A worker on the program says that now is no time to retire Shuttle.
It’s very appealing to imagine continuing the program, but it’s just not realistic. The decision was really made on February 1st, 2003, when the fleet size went (once again) from four to three, and this time there were no structural spares from which to build a replacement, as we did after the Challenger loss. As former Shuttle program manager Wayne Hale has explained, it is simply not practical to continue to fly. And since he wrote that, almost two years ago, it has gotten progressively more difficult to resurrect the program, with the ongoing shutdowns of second- and third-tier suppliers, who are no longer in business. The time to argue against this was six years ago, after the VSE was announced, because the decision was part and parcel of it, and while some politicians have made noise about trying to keep the program alive, nothing has ever happened to allow it. The Gap always existed, and a responsible NASA administrator would have done everything in his power to minimize it, and things could have been done to do so (for instance, allowing the original CEV flyoff scheduled for 2006 to go forward, and pick one to fly on an Atlas). Instead, Mike Griffin wasted billions on a flawed program that has expanded it, almost a year per year.
When you keep heading in a direction, eventually you get where you are going, and here we are. Space policy has, in general, been a slow-motion train wreck for decades, and now we’re watching the locomotive start to head over the cliff. It is the result of a lot of flawed policy decisions made over the years, almost all of whose consequences were perfectly predictable, and the piper has finally come to receive his wages for the clumsy dancing. Because space policy, at least human spaceflight policy, isn’t important, and hasn’t been since the early sixties. All that has ever mattered is the jobs, and now, even many of those will be gone. It’s time to grow up, and understand that you are never going to get good policy from a democracy on matters like this. Those who want to see us go into space are going to have to accept that the only route is one that provides a real return, that people are willing to pay for. Flawed and problematic as the new direction is, it at least offers some small amount of hope that we will be able to transition to such an environment. But the days of monolithic NASA monopoly programs for humans in space are over.
Even some of the big space primes have turned into, sorry to say, basket-cases in some areas through employee turn-over. Ugh.
So perhaps it’s time to divest from the International Space Station.
“..Those who want to see us go into space are going to have to accept that the only route is one that provides a real return, that people are willing to pay for.”
…which perfectly begs the remainder of the quote, “If not us,who? If not now, why?”
Oops, I guess I’m real tired, since the 2nd sentence I quoted is what you used for the first part of the quote.
I favored continuing the shuttle program until a some form of replacement was ready, for political reasons; so the Russians would not have us over a barrel on ISS access.
I know it would have been expensive, but I think it would have been worth it, sort of, especially of we’d gone the EELV route sooner and could have had it earlier, perhaps requiring a shuttle extension of a year or so.
However, it is IMHO far too late; too much of the infrastructure has been wound down. For good or bad, that bridge is burned.
When you keep heading in a direction, eventually you get where you are going
Which includes circles apparently.
How dare ya; stating the obvious. Too bad it wasn’t obvious to those spending tax dollars. If the shuttle is such a good idea, sell it to a company that wants to operate it… [crickets chirping]
Which gets you to the next question… why continue the I.S.S.? Which could be a problem for SpaceX and others. In case of the I.S.S., most of the expense was getting it to where it is, but again, I don’t see any private company willing to take it over.
Which gets you back to the final question… why space?
I have an answer, but we as a nation need to answer it.
All good things must come to an end, and so it is for the Shuttle. I agree that the time to NOT cancel the program, or to extend it, was years ago. No one did then, so now is not the time to suddenly reverse six years of planning.
No matter what we do, we will be dependent on the Russians for crew access to the ISS through 2015. The Russians, who are very smart about negotiations, knew this years ago. And after all that, they raised the prices from $48M to $51M/seat. This price does not seem like gouging to me (24 crew x $51M = $1.224B), and in fact it’s cheaper than Ares I could do ($1B/flight w/max 6 crew). Post Shuttle, I’m fine with the Russians doing what we were too inept to do. However, we should be awarding a crew services contract to either ULA, SpaceX, or both, for services starting in 2016.
A couple of specific critiques of the what NASA Engineer Mike Snyder wrote:
“The fact is the space station was designed and always intended to be supported by the space shuttle in addition to unmanned cargo vehicles supplied by Russia, Europe and Japan. These cargo vehicles cannot completely replace the unique capabilities of the space shuttle and were always intended to act as a supplement.” The ISS doesn’t care what delivers it human’s and cargo – it’s inanimate. While the Shuttle has unique capabilities that do not exist anywhere else, it also has higher costs than any other delivery system. With the construction of the ISS complete, the question is whether we need a Mack truck to run errands to the store for supplies, or a sedan.
