The lack of resiliency of NASA’s transportation plans is a point that I’ve made often. For instance, in The Path Not Taken, five years ago, I wrote:
The chief problem with the Bush vision for NASA is not its technical approach, but its programmatic approach—or, at an even deeper level, its fundamental philosophy. This is not simply a Bush problem, but a NASA problem: When government takes an approach, it is an approach, not a variety of approaches. Proposals are invited, the potential contractors study and compete, the government evaluates, but ultimately, a single solution is chosen with a contractor to build it. There has been some talk of a “fly-off” for the Crew Exploration Vehicle, in which two competing designs will actually fly to determine which is the best. But in the end, there will still be only one. Likewise, if we decide to build a powerful new rocket, there will almost certainly be only one, since it will be enough of a challenge to get the funds for that one, let alone two.
Biologists teach us that monocultures are fragile. They are subject to catastrophic failure (think of the Irish potato famine). This is just as true with technological monocultures, and we’ve seen it twice now in the last two decades: after each shuttle accident, the U.S. manned spaceflight program was stalled for years. Without Russian assistance, we cannot presently reach our (one and only) space station, because our (one and only) way of getting to it has been shut down since the Columbia accident.
The lesson—not to put your eggs in one basket—hasn’t been learned. The Air Force is now talking about eliminating one of the two major rocket systems (either Boeing’s Delta or Lockheed Martin’s Atlas), because there’s not enough business to maintain both. The president’s new vision for space proposes a “Crew Exploration Vehicle” and a new heavy-lift vehicle. The same flawed thinking went into many discussions in the last decade about what the “shuttle replacement” should be.
And it’s not a new idea. As Ron Menich points out in today’s issue of The Space Review:
…the following wording appears as Groundrule A-1 in the Space Transportation Architecture Study (STAS) from the late 1980s:
“Viable architecture will be based on a mixed fleet concept for operational flexibility. As a minimum, two independent (different major subsystems) launch, upperstage and return to Earth (especially for manned missions) systems must be employed to provide assured access for the specific, high priority payloads designated in the mission model.”
The words “independent (different major subsystems)” can help us to see a value that international partners can provide in large space architectures. Soyuz was not grounded at the same time that the Shuttle fleet was after the Challenger and Columbia disasters, and a future failure of, say, a Progress resupply vehicle would likely have no effect on the HTV’s ability to supply the stations. The fact that different nations developed their own independent launch capabilities has had the happy side effect of increasing redundancy, even though the original motivations (such as political or national pride goals) for developing those separate systems were far removed from reliability considerations.
I worked on (and later managed) that study for Rockwell, which was kicked off (at least for Rockwell) on the day that Challenger was lost.
And about three months after the Challenger loss, there was a Titan-34D accident at Vandenberg (the second consecutive failure for that vehicle), which shut that program down as well, leaving the US with no heavy-lift capability for a period of time. So even dual redundancy isn’t always enough. So all through the eighties, on STAS, on Advanced Launch System, and other architecture studies, it was a groundrule that we have a mixed-fleet capability in any future plans.
But even though Ron’s article says nothing new, apparently the lesson remains unobvious and unknown to the people who planned Constellation. As they did with the requirements to be affordable and sustainable (and in fact having redundancy is one of the ways of making it sustainable), they completely ignored the need for redundancy in the design of the architecture, to the point that they didn’t even attempt to explain why their architecture didn’t have it. It’s in fact frustrating that this wasn’t an issue that even came up in Augustine deliberations. No one wants to talk about it, even though it’s the biggest Achilles Heel in space transportation, as evidence by the fact that once we shut down Shuttle, we’ll have no means of getting to ISS independent of the Russians (at least NASA won’t — SpaceX and ULA may be another matter). And the reason, I suspect, that no one wants to talk about it is that it is a fatal flaw in their plans, and one to which they have no sensible response. If people admitted that this is a requirement, it drives a stake through the heart of heavy lift, once and for all. At least, that is, until there is enough traffic to justify the cost of developing and operating not just one such vehicle, but two.
And of course, every day that they delay doing the sensible thing, and figuring out how to carry out their plans with the vehicles they have, is another day of delay in reaching that far-more-distant goal.
So true. It always bothers me how so much NASA infrastructure is a single point of failure that is rarely discussed. The VAB is another example that I commonly cite. There are at least two cases where the VAB can be destroyed, a solid hit by a Category 4 or 5 hurricane and lighting an SRB during Shuttle integration. These are accidents that can happen now. NASA has no backup.
