I’ve had a lot of differences with John Logsdon over the years, but in this Space News piece (pointed out to me by Charles Lurio), he gets it pretty close to exactly right (i.e., we’re pretty much on the same page):
Yale University organizational sociologist Gary Brewer more than 20 years ago observed that NASA during the Apollo program came close to being “a perfect place” — the best organization that human beings could create to accomplish a particular goal. But, suggested Brewer, “perfect places do not last for long.” NASA was “no longer a perfect place.” The organization needed “new ways of thinking, new people, and new means.” He added “The innocent clarity of purpose, the relatively easy and economically painless public consent, and the technical confidence [of Apollo] … are gone and will probably never occur again. Trying to recreate those by-gone moments by sloganeering, frightening, or appealing to mankind’s mystical needs for exploration and conquest seems somehow futile considering all that has happened since Jack Kennedy set the nation on course to the Moon.”
Introducing “new ways of thinking, new people, and new means” into the NASA approach to human spaceflight has not happened in the two decades since Brewer made his observations. That was the conclusion of the Columbia Accident Investigation Board in 2003, and despite the positive steps taken since then to operate the shuttle as safely as possible, much of the Apollo-era human spaceflight culture remains intact. Trying to change that culture and thereby close out the half century of Apollo-style human spaceflight seems to me the essence of the new space strategy. There is no way of achieving that objective without wrenching dislocations; change is indeed hard. Gaining acceptance of that change will require more White House and congressional leadership and honesty about the consequences of the new strategy than has been evident to date.
Sadly, White House and congressional leadership and honesty have been in pretty short supply lately, on both this issue and others.
“There is a coherent explanation of what is being proposed, but NASA has given it little emphasis and it seems not to have registered with those trying to understand the new strategy.”
Oh really Logsdon, do tell.
“That strategy involves a restart — a five-year period of building the technological foundation for the future. That restart would be followed by another five to seven years of developing new systems based on that foundation, then a series of human missions to various destinations beyond Earth orbit. There is no commitment to a specific destination on a specific schedule; that avoids the narrowing effect that was a characteristic of Apollo.”
That’s your coherent explanation? In a word: pathetic.
Let me try: the future of NASA is in developing permanent in-space architecture, akin to the transcontinental railroad or the interstate highway system, to drastically reduce the cost of exploration, spur commerce and facilitate the settlement of the solar system and, eventually, the stars.
Let me try: the future of NASA is in developing permanent in-space architecture, akin to the transcontinental railroad or the interstate highway system, to drastically reduce the cost of exploration, spur commerce and facilitate the settlement of the solar system and, eventually, the stars.
Yes, indeed.
And EML-1 could well be the best place to start. 😉
Hey Bill, are you the president of the Intrepid museum or is it just an insanely common name?
Nah, but I am running for Governor of Texas. (No, that is not really me, either.)
I am the guy who got us lost causing you to miss dinner that one night at ISDC. I’m still embarrassed about that.
Sorry.
Let me try: the future of NASA is in developing permanent in-space architecture, akin to the transcontinental railroad or the interstate highway system, to drastically reduce the cost of exploration, spur commerce and facilitate the settlement of the solar system and, eventually, the stars.
And in the 50 years of NASA’s existence, they’ve never once shown the slightest inclination or ability to do any of those things. It’s just not in the nature of a government agency to do that. It wasn’t a government agency that built the transcontinental railroad. The government gave some favorable incentives and private companies for the most part did the construction. The interstate highway system was paid for by the federal government (or more accurately, the taxpayers) but they didn’t try to control the day to day operations of the highways. Nothing NASA has done has lowered the cost of launching things into space, at least not in the last 30 years. NASA has shown no interest in settlements of any kind except for a small, elite group of government employees. The odds of any individual becoming a NASA astronaut were at least one in a million and that’s as close to opening space for the masses as NASA ever intended.
Larry, I’m not sure if it is your intention to say that because NASA has never done X that NASA can never do X, but it certainly seems that way and the stated opinion of Paul Spudis and others is exactly that, so allow me to address it.
Logsdon’s wordy article is exactly about how the manned spaceflight portion of NASA seems trapped by its culture to try to repeat Apollo over and over and fail because of it. If you agree with him and choose not to stay mute, then you have to choose: either you believe that NASA is capable of change and advocate that change or you must advocate that NASA be stripped of the manned spaceflight duties.
Of course, Paul Spudis and others don’t agree with Logsdon.. they believe NASA hasn’t been trying hard enough to repeat Apollo and has been failing because they’ve been trying to change.
