional authorization a termination of the American human spaceflight program?
Obamaspace intended to give NASA a 19 billion dollar budget, a slight increased from previous amounts. On what level is this a defundment of the American human spaceflight program? NASA remains an agency as it was in its construct with nearly half a dozen space centers across the country and pursuing activities as far ranging as exploring the planet Mars with rovers to supporting human habitation of orbital space. Would not a termination of the human spaceflight program involve an actual termination of funds and a shuttering of NASA itself? If you are going to spin some bullshit supposition where there was some type of malice intended, and Obama would have defunded NASA in the future, perhaps you may have clued in on the fact that Obama does not get to set what NASA will be appropriated, and any such hypothetical termination will be at the hands of Congressional action, not the decision by Obama to abandon Constellation for a human spaceflight program of a different construct. Obama proposed what he proposed, which was a well funded NASA pursuing human spaceflight program activities, and it was up to Congress to approve or disallow that funding, or as it turn out, for a Senate committee to usurp space policy to fund a parochial 12 billion dollar HLV program.
As well, Obama can only preside over the course of his term, and for that term he sought an addressment of basic needs in the establishment of a new capability for ISS crew needs and national crew capability in the commercial crew program, and the foundational pursuit of research for efforts inherent in an exploration of deep space by humans, while maintain the substantive other components of NASA.
When Constellation was proposed to be ended, a human spaceflight program of wide capability was intended to be put in place. It was proposed to be well funded for its ambition, and you cannot claim that it was a turning away from human spaceflight without being a bold faced liar.
When American astronauts step aboard a SpaceX or Beoing capsule in the second half of this decade so as to work and live for months at a time at the ISS, would you have and will you stubbornly proclaim that America has no human spaceflight program for the terrible Obama ended it in the first half of the decade?
Hmm. Austism. Rand, maybe people think you hate things and are constantly angry because you constantly suggest people who disagree with you have some kind of mental disorder. Some might call that direct. Others find it belligerent in the extreme. It does not do your cause any good to behave in such a way.
Rand doesn’t suggest that all people who disagree with him are nuts. He suggests that people like you are nuts, Mr. Whittington. In this, he is doing you a favor. I figure you’re sane, but are simply without an honest bone in your body.
how much money do you think is required to figure out whether we MUST have some form of Super-Heavy lift to do BEO human spaceflight?
It is known that we don’t need it. How much money do you want to spend on figuring out something that is already known? HLVs are like Keynesianism, its supporters will never admit it is a flawed idea because they stand to gain from it.
I think the spaceflight program should conduct innovative research on the advanced phase-shifted electrodynamic propulsion system for a more efficient way to reach deep space.
Mark, if you have an alternate explanation for why you are so seemingly unable to accurately discern the emotional states of other people, and instead absurdly fantasize about them and then hyperbolically exaggerate those fantasies, we are certainly willing to entertain it.
Rand,
“Why do you look at the speck of sawdust in your brother’s eye and pay no attention to the plank in your own eye?”
Just worth considering.
Anne, in order for me to answer that question, you’d have to elaborate. A lot.
A great example of why kicking the can down the road was the correct policy is the recent discovery from LCROSS/LRO that the lunar poles have far more abundant water and other volatiles than anyone could have expected. We now know that getting our in-space propellant from the Moon will be far less expensive than initially estimated.
Will it be cheap enough to remove the need for Heavy Lift of Propellants? Prospecting robots can be on the surface in 3-4 years to begin answering that key question.
Blundering ahead now with Heavy Lift is not logical, since we don’t need it now. The need is elsewhere — in proving orbital depots, lunar propellants, and vastly more effective in-space propulsion.
Ferris,
“A question – how much money do you think is required to figure out whether we MUST have some form of Super-Heavy lift to do BEO human spaceflight? Not how much is needed for gamechangers, but how much is needed to determine whether Super-Heavy is needed for BEO spaceflight, or whether there might not be a more sustainable model?”
I appreciate your confidence in me, but while (I believe) I am a competent engineer; trying to cost such a trade study is not within my areas of expertise.
I can however make several suggestions as to how such a study be performed:
– Establish a specific set of requirements you are trying to achieve as this will help establish the size and number of launches required. Rand’s mission statement of “arbitrarily large missions BEO” does not (in my opinion) give enough detail. As an example a lunar fly by mission (figure 8 around the moon and re-enter) would fit that description. The Russians intended such a mission using the Zond (stripped down Soyuz) vehicle launched by a Proton booster. Therefore such a mission could be accomplished using a Delta IV Heavy (DIVH) and you have already “proved” no need for an HLV. If you do not want to specify a destination(s), then generalize it by stating the specified delta V to be applied over specified time periods to a specified payload mass.