This is part of the larger fallacy that government ought to do things at all, rather than just buy them. If NASA bought all their launch services from anyone who could deliver, redundant, affordable and sustainable lift would “just happen” without any planning by government at all. That’s the difference between supply and demand – demand can be “stupid” and still get what it needs.
It’s like me and computers. I like using them, but I just demand computers that work, and et voilà!, Intel provides. How they do it I have no idea, nor do I care all that much. I’m sure there are whole disciplines of economics that focus on this universal* truth.
There are very few circumstances where it’s smarter for government to just do stuff themselves. Military action is one of those, obviously, but in this context I would not object to NASA building one-off probes like Casini and the Mars landers in house. But anywhere a competitive market can provide a service government really ought to be obligated to use that service.
*And by “universal” I mean “Everywhere that isn’t Washington, D.C.”
It always bothers me how so much NASA infrastructure is a single point of failure that is rarely discussed.
Indeed. This is why “failure is not an option” is a culture, while the rest of the world notes, “failure is always an option”. NASA can’t suffer a failure, because it is unprepared for one.
It is a little strange that the Augustine commission made no direct stipulation of this, though I suspect stipulating redundancy pretty much leads to comparisons and competition. At which point it becomes very hard to argue that new launch vehicles should not be commercially developed. In such a scenario, NASA should not be in the launch business.
If NASA wishes to stay in the launch vehicle business (and many jobs depend on this), it has to find ways to comprehensively differentiating and justifying itself from commercial launch vehicles. Much higher safety standards is one possibility, a large heavy launch vehicle that no one else can commercially justify is another.
I suppose NASA really sees itself as “the X program agency”, so building “the Y launcher for the X program” makes sence. Also as practical (?) factors, if multiple craft are built to do something, none have the prestige as “THE X program launcher”, to focus the public awe on; and congress doesn’t want to spend money on multiple programs. The later is a issue hurting the military to – since rather then getting the funds for a couple types of craft each tuned for a mission, they can only get votes for a super do it all craft.
To be fare — with the capital costs dominating launch costs, a single super capable craft is likely always cheaper then multiple redundant or specialized craft.
To be fare — with the capital costs dominating launch costs, a single super capable craft is likely always cheaper then multiple redundant or specialized craft.
Not when you factor in stand-down time.
> Not when you factor in stand-down time.
Didn’t say there wasn’t a reliability issue – just a cost advantage.
Lets just say congress and NASA have not exactly been pushing for higher mission reliability
You think that there is no cost to unreliability?
> Rand Simberg Says:
> October 19th, 2009 at 1:09 pm
>
> You think that there is no cost to unreliability?
No, but I think congress and NASA think so. Course to them costs are in political capital – not $’s. If you have the votes it doesn’t mater if its a million $ or a Trillion $.
… I suppose in a way given NASA really has no schedule to keep – and failure is unthinkable from a PR standpoint – designing fall back possitions is high cost, since it suggests your not 100% confident in your insane relyability projections. After all, if Ares 1/5, Orion, Altairs areonly likely to lose a craft every few thousand flights – and were only planing a couple dozen….
Welcome to Oz economic and program management.
Nothing much will change until we open new markets. This is what a colony would do. Then NASA would become irrelevant.
NASA really has no schedule to keep – and failure is unthinkable from a PR standpoint – designing fall back possitions is high cost
No schedule to keep?
Once you have established an outpost (whether it’s ISS or a lunar base, you’d better have a regular resupply schedule.
What would happen to NASA’s lunar base if their launch system had to stand down for two years? Or their transfer stage, or their lunar module, or Orion capsule?
Best case: You have to abandon the entire base.
Worst case: You have no way to get the crew back home.
Either one would be very bad PR.
After all, if Ares 1/5, Orion, Altairs areonly likely to lose a craft every few thousand flights – and were only planing a couple dozen…
But NASA isn’t even claiming that.
The claim is they will only lose a *crew* that often. The way they get those figures is by selling, well, the rocket might only be 99% reliable, but we’ll have an escape system, and that will be 99% reliable — so, overall, we’re 99.99% safe.
The problem is, that assumes the safety of the crew is the only thing that matters and the mission itself is unimportant. That might be true, if you’re only doing sorties, but as soon as you start building a base, regular resupply missions become critical.
Not flying is safer yet, which almost seems to be the goal at the projected flight rates.