Bill, I remembered that.. just wasn’t sure if you were that guy as well 🙂 How’s the book sales going?
…they believe NASA hasn’t been trying hard enough to repeat Apollo and has been failing because they’ve been trying to change.
That’s rich.
Well, it’s nice to see that Logsdon has (apparently) finally reached where I’ve been for years.
Welcome.
Let’s see. Logsdon believes that the bad thing about Apollo was that it a goal, a plan to implement that goal, and a deadline to complete that goal. He believes that the good thing about Obamaspace is that it has none of these things.
Does anyone else realize how insane that is?
No, Mark.
You’re insane all alone in your little ungrammatical and illiterate corner with your imaginary “Internet Rocketeers.” Hope you all have a good time over there.
Trent asks:
Bill, I remembered that.. just wasn’t sure if you were that guy as well 🙂 How’s the book sales going?
Slow, but Ken Murphy and Peter Kokh both gave me strong reviews.
Mark, the best thing about Apollo was that there was infinite funds to achieve a modest goal. The worst thing about Apollo was that there was infinite funds to achieve a modest goal.
The linked piece also includes this passage:
This causes me to ask whether the Administration truly intends that which their more articulate supporters believe they intend.
NASA, like the NACA it was developed from is has an engineering culture built around problem. Give them a very precisely worded technical problem – supersonic flight, going to the Moon, etc. and they will solve it.
Give them vague goals, foggy visions, and mission creep (science, commercialization, space settlement) and unpredictable budgets and they will drift. They have been drifting since Apollo for that very reason.
Mark,
Myopia is not focus. Destinations are not the only sorts of goals. You can have meaningful goals and timelines that unlike Apollo or CxP actually lead to something useful. John’s point, which you completely missed is that sometimes developing capabilities *can and should* be the goal. That rushing off to spend tens and hundreds of billions of dollars to do a pittance of exploration is foolish, when investing some of that time and money up front can make a massive difference in what we accomplish.
Mark, you’re penny-wise and pound foolish.
~Jon
Thomas, so it seems you’re also in the camp of “NASA can never change” .. and seeing as Apollo can not and never will be repeated, you have to advocate that manned spaceflight be taken away from NASA right? Or do you support more dismal attempts?
Or, to put it more succinctly: the old tricks aint wowing anyone anymore, and if the old dog can’t learn new tricks then we’re gunna need a new dog.
There have been a number of reports over the years that have pointed out that fundamental pieces have not been developed by the POR.
FY11 rectifies this.
Consider.
We are 40 years after Apollo and we still don’t know exactly how much gravity we really need. What is the point of putting people on the Moon or Mars if the lower gravity will kill them in 10-15 years.
If that turns out to be the case what are the cures?
Shouldn’t we finding this out now?
What about radiation outside LEO. What shielding do we need? Does it have to be mass, or will magnetic shielding work?
Closed loop recycling for air, water and everything else for a long term mission in space. Not developed yet. (FY11 funds it.)
Surely these are the sorts of questions we need to address now.
After all how can you even start designing deep space missions without answers to these sorts of questions.
40 years after Apollo there are still way too many things that have yet to be done before we can even begin to think in a meaningful way about beyond LEO missions.
Unless, of course, all you’re really interest in is another rush to the moon flags and footprints mission.
Personally I’d rather go back to stay this time.
Thomas,
NASA, like the NACA it was developed from is has an engineering culture built around problem. Give them a very precisely worded technical problem – supersonic flight, going to the Moon, etc. and they will solve it. Give them vague goals, foggy visions, and mission creep (science, commercialization, space settlement) and unpredictable budgets and they will drift. They have been drifting since Apollo for that very reason.
Exactly. You’re the only poster on this thread to see things clearly.
The only things that do not change are the lifeless.
Adapt or die. It’s a rule that applies to every species, every human language, every human institution, every meme.
If NASA cannot or will not adapt to the reality of 2010 – that it isn’t 1961 anymore and never will be again – then it should be shut down completely.
Mark Whittington and others argue for a single goal with a single plan and a single deadline.
Why? Because it worked a single time?
Look at a rope. Is there only a single strand?
Paul, I’m calling you out. Respond or withdraw.
@Jon Goff & others
Why not amend FY2011 to include a goal of doing a lunar fly-by mission within X years of today with the Earth departure fuel supplied from a depot?
