I found this comment over at NASA Watch (in response to Mike Griffin’s latest attempt to rehabilitate his reputation) by someone who calls himself (or herself) “AresEngineer” sort of interesting:
Where’s all this “Ares is Bad, Bad Rocket” stuff coming from? Is it because the engineers on the project are saying that it was bad from the start, or because it’s easier to just parrot the news media? The media’s philosophy is “no publicity is bad publicity”, especially when they’re screaming “Ares is finished” predicated by initial findings that we need more funding for ISS and deep-space. Yes, the Augustine Commission has found a valid reason for concern. Just remember that they’re an advisory committee, not the ones that say yea/nay to the space program. And even the President can’t sack the project…only Congress can, and there’s almost unilateral support there for deep-space missions and the Ares program. And I think the whole “Ares is going we’re nowhere” is nonsense when at this hour, a 329-ft rocket is sitting in Kennedy’s VAB getting ready for it’s first test flight…Ares IX. One-half percent of the annual federal budget to fund space (and the technological fallout inventions which produce more jobs), is a great investment. If questionable programs like Cash for Clunkers went through, Auto company bailouts went through (and don’t forget the banks), U.S. Space can get it’s 3 billion a year (until launch) too.
It combines many of the prevailing false myths of space policy: that all NASA needs to succeed is enough money, and its technical choices are irrelevant; that we get more benefit from “spinoff” than the cost of the HSF program; that deep-space missions and heavy-lift in general (and Ares in particular) are synonymous, and that the former cannot be done without the latter; that having a fake rocket stacked at the Cape is somehow indicative of progress on the program.
In the coming decades, we can expect to hear this kind of thing forever: Mike Griffin’s NASA had a great idea for how to become space faring and get back to the moon, and the rocket was almost ready to fly, but unvisionary pinch pennies in the White House and Congress decided to end the next glorious chapter in spaceflight just when it was on the verge of happening. It will be very similar to the economically and politically ignorant refrain from people who bewail the short-sighted end of the Saturn program, or the wonderful SST that would have made us competitive with the Europeans, or Orion, which would have opened up the solar system with colonies on Ganymede by now if only the politicians hadn’t been such luddites and shut it down.
I’m sure that there are and were good people and good engineers working on the program, and when it’s your job to try to build something, you salute and do the best you can. And it’s hard to motivate yourself to do your best, or even go in to work in the morning, unless you believe that what you’re doing is worthwhile, so on a program like this, it can sometimes involve a certain degree of self delusion. But not everyone was so deluded, or we wouldn’t have been getting all of the inside scuttlebutt that we have been for years, from inside Marshall, Johnson and HQ, from people like this guy. And I assume that, when the program is finally put out of its and our misery, that many working on it will be relieved to not have to continue to charge that particular trench and barbed wire, and happy to be put on something with more promise, if that happens.
But there will also be people who will go to their graves cursing the philistines who couldn’t see the magic and wonder in Ares that they did, and I suspect that “AresEngineer” will be one of them. There’s nothing we can do about it — it’s just human nature — I’m just warning you now to be ready for it.
Given the fact that such a glaring budget shortfall was uncovered so easily by the Augustine panel, I wonder how Griffin could have supported such a plan, knowing full well he was effectively writing checks that would eventually bounce!
One can only conclude that Ares and the associated Constellation programme were selected on the clear belief that someone would eventually bail them out, once the sh#@ hit the fan.
This is Griffin’s true legacy: he sold NASA the space equivalent of a sub-prime mortgage!
I work on Ares, and it’s a lot of fun. I’ll regret its cancellation.
My guess is that most of the people (not you, Rand) who are hopping the “Kill Ares” bandwagon aren’t familiar with (or have forgotten) the aches and pains of developing complex aerospace systems. When I was a systems engineer on the F119 engine program, there were at least a half a dozen major technical risks that scared the pants off us. But now the F-22 (which uses the F119) is by far the best fighter aircraft in the world, because we licked those problems.
Having said that, Ares I has its share of configuration problems. All of them are solvable.
If anything, the “original sin” of Ares is that the configuration trades were done at headquarters level, mostly by people who shouldn’t have been in the business of configuring rocketships (sorry, Doc H). What should have happened is that headquarters should have directed the centers (particularly MSFC) to manage the conceptual design, with the work to be done by contractors — just like fighter aircraft procurement. It’s a tremendously successful model for development. But it does take awhile to get it right. But just as a rule of thumb, we don’t let pilots configure aircraft and we shouldn’t let astronauts configure spaceships. We let them have input, but not control….
