Rusty Schweikart steps up to the plate in support of the new policy. I don’t agree with all of it — I think he misses the point in some cases, but I like this:
Are we, in fact, on a dead end road? In answering this critical question you should not overvalue either my opinion or the opinions of my fellow astronauts, but rather focus on the considered and thoughtful, and even hard-nosed, analysis of the panel of experts who dealt explicitly with this, the Augustine Committee on our Human Spaceflight Program. Norm and his panel are very experienced and highly qualified academics, business leaders, astronauts, and space program executives. I have immense respect for them and their considered judgment. They performed a thorough, open and difficult review and analysis of where we are. Their conclusions were not reached lightly nor did they shy away from calling it as they saw it. I take their work and their conclusions very seriously and I believe you should as well.
Note that he’s not asking Senator Nelson (as others have) to take his word for it because he’s an astronaut — he’s citing someone who has actually studied the current problem (as opposed to a different problem that we had to solve half a century ago).
But I disagree with some of his arguments. First:
Technical arguments can and have been made to support this intermediate step, and they are not without justification and support. Nevertheless, in my opinion, the arguments for necessity are fundamentally weak, and in any event are overwhelmed by the widely held and devastating question “been there; done that… tell us why you’re doing that again?” Why, after 60 years, should we be devoting incredible resources and effort to going back to the Moon instead of to a challenging, pioneering new goal? As Norm Augustine stated in your 12 May hearing, the long term space program has to be supported on a continuing basis by the public, and the public simply will not maintain support to reliably sustain a monumental and expensive effort to do again what we did 60 years before. This is especially true of young people, who are hardly inspired by a goal of repeating their grandparent’s achievements.
The problem here is that he is confusing the goal of going to the moon, as established by the VSE, with the means (Constellation) chosen to achieve it. Yes, we don’t want to do Apollo again (and that was what Mike Griffin proposed, explicitly declaring it “Apollo on Steroids”). But that doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t, or don’t want to go back to the moon, if it can be done in an affordable, sustainable, and useful (which is a key attribute of sustainability) way. This problem will pop up again a little later in his letter. But he thinks that the problem is one of destination, and (surprise, surprise) he likes the asteroid mission.
As I’ve repeatedly said, destinations are beside the point, other than that they be beyond LEO. There is basic infrastructure needed to do so on a cost-effective basis, and once that’s in place, where we go is a relatively minor detail, which can be addressed by small additions to the infrastructure (a lunar lander for the moon, a long-duration ship with radiation protection for deep-space missions). But until we get that basic infrastructure in place, which won’t occur for years, even if we start now, arguing about the specifics of what we’re going to do with it is a dissipation of valuable political energy that would be better served to make sure that we get it, so we later have something to argue about (or more likely and preferably, options to do whatever we want).
He follow up with another confusion between VSE and Constellation, in “explaining” the Gap:
The sad state of our current space program, and the gap in particular, is a given. An unfortunate, but unavoidable given. We are here because of the complete mismatch between the program announced by President George W Bush in early 2004 and the inadequate funding which was subsequently sought and allocated since that time. As Norm Augustine testified before your committee on May 12, in the 4 years between the announcement of those ambitious goals and the time when his Committee conducted its comprehensive review of human space flight, the Ares launch vehicle development slipped between 3 and 5 years. This slip, combined with the planned termination of Space Shuttle operations in 2010 created and ultimately extended the “gap” in our nation’s ability to launch astronauts into orbit to 7 years or more. This gap, during which time we will be dependent on the Russians to launch our American astronauts to the ISS, was created during the prior space program. It is a given and it cannot be eliminated.
Emphasis mine.
Note that he (like many Constellation defenders) claims that there was a “mismatch” between Bush’s program and the funding. But this simply is not true. The mismatch was between the funding planned for the VSE and the program that Mike Griffin later chose to implement it. George Bush never said anything about developing an Ares I and Ares V, and it was the decision to go that route that cratered the budget, and created the sinkhole into which funding for all other aspects of the VSE disappeared. It continues to be frustrating that people commenting on this, who should know better, continue to misstate history, as I pointed out this weekend.
Rand, I have to disagree that the next LEO destination doesn’t matter. The level of difficulty between a NEO and the Martian surface is huge. It makes a lot of sense to go the easiest targets first, so you don’t have a big peak in development cost early on.
A manned Lunar lander, for example, is not a trivial program.
