I had missed this when they were posted, but the Chair Force Engineer had some thoughts on DIRECT a couple weeks ago, here and here.
“Wow.” Are we to believe that ESAS was designed with little or no consideration of what the supporting infrastructure would cost? It would certainly explain why we’re stuck with the unaffordable Ares I and Ares V.
I’d like to say that I’m surprised, but sadly, I’m not.
Further NASA statements such as “Ares I + Ares V uses 15 SRB segments, while two Jupiter 232’s use 16 segments” also reveal an incredibly simplistic approach to cost estimation. Such simple methods might be appropriate for pre-algebra students. Professional cost estimators ought to know better. That’s why cost estimation is so difficult; there may literally be thousands of dependent and independent variables that make up the true cost of the system over its lifetime. Saving a few million in rocket hardware may have bigger reprocussions with development dollars, standing army costs, and infrastructure costs. It’s best summed up on Slide 26, where Jupiter’s higher launch costs (measured in tens of millions per launch) are offset by the savings of billions in development costs.
We’d have to see a full life-cycle cost accounting with assumptions to know whether or not it’s a good saving to cut development cost at the price of higher ops costs. It depends on how much you’re going to fly. But I suspect that it probably is, because the up-front costs are in expensive near-term dollars whereas the flight costs are down stream and discounted, and the flight rate will probably never get big enough to justify spending more on development to reduce marginal cost per flight. That’s always the problem with expendables.
I really need to write up my talk on marginal costs from Space Access.
At this point, a swap of Ares for DIRECT will result in little net gain from a schedule or technical risk perspective. While Ares proponents might argue that the last four years have seen the design mature, Ares is still years away from flying significant flightworthy hardware. The maturity of Ares today is comparable to where DIRECT’s predecessor, National Launch System (aka New Launch System) was in 1991. The only potential crew launcher with any maturity is Delta IV Heavy. If SpaceX is lucky, Falcon IX will have a successful flight before the Augustine Commission completes its report.
I agree with this assessment and this is yet another reason why I have advocated the Shuttle C as the heavy lifter for NASA and the EELV for Orion (you could put Orion on top of the side mount aka the Aquila that Buzz Aldrin was pushing several years ago).
The Shuttle C solves these very tangled and cross coupled problems with the inline design and gets a system fielded years before either Ares or DIRECT. The biggest cost of these systems in the development cycle is the paperwork, testing, and verification, something that is almost NEVER accounted for in the initial costing of a system. The SSME issue? It is worth it to restart production of the SSME’s to save untold billions of dollars in development costs and TIME. Just the marching army cost of the three to five year difference between the fielding of the Shuttle C and a Ares/DIRECT system will pay for a lot of Shuttle C launches.
One other note about a side mount system that is lost in the rhetoric is that the side mount allows you to build a family of side mount hardware, beginning with the “classic 15 x 85 foot cargo bay (which retains the STS mounting systems thus lowering the cost of requalifying your ENTIRE payload verification process), and then moving to things like an integrated upper stage propulsion module and anything else you can imagine. It is not the most efficient system, but it may well be the best that we can do today.
We also have to ask ourselves what are we going to do on the other end of the logistical train. I state again that if we implement a robust ISRU, the Shuttle C will be the last heavy lifter that we ever have to build.
@Dennis Wingo:
There is currently renewed discussion about Shuttle-C on NSF.com. Can I tempt you back there? Trust me, the place is not all overrun with DIRECT fanboys.
One programmatic risk that has been mentioned is that since the orbiter production line has been shut down, building new cargo elements is a large source of risk.
Wingo. NASA has begun destroying Shuttle infrastructure, such as standard ET production capability. The Shuttle C option is dying and soon will be dead. Lunar development does not need it. I urge you to begin considering new avenues to realize lunar development that make use of the other existing or near existing commercial launch options, as well as how meeting the lunar payload demand will shape the course of commercial space development.
Consider there being two camps with respect to the lunar program. A front end, and a back end. The front end concerns itself with the shape of the lunar exploration and development on the lunar surface, while the other concerns itself with the back end of supporting that program through an effective and beneficial transportation scheme. These two camps are complimentary in their objectives; they can support one another in their efforts. A commercial launch solution can field an expansive lunar operation at increasingly competitive cost, and the lunar program can serve as the large payload market that has been lacking in the commercial space arena. Working together both can serve the aims of progress and accomplishment.