– Take into account the complexity and effects of on-orbit assembly. An example again, during early days of Space Station the truss designers wanted to build a “self assembling” station truss (that is each of the mechanical connections would have their own drive motors (the simplest form of robots, if you will) to secure the connecting bolts. As the design progressed they changed the design to use EVA to secure the bolts due to the weight, power, and cost impacts of using the individual drive motors. The space station only needs to handle station keeping, RCS, and docking loads, while any BEO spacecraft will have to handle considerable higher Trans Wherever Loads (unless some sort of low thrust electric propulsion is used, unlikely for crewed missions). That means considerable payload weigh, power, and cost penalties will have to be paid for multiple assemblies or a space station (ISS?) will be required to support assembly.
– Establish the type of orbit to orbit propulsion to be used. Example: If a LANTR type propulsion stage is assumed it will significantly lower the total weight of the vehicle over using chemical LH2/LOX propulsion and this could push toward (what I assume is your desired goal of) a smaller earth to orbit booster.
– Last but not least specify what you mean by “sustainable”. I know what the dictionary definition means, but without defining what the proposed program is willing to pay the requirement for sustainability is not verifiable.
A good deal of work along these lines was done I believe during the ESAS study (for the Lunar Case). Unfortunately I do not think enough emphasis was placed on the various HLV configurations vs. Orbital Fuel Depots or combinations of the above. However a lot of time (and redundant effort) could be saved by using those studies as a starting point.
“Joe – Why would OMB do the prioritization? Thats NASA’s job”
Not sure what to reply. If anything I said in my previous posts implied I thought OMB would/should be doing any technical prioritization that certainly not my intent. By default (setting the budget levels to the work to be done, without working with the NASA technical people) they may have helped create the need for prioritization.
Joe,
I’ll reply to your first point later (am actually quite busy at the moment). However, with regard to the second. I personally am not convinced that it wasn’t enough to make some severe inroads (the 7 vs 10 Billion), but lets leave that to the side. Fundamentally, I will grant – OMB’s budget did set the need for prioritization. But the problem was that NASA didn’t have time to set the prioritization, before the release of the budget (and then, quite quickly, you had people freaking out). So the fact that the budget didn’t have prioritization doesn’t mean that there wouldn’t have been. IMHO, prioritization at the budget document level release probably can be somewhat counter productive.
The point being – just because the prioritization hadn’t been done right then, doesn’t mean we weren’t going to see prioritization.
I guess what I am asking is this – if you grant OMB should not be doing the prioritization, and we acknowledge that NASA didn’t have enough time to do a prioritization before the release of the budget (which is historically the case), then how was a prioritization suppose to be included in the budget document?
MPM – well, actually, it isn’t known (at least in NASA’s eyes) because no one has actually demonstrated it. That is part of the problem. The numbers look good, but until NASA sees physical evidence (and it has to be, to a certain degree, evidence that NASA produces, which gets even worse), NASA doesn’t believe its the case.
MPM – well, actually, it isn’t known (at least in NASA’s eyes) because no one has actually demonstrated it.
The same is true for EOR, and NASA does believe in that. It is clear enough that orbital refueling avoids the alleged need for HLVs. All you need is a little rocket equation level analysis. I don’t think there is anyone at NASA who truly believes HLVs are necessary. I can believe that some believe it to be desirable, maybe even very desirable.
There is a large subset of the population commenting on space blogs that believes that *every* act of the Obama administration is designed to undercut the exceptional stature and activities of the US in the world, turning it into just another European Welfare State. They look at the achievements of Apollo, and see its uses in weighting people’s perceptions on the side of American exceptionalism. They believe that any US achievement on such a scale is inimical to this administration, and that *any* plan put forwards by this administration about Space is a plan to scuttle the possibility of such achievements.
When they are people whose jobs, or their friends jobs, are also endangered by such plans, their willingness to find that the careers of KSFC, MSFC, and JSC engineering managers are congruent with Human Spaceflight contributing to American Exceptionalism becomes nearly total. As an American Exceptionalist myself, with many friends in both NASA and New Space, I must take issue with this. Those jobs are not that important! Those institutions are not that important- not to the advance of US Human Spaceflight, and not to the Obama Administration!
I dislike almost every policy I see out of the Obama Administration, but for the one announced early this year about Human Spaceflight. That is because it contains technology developments that I have desired for over 40 years, … yes, such as LEO Propellant Depots.