The fact is that major configuration issues on complex systems really need intense study by teams of experts, sometimes taking years to synthesize a workable, and then an optimal, design. So, frankly, I’m not impressed by arguments from people sitting around IN THEIR PAJAMAS (;-) that the Ares configuration should have been x or y or z, and it would have been a whole lot better than what we have. That’s essentially the seat-of-the-pants approach that got us where we are today. But hey, it’s a free country, and maybe one of those folks is right.
But you go to space with the rocket you have, right? What we have is a rocket and a team of engineers pretty far along in the predesign phase. Sunk costs are sunk, so we should quit arguing about what we should have done in 2004. Instead we should plan what to do with the resources we have. The pieces and subsystems and growing amount of test data and tools and trained personnel are all resources for space exploration that should not be wasted. The Constellation team should not be fired and disbanded, but rather should be given the opportunity to open up the design space, i.e. do real configuration trades. This might lead to a better rocket. But disbanding this team would be a far greater waste of resources than even “cash for clunkers”!
BBB
Ares was a pointless waste of money, and it would have been a pointless waste of money even if the development effort had encountered no problems whatsoever.
Ares was a pointless waste of money, and it would have been a pointless waste of money even if the development effort had encountered no problems whatsoever.
Yes, the fact that it was an awful concept, technically, was just a bonus.
Yes, the fact that it was an awful concept, technically, was just a bonus.
Yes, that was a good thing, enabling the thing to be killed so soon. Would that the shuttle and space station had failed so conveniently.
What should have happened is that headquarters should have directed the centers (particularly MSFC) to manage the conceptual design, with the work to be done by contractors — just like fighter aircraft procurement.
Do you think that’s never been tried? NASP, Shuttle II, Shuttle C, X-33, X-34, X-38, Orbital Space Plane, etc. were all directed by NASA centers (particularly MSFC). How has that worked out?
When I was a systems engineer on the F119 engine program, there were at least a half a dozen major technical risks that scared the pants off us. But now the F-22 (which uses the F119) is by far the best fighter aircraft in the world, because we licked those problems.
This analogy is wrong in so many ways, I hardly know where to begin.
First, you say, “we don’t let pilots configure aircraft and we shouldn’t let astronauts configure spaceships. We let them have input, but not control…”
That statement is completely wrong. The Air Force is run by pilots, and so is the FAA. The development of aircraft is completely overseen by pilots.
The first airplane was designed by Orville and Wilbur Wright, who were also the first pilots. Jack Ridley, who was project engineer on the X-1 and developed the flying tail, was also a test pilot on the X-1. Scott Crossfield was a senior engineer on the X-15 as well as the first pilot to fly it. SpaceShip One was designed by Burt Rutan, who is a pilot. Two of the three pilots who flew it are also engineers.
I’ve never met an aircraft engineer who had no desire to fly on one of his creations. Even those who aren’t pilots seem eager to jump into the cockpit for a ride whenever possible. Nor do I hear them express the concept for pilots that I hear from NASA contractors.
That attitude has bitten NASA in the past. The Apollo 1 fire would not have happened if NASA had listened to Scott Crossfield. Perhaps this started with Von Braun. I recently saw some of his early drawings for a manned derivative of the V-2. Von Braun’s landing gear design was completely FUBAR; any pilot would have recognized that immediately.
Getting back to your F-22 analogy, the F-22 is a fighter plane, not a transport. The Air Force has a limited number of transports for special military missions but 90% of its transport requirements are purchased from companies like Federal Express, American, Southwest, etc.
Do you think the Air Force should spend all its money on transport planes and have nothing left over to acccomplish its mission? Then, why should NASA do that?
The F-22 is a new concept, not a reproduction of an old fighter plane the Air Force flew 50 years ago, and no one goes around saying, “The F-22 is the only way American pilots will go into the air for next 50 years.” Why should NASA do that?
You say, “you go to space with the rocket you have, right?” If you believe that, why not go to space with the rockets you have — Delta and Atlas?
As Burt Rutan says, “If all you want to do is go back to the Moon in a capsule, why not do it tomorrow morning?”
Let’s not waste decades and tens of billions of dollars to develop something that’s just as expensive, unreliable, and dangerous as what we already have, or what we had in the past. We are Americans. We should be moving forward, not backward!
I work on Ares, and it’s a lot of fun.
One more question: Is working on Ares more fun than working on working on a program that might take *you* into space?
That’s what it comes down to.
For anyone who hasn’t seen it, the movie “Pentagon Wars” provides a riotous/sad view into Defense Department procurement. I wonder if a similar documentation will take place on Ares…
Speaking as a Systems Engineer . . .