I have a thread on NSF as well that I believe can serve as the backend to the frontend ideals you and others advocate. Lunar development is not predicated upon a NASA launch solution, and would be better off if a commercial path was chosen to help implement it.
http://forum.nasaspaceflight.com/index.php?topic=16064.0
There is currently renewed discussion about Shuttle-C on NSF.com. Can I tempt you back there? Trust me, the place is not all overrun with DIRECT fanboys.
My login at NASAspaceflight was disabled by the owner of that site.
libsOn
I am quite well aware that an architecture that uses only EELV could be implemented and that it would probably be superior to one that incorporates the Shuttle C. I also live in the real world and understand that the political environment will not allow this to happen.
If you want civil responses from me, you might well deign to use my first name in your response.
> My login at NASAspaceflight was disabled by the owner of that site.
WTF??? I did not know that. Any other forums you frequent? I see you on a number of blogs, but that’s not a good place to have a discussion about your ideas, unless they happen to intersect with the topic of a blog post.
Dennis, I meant nothing by my manner of addressment; it’s just a habit I have in real life that I enjoy partaking in. Your preferred means of addressment has been noted.
Might I pose the idea that a lunar mission design that does not significantly address the inclusion of commercial stimulus will not survive the upcoming review of the lunar missions. Prominent in the stated objectives of the Augustine review is number three: stimulating commercial space flight capability. A NASA developed heavy lifter is the antithesis of this stated course of direction.
Perhaps the actual shape of the lunar program is outside the determination of an agency that would seek to extend its own prominence above all else.
“I am quite well aware that an architecture that uses only EELV could be implemented and that it would probably be superior to one that incorporates the Shuttle C. I also live in the real world and understand that the political environment will not allow this to happen.”
I remember you saying those exact same words a few years ago — about Ares. But contrary to your expectation, the “political environment” did allow Ares to fail.
Once again, you have faith that the politicians will not allow the Great Big Rocket to fail, and once again, you’re going to get your heart broken.
There’s an old saying:””Put not your trust in princes.” And another one: “Fool me once, shame on thee. Fool me twice, shame on me.”
It’s time to break the cycle of dependency, Dennis.
I remember you saying those exact same words a few years ago — about Ares. But contrary to your expectation, the “political environment” did allow Ares to fail.
No Ed, I did not, you keep projecting that. I never supported that architecture and said so publicly in the Huntsville Times.
Might I pose the idea that a lunar mission design that does not significantly address the inclusion of commercial stimulus will not survive the upcoming review of the lunar missions. Prominent in the stated objectives of the Augustine review is number three: stimulating commercial space flight capability. A NASA developed heavy lifter is the antithesis of this stated course of direction.
Oh I agree entirely. The Shuttle C type architecture will allow that. The resupply of food and supplies should be done with EELV’s Falcon 9’s, Ariane V’s, H II’s, or any other vehicle that might show up.
We even worked out a family of landers that would take advantage of the various lift classes of vehicles.
I hate to sound stupid here, but I have a small issue with Rand’s last graf. Isn’t that the same trap the Shuttle development ran into thirty years ago; cut development costs, push the expense forward, which results in much higher launch costs later?
True, there will be some inflation, but will it be enough to “discount” the later (higher) cost? Also, weren’t higher launch costs one of the main reasons the Shuttles ended up flying at only about 10% of the original projected frequency?
Come to think of it, this reminds me of parts of the Wintel vs. Apple debate; Wintel systems are (generally) cheaper to buy, but more expensive to maintain over the entire life cycle due to security and reliability concerns. Apple systems with OS X -on the other hand- have a higher up-front price tag, but are cheaper to maintain, resulting in an overall lower lifetime cost.
Isn’t that the same trap the Shuttle development ran into thirty years ago; cut development costs, push the expense forward, which results in much higher launch costs later?
Yes. But the vehicle under discussion here is an expendable, with a low projected flight rate, not an ostensible reusable with a high one. It makes a big difference.
@Dennis Wingo:
Would you object to J-130 only instead of Shuttle-C? If it is true that with the orbiter production line gone Shuttle-C is now the riskier option, what would be wrong with J-130? Other than the fact we shouldn’t have an SDLV at all?
I never supported that architecture and said so publicly in the Huntsville Times.
Yes, Dennis, but that’s not what you said about her before the divorce. 🙂
“Just give me Ares V and a reusable solar electric propulsion stage….”
Does that ring any bells?
There’s an interesting paper in the University of Huntsville library that imagines all the glories ESAS would enable — huge gantries on the Moon, ISRU, commercial development, etc.
http://lib.uah.edu/researchassistance/files/NNL06AE27P.pdf
The paper is only two years old, and the primary author is listed as “Dennis Wingo.”