I think you could make a very good case that we should return to the Moon before we go to Phobos. As a current public policy matter, the question is moot. The final decision on that will be made by a different administration and a different Congress far in the future.
The level of difficulty between a NEO and the Martian surface is huge. It makes a lot of sense to go the easiest targets first, so you don’t have a big peak in development cost early on.
I think you’re missing my point. They don’t matter right now. Or rather, as long as we don’t choose one, and particularly as long as we don’t choose a stretch goal, like Mars surface (I disagree that a manned lunar lander is that big a deal), it doesn’t matter. Obviously it matters if we make a choice, and particularly a bad one, right now. That was the problem with the VSE, which said moon by 2020, and so Mike decided that he had to do AOS with no tech development to achieve the goal (as it turns out, it wasn’t enough, with the budget that he had to work with, and knew he had to work with before he made that disastrous decision). What we need right now is the basic goal that we’re going beyond LEO. The problem is that many don’t want to accept that unless they’re also told they’re going to be on Planet X in Year Y. What’s nice to me about the president’s notion of an asteroid mission is that it’s sufficiently vague, and not that difficult, that it doesn’t drive anything in the near term other than deep-space technology development. What was bad was the way in which he shallowly dissed the moon (as sadly, does Rusty).
As a current public policy matter, the question is moot. The final decision on that will be made by a different administration and a different Congress far in the future.
Exactly. That’s my point.
Space history is written by the whiners.
The mismatch was between the funding planned for the VSE and the program that Mike Griffin later chose to implement it. George Bush never said anything about developing an Ares I and Ares V…
This is disengenuous. Someone in the White House or OMB could have provided more oversight if space development was a higher priority for the Bush administration. That a hands-off approach is standard does not absolve George Bush and the White House of responsibility for poor execution.
Someone in the White House or OMB could have provided more oversight if space development was a higher priority for the Bush administration. That a hands-off approach is standard does not absolve George Bush and the White House of responsibility for poor execution.
I didn’t say it did, Sam. I was just distinguishing between the VSE and Constellation, to clarify for those who don’t understand the difference.
I think that the Bush White House is totally to blame for the current mess. Anyone who thinks that I am absolving George Bush from it hasn’t been reading what I’m writing. I’m just trying to clarify the record. Despite Griffin’s mismanagement, the buck stops in the Oval Office.
Will McLeansaid”
“Rand, I have to disagree that the next LEO destination doesn’t matter. The level of difficulty between a NEO and the Martian surface is huge.”
I think a look at the possible architecture you can get with some technological development under the new plan shows that this is not so.
Develop fuel depots and all the bits and pieces for deep space exploration – which you do in LEO – and you can go just about anywhere between here and Mars in steps of 4kps delta-v or less just by pre-positioning fuel depots.
The way to do it is to develop a true deep space vessel. It may be little more than a transhab style module pushed along by a Aces upper stage. The important point is that something like this can be developed relatively cheaply as the other great, and under appreciated. advantage of fuel depots is that it buys you margin.
Margin means a more robust, reusable vehicle.
Margin means lower cost as you are not pushing the boundaries of the technology
The only big step in this architecture is earth to LEO (around 10kps). which is to be done by commercial anyway.
The result is, do the development now proposed by NASA and you have reusable vehicles and depots that will allow the exploration of anything and everything between here and Mars.
Anything.
And everything.
That is why it is called the Flexible path
The way to do it is to develop a true deep space vessel.
Exactly.
It may be little more than a transhab style module pushed along by a Aces upper stage.
Or even less than that.
There is basic infrastructure needed to do so on a cost-effective basis,
Reusable landers and RLVs (or cheap expendables) if you want to do it commercially, just reusable landers if it is government funded. And government funded freely competing commercial propellant launches before we have RLVs are the best way to get those RLVs soon. Waiting for suborbital craft to evolve into orbital ones is another possibility, but will take a lot longer.
But until we get that basic infrastructure in place, which won’t occur for years
Which is exactly why we shouldn’t wait for that infrastructure, but do what is needed to bring it about. At the very least that includes R&D. The next step would be to start doing exploration supported by commercial propellant launches. We have all the technology and infrastructure we need for that and we’ve have had it for a long time. What we need is spacecraft.
RLVs are too important to have to wait for cryogenic depots – and vice versa. YAGNI, at least not yet.
This was presented at NASA Exploration Enterprise Workshop. It’s how NASA plans to get to their new technologies.