The Constellation team should not be fired and disbanded, but rather should be given the opportunity to open up the design space, i.e. do real configuration trades.
Early in your post you talk about fighter development for the Air Force. The last time I looked the USAF didn’t try to design their own plane, they contracted out the technical design work and ran the program office. MSFC biggest problem is continuing to think they could be their own prime contractor.
NASA should be pushing the envelope and going to the next place. Contract now for LEO access. In a short time LEO Orbital operations should be contracted out.
MSFC should be thinking about Fuel Depots, VASMIR, Polywells, Aldrin Cyclers, HSTs, etc.
JSC should be mission ops and Space Traffic Control (like the ATC system).
KSC? It’s like BRAC, either lease portions directly to USA, ULA, SpaceX, etc. or give it to Florida to let them lease it. Either way it’s a facility that NASA no longer needs directly.
MSFC biggest problem is continuing to think they could be their own prime contractor.
I’m not sure the exact definition of prime contractor, bute SpaceX seems to be its own prime contractor.
Yours,
Tom
bbbeard wrote:
My guess is that most of the people (not you, Rand) who are hopping the “Kill Ares” bandwagon aren’t familiar with (or have forgotten) the aches and pains of developing complex aerospace systems.
Probably not. Many of the Ares critics are practicing aerospace engineers who live the “aches and pains of developing complex aerospace systems” every day. It’s *because* we live this stuff every day that we can see through the NASA bs on the Ares rockets (indeed, the whole ESAS architecture).
The fact is that major configuration issues on complex systems really need intense study by teams of experts, sometimes taking years to synthesize a workable, and then an optimal, design. So, frankly, I’m not impressed by arguments from people sitting around IN THEIR PAJAMAS (;-) that the Ares configuration should have been x or y or z, and it would have been a whole lot better than what we have.
Ares has major configuration issues. There’s no doubt about that. Launching a crew on large, unsafe solid rockets has got to be one of the most reckless decisions NASA ever made. But the configuration issues, as serious as they are, are just a sideshow. Ares’ biggest problem is an architecture problem: it’s just not needed.
NASA is spending $35 billion developing a launch vehicle that is completely unnecessary. There are (at least) two things wrong with that: 1) the cost, and 2) the existance of the program.
Boeing spent $2.5 billion developing the Delta IV Heavy — including the Delta IV Medium — a launch vehicle with equivalent performance to the Ares I. Yet NASA is (failing at) developing the Ares I while spending 14 times the money! This is madness.
Yet even if NASA could develop the Ares I for $2.5 billion (it can’t — it’s already spent more than that), it would still be a waste of money, because the Delta IV Heavy already exists. NASA could use it for the marginal price of the launch vehicle. There is just no good reason for there to be an Ares launch vehicle in the first place.
Honestly, Ares’ problems are so numerous and so large that I’m having a hard time understanding why anyone — even the program manager — would try to justify it even as a joke.
Mike
As another (radio) System Engineer, I concur with Alan and bbbeard on the management of big systems, and how the mess up so badly in the beginning of the project.
My theory is that decision makers get to positions of authority and cannot break the paradigms that made them successful. Even when they try to be creative, they use wrong headed analogies.
In military radio systems, some General sees how small his cell phone is and asks a reasonable question why his radios are so big, without understand the tremendous (fixed) infrastructure that cannot work on the battlefield. Even after you explain that, they still vote for a Satellite communication system (MUOS) that uses cell phone technology.
In the Joint Tactical Radio System, (JTRS) the paradigm was to build a radio the same way as personal computer – with a motherboard from IBM, power supplies from China, memory from AMD, etc. and wrapped in a local box. The program is over 10 years old and it isn’t smaller, cheaper, or better than the radios it replaces. It is very similar to the progress on Aries.
During the Apollo program, it was amazing that the Lunar Orbit Rendezvous was chosen. IIRC, there was one engineer that had to fight like crazy. Maybe because the stakes were so high the management would actually listen.
Thanks for your input BBB
I’ve closely watched the evolution of NASA’s plans since the Columbia disaster. I remember how the original plan was to have a competitive fly-off between two contractors beginning around 2008! I wasn’t happy when the new management team mandated ‘Apollo on steroids’, even so I still believed that NASA could make it work.
But the problems with Constellation have ballooned beyond the resources Congress is willing to give NASA. It’s a shame that the time and money spent so far have been wasted, but I don’t see any way the Ares rockets will live on.
Alan:
MSFC biggest problem is continuing to think they could be their own prime contractor.