Unfortunately, the paper never considered what it would *cost* to do all those things using ESAS. That’s the same mistake you’re making with Shuttle C today.
“Just give me Ares V and a reusable solar electric propulsion stage….”
Nope, never said it.
Yep, that was a contractor report that asked me to take the ESAS architecture and extend it with commercial support, quite the opposite of what you are contending.
I concur w/ Mr. Wingo that if we absolutely must have a shuttle-derived rocket for political reasons, we may as well go with Shuttle-C. It’s got the lowest development costs of all proposed SDV’s, and it’s hard to imagine an alternative SDV achieving an appreciable reduction in the cost per mission.
But if the retention of shuttle jobs is an issue, is there a way to save them without building an SDV? I think the idea of a manned Delta IV Heavy launched from LC-39 is worthy of study. If the purported Aerospace Corporation report insists on building a new launch pad for manned EELV’s, would it be easier to start with the existing infrastructure at LC-39?
I concur w/ Mr. Wingo that if we absolutely must have a shuttle-derived rocket for political reasons,
But we have no proof that we absolutely must have a Shuttle-derived rocket for political reasons. Dennis believes he’s the only person who lives in “the real world,” and whatever he wants NASA to do, the politicians “will not allow it” to fail. Yet, NASA has failed to do many things Dennis wanted and the politicians have allowed it.
When I first met Dennis, he was using the same Politically Correctness argument for EELV. Many of us tried to tell him it was a waste of taxpayers money, but he wouldn’t listen. (No doubt, he will deny this, too.)
EELV is one of the few things Dennis wanted that actually got built — but now that it exists, it isn’t good enough. He wants a bigger, more expensive rocket! So, what did the taxpayers spend all that money? If Shuttle C actually got built, would the Moonies be satisifed with that? Or they immediately start clamoring for Shuttle D, E, and F?
Oh I agree entirely. The Shuttle C type architecture will allow that. The resupply of food and supplies should be done with EELV’s Falcon 9’s, Ariane V’s, H II’s, or any other vehicle that might show up.
Such a strategy backloads any commercial participation until after the large conduct of a lunar systems development and operational campaign. It is also predicated upon there being sufficient funds to establish and support lunar operations of a scale requiring such resupply, an uncertainty given the state of future budgeting and the unknown cost of the actual lunar conduct under NASA execution. It also sets up a play where such commercialization will be at the expense of continued internal NASA resupply, and also seems to choke the eventual market with diplomatic participation. All told it will not see any commercial input until well after untold tens of billions have been spent by NASA on NASA, and will not see even minor commercial utilization for a decade or more. Hardly “stimulating commercial space flight capability”.
It is ISS style commercial inclusion, where the vast majority of sum and time is first spent the traditional internal NASA way and actual effort into tasking the commercial sphere is but a brief afterthought at best; in the ISS case only coming about with the unforeseen termination of the internal means NASA would have mandated for resupply. Colour me unimpressed. More NASA orthodoxy.
I’m more or less resigned to an SDLV (although I will keep criticising it), but I want it to be the cheapest one possible. Perhaps that’s Shuttle-C, although I’m not convinced. At any rate I think depots are more important than ISRU in the short run. Especially since they could happen in the short run. I’d want to see a hypergolics depot (since we know for a fact that it could be operational soon) that supports refuelable Orions and later commercial tugs that help with resupply of the ISS. Then I want a LEO hypergolics export depot and an L1 hypergolics import depot that serves hypergolic landers.
The enormous demand for launching propellant generated by a lunar program can help establish a market for commercial RLVs or cheap expendables like Aquarius. ISRU helps with further exploration of the solar system, large in-space infrastructures etc. With ISRU, you might never need a big launcher again, but without the first wave of propellant flights it may take a long time before we have RLVs. We need a cheaper way to get to orbit before we need a capability to go beyond the Earth moon system. If we have to choose between ISRU and depots, I say we should choose ISRU. Of course, in a sane world there would be no reason not to have both. The sooner commercial space gets a foot in the door, the better.
This is why I’d rather have J-130/Aquila lift an Orion to L1 than Shuttle-C lift a fully fueled Altair to LEO.
D’oh! I meant: if we have to choose between depots and ISRU, we should choose depots.
Martijn, the fastest route to your stated goal would be to encourage a non-NASA owned / operated EML-1 transfer station.
However, given NASA’s current monopoly on US human spaceflight, the fastest route to a non-NASA owned or operated EML-1 transfer station is to deploy such a facility under the flag of a foreign government and accept visiting Shenzou and Soyuz spacecraft as we await better American vehicles.