What don’t we know about building depots that isn’t best learned by committing to build a depot, and then using that depot to go somewhere?
What FY2011 lacks (among other things) is any commitment to establishing new permanent infrastructure out there.
Dr. Spudis seeks a commitment to establish a lunar base to do ISRU – which certainly is a worthy goal.
A far less ambitious goal could be to deploy a functional LEO fuel depot by 201X or better yet a functional EML depot by 201Y however FY2011 doesn’t do any of that.
PS — A commitment to deploy a functional LEO depot and a functional EML depot would both constitute steppingstones towards a permanent lunar presence AND easier access to NEOs, Phobos/Deimos & Mars.
And lunar ISRU fuel and an EML depot opens up the Solar System.
Logsdon’s wordy article is exactly about how the manned spaceflight portion of NASA seems trapped by its culture to try to repeat Apollo over and over and fail because of it. If you agree with him and choose not to stay mute, then you have to choose: either you believe that NASA is capable of change and advocate that change or you must advocate that NASA be stripped of the manned spaceflight duties.
Some people fail to understand that at its heart, NASA is just another government agency. Its first and foremost mission is to survive as a government agency with the added hope of additional funding. Sure, give then tens of billions of dollars a year and they’ll spend it, eventually accomplishing something worthwhile. However, give them the same amount of money and they’ll spend that doing the same things they’ve done for the last 30 years. In the arena of manned spaceflight, that means they’ll continue carrying a few government employees to LEO indefinitely.
Other than perhaps a few dreamers, NASA as an agency has no interest or incentive to do anything other than what it has always done. NASA will never take me, you or anyone else who isn’t one of their astronauts into space. They won’t work to establish colonies or any of your other dreams, either. If you want those things, it’s time to quit putting your hope on a bureaucracy and start looking for alternatives that might have a better chance of success. After all, one definition of insanity is doing the same thing over and over while hoping for a different outcome.
I can think of three possible government agency forms that NASA might take:
1) Crisis management hard one off technical problem solving at extreme cost (Apollo).
2) A DARPA like agency fostering serious technical R&D in aerospace and space.
3) An academic science research institute.
There is no justification for option one anymore so we can disregard that – the world now only wants space on the cheap (not NASA). Some parts of NASA might make a transition to a DARPA like agency, but it may be better to start from scratch on that front. This leaves the academic science research institute path, which I think NASA could actually do quite well at. Personally I think this is where NASA should go.
The original task that NASA was created for was accomplished many decades ago – NASA needs to transition to some other government department model or retire.
I’ve often thought that one way NASA could maintain their human spaceflight urgency would be to serve in a Coast Guard-type role. Craft on standby for launch, ready to rescue people in LEO (and eventually beyond). Training missions could take place every couple months, a little more frequently than the launch rate we’re seeing today. The budget then wouldn’t really matter, because all the missions would be to save a life.
Of course, there would need to be more human activity in orbit before such an option would be viable…
Mark Whittington and others argue for a single goal with a single plan and a single deadline.
Why? Because it worked a single time?
Spudis and Whittington are like the little old ladies on the streets of Moscow after the fall of Communism. They can’t understand how food could keep showing up in the stores without 5- and 20-Year Plans created by the Commissar of Agriculture and approved by the Politburo. It’s the system they grew up with, the only system they know, and they can’t understand that there could ever be another way. Much less imagine that private enterprise might actually work better than the Vision of Soviet Enterprise.
I don’t think it is quite that bad, Edward. Rick Tumlinson’s idea about the divergent political philosophies of space utilization (expanded upon by Trent Waddington a few weeks ago) explain a lot of these battles for the future of NASA.
The NASA of Apollo was all-but-officially an army. The von Braunian approach (Explorer/Mercury/Gemini/Apollo) makes sense in the context of a Cold War moon race or an imminent (i.e. a decade) big asteroid strike. It’s a sensible approach for Paul Spudis to advocate in a crisis context.
The context of 2010 is very different than 1961 though, and that has to be recognized and truly embraced by NASA or else NASA is done for. Right now, because it has spent the last 40 years as an “army in peacetime” rather than doing NACA-like things such as lowering the cost to orbit and establishing ubiquitous orbital infrastructure, NASA is expendable and only political inertia keeps it going.
Support for NASA is a mile wide and a millimeter deep. If NASA persists with Saganite “look but don’t touch” robotic missions and von Braunian hugely-expensive flashy megaproject manned missions, never opening up space to the rest of us, that support will continue to erode as it has ever since Challenger.