That’s part of what I was saying — obviously I wasn’t clear enough. NASA and MSFC should stick to program management, just like the Air Force Systems Command, which oversees and guides but does not design or produce.
Ed Wright:
Do you think that’s never been tried? NASP, Shuttle II, Shuttle C, X-33, X-34, X-38, Orbital Space Plane, etc. were all directed by NASA centers (particularly MSFC). How has that worked out?
One of the reasons this model works so well is that designs that don’t make the grade get selected out somewhere in the process. I can’t even count the number of advanced design projects I’ve been on. Some of them made it to production (IPE, F-22, F119). Some make it to flight test (F-16XL). Some made it to full-scale model (E-7). Some made it to small-scale models. But most went into the bit bucket. That’s the nature of the development process. And it works really well. And it is very different from the ESAS process that led to Ares.
First, you say, “we don’t let pilots configure aircraft and we shouldn’t let astronauts configure spaceships. We let them have input, but not control…”
…That statement is completely wrong. The Air Force is run by pilots, and so is the FAA. The development of aircraft is completely overseen by pilots.
At the time I was working for General Dynamics, the 3-star in charge of Wright-Patterson AFB (where they keep the System Project Offices) was a distinguished pilot with thousands of hours of flight time in countless types. But the civil servants and lieutenants and captains I negotiated with were NOT pilots. They were engineers. And the general was smart enough to leave the engineering to engineers.
At General Dynamics and Pratt & Whitney, NONE of my chain of command were current or former military pilots. We consulted with pilots in exactly those forums where their input was crucial — e.g. human factors group, cockpit review team — but by and large pilots have no particular expertise when it comes to nozzle/afterbody integration, or the heat transfer problems in cooled turbine blades, or rotor thrust balance, or any of the thousands of design decisions that make a complex system viable.
Don’t get me wrong — I have the utmost respect for military pilots, especially fighter pilots! They are a rare breed and they’ve placed their lives on the line for our country. But unless they hung up their wings and got an engineering degree, they don’t — and shouldn’t — play a central role in the design process.
This is not to deny that some aerospace engineers are pilots. Probably 10% of the engineers I knew at GD and PW had some flying experience. Heck, if that’s your definition, I’M A PILOT… I fly sailplanes. But I’m not a fighter pilot and my logbook is incidental to my value as an aerospace engineer. Some of the folks I respected most were ex-military. I knew an engineer who flew B-24s in WWII, then came home and got an engineering degree on the GI Bill. I also knew an engineer who had been in the Third Army under Patton and another who was an infantry captain in Vietnam.
I’d be interested to know if your experience was different. Were your supervisors military pilots, and not engineers? What systems have you brought to production?
And for the record, I never had any desire to ride in the F-16 or F-22 or on the Ares I. What I enjoy is my work. I’m a rocket scientist…. oh, and by the way, my current VP is a former astronaut. He’s a top-notch guy, but I don’t let him draw on my markerboard.
Michael Kent:
Many of the Ares critics are practicing aerospace engineers who live the “aches and pains of developing complex aerospace systems” every day.
Well, I’m willing to admit that you might be right — I doubt anyone has made a serious effort to tally up the Ares opponents. But that’s not my impression, based on my unscientific sample of blog posts, which seem to be light on technical expertise.
Even at MSFC, I see a lot of “younger” (i.e. under 50!) engineers who have never actually been all the way through a complex systems development to production. And I hear some griping about the configuration and the way it was chosen. I also know a lot of ‘graybeards’ — with whom I always feel an affinity, since I am approximately 400 years old, give or take — and pretty uniformly their gripe is not about the configuration but about the unwillingness of the young’ns to do what it takes to do the development right.
BBB
I also know a lot of ‘graybeards’ — with whom I always feel an affinity, since I am approximately 400 years old, give or take — and pretty uniformly their gripe is not about the configuration but about the unwillingness of the young’ns to do what it takes to do the development right.
The problem is that some engineers don’t care or don’t want to adequately document what they are doing. They don’t view it as real engineering. Usually they are the ones to give the SE Team a lot of grief on the requirements management when we ask the tough questions. From what I’ve read from purported insiders it seems like MSFC SEs are either (a) playing politics, (b) not managing the requirements, or (c) just being ignored by everyone else.
Do you think that’s never been tried? NASP, Shuttle II, Shuttle C, X-33, X-34, X-38, Orbital Space Plane, etc. were all directed by NASA centers (particularly MSFC). How has that worked out?
One of the reasons this model works so well is that designs that don’t make the grade get selected out somewhere in the process.