“There has been much discussion and debate about commercial providers’ taking over the role that the space shuttle was always intended to perform. This is a worthy goal that I support for many reasons, but these vehicles do not exist and are not operational today.” Is he talking about Ares I? Of all the non-shuttle crew launchers, only Ares I is a paper rocket (does not exist). Delta & Atlas are flying, and Falcon 9 is getting ready to start it’s test program.
If we contract with ULA or SpaceX for crew delivery services starting in 2016, their launchers (Delta, Atlas, Falcon 9) will have far more history pre-crew than any other manned launchers in history. Compare that with the plan for Ares I, which calls out for manned flights after only one complete test flight. The commercial providers, using the same rockets for cargo and crew, will have more opportunities to demonstrate and improve their launchers than any government run launcher. NASA is the hobbyist here, and the commercial companies are running businesses with a consistent schedule of launches.
Ron,
1. As I’ve said before here and on my blog, it was always the plan to rotate crews to the ISS with the Soyuz, and the Shuttle not only was never going to be used for that task but it doesn’t even make sense to suggest that it could be. http://quantumg.blogspot.com/2010/05/hitching-rides.html
2. The price increase you described is a little thing called inflation.. not to mention support for the increased flight rate requirements of the ISS now entering “full utilization” mode.
Frankly, if I was Energia, I’d be kicking RSA for not getting exclusive rights to take Expedition crews to the ISS, in writing, back when the original agreement was drawn up. As it is, the US looking around for alternatives to the Soyuz is just a protectionist knife in the back on a handshake deal.
NASA is the hobbyist here
Exactly for the reasons you stated. This is actually one of the more hopeful signs. Inertia should keep the I.S.S. operating for years past it’s planned termination. It’s the only government game in town (w/shuttle and Constellation both gone.)
Which gives private companies the time to grow past the need for NASA. As my brother-in-law always says, government programs have a beginning, a muddle, and no end…
So perhaps NASA will provide more destinations for private companies to service in the future. We are close to having economic viability for humans to orbit (orbital tourism.) Once we have economics beyond orbit (settlements) everywhere else in the solar system will become viable.
The ISS isn’t a destination. It’s a $100 billion moving buoy. Why don’t we just forego the continuing costs
Rand, the notion that we can’t continue to operate the Shuttle 100% false especially when coupled with a SDHLV to follow it in order to provide a new long term market for the lower tier suppliers to reengage. Last time I checked most business will sell to anyone who will buy.
It’s also false that the savings in shutting STS down will be any more than $1 Billion dollars given how much of ‘fixed’ cost will just transfer to other NASA activities. Does the budget line item Cross Agency Support ring a bell?
So in summary for the ‘real’ savings of a $1 Billion dollars per year we are willing to abandon the $100 Billion dollar ISS investment, or international commitments, decimate a $40 billion dollar industrial base, lose $10 billion dollars of progress that has been made on the PoR and scatter thirty years of operational experience to the wind. All in order to pay $3 Billion dollars under the COTS-CRS contract for the same amount of payload that 2 flights of the STS can deliver (gee I thought this was supposed to less expensive than Shuttle), with free crew rotation plus all the up and down mass/volume you need at no extra charge.
Still not convinced? how about that fact that ‘only’ Augustine Option 4B avoids sending over a billion dollar to same Russian organizations improving the ranging of the soon to Iran nuclear tipped rockets until they can hit the US and we avoid layoff 40,000 Americans. You know the same ITAR law we need waivers for year after year from Congress while we simultaneously crush harmless technology under tons of bureaucratic paper work and lawyers. Do as I say not as I do seems to the message out of Washington and you.
Mike Snyder is spot on, the new policy is FUBAR just like the PoR was FUBAR. The fact that the proposed policy carriers over the serious policy disconnects of the old doesn’t make it right. Option 4B is fast become the only policy option out of this mess. A mess that may have well been created after Mike Griffin took NASA off the rails and away from the clear headed recommendations of the Aldridge Commission but a mess that we can still avoid even in this late hour.
So in summary for the ‘real’ savings of a $1 Billion dollars per year we are willing to abandon the $100 Billion dollar ISS investment, or international commitments, decimate a $40 billion dollar industrial base, lose $10 billion dollars of progress that has been made on the PoR and scatter thirty years of operational experience to the wind.
We aren’t going to abandon the ISS. That was the previous plan.
And don’t confuse cost with value.
Rand: “We aren’t going to abandon the ISS. That was the previous plan.”