This is the link
http://www.hobbyspace.com/nucleus/index.php?itemid=20493&catid=6#c
“2011: human robotics interfaces (ISS) (ETDD)
2011-2016: 3 SpaceX demos and initial 12 operational cargo flights (ISS) (C3PO)
2012: ALHAT (autonomous landing and hazard avoidance) (ETDD)
2012: biomed tech demo (ISS) (HRP)
2012-2016: 1 Orbital demo and initial 8 operational cargo flights (ISS) (C3PO)
2013: radiation risk model (HRP)
2014: advanced in-space propulsion mission (FTD)
2014: closed-loop ECLSS (ETDD)
2014: high-energy systems (ETDD)
2014: NEO robotic precursor (RP)
2014: performance health tech demo (ISS) (HRP)
2014: commercial crew demo flights (ISS) (C3PO)
2015: Lunar lander robotic precursor (RP)
2015: advanced in-space propulsion (ISS) (ETDD)
2015: advanced in-space propellant transfer and storage (FTD)
2015: LOX/methane or LOX/H2 in-space engine demo (HLPT)
2015: another biomed tech demo (ISS) (HRP)
2015-2020: commercial crew missions (ISS) (C3PO)
2015-2020: Orion Emergency Rescue Module missions (ISS) (Orion)
2016: lightweight/inflatable modules and closed loop life support (ISS) (FTD)
2016: ISRU (ETDD)
2016: Mars robotic precursor (RP)
2016: LOX/RP prototype engine (HLPT)
2016: further radiation risk model (HRP)
2017: aero-assist/entry, descent, and landing (FTD)
2017: performance health suite demo (ISS) (HRP)
2018: EVA demo (ISS, maybe for suitport/suitlock tech) (ETDD)
2018: another Mars robotic precursor (RP)
2018: Mars Medical Suite demo (ISS) (HRP)
2019: another NEO robotic precursor (RP)
2020: LOX/RP operational engine, thrust >= 1M lbs (HLPT)
2020: nuclear thermal propulsion (ETDD)”
The interesting stuff happens around 2015 just as commercial crew starts.
Of course you have to get a budget passed first.
Fred and Martijn are right about the centrality of a true deep space vessel to any practical future exploratory program beyond cislunar space, but the idea that an ACES/Transhab lashup can do the job is just nuts. Such a thing is marginal even for mooching about in cislunar space as its occupants are subject to becoming crispy critters any time Sol randomly belches.
Any space environment in which humans need to exist for long periods requires radiation shielding and something approximating Earth-surface gravity to prevent systemic bodily degradation. A true deep space vessel has to be able to provide these necessities when making runs regardless of the solar weather. It also needs to be able to continue supplying both necessities while on station at any given destination. In my view, this means two things: (1) magnetic crew shielding; (2) rotating toroidal habitation units.
To keep consumables mass to a reasonable maximum, really long-distance missions need an indefinitely sustainable pure or technology-augmented biosphere that consumes waste and produces food.
To keep reaction mass requirements as low as possible, the highest possible specific impulse engine technology is required. Right now that looks like VASIMR.
As most of the interesting destinations are away from Sol, rather than toward it, any practical deep space ship must be nuclear fission powered as the solar flux gets too tenuous too fast to be useful for baseload power requirements.
Missions Sol-ward would require enhanced heat rejection systems compared to ships headed to AU+ destinations.
All of these needed technologies can be developed straightforwardly in LEO and cislunar space provided that getting there can be made suitably routine and cheap.
Modular ships assembled in LEO from these technologies could make free space excursions to any target destination from Mars out to the Pluto-class minor planets in the Kuiper Belt. If landing on any sizable target object is desired, then one or more lander craft and suitable fuel mass could be added to the cargo manifest.
Seafaring didn’t get reasonably safe and predictable until the advent of metal hulls and steam propulsion. Being the slave of winds that might or might not blow at any given time eventually just wasn’t good enough. I see no point in screwing around with the equivalent of dinghies in space that can only venture out when the solar wind isn’t blowing. Let’s be honest about what the genuine minimum necessities are to do a proper job of deep space ship design and operation, then get on with getting from where we are now to where we need to be.
Most especially, let’s quit imagining we can do real exploration in deep space with anything that can be bundled into the payload fairing of even the largest “heavy lift” booster imaginable. Real spaceships are going to be big suckers and will have to be assembled, piecemeal, in LEO.
Dick, some great vision there thanks.
Such a thing is marginal even for mooching about in cislunar space as its occupants are subject to becoming crispy critters any time Sol randomly belches.