The arguers proceed to warn that any such congruence with sustainable advances in spaceflight *must* be a false trail, which will lead to a dead end, because the White House cannot, by their true desires, advance programs that will make the US exceptional in the world. Again, this would assume that the White House believes that HSF is that important. I find no belief that they do believe it is important anywhere in the record. To them it is purely jobs politics, as it is to people like Senator Shelby.
Lori, on the other hand, has been trying to bring a higher level of American HSF participation from outside NASA for at least 20 years. She went to bat for the Oregon L5 team in 1990, over a $28,600 contract, so hard she bounced when she hit resistance that is still unexplained in detail today. That she is now working at similar agendas to those of SFF and others who went outside NSS from 1990 onwards tells me she has her desire for Human Spaceflight intact.
Besides the argument that anyone who believes something good might come from the Obama Administration must be naive, there is another assumption lurking just below the surface. It is that a large single program like an HLV must once again be a rallying point that will attract enough supporters to drive through Congress sufficient funds to complete not only the “program too big to fail”, but all other technology really needed to get us a Spacefaring civilization. This does *not* comport well with history!
By the summer of 1965, Apollo was eating the seed corn funding small technology development programs for “Post-Apollo” missions. By 1977, STS was eating funding for such program components as the Space Tug and other key technologies. By 1987, what is now ISS was eating funding for inflatables and other advances. Ares 1 was outgrowing NASA’s political funding abilities so fast that by 2007 it had eaten NASA Institute for Advanced Concepts in a slurp that gave it less than one week of funds. NASA projects “too big to fail” do *not* drag smaller programs in their political wake, …they devour them!
What makes America exceptional is *not* its government programs, but the freedoms of action its people have to build the networks that will let them accomplish their personal goals-in this case, goals of settling the Solar System. NASA supporters, which I count myself as, can make a contribution to those networks, but not by continually insisting that it is only that NASA makes us exceptional in Space. Contributing support to the freedoms of action needed to settle the Solar System, physical freedoms, such as NASA can *help* build, market freedoms, intellectual freedoms, and others, are all important. Stop trying to plot political paths that have not existed since 1970. Chart a course for freedoms, instead.
MPM
with regard to EOR – I’d disagree. While its true no one has demonstrated a complete EOR system, we have demonstrated all of the technical pieces separately.
The same cannot be said about fuel depots, or ISRU ( I personally think this is a bogus issue, but I suspect that this is part of the NASA culture at work).
One other thing, regarding the rocket equation analysis – I think part of the discussion though isn’t based in the rocket equation. I think there are 2 other factors worth considering
1) NASA treating space as a mission based situation, rather than a constant interaction system. What I mean by this is that NASA didn’t figure out how to do “routine” with the shuttle, and so it fell back on doing things mission based – that is, from the moment of launch, until the crew is recovered, the crew is a moment away from certain death. Until this changes, NASA will demand a Super HLV.
2) NASA wants to go place, with a minimal amount of non-new tech. Thus, they fall back on Super HLVs and the like. NASA doesn’t know at all how to make a calculation about which systems produce more long term benefit.
While its true no one has demonstrated a complete EOR system, we have demonstrated all of the technical pieces separately.
The same goes for orbital refueling, just not for the super-efficient propellants we’d like to use (at least for crew). But storable propellant + RLVs would beat HLV + LOX/LH2 hands down, as would EELVs for crew EDSs and SEP for cargo and propellant.
Your points 1)+2) have some truth to them. But neither of them truly requires HLV, of either the Super or ordinary variety.
Ferris,
“I’ll reply to your first point later (am actually quite busy at the moment).”
Happy Holidays! 🙂 Seriously I will look forward to your reaction to my suggestions when you get a chance to look at them.
“Fundamentally, I will grant – OMB’s budget did set the need for prioritization. But the problem was that NASA didn’t have time to set the prioritization, before the release of the budget (and then, quite quickly, you had people freaking out).”
We are in agreement as to this. Isn’t agreeing occasionally fun.
“I guess what I am asking is this – if you grant OMB should not be doing the prioritization, and we acknowledge that NASA didn’t have enough time to do a prioritization before the release of the budget (which is historically the case), then how was a prioritization suppose to be included in the budget document?”