Wrong again Rand, you obviously haven’t read the GAO June and November 2009 reports concerning serious delays in COTS and the ISS supply shortfall. Without the ISS 90% of the COTS not so commercial business base goes away as well.
What good is extending the ISS by five years if we starve it to the point that we can’t actually use it for research? Face it, the proposed policy is just as FUBAR as the PoR, just in different way.
At least under the PoR we saved some money by turning the ISS into a fish tank, you would have us spend money hand over fist to turn the ISS in to a death defying stunt for two unlucky astronauts chosen to spend every hour of every day going in circles trying to keep it alive. For what purpose?
All because of the same bad idea shared by the new plan and the PoR of how to save a billion dollars per year by shutting down the Space Shuttle. What great choices the extremes have given us, either the ISS is turned into a fish tank or it becomes the most expensive stunt of all time. Take your pick.
I see that you too are in denial about the practicality of keeping the Shuttle alive. And you continue to confuse cost and value.
The ISS isn’t a destination …. Why don’t we just forgo the continuing costs?
This is the second instance, Presley, that I’ve noticed you like to redefine words. It certainly is a destination regardless of your feelings about it. They could stop funding it. Do you believe it will happen? Do you have any reason to believe it?
They could stop funding it. Do you believe it will happen? Do you have any reason to believe it?
I believe it’s quite likely that in the coming existential financial crisis, they will stop funding it.
Stephen Metschan said:
“sending over a billion dollar to same Russian organizations improving the ranging of the soon to Iran nuclear tipped rockets”. George Bush didn’t have a problem with this, which is my measure for right-wing conspiracy theories, so I won’t be worried about this either. Besides, Russia is not an Islamic state, and they are much closer to Iran’s missiles than we are, so they have more to worry about than we do.
“Option 4B is fast become the only policy option out of this mess.”. The ISS is set for cargo and crew delivery through 2015, so the Shuttle is not needed. With four different cargo systems delivering to the ISS, the risk for cargo is somewhat mitigated. For crew, I do agree that we need to start developing our own crew delivery system, but the Shuttle is the most expensive, and least safe option available. For $1.3B, ULA has said they can man-rate the Delta IV, which already has flight history. There is no reason we shouldn’t pursue Delta IV for crew, and then work on a second launcher for redundancy. These are also less expensive than the Shuttle, so we would also be good stewards of the U.S. Taxpayers money.
“All because of the same bad idea shared by the new plan and the PoR of how to save a billion dollars per year by shutting down the Space Shuttle.”. Let me see if I have this right. You want to dump the ISS, which is a permanently manned space station that provides us with a platform for doing research on what it will take to live and work in space. Instead, you want to go back to launching a couple of short trips into space a couple of times per year. And this is better how? With the ISS construction complete, it costs more to operate the Shuttle program than it does to resupply the ISS.
“GAO June and November 2009 reports concerning serious delays in COTS and the ISS supply shortfall.”. What major aerospace program has not had delays – are you surprised? So far the delays have not affected the ISS, and in the case of SpaceX, they have their production line churning our flight hardware, which will allow them to step through their test program as quickly as possible. Notice NASA is not paying for any schedule slips, so the COTS program is doing what it was intended to so far. Now we need to create a similar program for crew delivery.
Rand,
[[[We aren’t going to abandon the ISS. That was the previous plan.]]]
Folks seem to keep forgetting the first “I” in ISS is for International.
Unlike the Shuttle, decisions on the fate of the ISS are not left to NASA alone to make. All the partners would have had to agree to the decision to end the ISS and I suspect the U.S. would have had a difficult time selling the Russians on the idea.
So the most the U.S. would have been likely to do in 2015 would have been to withdraw from the ISS as provided in Article 28 of the 1998 ISS Agreement, which is available on the State Department’s website
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/107683.pdf
But withdrawn would not have released the U.S. from liability for the ISS as provided under Articles 16 and 17 unless the other partners agreed to release NASA from any liability from the ISS as part of the withdrawal agreement.
Similarly, the ISS may not be deorbited unless the ISS partners agree to it. Actually in theory all of the partners would need to agree as under the 1998 Agreement its possible if a single party objects they may argue they have the right to operate ISS by themselves after the others withdraw. Any bets Russia would have so decided?
Bottom line, the ISS would very likely have continued beyond 2015 regardless of what the President decided or what the previous plan called for. The only difference is NASA, or commercial U.S. firms, would no longer have access to it IF the U.S. has chosen to withdraw from the 1998 ISS Agreement.