I don’t think that is true. A storm shelter should provide adequate protection against SPEs. Prolonged exposure to GCR and microgravity may be much bigger problems. That is one reason why I think skipping the moon is a bad idea.
Real spaceships are going to be big suckers and will have to be assembled, piecemeal, in LEO.
The trouble with that is that it would require enormous up front expenses. Not the best place to start and very difficult to get funded. I’d love to get there eventually, but I don’t think it’s going to happen unless we develop cheap lift first. If we start with cis-lunar orbital operations, we can use that as a lever to develop cheap lift. The less infrastructure we have to build to get there, the better. And I don’t think we need anything we don’t have already, apart from reusable spacecraft.
Once we have fully commercial, profitable operations in LEO, everything else will follow. Until we have that, progress will depend on politicians. The past thirty years show us the likely result of that.
Quoting from Heppenheimer’s “The Space Shuttle Decision” (google for an online copy):
In May 1969, Clauser proposed that the coming decade “will see the cost of space transportation reduced to the point that the average citizen can afford a trip to the Moon.” He emphasized that “when I speak of low-cost space transportation, I define low to be so low that the citizenry can afford to buy tickets for space.” To achieve such a goal, he put his trust in single-stage launch vehicles burning hydrogen for high performance, and capable of routine flight to orbit. With such craft, NASA might undertake as many as 40,000 missions “before flight costs would begin to absorb a major share of its minimal budget.”
The Shuttle was started with the best of intentions, but it has turned into the biggest obstacle to the goals it set out to achieve. Its originators would have been appalled. Until we can find a way to get past continued dependence on politicians very little progress seems likely.
Until we can find a way to get past continued dependence on politicians very little progress seems likely.
If we’re going to depend on NASA as the organization to move out into the solar system efficiently and effectively, we have to remember that progress will always sway with the political wind. Rand says that destination doesn’t matter, but politically, when it comes to manned space via NASA, destination has always mattered and that will only change if the nature of politics changes. Since the Challenger disaster, there’s been the constant drumbeat that the only way for NASA to improve (it’s effectiveness in executing its mission) is to change its internal culture — culture, culture, culture — it’s always NASA’s culture that’s the problem. But that’s only part of the problem. The other part is pure, terrestrial politics and I’m not seeing how ObamaSpace does a single thing to address that part of the problem.
The other part is pure, terrestrial politics and I’m not seeing how ObamaSpace does a single thing to address that part of the problem.
Well, for one it would get NASA out of at least the crew launch business. It also delays an HLV, perhaps by long enough that we’ll be able to kill it. And maybe it will trap NASA in LEO for long enough that someone like Bigelow beats them to L1/L2 or even the moon. Not my preferred scenario, I’d rather see NASA go beyond LEO as soon as possible, and create a market for RLVs or other affordable lift in the process. But those are three things that “ObamaSpace” would do.
Well, for one it would get NASA out of at least the crew launch business.
Really? You really think, even if Obama were re-elected, NASA and it’s firmly entrenched political patrons are going to give up their crown jewel?
And maybe it will trap NASA in LEO for long enough that someone like Bigelow beats them to L1/L2 or even the moon.
IMO, and I know this is so 2004, what Bigelow/Armadillo/SpaceX/etc does should have very little, if any, relation to what NASA does.
But those are three things that “ObamaSpace” would do.
No need for scare quotes. It’s his policy, his idea, he needs to own it.
Rand says that destination doesn’t matter, but politically, when it comes to manned space via NASA, destination has always mattered and that will only change if the nature of politics changes.
Huh?
Between 1967 and 2004, we had no destination. Shuttle was a flawed attempt at infrastructure building, and it was politically sustainable for almost four decades. So I would suggest that we return to that, but do it smarter.
What are we missing?
Ultimately ships will need nuclear power and the fact that you are operating in a radiation rich environment should silence (or the equivalent) anti-nuke wackos. But it’s not even close to being a first step.
Cost to orbit is not the issue [pause for gasps.] Why? Two reasons. The current costs already allow profitable launches and increased flight rates will bring those costs down. So it’s not the issue to focus on. It’s taken care of naturally if we deal with other issues in the best order. The best order is that which creates a robust economy in space; driving up the rate of activity.
First we need more orbital destinations. Bigelow hotels seem to be the closest thing to doing that. Though it’s not something to focus on (unless you have rich touristy relatives and want to put a bug in their ear) because Bigelow is already on it. It’s not too early to encourage other competition with Bigelow. Actually, Bigelow has things in orbit and competitors need time to catch up. So now is the perfect time to encourage them. $100m for a BA330 seems just a tad overpriced.