> ken anthony Says:
> October 19th, 2009 at 1:59 pm
> Nothing much will change until we open new markets. This is
> what a colony would do. Then NASA would become irrelevant.
But then you need a reason for the colony. IE a way for it to pay its way.
> Edward Wright Says:
> October 19th, 2009 at 2:36 pm
>> NASA really has no schedule to keep – and failure is
>> unthinkable from a PR standpoint – designing fall back
>> possitions is high cost
> No schedule to keep?
>
> Once you have established an outpost (whether it’s ISS
> or a lunar base, you’d better have a regular resupply schedule.
Oddly that doesn’t seem to be a concern.
Obviously for ISS NASA at best will be one of several flying stuff to the ISS – more likely NASA will cease to fly to the ISS in a year or so – for the forceable future.
Projections are about 10% of flights to the moon with Ares-1/5/Orion/Altair will fail (if depending one system for access is bad, depending on 4 systems all working in concert is worse) then the every 6 month flight to the moon will be scrubbed. I suppose though they could launch the next one earlier, and the concept is that the lunar base will always have evac and return to Earth capacity. So if the crew runs out of suplies they can return — if the Orion waiting in orbit works, adn the Altair parked by the base.
Stil, would abandoning the base be worse PR then admiting the launchers aren’t going to be as reliable as shuttle?
> Edward Wright Says:
>October 19th, 2009 at 2:42 pm
>> After all, if Ares 1/5, Orion, Altairs areonly likely to lose
>> a craft every few thousand flights – and were only planing
>> a couple dozen…
> But NASA isn’t even claiming that.
>
> The claim is they will only lose a *crew* that often. ==
Which is BS given they aren’t built as well or as tough as Shuttle or other craft — I heard the numbers came out as a loss of crew each 30 flights, and 10% of missions to the moon will have to be aborted due to launch failures.
>== The way they get those figures is by selling, well, the
> rocket might only be 99% reliable, but we’ll have an
> escape system, and that will be 99% reliable — so,
> overall, we’re 99.99% safe.
Which is laughable, but they could well try to sell that.
> The problem is, that assumes the safety of the crew is the
> only thing that matters and the mission itself is unimportant. ==
>==as soon as you start building a base, regular resupply
> missions become critical.
Well really neiather is considered critical – IMAGE is considered critical. Think of shuttle. They knew they weer going to lose a shuttle with the SRB o-ring issues, or the SSME issues, or hundreds of others — but openly admitting it and losing face was far more critical then losing a ship and crew someday.
I was in JSC in the shuttle program then. I saw it. –still can’t beleave it – butI see no reason to assume the attitude changed with Ares/Orion/Altair. Actually given how NASA specified lower quality adn relyability standards for Orion, I expect its even more in play.
> john hare Says:
> October 19th, 2009 at 3:28 pm
>
> Not flying is safer yet, which almost seems to be the
> goal at the projected flight rates.
Thats always been ideal for NASA. Eternal study and development programs.
…And yes they adn congress seem to be calmly drifting into a corner where NASA will cease to be a space flight agency, and just get in line with the tourist for a lift to ISS. Though others have suggested its a backhanded drift into extending the shuttle program for years – possibly a decade. Shutle is a HELL of a lot cheaper – almost a factor of ten cheaper – then Ares Orion. It looks a lot more impressive then Apollo on steroids, it looks likely to be a LOT safer. That all may well make it the easiest option for congress to swallow. Especially this congress that has no real love of maned exploration, and wants NASA focused on LEO ops.
> To be fare [sic] — with the capital costs dominating launch costs, a single super capable craft is likely always cheaper then multiple redundant or specialized craft.
this is the heart of it rand. NASA people aren’t just wrong, NASA people think they’re right. they’re engineers talking about economics. they just don’t get it.
how much would you trust an economist to talk about engineering? not at all… but everyone thinks it is fine for NASA engineers to talk about rocket costs.
give me a break kelly. you speak of “launch costs” and “cheaper”. well the REAL dominant way to make “launch costs” “cheaper” is to introduce free market competition and promote commoditization of the system. basically you take away everything NASA holds dear.
the policy makers know about this, and that is why NASA has never changed for the better, even after killing two entire shuttle crews of 7 astronauts. Because NASA changing for the better means there is LESS NASA.
I think I understand why NASA does not want launch vehicle redundancy, but why did the Augustine commission not stipulate it?
this is the heart of it rand. NASA people aren’t just wrong, NASA people think they’re right. they’re engineers talking about economics. they just don’t get it.