So if the President has followed the “so call” plan to “abandon” the ISS in 2015 all he would have done is given away a facility it cost taxpayers $100 billion plus to build to the ISS partners. Somehow I don’t think Congress would have approved that decision.
So really the idea that President Obama “saved” the ISS from destruction in 2015 is a myth, all he did was save if from becoming a $100 billion dollar giveaway to Russia and the other ISS partners, IF he could have gotten the Senate to go along with his decision.
And the same applies in terms of the future of the ISS beyond 2020, unless of course a failure of a component requires it to be abandoned and deorbited.
I agree that it was unrealistic to think that ISS was really going to be deorbited in 2015, but it was the policy. In that, in fact, it was the same sort of scam, budgetarily as the “Medicare Doc Fix,” to pretend that ObamaCare wasn’t going to increase the deficit. Nonetheless, at least the new policy is more honest about it, and forces the hard budget choices that Mike Griffin never wanted to acknowledge.
Costal Ron, you need to read the GAO reports. You clearly haven’t.
The ‘actual’ situation is even worse, BTW. One of the provisions of the 2010 Authorization Bill is to ‘force’ NASA to actually connect the dots with regards to this. The fact that this needs to be forced on Executive branch at all is very telling is it not? Seems they don’t have problem with abandoning our existing Human Space Flight capabilities, HLV industrial base, PoR progress, workforce, international commitments, or even the ability to actually use the ISS for research despite claims to contrary for all the above.
But if forced too choose between the fish tank (PoR) option 3 or the money pit in orbit (President’s Plan) option 5B I would choose the fish tank since as Rand correctly states (yes he is right from time to time) its important not confuse sunk cost with new money. The problem is he draws a false association with SDHLV in that the President’s plan as stated is to replace the $40 Billion dollar SDHLV industrial base and workforce experience with a ‘new’ $30 Billion dollar Kero/LOX HLV industrial base and workforce.
All in the name of chasing a theoretical operational cost savings that could never in million years save the money required to make the shift even if we assumed a zero percent cost of capital. The best path is to put the fear of god into ATK and get a reduction in the cost of existing 4-Segment SRB. If you are looking for a ways to technical save some serious SRB cost we don’t need the SRB thrust vector controls for the inline SDHLV any more and I think all the expense in making the SRB reusable needs to seriously looked at as well. These changes would likely cut the cost of the SRB in half. Maybe the plan all along in turn over the PoR apple cart, though I think this is just way to clever IMHO.
So in summary Rand’s sunk cost analogy is utterly false from basic business 101 principles regarding SDHLV where as it’s directly applicable when debating the merits of the ISS fish tank vs the ISS money pit polices we are being forced to choose between at present. It appears fundamental spacecraft design principles isn’t his only blind spot. Though even this blind spot is far surpassed by his blind spot regarding how the Progressive worldview succinctly explains the underpinning logic and motivation behind this new policy.
Under Griffin COTS was a way to take out ULA so it wouldn’t show up his precious Ares-1 plus placate the new space crowd. He didn’t give them serious money nor did he take them serious because he could have cared less about the ISS. Now under Bolden its now being used as a hammer/justification to destroy the progress that has been made under the PoR and America’s HSF program over the last fifty years. Same tool, but in different hands its being used to achieve two very different objectives.
Fortunately there ‘is’ a better option called 4B, hated by both extremes in this debate for very different reasons as well. On one side it illustrates just how broken the decision process is within NASA and at the policy review level has been over the last five years. On the other side it preserves and even enhances an exceptionalist view of America that gets in the way of “moving beyond the Constitution”. A key objective of all true Progressives and one unfortunately that has been happening to us one law and one supreme court ruling at a time for about hundred years now.
Back to Space policy, Option 4B extends the shuttle enabling expanded utilization of the ISS called for in the President’s plan, develops a modest SDHLV of 75mT, 10 m payload diameter with growth options to the ESAS Ares-V 150mT if needs be (not likely IMHO), delivers a beyond LEO Orion and enables the efficient s-curve growth of the President’s R&D plan to similar levels of funding he has proposed in FY15 time frame. All the above fit within the top line of the President’s budget with not one dime of reductions or change to other non-HSF related NASA activities in the President’s proposal.
http://www.directlauncher.com/documents/NASA-Compromise-Budget-Detailed.xls
The only big change from the Augustine costing was that we eliminated the EDS, not needed in Phase 1 under the DIRECT plan but ignored in their cost assessment, thereby lowering the cost to $8 Billion dollars for the Jupiter-130 vs the Jupiter-241 upgrade they did cost. Note Augustine also placed the price for a SDHLV at almost the same level as what the ‘entire’ Orbiter + STS stack cost from scratch corrected to today’s dollars. Plus we needed to carry the STS fixed cost base for fifteen years. Can some one say thumb in the scale.