Want to ensure NASA is relevant, and for a very long time? Open up space for business.
However, if those who say it is impossible for NASA to change are correct, that it must always have some One Destination to Rule Them All… the moon ain’t it. Neither is Mars. Neither one would excite the imagination the way that Apollo did. It would be like remaking Star Wars using exactly the same script and special effects – you’d still have Star Wars. You need something that will excite the imagination and get people all jazzed up and willing to spend 4% of the federal budget on NASA. It has to be a quantum leap. Build me a space elevator. Or develop Warp drive. Those are worthy von Braunian goals. Anything less is just blah.
A lot of it comes down to the difference between results oriented people and process oriented people. Results oriented people are perceived as people that get things done while process oriented are perceived as the grit in the wheels of progress. The new direction is perceived as turning a results oriented agency and forcing it to become a process oriented one by not having a fixed goal and deadline.
The reality is that both types of people are required for progress, and NASA is dominated by one type, the process people. The results people still there get buried in paperwork. The false perception that the current NASA culture is results oriented causing many of these arguments that they just need a goal. Never mind the sheer number of goals that have produced poor results. Shuttle, Station, X33, and Ares are possibly the best known examples of things that missed their target goals.
Paul,
Thanks 🙂
But having a background in strategic management helps.
Tom
Trent,
HSF is the core of NASA’s identity. Outsourcing it is going to cut the heart of the agency out.
Tom
john hare,
The best way to turn a results oriented organization into a process oriented one is for outsiders to micro-management it and second guess every decision it makes. Congress and the New Space Advocate community may now take their bows for doing so.
Thomas, if HSF is the heart of NASA then it’s cold and it’s black and it’s surviving on life support.
HSF is the core of NASA’s identity.
It was hard for many cold war warriors to move on and change their identity, it is rather amazing that there is still one left (NASA), that was a long time ago. The world is now very different place, requiring very different warriors, so to speak.
NASA has next to no competence in economic development and thereby has next to no place in directly developing economically viable HSF, but I think there is a lot more to NASA than HSF – like pure research.
Thomas Matula,
The change started well before New Space Advocates existed. It is true though that micromanaging and second guessing produce that result, though other factors include a maturing organization and the natural entrophy of large groups. The problem that is left is how to change it back considering the fact that congress and the public are properly involved in the decisions concerning the agency.
How do you suggest getting results from a large organization when most of the group incentives are toward process?
The best way to turn a results oriented organization into a process oriented one is for outsiders to micro-management it and second guess every decision it makes.
You mean outsiders like you, Spudis, Whittington, etc. who’ve been attacking NASA all year long? Take a bow, Tom!
Anyone familar with the history of NASA knows that it had outside review panels, advisory boards, etc. from the very start. The idea that NASA had a free hand to do whatever it liked during the Apollo era is a myth invented by Apollo worshippers who never took the time to learn how Apollo really worked.
It wasn’t until the Vision of Space Exploration that Congress completely abandoned its oversight role and merely shovelled money into Mike Griffin’s coffers, no questions asked. How did that work out for you?
So, now the people who say they that elected officials (and the public) should have no say in how NASA operates are attacking the leadership of NASA and asking politicians to force NASA to build systems NASA leaders don’t want. You can’t buy irony like that anymore today. 🙂
Dr. Spudis seeks a commitment to establish a lunar base to do ISRU – which certainly is a worthy goal.
So, you want NASA to build factories and bases on the Moon now, Bill? I thought you believed that should be done by the private sector? Or is that only on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays?
NASA spent $100 billion building a base in Low Earth Orbit, and it only holds 6 people. How much do you think it would spend trying to build ISS 2 on the Moon? Let alone a full-scaled factory?
And what about exploration of the solar system? And planetary defense? Who’s going to do that, if NASA commits to house-sitting on the Moon and going around in circles for another 50 years? If the next impactor comes and we’re not ready for it, are you and Spudis prepared to stand at ground zero?
Wouldn’t it make more sense to let NASA continue the exploration mission it was designed for, and leave building cities, running factories, etc. to people who actually know how to build cities, run factories, etc.?
I’ll not be buying his book because obviously he didn’t do his research. … “The Apollo spacecraft and the magnificent Saturn 5 launcher proved not to be relevant to any post-Apollo mission that could gain political support in the early 1970s, and were quickly discarded.” … Simply not true.