I don’t necessarily expect engineers to understand economics. But the world would be a lot better place if they at least understood basic accounting. And it’s not too much to ask for people who passed calculus.
>rock badger Says:
October 19th, 2009 at 6:16 pm
> ==
> give me a break kelly. you speak of “launch costs” and
> “cheaper”. well the REAL dominant way to make “launch costs”
> “cheaper” is to introduce free market competition and promote
> commoditization of the system. ==
Problem is there is so little demand, competician can’t help – it could actually hurt.
You have to remember NASA is only talking about 2 flights a year! Specify two teams – or more – and you get all the overhead, but not enough flights so anyone can can cut costs through learning to reduce direct costs. For example for Ares V they are projecting spending $30 billion to develope it, but only fly ten or so over 5 years. Plus of course the costs to care and feed the KSC launch facilities – up to $6 billion a year, divided by 2. So your at $6- billion a flight, plus a couple hundred million a fight to build and launch it. Competition could drive down the couple hundred million part, but the up to $6 billion part is overhead driven by gov regs and agency directives. Add in another ship dev program they can split the needed KSC overhead, but their R&D dev costs for each will be carried by fewer fights each.
Congress ran into the same problem when they ran a compete contract on engine replacements – but bought so few afterwards it just cost them more, adn both biders lost a fortune.
>== NASA has never changed for the better, even after killing
> two entire shuttle crews of 7 astronauts. Because NASA
> changing for the better means there is LESS NASA.
Well if you mean their holding on to launch is just to keep their launch budgets inside the agency – thats true, but its politically nessisary. If they spend to little – or not in the right districts – they lose political respect.
kelly, you’re just trying to rationalize crap when you don’t need to.
we’re not talking about building two super heavy boosters. of course there is no demand or money for that. instead we’re talking about building multiple smaller boosters. that is the whole point. they can be afforded, they are in demand, they compete with each other to lower prices, and they are redundant backups for each other. Get it?
atlas v phase 2 can:
– lift the cargo of one super heavy booster (in two launches.)
– lift a heavy orion in one launch.
– lift common medium class cargo with only one core booster.
a rocket with that capability doesn’t have low demand. it has very HIGH demand because it serves so many markets. NASA can buy that one rocket for three totally different missions.
so lets be clear. there was no way to rationalize not building it 5 years ago. the black zones and safety issues were lies. everyone knew then that EELV was the way to go. but policymakers stopped it from being built because it would put NASA people out of work. the end.
PS:
not only can this rocket do those jobs, but other rockets can do those jobs too. this is where the competition and redundancy come in. it is easier for corporate america and international partners to replicate the functionality of the lighter rocket than build another a saturn v. elon isn’t sitting on his hands with falcon 9 heavy: his people have been planning a much heavier launcher for years. but it won’t be saturn V class either.
do you know what synergy is? in business it means making money from nothing. in rocketry it means depots pay for themselves when NASA uses them, and then they create new business and jobs out of thin air when corporations are paid to service and use them. it means building a dual launch system to fly to the moon, and then getting a LEO crew launch system for free.
so not only does the 75mT dual launch architecture serve three discrete markets compared to the 140mT one, but it also creates a fourth market out of thin air with the depots. and you instantly get lower prices and redundancy because rocketeers can compete for this class of launcher. this is synergy. this is what business does to make money from nothing.
if NASA was a business it would be out of business. oh wait, NASA is the fed, and the fed IS out of business. check the yuan in your pocket.
PPS:
Why did augustine not weigh redundancy in the architecture as heavily as we think it should have been weighed? probably because they had a lot to do and they just missed it. I’d say, in hindsight: an architecture with a lower capacity booster that is more easily replicated by other producers is significantly better than the more rare heavy booster, if all else is equal.
>rock badger Says:
> October 19th, 2009 at 8:50 pm
> kelly, you’re just trying to rationalize crap when you don’t need to.
>
> we’re not talking about building two super heavy boosters. of
> course there is no demand or money for that. instead we’re
> talking about building multiple smaller boosters. that is the
> whole point. they can be afforded, they are in demand, they
> compete with each other to lower prices, and they are
> redundant backups for each other. Get it? ===
Wellthat opens up 2 other cans of worms.
Really if your trying to do a mission, you should be contracting for a Earth to where ever service. That would get you the best systems, but it would not necessarily get it in the right districts. It doesn’t mater if it works – since the goal, adn public interst, is for the jobs in districts. Ares is optimized for pork in districts (keep using SRBs from Utah, ET sements from New Orleans, etc).