The $8 Billion number though is the same one found by the Bolden 2009 HLV study. The same study he refuses to release to Congress, because it’s “pre-decisional”. Not to worry they have it they just want it officially from NASA so they can officially ask the obvious WTF type of questions during the hearings. Like say for example why, we would we walk away from the lowest cost $8 Billion HLV option you found, that we can start now while the SDHLV industrial base and workforce is still hot in order to pursue the $30 billion dollar Kero/LOX option five years from now?
The $8 Billion number is also consistent with the CBO study and Boeing’s recent cost proposal as well, all of which can be directly tied to reasonable extrapolation of what like components cost during the Space Shuttle development.
Stephen, I have read the GAO reports, and more importantly, I keep abreast of what Orbital and SpaceX are doing. I disagree with your characterization of the COTS program overall, so we’ll just have to agree to disagree.
Regarding any launcher that is larger than the current launchers (Atlas, Delta, Falcon 9), the question for a lot of us has always been what are you going to launch with it? Let’s use “business 101” principles here – supply and demand. What is the business demand for a larger launcher?
Using 5m diameter and 50,000 lbs as the constraints, we built a 875k lb space station. We have not maxed out our abilities with this type of construction yet. Lockheed Martin has proposed the ACES family of vehicles, which uses current and near-term technology to do everything that Constellation wanted to do, and does it with Delta IV and Atlas.
Maybe someday we’ll need a larger launcher, but until I see a defined product or program that can’t be done with an HLLV, then it’s a waste of time.
Delta IV Heavy and Atlas V Heavy can get the price to LEO down to $6,000/lb, and Falcon 9 Heavy could lower that to less than $3,000/lb. Sure you lose some efficiency when you build in modular sections, but you make up for it with flexibility and lower overall cost.
When you build a bigger building, you don’t build bigger delivery trucks – you just make more deliveries. Same concept.
Coastal Ron,
[[[What is the business demand for a larger launcher?]]]
There is no business demand until a business case is made for SBSP.
The government operational requirement for a HLV would be to support a lunarbase or Mars mission. And the cost trade-off would be between using lots of small payloads with all the infrastructure costs needed for orbital refueling versus the cost of simply delivering payloads direct to the Moon, or quicker assembly for a Mars mission. And at the moment I don’t know anyone who has published any studies with reliable numbers for either option. So the arguments pro and con are simply based on opinion of which would be less expensive.
And since Senator Feingold is trying to slip a law through the Senate banning NASA from spending any money on human lunar missions, the lunarbase option may be a moot point.
given away a facility it cost taxpayers $100 billion plus to build
I was worried. It’s a good thing our president doesn’t have some share the wealth philosophy or sumptin.
“I believe it’s quite likely that in the coming existential financial crisis, they will stop funding it”
The Soviet Union collapsed and MIR remained operational. Are you proposing what is to come will be worse than the collapes of the USSR?
I see some tight days ahead but nothing like the above.
I suspect the likely way out of the entitlemens mess is to simply raise the eligibility age of those not yet drawing on them. Playing with discresionary spending is background noise in comparison.
“And since Senator Feingold is trying to slip a law through the Senate banning NASA from spending any money on human lunar missions, the lunarbase option may be a moot point.”
The gig is up on that one and it has zero co-sponsors.
“All in the name of chasing a theoretical operational cost savings that could never in million years save the money required to make the shift even if we assumed a zero percent cost of capital. The best path is to put the fear of god into ATK and get a reduction in the cost of existing 4-Segment SRB. If you are looking for a ways to technical save some serious SRB cost we don’t need the SRB thrust vector controls for the inline SDHLV any more and I think all the expense in making the SRB reusable needs to seriously looked at as well. These changes would likely cut the cost of the SRB in half. ”
Considering that the ATK employees necessary to implement this idea are either laid off, retired, or dead (due to old age), I’m really curious how this is going to happen. Production lines for Ammonium Perchlorate are also being shut down even now, so getting all of that going again is not just going to be the same price, but actually more expensive than current cost estimates for SRB construction. This would be true even if it were for a purely commercial project.
The only way to get a significant cost reduction for SRB construction is to put together a massive contract guaranteeing a purchase of hundreds of SRBs and the ability for ATK to justify a massive recall of its workforce and a simply massive recruitment drive for engineers and skilled employees who can get the job done. All of that costs not just some money, but major amounts of money. I’m talking an investment that not even NASA can possibly afford.