NASA developed the Apollo Extension Systems (AES) as a plan for the beginnings of a lunar base. Development actually started in May, 1966. The initial plan was for a first mission in March, 1970. But budget cutbacks and then the cancellation of further Saturn V production led to the post-Apollo project being cancelled in June, 1968.
The planned evolution was to take the basic Apollo hardware forward to the Apollo Extension Systems, Next would have been the Apollo Logistics Support System and then to the Lunar Exploration System for Apollo. The end result would have been continuously expanding permanent stations on the moon.
There was a longterm plan and Apollo was part of that plan. But Johnson had a war to fight and Nixon wasn’t interested.
***BTW, In 1992, AIAA published paper 92-1546, “Launch Vehicles for the Space Exploration Initiative”. This paper concluded that a revived Saturn V was actually cheaper than the NLS (National Launch Systems) vehicle then being debated.
john hare,
[[[How do you suggest getting results from a large organization when most of the group incentives are toward process?]]]
By stopping the micro-management and second guessing. As long as someone is looking over your shoulder you will be sure to follow the processes in place so you are able to defend your decisions.
Imagine building a house for a lawyer who made their fortune from consumer protection lawsuits who wants you to justify everything decision you make to an outside engineer who is always second guessing you. Imagine how long it would take you and the cost. Then you will see one of the big problems NASA has. And the difficulty of going back to being a result focused organization.
Pete,
When the average American thinks of NASA they don’t think if scientists in some lab, but astronauts in space.
Ed, Lunar ISRU is regularly conflated with ISS-like manned outposts on the Moon – that’s certainly something Spudis likes to do – but there’s no relationship. Sure, if you had a human lunar outpost you’d be stupid not to design for optimum ISRU but there’s been plenty of robotic mission designs which have included LUNOX production as an enabler.. and those missions clearly weren’t designed with the intention of flying them after some future lunar outpost is pumping out propellants.
There’s no reason why JSC can’t fly an ISRU testbed to the Moon in the next few years. Project-M will most likely enable all sorts of experimental payloads. Whether they will get funding to develop a reusable lander to carry propellants back to Lagrangian points or even LEO is dependent on who’s toes they stand on – it will be pretty hard to justify a lunar base on the grounds of ISRU production if a robotic architecture can deliver that autonomously.
The reason to go and build a base on the Moon is simple: we need to learn how to live off-world. That’s the only goal worth having. The question becomes: is learning to live in the hard vacuum of the Moon with the limited resources of the Moon at all relevant to that goal? If Mars is the next home for humanity – and I’m on the record as saying it really isn’t the best of the available options, but the current NASA direction says it is – then does learning to live on the Moon actually teach us anything? Can better lessons be learnt at the MDRS or the other Earth-analog facilities? If so, why are they running almost completely unfunded now?
LoboSolo, ummm.. John Logsdon was *actually there*. Go look up the story of how LOR was selected and read the author of the work sometime. There was a long term plan in ’61.. then Apollo destroyed all that, and we’ve been living with the consequences of accelerated-schedule-addiction ever since.
That’s not to say the von Braun vision of Station, Moon, Mars was any good, the distinct lack of commercial involvement still haunts us, but claiming Apollo somehow fit into that plan is simply misrepresenting history.
But budget cutbacks and then the cancellation of further Saturn V production led to the post-Apollo project being cancelled in June, 1968.
How does that make Logsdon’s statement “not true”? Don’t budget cutbacks show that it was unable to gain political support, just as Logsdon said?
BTW, In 1992, AIAA published paper 92-1546, “Launch Vehicles for the Space Exploration Initiative”. This paper concluded that a revived Saturn V was actually cheaper than the NLS (National Launch Systems) vehicle then being debated.
Pretty meaningless, since neither was affordable. As for that paper, by Steve Cook — well, Cook couldn’t build X-33 for what he said he could, and couldn’t build Ares for what he said he could, so why do you assume he could build a revived Saturn V for what he said he could?
Apollo did not result in “continuously expanding permanent stations on the moon.” It resulted in 50 years of high cost and stagnation.
there’s been plenty of robotic mission designs which have included LUNOX production as an enabler.. and those missions clearly weren’t designed with the intention of flying them after some future lunar outpost is pumping out propellants.
Who’s going to build and operate the factories that produce that lunar oxygen? Even Dennis Wingo now says that robots can’t do it all.
And as Henry Spencer said at space access, chemical engineers cringe at some of the statements made by aerospace engineers.