Works “well” for whom? Certainly not the taxpayers, who spent tens of billions of dollars on those vehicles and got nothing to show for it.
But I’m not a fighter pilot and my logbook is incidental to my value as an aerospace engineer.
Not incidental at all. Someone who never leaves the ground has no idea how things can go wrong. Like the engineers who said that Mercury didn’t need manual backups and thought it was a good idea to pressurize Apollo with 17 psi of pure oxygen.
Tell me, would you fly a sailplane that had a 1% chance of killing its crew every time it left the ground?
And for the record, I never had any desire to ride in the F-16 or F-22 or on the Ares I. What I enjoy is my work. I’m a rocket scientist….
I thought you said you were an engineer?
Anyway, this statement explains your earlier comment. If you’re only interested in working on rockets and have no interest in flying, the current model does indeed “work well” for that. It produces a great many jobs and very few flights.
It doesn’t work for those of us who are interested in spaceflight and think NASA should be helping to advance it.
But unless they hung up their wings and got an engineering degree, they don’t — and shouldn’t — play a central role in the design process.
Ah, credentialism.
The Vice President of Engineering who oversaw development of the F-16 at General Dynamics was a high-school dropout, wasn’t he? 🙂
For anyone who hasn’t seen it, the movie “Pentagon Wars” provides a riotous/sad view into Defense Department procurement. I wonder if a similar documentation will take place on Ares…
From my experience Tom, I’d say “Pentagon Wars” is more like the Orion CEV program. The Ares program has always had the same requirement, and has been redesigned constantly to help it meet that requirement. Some would argue that CEV’s weight caused major modifications, but considering CEV was originally suppose to be a 6 person vehicle capable of carrying 95 percentile male, I’d say Ares was underpowered from the start based on original architecture.
It will be very similar to the economically and politically ignorant refrain from people who bewail the short-sighted end of the Saturn program, or the wonderful SST that would have made us competitive with the Europeans, or Orion,
I think the problem of Saturn V was that the rocket was too complex. The engine technology was good enough for use today and is being reinvented. Had they made smaller rockets using F-1 and J-2 engines there would never have been a need for the EELV program in the first place.
The arguments over Ares I’s technical issues, whether supportive or critical, miss the point.
Any new launcher developed by NASA, barring nearly-superhuman management focus and skill, will be designed to require a large fraction of the development manpower, and as much as possible of the existing infrastructure, to operate.
That creates a large annual fixed cost that will be divded over very few launches. Since the resulting rocket will be designed for NASA, it will serve only NASA needs and not be shared with other users. That will result in a very high launch cost.
Ed Wright:
I thought you said you were an engineer?
I were an engineer. Now I r a scientist since I got my Phd!
No, seriously. I earned a BS and MS in mechanical engineering at MIT, worked for a dozen years in the airplane side of aerospace, got tangled up in academics, went back to MIT and earned my PhD in theoretical physics, taught physics and engineering for a dozen years at a small Catholic university, and eventually got tired of academia. Rand convinced me that space is where it’s at, although I guess I didn’t read the fine print, since I now work for a consulting firm in Huntsville, helping the good folks at MSFC design Ares. And what I do is more ‘science’ than ‘engineering’ so I have no qualms about calling myself a rocket scientist.
Tell me, would you fly a sailplane that had a 1% chance of killing its crew every time it left the ground?
Just another reason not to want to fly either the Shuttle, or Ares, or for that matter, Apollo/Saturn. Spaceflight is dangerous. We’re trying to make it safer. You mentioned Delta and Atlas. Have you never looked up their launch failure rate? At least they’ve never killed any astronauts… why do you suppose that is?
Works “well” for whom? Certainly not the taxpayers, who spent tens of billions of dollars on those vehicles and got nothing to show for it.
Works well for the United States of America and the men and women who defend it. America secured Air Dominance(TM) for the foreseeable future. How many billions of dollars would you spend to avoid 100,000 dead in the next major war? Or are you one of those folks who think we’ll never have a major war again?
credentialism
I prefer to call it “training”. What you don’t seem to acknowledge is that being a great pilot and being a great engineer require two very different skill sets. Not to say that one person can’t be both, but that one doesn’t require the other and in practice we don’t see it very often.
It doesn’t work for those of us who are interested in spaceflight and think NASA should be helping to advance it.
Well, America needs dreamers. Keep dreaming.
The Vice President of Engineering who oversaw development of the F-16 at General Dynamics was a high-school dropout, wasn’t he?
Do you mean Harry Hillaker? He had a bachelor’s in engineering from UMich. (BTW he wasn’t a pilot — but the interaction between him and John Boyd is legendary.)