Keep in mind that the plant at Promintory where the SRBs are manufactured was designed to produce about 6-8 SRBs each month. The facility certainly has the capacity to produce some serious amount of stuff if necessary.
A major redesign of the SRB, as outlined above, might offer some cost savings, but it would have to be designed as a part of a larger overall system. That might as well be a genuine full replacement of the Shuttle (aka a Shuttle II system). To meet man-rating standards that NASA currently requires for such a vehicle for just the SRB modifications would be billions of dollars just for the SRB redesign alone. Taking a “screw the rich” attitude that ATK will do this out of the generosity of their heart is not going to happen, fly with the ATK board of directors, nor should it.
The Soviet Union collapsed and MIR remained operational. Are you proposing what is to come will be worse than the collapes of the USSR?
It helped that their launchers were one of the few things they could actually sell on the world market. Ultimately, of course, the Mir was deorbited.
I see some tight days ahead but nothing like the above.
The thing that has me sweating is that so much US Federal debt is in short term instruments (compared to the debt of most other countries). This means that when things go bad, they could go really bad, really fast. I’m talking hyperinflation here.
Paul D. said “It helped that their launchers were one of the few things they could actually sell on the world market. Ultimately, of course, the Mir was deorbited.”
We already have two modern launchers (Atlas & Delta), and a third close behind. We’re set on launchers for the next 5 years, and we can expand or duplicate the ISS with what we have.
MIR was deorbited, but then they jumped into developing the ISS, so they kept up their space program even as they were trying to figure out what they were doing in their country. As long as we keep our programs to manageable sizes, then I think we’ll be able to do the same if our financial situation worsens.
“As long as we keep our programs to manageable sizes, then I think we’ll be able to do the same
ifwhen our financial situation worsens.”FTFY
Coastal Ron :” Using 5m diameter and 50,000 lbs as the constraints, we built a 875k lb space station.”
Yes in just under 20 years and for the low low price of $100 Billion dollars. Your point?
Compare ISS to Skylab which was ground integrated, tested and then placed into orbit in one launch using a ‘high volume’ HLV at a cost under a $5 billion dollars. There is geometric price increase for design and construction of spacecraft once you pass a critical packing density threshold using existing technology. We have had launch systems around the capacity of the ULA family now for about forty years. Many of the unmanned mission are starting to become a been there done that affairs just like ISS as well. Where we are truly breaking new ground, ie MSL and JWST we are see significant cost overruns that run many times the launch cost as we attempt to shoehorn more mission capability than the last mission into the same payload capabilities. Why more mission capability? Because without more capability why do the mission at all. If JWST had the same capability as Hubble what’s the point or if MSL could only duplicate the Mars Rovers what’s the point etc.
Now if all we needed to do was to put LOX tanks in orbit, clustering up a bunch of Atlas cores from time to time would make a lot of sense and in fact may be the best way to get about 75% of the mass we need in orbit up there provided we have orbital propellant depots.
The problem is that once you consider the importance that packing density and in-space vs ground integration for spacecraft plays with regards to cost you need a bigger core, once you have bigger core you need bigger engines, once you have bigger Kero/LOX booster you need a large second stage to finish the job. This all starts driving you towards the a modern day Saturn V and away from simple upgrades to the ULA line which is exactly what the Bolden HLV study found, hence the high price tag. Clustering up existing ULA cores doesn’t work for the Spacecraft and the spacecraft is what drives the cost not the launch system.
Out of the $240 Billion dollar Space Industry only $20 Billion is spent on launch services worldwide. The rest is related to Spacecraft or Missions. So even if the said launch system were free it wouldn’t shift the demand curve on the current Spacecraft/Mission cost paradigm. Yet as Skylab is to ISS this could help shift the balance if the limitations with regards to mass and volume were effectively eliminated. Hence why lower cost access to space can grow the industry, not because the launch cost gets less expensive but because the cost optimal spacecraft design shifts to heavier approaches that are significantly less expensive and yet more capable/robust.
Concerning COTS, and specifically SpaceX, what do you know about induced environments, specifically base heating?
Stephen Metschan May 20th, 2010 at 12:20 pm
No matter how big of a launcher we build, we will always be building modular structures in space. Are you arguing that 50,000 lbs is too small, but 75,000 lbs (or 100,000 lbs) is just right?