Also note that Spudis and Marshall wanted to spend almost $2 billion on *one* robot lander. That’s one expensive robot — JSC’s Human Lunar Return architecture would have developed an orbital propellant depot, a lunar lander, and an inflatable lunar habitat and returned humans to the Moon, for about the same amount of money. So, using substituting those robots for humans wouldn’t actually save any money.
The reason to go and build a base on the Moon is simple: we need to learn how to live off-world. That’s the only goal worth having.
NASA’s already done that with ISS. So, if that’s the only goal worth having, we might as well shut NASA down.
Of course, there’s a difference between learning how to live off-world and learning how to live off-world affordably.
The question becomes: is learning to live in the hard vacuum of the Moon with the limited resources of the Moon at all relevant to that goal?
NASA did that in Apollo. Again, the difference is between doing it and doing it affordably.
But how do you go from “mankind needs to learn X” to “NASA needs to learn X”? Just because something needs to be done does not automatically mean NASA needs to do it. Does NASA need to learn to build suborbital spacecraft? Does NASA need to learn to build inflatable space stations?
Go look up the story of how LOR was selected and read the author of the work sometime. There was a long term plan in ‘61.. then Apollo destroyed all that,
Don’t trust the official histories — they are written by the winners. The Apollo guys didn’t “select” LOR, they stole it. Apollo was headed for failure. The Gemini guys argued that they could do it with their “lunar bug” and Lunar Orbit Rendezvous. The higher-ups finally had to admit they were right, but they weren’t about to let Gemini do it. So, the Gemini bug became the Apollo Lunar Module. And three astronauts died in a fire because NASA chose to use a capsule that wasn’t ready to fly rather than one that was already flying.
By stopping the micro-management and second guessing.
So, you’re going to stop second-guessing and micromanaging General Bolden’s plan, Tom?
Glad to hear it. 🙂
Or do you simply mean you want *other* people to stop second-guessing, but you are still allowed?
Dr. Spudis seeks a commitment to establish a lunar base to do ISRU – which certainly is a worthy goal.
Whether NASA is the right agency to accomplish this goal is a different question.
factories
You keep using that word.. I don’t think it means what you think it does.
Also note that Spudis and Marshall wanted to spend almost $2 billion on *one* robot lander.
Yep, and JSC is doing it with no funding and no prime contractor. The fact that Spudis is full of fail doesn’t mean everyone is.
Of course, there’s a difference between learning how to live off-world and learning how to live off-world affordably.
There certainly is and I wouldn’t argue that NASA doesn’t still has a lot to learn about that too.
I’m trying to give Spudis’s arguments some legs here – God knows it needs it. You send humans into space because you don’t learn to live on other planets with robots. The ISS has taught us a lot but clearly not enough. Is that because of the location, or is that because of the NASA culture? I, personally, think it is because of the culture.. as much as NASA talks about “learning to live in space”, and Spudis talks about “learning to live off the land”, they don’t actually do that do they? Maybe having that as a clearly stated goal would actually change their culture a bit.
But how do you go from “mankind needs to learn X” to “NASA needs to learn X”? Just because something needs to be done does not automatically mean NASA needs to do it.
If the point of NASA’s HSF program shouldn’t be to contribute to the goal of learning how to get to other worlds and learning how to live on them, what should it be?
@Trent … Apollo was conceived in 1960 (prior to your theory that it destroyed the long-term plan in ’61) during the Eisenhower administration as the follow-on program to Mercury. Gemini came into existence AFTER the approval of the Apollo program as a intermediate step to develop, test, and prove the technologies needed for Apollo.
BTW, those early plans for bases on the Moon were military bases from the Air Force (Project Lunex) and the Army (Project Horizon).
Initially, NASA (von Braun) favored the direct approach … an all in one vehicle … to land on the moon but it quickly became apparent that weight would be a problem. The debate moved to whether to use use EOR or LOR. The darkhorse LOR won out.
Now, could Gemini gone to the moon with a “bug” lander? Probably, but if you think Apollo was dangerous and risky, the proposed Gemini moon mission was downright scary.
And you want to talk about one and done?
The Gemini moon landing proposal called for a spacewalk to an open-seat lander. Then one astronaut would land on the moon, walk around, take off, rendezvous with the Gemini capsule, and spacewalk back to it.
Compare that to the Apollo astronauts actually staying and living on the Moon for days at a time.
So you can see, Apollo was conceived during the early planning stages. As I outlined before, it became the centerpiece in planning for incremental an evolution to a permanent presence on the moon. But Johnson had to fund the war and the Great Society …