I like Singapore for this role — historically an entrepot city with strong connections with the Anglosphere as well as non-Anglo Europe, China and India.
Such a strategy backloads any commercial participation until after the large conduct of a lunar systems development and operational campaign.
Absolutely not. It actually front loads it as you send many of the components of the lunar outpost via commercial/EELV type vehicles BEFORE human landings.
Laf, if you think that what I am talking about is NASA orthodoxy, you have not seen NASA orthodoxy.
D’oh! I meant: if we have to choose between depots and ISRU, we should choose depots.
Absolutely not. If we get ISRU, depots will follow. If we go for depots, we remain 100% tied to the earthly logistical train. It is FAR easier to lift propellant from a 2.6 km/sec gravity well than from a 7.5 km/sec gravity well.
Would you object to J-130 only instead of Shuttle-C? If it is true that with the orbiter production line gone Shuttle-C is now the riskier option, what would be wrong with J-130? Other than the fact we shouldn’t have an SDLV at all?
Absolutely not. The problem with the entire DIRECT system is that it is nothing more than Ares lite. The people, which are the most important part of this equation, understand the STS system and there would be very little changes in the operations at the cape or the pads or the launch infrastructure. DIRECT changes all that. DIRECT needs a production line that does not exist as well so that is not the issue. DIRECT also needs massive redesign of the ET, pads, logistical system. There are plenty of buildings empty at Lockmart in Colorado, Boeing in California, and other places to build the Shuttle C. Also, according to some Pratt sources, the SSME production line is still intact. Yet another issue is that we can use all the STS payload interfaces, safety process, and even things like ISS modules unaltered that could be use for early lunar outpost modules, a reusable space vehicle, and other things.
Testing, verification, operations, all are altered little with a Shuttle C but would be massively changed with a DIRECT system.
> Absolutely not. If we get ISRU, depots will follow. If we go for depots, we remain 100% tied to the earthly logistical train. It is FAR easier to lift propellant from a 2.6 km/sec gravity well than from a 7.5 km/sec gravity well.
Ah, but I’m not saying we should remain dependent on the earthly logistical train, far from it. I’m saying we should do depots first because we can do them pretty much now, without too much cost and with very little risk. I say we should use the initial massive launch volume needed to get ISRU infrastructure and manned presence operational on the moon to get the high flight rates that will justify RLVs. Initially they would be launching propellant. Once ISRU came online, they would mostly launch people, and do so much more affordably than today, which is exactly what we need for development of commercial space. ISRU removes the need to launch large amounts of cargo or propellant to orbit, but it does nothing for the cost of launching people to orbit.
Also: depots are very useful in combination with short distance tugs that are themselves very useful for resupplying a space station, whether it is a government owned space station or a commercial one. And without efficiently resupplied space stations, you won’t get significant orbital tourism. Closed loop life support is of course another important part of that.
All of this doesn’t mean we shouldn’t start with EELV-launched ISRU systems at the same time. And with a hypergolics depot at L1, you can start landing chunks with a dry mass of about 16mT, the largest chunks a Centaur will get from LEO to L1. It doesn’t make things any cheaper, but it does allow for bigger chunks than will fit on a single EELV launched lander.
BTW: did you see my wild idea for moving most of the regolith/ore processing to L1 in a high-power architecture? The solar panels could even self-ferry by ion propulsion. Do you think it has any merit?
> Absolutely not. The problem with the entire DIRECT system is that it is nothing more than Ares lite. The people, which are the most important part of this equation, understand the STS system and there would be very little changes in the operations at the cape or the pads or the launch infrastructure. DIRECT changes all that. DIRECT needs a production line that does not exist as well so that is not the issue. DIRECT also needs massive redesign of the ET, pads, logistical system.
Note that I’m talking about ‘DIRECT Light’, not DIRECT itself, to which I’m strongly opposed. In other words just an SSME-powered J-130, with no upper stage, or perhaps with an existing commercial upper stage. The DIRECT team claims infrastructure modifications would be minor compared to Ares and more importantly it is claimed the existing infrastructure is crumbling and needs to be replaced anyway.
The very knowledgeable NSF poster ‘Jim’, says that the complex cargo element would be very expensive and risky, whereas modifying the ET would be fairly straightforward.
Now if you’re right that Shuttle-C would still be cheaper and more importantly operational sooner – in a way that doesn’t harm commercial space – then I would prefer it to J-130. I am unqualified to judge whether this is true, it’s just that I hear knowledgeable people claim otherwise.