Secound NASA and Augustine demand a HLV based concept. This is a losey way to get anywhere, doesn’t advance us in space, but its what they demand. Even Augustine dismisses alternates with multiple flights. Why I don’t know – but given he was amazed to find commercials are doing serious launch systems, I was surprized he wasn’t better versed.
Past that, the whole moon program is about 300-400 tons a year to LEO. So thats only about 15-16 EELV clas flights a year. Split that up, and you still are all overhead and capital spread over very few flights. However yes from a assured access point of view it would be better, but to NASA or Washington thats pretty irrelevant.
Really though – your missing one really basic problem. Shuttle is a EELV class launcher. It has (sadly) the best safty record in the busness, and is the most flexible craft ever, adn it cost about 1/10th as much per launch as Ares is expected to. So if you break the cargo into 25 ton lifts. NASA has little reason to build any new launcher. They developed all Shuttle lift lunar return concepts in the’90’s, so its all off the shelf concepts.
One big reason that may wellbe the ignored 800 pound gorila is Griffens base concept for Ares/Orion/Altiar. Griffens view was that NASA had lower public support then in Apollo days because shuttle made flights to space to frequent and routine. He wanted space launches to be rare spectaculars. The point of Ares design, adn the mega booster design, is to REDUCE access to space. Few spectacular flights, with few astrounauts. But he had to keep the total cost up and spent in the proper districts.
Remember when EELV first was proposed as the launch craft for theOrion (before it was named that) Griffen responded be redefining Orion to be twice as heavy – thouse being to big for EELV. If you couldn’t launch even the capsule, you obviously would need his Ares design.
>==
> so lets be clear. there was no way to rationalize not building
> it 5 years ago. the black zones and safety issues were lies.
> everyone knew then that EELV was the way to go. but
> policymakers stopped it from being built because it would
> put NASA people out of work. the end.
Not just NASA personel – they have less weight then all the subcontractors scattered across the country making shuttle parts.
=
> elon isn’t sitting on his hands with falcon 9 heavy: his people
> have been planning a much heavier launcher for years. but
> it won’t be saturn V class either.
Actually he IS building a Sat-V class Falcon Heavy. He also beleavesyou need a 100+ ton launcher for space exploration. Thats wrong of course.. but thats off topic.
> do you know what synergy is? in business it means making money
> from nothing. ==
?? Ah no, it means when multiple independant things merge into a unexpectantly better total thing.
But again your considering whats most economical or effective – which is irrelevant in a big federal program that in the end doesn’t need to do anything. [At the end the military actually needs win wars with their gear – pork or no pork. Really voters don’t want anything NASA is producing other then the pork, and the fame of having the agency that brought folks to the moon.]
>==
> so not only does the 75mT dual launch architecture ==
???
Which architecture is this? It would obviously make more sence then a 160ton Ares-V, but why it versus a 6 launch 25 ton cobfig with on orbit assembly or something?
>== serve three discrete markets compared to the 140mT one,
> but it also creates a fourth market out of thin air with the
> depots. and you instantly get lower prices and redundancy
> because rocketeers can compete for this class of launcher. ==
Wellthe builders can compete for a bout any lift size, but no one currentl;y has a 75 ton lifter in operation – so why focus on that?
Also – WHAT forth market? No one is ciurently lifting 75 ton cargo, so you still only have one customer – NASA.
Confused here.
>==if NASA was a business it would be out of business. ==
Of course, but its not a busness, its part of the gov. Its budget is in political capital and votes, not $’s. Ares was designed to fit best wiothin the projected political support market in Washington.
Lets face it – what is the point of the return to the moon mission at all? Like ISS there are no defined science, technology developments, or economic hgoals for the program. Its just flags and footprints. If they weer fostering a CATS system (better if it was CATS services contracted from industry) but they aren’t, and obviously that the last thing Griffen would want.
Now as to the seperate idea of a competative launch concept being cheaper – thats quite possible, but there are factors of such a tiny lift demand that make competitian not nessisarily able to lower costs.
Personally all this – the whole return to the moon program is a wates of time and money of no helpin getting us into space – its actrually supposed to be part of NASA moving away from routine access to space. So arguing how to do a distructive program, and most cost effectivly lift a dangerous and substandard Orion, doesn’t really interst me.