“The problem is that once you consider the importance that packing density and in-space vs ground integration for spacecraft plays with regards to cost you need a bigger core, once you have bigger core you need bigger engines, once you have bigger Kero/LOX booster you need a large second stage to finish the job.”. And yet, we built the 875,000 lb ISS within the 5m diameter, 50,000 lb constraint. Engineers are pretty clever. So far you haven’t proved that we can’t continue to build large stations in space using current technology.
The basic issue comes down to how much you customize the spacecraft or systems you need in space:
– On one end is fully custom, which means lots of R&D and testing, and you’ll only use them for their specific tasks. Weight is optimized, and fuel and supplies needed for a mission are the least possible. However, the R&D costs are high, as are the manufacturing and sustaining costs. With custom hardware, safety is more of a concern because you don’t have any prior history to rely upon.
– For reusable, or modular systems (like on the ISS), R&D and testing is fairly low after the initial design since you’re building many units, and you can modify existing hardware to make incremental changes. Weight is not optimized, so you have to make it up with more fuel (a commodity item). R&D costs are spread across more units, so they stay lower, as do manufacturing and sustaining costs. Because you are using the same hardware over and over, safety increases over time.
These principles are not dependent on a particular size of launch mass, so it could be applied to 50k or 150k lb payloads. However, we have the ability to launch lots 50k lb payloads now, and we have 5m diameter ISS modules and systems already designed, manufactured, tested and in use. We have all of this now, so what are we waiting for??
Bottom line, whatever money it takes to design and build your first HLLV, with the same time and money, and current launchers and technology, I could have us in orbit around the Moon and ready to land.
“Concerning COTS, and specifically SpaceX, what do you know about induced environments, specifically base heating?”. It doesn’t matter what you and I THINK, we’ll find out about any issues during the Falcon 9 test program. I know Direct had issues with base heating, so I’m sure you’re anxious to see if someone has the solution for you… 😉
Then please accept my apologies. The ISS is a destination. So is every other point in space-time.
They were. Arguably they still are. Just later rather than sooner. They’ve wound down the Shuttle, haven’t they?
“No matter how big of a launcher we build, we will always be building modular structures in space. Are you arguing that 50,000 lbs is too small, but 75,000 lbs (or 100,000 lbs) is just right?”
It should be notable that even the airline industry is facing this problem, where Airbus opted for the much larger A380 for development and Boeing instead went for a relatively smaller 787 model on the assumption that there really wasn’t a market for something significantly larger than their 747. There is an expanded variant of the 747, but it wasn’t significant resources for R&D of a monster jetliner.
For spaceflight, the question is in regards to the market demand for such a spacecraft. Ideally, if the goal is to drive down the cost of access to space, what is desired is a rough compromise between what is gained in terms of economies of scale when a vehicle is mass-produced and maximizing efficiency in terms of pounds delivered to orbit. Larger vehicles generally do the job much more efficiently, but how many customers need a really huge vehicle?
It is noteworthy, though, that SpaceX has upgraded both main vehicles in its inventory to larger sizes. The Falcon 1 is now the Falcon 1e with larger payload capacity, and the Falcon 5 has been upgraded almost right at the beginning to a Falcon 9 in part due to customer demand.
If the demand is there, the vehicles will be built. Until then, the launchers that are currently in the marketplace certainly are large enough to do proof of concept launches for something like a Bigelow hotel in space or potentially an ISS replacement. It may take some creativity, but it can be done.
Presley Cannady,
As I noted in detail above the ONLY thing NASA may do unilaterally in regards to the ISS is withdraw from funding its share under Article 28 of the 1998 ISS Agreement. But the actual fate of the ISS is up to the other partners in the agreement, NOT NASA, the President or Congress.
As for funds to operate it if the U.S. withdraws, keep in mind it is likely a large part of NASA ISS funding is for NASA overhead, as is the case with Shuttle. Plus the 1998 ISS Agreement allows other partners to be added to the ISS. Any bets a deep pocket country like China or India would like to take the place of the U.S. in funding it. 🙂
Robert Horning Says: May 21st, 2010 at 3:51 am
You bring up good examples. At the beginning of the commercial airline industry, it was the airlines that drove the size of the airplanes. United, American, and Pan Am saw their projected markets, and pushed the aircraft industry to build more capable planes. Supply and demand. Rarely would a manufacturer build something that didn’t have customer orders.
Using another transportation analogy, Delta/Atlas/Falcon are like medium duty trucks. You can use them for just about anything, and they don’t cost a lot. For bigger projects, you may have to make more trips, but you can still get the job done.