When I was at GD the VP in charge of the F-16 program was Ted Webb, who had a doctorate in engineering.
So who are you talking about?
You didn’t answer my previous question: I’m still interested to know if your experience was different. Were your supervisors military pilots, and not engineers? What systems have you brought to production?
BBB
Rand convinced me that space is where it’s at, although I guess I didn’t read the fine print, since I now work for a consulting firm in Huntsville, helping the good folks at MSFC design Ares.
Yes, you failed to read the fine print. Huntsville is not space, and Ares will do nothing to get you into space. Which may not be a problem, if you never wanted to go into space.
Tell me, would you fly a sailplane that had a 1% chance of killing its crew every time it left the ground?
Just another reason not to want to fly either the Shuttle, or Ares, or for that matter, Apollo/Saturn.
Perhaps I misunderstood you, or you misunderstood my question. I asked if you wouldn’t prefer to cancel Ares and work on something that might get you into space.
Your answer was, “I never had any desire to ride in the F-16 or F-22 or on the Ares I. What I enjoy is my work. I’m a rocket scientist…”
That sounded more like a lack of interest in flight than a concern about safety. The F-16 and F-22 are fairly safe (or will be, once the structural problem in the F-22 is fixed).
Are you implying those planes are deathtraps?
Do you not see any ethical problems in advocating the development of systems that you wouldn’t be willing to ride yourself — then saying the astronauts who will ride them shouldn’t be involved in the design?
By the way, the last “spacecraft configured by astronauts” was the Gusmobile (aka Gemini). I’m curious what you think was wrong with it and how it would have been improved if Gus Grisson wasn’t involved.
Spaceflight is dangerous. We’re trying to make it safer.
No, unfortunately, you aren’t. You just acknowledged that Ares will be just as dangerous as Shuttle and Apollo. Which makes you smarter than Mike Griffin (or more honest.)
To make spaceflight safer, we need to make space vehicles more reliable (which means making them reusable). Ares is not trying to do that at all. In fact, the official propaganda line is that NASA’s building Ares because it “proved” reusable vehicles are “impossible.”
You mentioned Delta and Atlas. Have you never looked up their launch failure rate? At least they’ve never killed any astronauts… why do you suppose that is?
It’s called the statistics of small numbers. No one has tried launching an astronaut on Delta or Atlas since the 1960’s, so there has been no opportunity for Delta or Atlas to kill any astronauts.
What do you think the answer is?
What is your point? I don’t advocate launching astronauts on missiles like Delta, Atlas, or Ares, nor would I want to ride one.
On the other hand, I would have no qualms about jumping into the back seat of an F-16, F-22 (with the caveat noted above), or a reusable spacecraft.
None of that explains why you think NASA should spend tens of billions of dollars to replace Delta and Atlas with something just as dangerous and even more expensive.
Works well for the United States of America and the men and women who defend it. America secured Air Dominance(TM) for the foreseeable future.
Huh??? What does the F-22 have to do with Marshall Space Flight Center?
The only connection between MSFC and the F-22 is all the Marshall employees who post at places like NASA Watch saying the US government should stop “wasting” money on the F-22, aircraft carriers, etc. and give it all to NASA.
Again, the men and women who defend the United States do not develop, purchase, and operate airliners to meet all their transportation needs. They purchase 90% of their transportation from commercial operators. Since you keep comparing NASA to the military, please tell me why NASA shouldn’t do the same thing.
How many billions of dollars would you spend to avoid 100,000 dead in the next major war? Or are you one of those folks who think we’ll never have a major war again?
That, sir, is slander.
If you want to avoid a lot of American dead in the next major war, you ought to be calling for those billions to go into Military Space Plane — not Ares, which has no military value whatsoever.
When I was at GD the VP in charge of the F-16 program was Ted Webb, who had a doctorate in engineering.
So who are you talking about?
The Internet sources say it was Ed Heinemman. I’ll check his autobiography.
Do you think Heinemman was less “trained” because he didn’t have four degrees like Mike Griffin?
Maybe by your definition, but he built aircraft and rockets that actually flew. That’s something Griffin’s never done.
I feel a need to heap some abuse on Ares here, you know in case someone was asleep for the last six years. Let us keep in mind that:
1) Ares was rationalized in a study (the ESAS) that heavily stacked things in favor of the Ares I. For example, vehicles with first stage solid rocket boosters had weaker requirements to meet than liquid fuel first stages. Also the safety numbers for the solid rocket motor are fantasy (something like 1 in 3,400 or so) and at least a factor of ten better than what the SRMs have historically done. Given that Griffin favored Ares I before the ESAS started (Ares I and V were chosen in a study he had chaired before he became NASA Administrator), this looks to me like the ESAS anointed the choice that had already been made.
