Next time a senator lectures him about Newsweak’s “invention of the year” (that doesn’t exist yet) and how Ares I-X proved that Ares I will be safe and work great, he should point out that it damaged the part of the rocket that was supposed to be reusable due to a parachute failure, that we still don’t know if we can do parachutes of this size that operate reliably, that it caused severe damage to the launch pad from scorching, and that it contained no elements of an actual Ares I.
[Update a few minutes later]
A depressing thought from Clark Lindsey:
NASA should at least have some sort of fact sheet that lays out the basics and is presented and discussed with the committee members and/or staff beforehand, especially those like Mikulski who are still open to new input. The written testimony from Bolden is clearly not doing the trick.
Of course, a fact sheet can never be long enough to inform a Senator on an appropriations committee, of all places, who doesn’t know the difference between marginal cost and recurring cost.
It’s sobering to realize that the state of confusion and superficiality displayed so vividly in these hearings on NASA, which involves funding in the mere nineteen billion dollar range, must certainly occur with most every item in the budget, including those that involve “real money”.
I think we saw this on full display with both the failed “stimulus” and health care, in which we had to “pass the bill to find out what was in it.”
If I was faster on my feet during such a hearing than I currently am, I’d ask why Time is viewed by the Senator as a better source for engineering analysis than the Augustine panel?
I am reminded when Time published a hit piece on Percheron thirty years ago saying it could hit the Houston Astrodome from our pad at Matagorda Island, when the vehicle had only enough propellant for about three miles of range.
It’s a multi-layered irony that the exact sort of NASA Admin who would lecture a Senator on engineering points is Michael Griffin.
Only the second and fourth of those points has any validity. I’m a bit surprised you didn’t pile on with the stage separation dynamics while you were at it.
The parachute failure was not intrinsic to Ares I (since Ares I-X used a four-segment SRB, it used basically the same parachute system as the shuttle).
The point about a parachute to decelerate a five-segment SRB is valid.
The pad structures were not hardened for the Ares I-X launch because they were planned to be razed anyway, damage was expected, and observations of the damage would help determine how much hardening the Ares I-X ML would need.
The point about the lack of commonality between Ares I-X and Ares I is valid. Ares I-X was simply not a good use of $400 million given how little of the test results were applicable to Ares I.
Ares I-X was simply not a good use of $400 million given how little of the test results were applicable to Ares I.
One justification given for the test was that it was intended to validate models, not to test a design. Even if we accept that, there is of course no way this test can be used to show that Ares was on track.
The parachute failure was not intrinsic to Ares I (since Ares I-X used a four-segment SRB, it used basically the same parachute system as the shuttle).
Nothing about the test was intrinsic to Ares I, other than the outer mold line. Nonetheless, the solid casing was supposed to be recovered, and the chutes failed.
I wouldn’t put the pad damage on Ares I-X. The pads are in need of some serious TLC. The last couple of years, the pads have seen more damage than past history shows from SSP launches. Otherwise, good points.
Alex, your comment leaves me unable to stop laughing. It is so sad, and so true.
Of course if the Senator’s staff was really up to date he could have countered Administrator’s Bolden’s parachute claims by referring to this successful test last week at Yuma Proving grounds as part of the development program for the actual Ares I parachute.
http://www.physorg.com/news190646531.html
[[[Under a brilliant early morning Arizona sky, NASA conducted a successful, record-breaking test of a drogue parachute being designed to return next-generation space vehicles safely to Earth.]]]
You know I have a sneaking feeling that the end result of all this debate will just be a continuing resolution instead of a budget pushing the debate on ending the Ares I into next year, followed by a new Anti-Obmana Congress keeping it alive until the Next administration when it will be the POR of record again (i.e President Obama wanted to kill it so it must be a good program…)
Once again I really, really hope Falcon 9 is a spectacular success on its first launch. Otherwise the Senators in support of Ares I will have all the ammunition they need to keep it alive until then.
That was your fourth point, with which I concurred. But that point, and the parachute point, cannot both be valid simultaneously. The parachute failure on Ares I-X was not applicable to Ares I. Bringing it up is a cheap shot, and you know it. You just added it to pad out the list.
The fourth point, that the systems on Ares I-X are largely dissimilar from those of Ares I and that $400 million was too much to spend just for model validation, is the main one, and in fact the only one that need be listed. Quality, not quantity, Rand.
Clark Lindsey also made a very good point at the end of the piece that the growing opposition to any HSP will eventually win if programs like Constellation continue to get funded. Future government funding is conditional on a low cost and effective HSP. The HSP may not survive another Constellation debacle.
So if Constellation or its progenitors live, the HSP may die – a very sobering point.
Ares I-X was just a milestone. The insane cost of Constellation and Ares I is due to two things: overwhelming paranoia with safety, and the absurd focus on simulation and modeling as synonymous with safety. Be sure, whatever crew vehicles are chosen by NASA to fly astronauts will also be given the intensive S&M treatment.
And yes, I do hope that term catches on 🙂
Flex Path is a horrendous attempt at implementing a commercialized national manned space program. It totally ignores the political environment and lacks any form of cohesive defined planning structure. Flex Path exemplifies an all or nothing amateur approach. A vague plan that leaves the US manned space program in total disarray and KOAS while the bickering and infighting goes on and on and on…. Amazing how Flex seeks to destroy the very hand that feeds it?????