Second we need safe and routine fuel transfer. Everybody with a hand in the game should be working on this now. It should be standardized so everyone using the same fuel is capable of transfer with each other. Everybody.
Then we need more players in the game than a nuke powered ship will give us. Solar power and fuel cells aren’t ideal, but it will get us to the moon and mars. Magnetic shielding works for the earth and would be preferred in space, but until nuclear powered (and we should not wait if we want the fastest economic development) a storm shelter will do the trick. Of course we’ll rotate the ships enroute to any destination beyond the moon.
I could be wrong. It will take a few billion to put a real spaceship in orbit. At that level of expense, perhaps private nukes are possible. My point is we don’t let it hold us up if it is an impediment. Look how SpaceX at this very moment is being held up for months because of flight termination requirements. How hard is it to terminate a flight? Don’t rockets want to do that to themselves too well already?
So what we are missing is to deal with the red tape, perhaps? I hope Elon is working on another private island for his F9/heavy.
Ken,
[[[So what we are missing is to deal with the red tape, perhaps? I hope Elon is working on another private island for his F9/heavy.]]]
Unless its a U.S. island he will just be trading ITAR red tape for USAF procedures.
In terms of islands I have always been surprised no one has looked at Guam. Its has infrastructure, belongs to the U.S. (no ITAR) and would allow polar as well as easterly flights if you select the right location. And likely incentives for the economic development a spaceport would bring.
The best order is that which creates a robust economy in space; driving up the rate of activity.
Sure, market pull vs technology push, even if initially only governments are the buyers. Market pull will probably work best for launch vehicles, technology push will be good for cryogenic propellant transfer and storage, ISRU, aerobraking etc. Even there market pull could be enough, say by buying propellant in LEO and at L1/L2 combined with transport services between those locations. I’d advocate a combined approach.
To get that market pull doing it is hard to find a better way than exploration based on propellant transfer. It is hard to beat, if you can pull it off. There are alternatives of course, there is rarely One True Solution. Solar power satellites are another possibility, though they have fewer enthusiasts than exploration.
Second we need safe and routine fuel transfer.
We aleady have safe and routine fuel (and oxidiser) transfer. We do want more of it, especially with cryogenic propellants. LOX alone would give an enormous improvement and LH2 even more so. But RLVs or cheap expendables offer far greater benefits. We can get affordable exploration and cheap lift without depending on cryogenic propellants and do it more quickly, more cheaply and with less risk.
Microcosm reckons even cheap expendables can get launch costs down by an order of magnitude or more. RLVs may even be able to reduce costs by two orders of magnitude. Different chemical propellants have a much smaller effect and only affect traffic beyond LEO, which is of little help to LEO tourism, which looks like the first market that could tap purely private revenue streams.
Cheap lift shouldn’t have to wait for cryogenic propellant transfer any more than it needs to wait for aerobraking, ISRU, surface nuclear power, HLV or NTR. Similarly cryogenic propellant transfer shouldn’t have to wait for anything else either.
Between 1967 and 2004, we had no destination.
The Shuttle’s destination, the way in which it was sold to US politicians not to mention the voting public, was a space station. It was 30 years of, “We’ll get to that part, we promise, we just have to figure out this shuttle stuff first”. After Freedom petered out, no one really believed that anymore, but they continued with the fiction. The reality was that there was no destination but you can’t deny that they didn’t continue to assure us that they would build one — eventually.
All manned programs, and most unmanned programs, have had the promise of a destination. Technology and infrastructure within manned space have been subsets of programs with destinations. Politicians can’t go back to their constituents to justify expenditures on manned space by saying that, for example, they’re paying to develop a new LOX/LOH engine with X% increase in ISP without demonstrating that they’re going somewhere. If they don’t, then it just looks like they’re paying for toys for white collar welfare workers.
It’s all very nice to blue sky about orbiting refueling depots and asteroids, but the reality is that there is an existing destination for ObamaSpace, ISS, and without it, Obama wouldn’t have been able to sell his program.
Unless its a U.S. island he will just be trading ITAR red tape for USAF procedures.
Did I say what flavor of red tape? I mean we need to work now to deal with all of it realizing what an artificial impediment most of it is.
Regarding termination. Weren’t those rules developed when rockets had more of a tendency to choose their own trajectory? Is that still a problem these days?