2) Ares I competes directly with the EELV launchers. There’s no reason at that point (aside from bogus safety and performance claims made on paper rockets) not to use what we already have. I also consider this a serious national security issue. We need healthy commercial launch capability in space. What is NASA doing to help that? Compete with these companies head on and lure a huge portion of the US’s space industry into cushy cost plus contracts.
3) A huge portion of the problems with the Ares I would go away, if they dropped the requirement that the first stage be a Shuttle-derived SRM. Instead use an appropriate liquid fuel first stage. Thrust oscillation? Gone. Underperformance? Gone. Bad aerodynamic aspect? Gone. But guess who makes liquid fuel first stages? The same people who make the EELVs.
4) Why are we starting to build the heavy lifter in 2018 (or later now that the schedule has slipped many years) rather than now? We have here yet another example of poor program design. I don’t care that the Ares I shares some features with the Ares V. The meat of this project was delayed more than ten years for some reason. That introduces huge cancellation risk which we’re seeing the consequences of.
My view is that Ares had from the start all the characteristics of a program that can and should be canceled. It contains erroneous or even deceptive rationalizations, very poor design choices and planning, obtuse adherence to a bad plan, and a sharp denial of reality and of the US’s national interests in space.
Ed:
Well, after a few failed attempts to engage you on a technical level, I can only infer that you are either not part of the aerospace engineering community are you are playing it really close the vest and acting dumb. Unlike Karl, who has at least provided a technical critique which justified his concerns about Ares, so far you have indicated merely a rudimentary desire to climb aboard a spaceship for a joyride. You don’t seem to be familiar with big aerospace programs or how they are structured and paid for. The Constellation program is not about building a bigger version of the E ride at Disneyland. Go talk to Rutan if that’s what you want. I have asked you several times what programmatic experience you have. I have been very open about my own background and how I came to my views. You’re welcome to anonymity but you’ve lost the opportunity to convince me you are anything but a poser. (I just erased a harsher phrase, because I realize that perhaps I was once in your shoes and I don’t want to discourage you from dreaming.)
Karl:
I have some of the same concerns about Ares and how it came about. I would not have chosen to go the ESAS route and I intend to discuss this with MG if and when I run into him (Huntsville is a small town).
I personally would not label the safety estimates for Ares “bogus” — at least some honest effort (actually, quite a bit of effort) has gone into quantifying the risks, failure modes, and failure rates of Ares. Folks who doubt these estimates are welcome to come up with their own risk estimates, but honestly I doubt any one person, or small team of persons, would have the expertise to come up with a credible counter-estimate. It would seem that a counter-claim that the criticism is bogus would at least be able to point to the imbalance in the magnitude of the analytical effort. But you’re right, all the claims and counter-claims are just “paper” right now. Historically, it’s the things that you don’t know — the “unknown unknowns” — that bring down launch vehicles.
I agree that Ares V schedule is not aggressive enough and that this delay compromises the overall Constellation effort. I think from the beginning Constellation has been programmed to level resources rather than demand resources — that’s the major reason for the infamous gap between Shuttle and Orion/Ares — and that this is a major flaw in the program philosophy, albeit one driven by budgetary realities.
I certainly agree Ares I should have baselined a liquid first stage. In terms of programmatic risk, the mere fact that no one has built an SRM first stage / cryo upper stage rocket ever should have been a clue to score this configuration with higher technical, safety, and programmatic risk. But the tradeoff is not so simple that an SRM first stage should have been ruled out. This is precisely the kind of trade that needs to be done through the design process I outlined before.
BBB
You don’t seem to be familiar with big aerospace programs or how they are structured and paid for.
I know exactly how those “big aerospace programs” are paid for — by dipping into my wallet.
Now, I’m waiting for you to justify reaching into my wallet to pay for your program.
The fact that you would rather insult me than try to justify Ares on its merits is quite telling.
I have been very open about my own background and how I came to my views. You’re welcome to anonymity but you’ve lost the opportunity to convince me you are anything but a poser.
I did not “pose” as anything. I never claimed to work for NASA or a government aerospace contractor.
If you’re mad because someone who doesn’t work for the government expresses an opinion about how the government spends taxpayers’ money, well, that’s your problem.
Your “background” does not prove that your views are correct. If you can’t support a statement with facts and logic, it doesn’t matter who you work for or how many PhDs you have.