We already have a supply system in place for 5m wide cargo that is 50,000 lbs or less. We have ISS modules designed, tested, and in use, and we can build more of the same (Node 2/3, Quest airlocks, etc.). The R&D is done, the systems are tested, and the tooling exists. No waiting.
Ares V & HLLV’s are more like heavy duty trucks. They are great when you have lots of stuff to deliver, and they are the most economical when you keep them running continuously.
The problem though, is that we don’t have any projected “big projects” that will need HLLV’s. Constellation is a short-term program, and then we don’t have any projected needs after that. There are no 10m diameter payloads designed yet, and though you could lift smaller diameter payloads, the mass would have to be much larger then 50,000 lbs to justify using Ares V over Atlas or Falcon 9.
To fully utilize Ares V or an HLLV, we would have to build a new family of payloads that justify the launcher. Constellation has no reusable elements, and when the Constellation program ended, so would the need for Ares V. Who is going to pay for all the big payloads? The U.S. Government? Not likely, and until we get a robust commercial space industry going, private enterprise doesn’t have a profit incentive to do it yet either.
We have the ability today to start building spacecraft and exploration vehicles that fit on existing launchers, and we can get into space and start doing stuff quicker by NOT building an HLLV, and using that money to start launching stuff.
So is every other point in space-time.
You really have to be super intelligent to be this obtuse.
What makes I.S.S important as a destination with regard to this discussion is someone will pay someone else to transport supplies and people their for a profit. While some points in space/time may share this quality, most do not and for the purposes of this discussion are not destinations.
The Falcon 1 is now the Falcon 1e with larger payload capacity, and the Falcon 5 has been upgraded almost right at the beginning to a Falcon 9
Picking nits… both F5 and F9 were planned. Your point is entirely correct; market demands lead to discontinuing the F5 in favor of F9. The F9 heavy would be a continuation of this trend.
Which is exactly how free markets are suppose to work and why much, but not all, of the discussion of heavy lift is pointless.
So essentially, someone pays someone else to transport supplies and people to this particular point in space and time because of some special quality. In fact, the quality of this very, very special point is that we’ve put a $100 billion buoy there.
So why not put a considerably less expensive buoy elsewhere have your someone pay someone else to supply and rotate crew there? Or better yet, pay that someone else to put up an even cheaper buoy? Maybe a buoy that has a snowball’s chance in hell seeing a return on the investment made by the taxpayer?
The most straightforward way to get an HLV is just to cluster 7 existing ELV cores. For any of Atlas, Delta IV or Falcon 9 selected you get a vehicle with lift capability equal to or greater than Saturn V. As others have noted, however, there are new difficulties that can arise, including base heating.
You also take on other disadvantages of purpose-built HLV’s vs. existing ELV’s, including their “heavy” variants. The main thing you’d give up is the radically reduced ground handling headcount and infrastructure required by the latter compared to the former. HLV’s are tall enough and heavy enough, even unfueled, to require fairly heroic engineering measures to assemble them and get them out to a pad. The Canaveral Vertical Assembly Building already exists, but is expensive to maintain. To handle Direct/Ares V-class vehicles, it’d need a major refit. Ditto those monster crawler-transporters that run stacked vehicles out to the pads. They’re not getting any younger, have had extended lack of availability downtime in the past and, as the saying goes, parts are hard to get. The company that built them merged out of existence decades ago and most of the engineers who designed them are dead or long-retired. I say park the beasts in the VAB and turn the whole shebang over to the National Park Service as a national monument.
I don’t know how ULA puts its Atlases and Deltas together and gets them to their pads, but SpaceX assembles and transports Falcon 9’s horizontally, then stands the suckers up by pivoting at the base – much like the Russians do with the Soyuz booster, but even more efficiently as the prime mover is diesel truck- rather than diesel railroad-based. You can reasonably do this with a vehicle that’s 100 feet tall, plus or minus, but it’d probably be more expensive to do this with 300+ foot monsters like Direct/Ares V than even the current vertical stacking/crawler-transporter approach. You’d be pretty much having to build half a drawbridge that could also move.
HLV’s are irremediably labor- and facilities-intensive. Existing and soon-to-be-operational ELV’s, not so much. Relatively speaking, it’s the difference in headcount and equipment between a low-budget indie film production and a Cecil B. DeMille-scale epic. If space lift is ever going to be sensibly priced it cannot continue to require a cast of thousands to accomplish.
why not put a considerably less expensive buoy elsewhere have your someone pay someone else to supply and rotate crew there?
You have a great idea. Let’s do it.
We weren’t discussing if I.S.S. was a good investment. It was about you redefining destination.