>==
> Why did augustine not weigh redundancy in the architecture
> as heavily as we think it should have been weighed? probably
> because they had a lot to do and they just missed it. ==
I think your being to generous to the group. They were formed to deliver better options for the current program goals. –and really didn’t look into even the most obvious alternatives.
I think the only reason they looked at options like SpaceX, is it would look pretty stupid to ignore them – when they are about to start flight tests of their version ofAresOrion, and their program is much farther along then NASA’s.
I completely agree -SpaceX or other commercials would spell the end of NASA. However, you can hardly be surprized that NASA and the gov arn’t eager to pay folks to destroy them.
PS
Ok rock badger, reading over the above got off on lots of rambling side topics.
To the point.
Current projections for NASA until 2024 is a total of 16 Orion flights, and 8-10Ares 5 Altair flights…and thats assuming Orion doesn’t lose more missions to COTS, or due to schedule slips.
Trying to compete for 16 EELV class Orion launches over the next 15 years is not going to help anyones bottom line.
Of the 8-10 Ares 5s, this could represent 800-1,500 tons lift, virtually all of it fuel. This would represent a big enough lift market to be worth competing for; but NASA adn Augustine reject the concept of on orbit assembly as infeasible, as well as the concept of reusable launchers. (Odd given the history of the reusable and comparatively cheep shuttle, doing FAR more complex on orbit assembly. One could be suspicious..)
Given the assumption that resurrecting the half century old Apollo capsules, by repacking shuttle parts (especialy the politically important ones), in a twin launch config with a HLLV, was the way to go; and docking more then two or parking something for a while on orbit was infeasible; you get driven to something like the Apollo on Steroids design.
Competician and lower costs are infeasible and undesirable.
Does it do anything usefull to advance us in space or lower launch costs — nope, not their goal, not their job.
Current projections for NASA until 2024 is a total of 16 Orion flights, and 8-10Ares 5 Altair flights…and thats assuming Orion doesn’t lose more missions to COTS, or due to schedule slips.
Trying to compete for 16 EELV class Orion launches over the next 15 years is not going to help anyones bottom line.
Two reasons your assumptions are of:
1. If you redesign the architecture so that it requires, say, 30-35 EELV class launches instead, you are definitely getting into numbers that can support the contracting process, and a considerable amount of R&D.
2. Here’s the main point. You claim that capital costs are the killer for HLV’s, and you’re right… it just that you come to the wrong conclusion. If you outsource the capital and (especially) the overhead costs, you can afford a lot more than 35 flights when it’s time to run the program.
You’re freezing architectural numbers, when the whole point and reason of going with existing smaller launchers is to change the architecture. Enter straw man.
>Roga Says:
>October 20th, 2009 at 2:44 pm
>> Current projections for NASA until 2024 is a total of 16
>> Orion flights, and 8-10Ares 5 Altair flights…and thats
>> assuming Orion doesn’t lose more missions to COTS, or
>> due to schedule slips.
>>
>> Trying to compete for 16 EELV class Orion launches over
>> the next 15 years is not going to help anyones bottom line.
> Two reasons your assumptions are of:
> 1. If you redesign the architecture so that it requires, say,
> 30-35 EELV class launches instead, you are definitely getting
> into numbers that can support the contracting process,
> and a considerable amount of R&D.
Hence why I mentioned
>>Of the 8-10 Ares 5s, this could represent 800-1,500 tons
>> lift, virtually all of it fuel. This would represent a big enough
>> lift market to be worth competing for; but NASA adn
>> Augustine reject the concept of on orbit assembly as
>> infeasible, as well as the concept of reusable launchers.
>> (Odd given the history of the reusable and comparatively
>> cheep shuttle, doing FAR more complex on orbit
>> assembly. One could be suspicious..)
1500 tons of lift could represent 60 EELV class launches.
> 2. Here’s the main point. You claim that capital costs are
> the killer for HLV’s, and you’re right… it just that you
> come to the wrong conclusion. If you outsource the capital
> and (especially) the overhead costs, you can afford a lot
> more than 35 flights when it’s time to run the program.
Not you are thinking economic costs not political costs. Outsource it and reduce the costs – and you lose the votes and the program. Thats why they could never do the shuttle upgrades to lower its per flight costs, adn increase its reliability. They would cut expenditures in important districts.
That’s why the insane Ares built around SRB’s! Even ignoring the fact the EELVs have been flying for years, what idiot would put people on the nose of a shuttle SRB?! BUT Ares is a designed-to-pork config.