If you think Ares is a good investment, why not show us a cost-benefit analysis rather than irrelevant boasting about your resume?
The Constellation program is not about building a bigger version of the E ride at Disneyland.
I never said it was.
In fact, I said the exact opposite — that Ares is doing nothing to advance the development of human spaceflight and should be cancelled for that reason. And you have not offered a single datapoint to dispute that.
This is the point you keep missing. NASA wasn’t created just to provide you with “work I enjoy.” It was created to help advance American aviation and spaceflight.
If you aren’t interested in spaceflight and believe it’s just “a bigger version of the E ride at Disneyland,” that’s fine. One of my aunts had no interest in air travel. But she wasn’t asking the taxpayers to give her $100 billion, either. If you’re asking the taxpayers for that much money, the taxpayers have a right to get something in return.
Well, Ed, thanks for validating my point. I started my commentary in this thread with the statement, “My guess is that most of the people… who are hopping the ‘Kill Ares’ bandwagon aren’t familiar with (or have forgotten) the aches and pains of developing complex aerospace systems.” Your commentary exhibits exactly what I was talking about. I see comments like yours in many places.
BBB
BBB,
I’d like to make a comment about your analogy of Ares to the F22. I think you are saying that the F22 is a good analogy because it looked like it was in trouble several times, but with perseverence it was a successful program that overcame a normal amount of technical problems.
I also think the F22 is a good analogy, but for a different reason. It was a failure because it built the wrong thing. It is a great air-superiority fighter designed to defeat an enemy’s high-tech air force. But right now we don’t have any enemies with a high-tech air force. And the enemies we have are using things like roadside bombs that the F22 can’t do anything about.
Ares is designed to put a few astronauts on the moon without leaving behind any infrastructure that will make spacefaring cheaper in the future. That’s not what we should be trying to build. I think that’s what Paul was saying in comment 4. You should be aware that there is a large contingent of people on the “kill Ares” bandwagon for whom the technical issues are not the most important issue.
Bob:
I can understand your reasoning about the F-22. But I happen to disagree that we are past the Era of Large Wars. It is by now commonplace to point out that generals (including the armchair variety) are always preparing for the last war. Unfortunately for us, this means that we are rapidly abandoning modern armament in favor of stocking up on IED detectors and unmanned aerials vehicles. You’re right, the F-22 is not intended for counter-insurgency. But you’re wrong to think that counter-insurgency is the only kind of warfare we will be called upon to fight.
I worry that the day will come when we will ache and bleed for air dominance, because the countries that plan to challenge us in the next century will not rest with the status quo. The F-22 would have guaranteed air dominance for the next fifty years or so, but without it, or with only a handful, our enemies will inflict untold casualties. Our grandchildren may or may not care that we attempted to reduce CO2 emissions, but I feel certain they will blame our foolishness for leaving them defenseless.
One of the beliefs I see floated here from time to time is that private enterprise, based on private initiatives, will return us to the moon. I wouldn’t count on it, any more than I believe that private industry would have built the F-22 without government incentives. A NewSpace industry oriented toward individual access to space may or may not flower, but I still see access to the moon and beyond as something only governments are large enough and “dumb” enough to fund. (And I don’t really mean “dumb” in a negative sense, I just mean “dumb” in the sense that governments are insensitive to profit incentives.) I’m willing to be proved wrong, but I have yet to see a business model for lunar access that makes sense for private enterprise.
Perhaps you are suggesting that government space access should be aiming higher than putting a few astronauts on the moon. In that case, I agree, but I still see Ares, or something very similar, as a necessary step.
BBB
One of the beliefs I see floated here from time to time is that private enterprise, based on private initiatives, will return us to the moon. I wouldn’t count on it, any more than I believe that private industry would have built the F-22 without government incentives.
One of these things is not like the other…
Perhaps you are suggesting that government space access should be aiming higher than putting a few astronauts on the moon. In that case, I agree, but I still see Ares, or something very similar, as a necessary step.
No, like Apollo, it is a step backwards toward that goal.
“My guess is that most of the people (not you, Rand) who are hopping the “Kill Ares” bandwagon aren’t familiar with (or have forgotten) the aches and pains of developing complex aerospace systems.”
This is the truest statement on the site, even if it is billed as a guess. Anyone who would like some perspective on the issue can consult J.D. Hunley, _Prelude to U.S. Space-Launch Vehicle Technology: Goddard Rockets to MInuteman III_ and _U.S. Space-Launch Vehicle Technology: Viking to Space Shuttle_ (University Press of Florida, 2008)