Now I see where you thought I was suggesting OMB should be doing the prioritization. Where we disagree (you knew we would) is the part about “which is historically the case”. My understanding based on press accounts backed up by what I consider to be reliable office scuttlebutt is that (1) NASA at the level below Bolden/Garver knew nothing about the radical change in policy until less than 36 hours before the Budget Roll Out and (2) that far from this being normal procedure OMB usually gives NASA a draft of the new budget about Thanksgiving in order to allow what is called a “pass back” (essentially NASA gets a chance to suggest changes to the budget, with varying degrees of success). This has been true even in “normal” years (i.e. those in which big policy/program changes are not being proposed).
Think of the Bush proposal for VSE (whatever you may think of its eventual outcome). Bush made a public speech announcing the policy change and OMB and NASA worked to establish the original Budget (remember this was pre-Constellation Systems and Rand may have even approved of the budget and process at that time). If a similar process had been followed here Doug Cooke’s organization could have provided the prioritization (or maybe even better culled the Flag Ship Demonstrations down to an affordable number under the budget limitations – Orbital Fuel Depots, NTR, SEP, Advanced ECLSS, Inflatable Structures – that would be my list anyway in order of priority if further culling were required) and the hole fiasco could have been avoided
What really tore it was when in July some 4 months after the budget roll out there was still no significant detail added to what the budget meant in spite of Congressional direction to provide more detail by a month prior to that date. Why this was not done I have no idea, but I have a hard time believing that Bolden just likes taking personal abuse in public. It was then that Congress, in frustration over being asked to buy a “Pig in a Poke” (sorry about the cliché, but it fits), began to try to write their own version of a plan.
MPM –
getting on soapbox
whether we need HLV or not, we already have them in the form of Delta IV Heavy (as well as potentially Falcon 9 Heavy & Atlas V Heavy).
The real debate is whether we need Saturn V class (IE super Heavy). And I agree there really isn’t a good reason for Super HLV – I’ve been accused of being violently Pro-technology (actually, I was accused of being violently pro depot, but I’ve since decided that its advance tech in general that we need to be talking about).
This is more of an attempt to understand the NASA culture & mindset that results in things like Constellation. And then prevent them in the future.
Joe
When I said historically, I meant effectively what you said
This I agree with. (I actually have a theory about what happened and its much less nefarious than is supposed, if people are desperately curious, and it fits the data much better than “Obama is out to destroy human spaceflight) I grant I phrased it very poorly (I am finishing up some professional testing today, and had my mind elsewhere). My point was, given that they didn’t have time, and given that OMB isn’t the agency to be doing the prioritizing, what other options were there?
HLVs are like Keynesianism, its supporters will never admit it is a flawed idea because they stand to gain from it.
With the understanding that at some time in the future, HLV might makes sense but only after the economics make sense. HLV is the natural result of incremental increases in current systems.
Why they don’t design to use existing launch systems, but instead try a riskier, costlier parallel development of new systems, makes absolutely no sense.
With the understanding that at some time in the future, HLV might makes sense but only after the economics make sense. HLV is the natural result of incremental increases in current systems.
A good point. And the word might is very important. Once we have cheap lift it could also turn out to be cheaper to do orbital assembly, perhaps with raw materials from the moon, asteroids or Phobos/Deimos, or perhaps with assembly facilities in those locations. It’s far too early to tell.
Why they don’t design to use existing launch systems, but instead try a riskier, costlier parallel development of new systems, makes absolutely no sense.
That could make a limited amount of sense if the parallel development was of something that promised a major reduction in commercial launch prices, such as an RLV. But it isn’t and even if it were NASA isn’t up to such a task. In addition the RLV would be a probable automatic side-effect of an exploration architecture based around propellant transfer, so it makes little sense for NASA to do that.
Ferris,
“When I said historically, I meant effectively what you said
My understanding based on press accounts backed up by what I consider to be reliable office scuttlebutt is that (1) NASA at the level below Bolden/Garver knew nothing about the radical change in policy until less than 36 hours before the Budget Roll Out”
I take it this means you also agree that this is far from normal procedure when NASA would have been allowed to respond to a “draft” of the budget and (hopefully at least) produce something that might have made sense and this is the point of your next comment.
“I actually have a theory about what happened and its much less nefarious than is supposed, if people are desperately curious, and it fits the data much better than “Obama is out to destroy human spaceflight”
Consider me officially on record as being “desperately curious”. I understand you are busy right now, but when you get a chance please expound on your theory; I am very interested to hear it.
“I grant I phrased it very poorly (I am finishing up some professional testing today, and had my mind elsewhere).”
No need to explain the dangers of “multi-tasking” I am very familiar with them myself. Good luck with the testing.