Haven’t read the Space Review article yet, but I looked up the Augustine Report online last week. To me, the recommendations still mostly make sense, and don’t seem like something that Bob Park would be thrilled about. For instance, the recommendation is to keep space science spending at 20% of NASA’s budget with no reductions. The heavy-lift launch idea probably could go away. Recommendations posted here for reference:
Recommendation 1: That the civil space science program should have first priority for NASA resources, and continue to be funded at approximately the same percentage of the NASA budget as at present (about 20 percent).
Recommendation 2: That, with respect to program content, the existing strategic plan for science and applications research proposed by NASA with input from the science community be funded and executed.
Recommendation 3: That the multi-decade set of projects known as Mission to Planet Earth be conducted as a continually evolving program rather than as a mission whose design is frozen in time. A combination of different size spacecraft appears to be most appropriate to meet the needs of simultaneity, accuracy, continuity and robustness. NASA also should reestablish research and development in support of environmental satellites to meet NOAA-started requirements. NOAA, for its part, must budget adequately to finance the operational costs of spacecraft and instruments, as well as related day-to-day support activities
Recommendation 4: That the Mission from Planet Earth be established with the long-term goal of human exploration of Mars, underpinned by an effort to produce significant advances in space transportation and space life sciences.
Recommendation 5: That the Mission from Planet Earth be configured to an open-ended schedule, tailored to match the availability of funds.
Recommendation 6: That NASA, in concert with its international partners, reconfigure and reschedule the Space Station Freedom with only two missions in mind: first, life sciences experimentation (including the accrual of operational experience on very long duration human activities in space) and, second, microgravity research and applications. In so doing, steps should be taken to reduce the station’s size and complexity, permit greater end-to-end testing prior to launch, reduce transportation requirements, reduce extra-vehicular assembly and maintenance, and, where it can be done without affecting safety, reduce cost. The planned ninety days may prove an inadequate period of time to conduct so significant reassessment. Such time as is required should be taken.
Recommendation 7: That technology be pursued which will enable a permanent, possible man-tended outpost to be established on the Moon for the purposes of exploration and for the development of the experience base required for the eventual human exploration of Mars. That NASA should initiate studies of robotic precursor missions and lunar outposts.
Recommendation 8: That NASA, in concert with the Office of Management and Budget and appropriate Congressional committees, establish an augmented and reasonably stable share of NASA’s total budget that is allocated to advanced technology development. A two- to three-fold enhancement of the current modest budget seems not unreasonable. In addition, we recommend that an agency-wide technology plan be developed with inputs from the Associate Administrators responsible for the major development programs, and that NASA utilize an expert, outside review process, managed from headquarters, to assist in the allocation of technology funds.
Recommendation 9: That the Administration promptly establish and fund a firm program for development of an evolutionary, unmanned but man- rateable, heavy lift launch vehicle. This system should reach operational capability in time to support all but the initial phase of the Space Station deployment.
Recommendation 10: The Committee recommends that the procurement of an additional Space Shuttle orbiter, for a five-orbiter fleet operation, not be undertaken at this time, but spares procurement should continue. If an orbiter is lost in the relatively near future, the decision on whether to procure another orbiter should be made in the context of the availability of the new heavy lift launch vehicle and the demands on the remaining orbiter fleet.
Recommendation 11: That NASA initiate design effort so that manned activity in the Space Station could be supported in the absence of the Space Shuttle. Crew recovery capability must be available immediately, and provision made for the relatively rapid introduction of a two-way personnel transport module on a selected expendable launch vehicle.
Recommendation 12: That a Space Council Executive Committee, chaired by the Vice President and consisting of the Administrator of NASA, the Directors of the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, be institutionalized. Other Space Council principals should participate in the Space Ex-Comm meetings when appropriate, at the invitation of the Chairman. Major issues would continue to be addressed by the Space Council as a whole.
Recommendation 13: That NASA management review the mission of each center and consolidate and refocus centers of excellence in currently relevant fields of science and technology with minimum overlap between centers. An appropriate balance between in-house and external activity also should be developed
Recommendation 14: That NASA should be designated a “pathfinding” agency for the implementation of an advanced personnel management system. Under this system the current legislative package would be expanded to include “pay for performance;” more flexibility in senior executive hiring, evaluation and removal; additional cost reimbursement for relocation; and a capability for handling extended temporary duty costs. NASA management should propose to OPM the personnel package it deems appropriate in the above regards.
Recommendation 15: That the Office of Personnel Management provide NASA the full flexibility permitted by law regarding dual compensation waivers, and that OMB allocate to NASA a significant portion of the 800 now approved “world-class” positions. NASA also should fully utilize the authority granted by the Space Act and fill all 425 “critical” personnel positions, thus helping redress locality pay inequities that will not be alleviated quickly enough by pay reform. New legislation should authorize NASA broad authority to establish, set the pay of, and fill up to 10 percent of its positions with “critical skills” appointments. In the event that recent and planned civil service reforms do not promptly alleviate the shortcomings of the NASA personnel system then, NASA should initiate the process of selectively phasing additional centers into the Jet Propulsion Laboratory model; that is, affiliate them with a university as Federally Funded Research and Development Centers.
Should have read the TSR article first…hmmmm…
Well, NASA rationalizations for manned space flight depend heavily on space science. That sort of reasoning is vulnerable to someone like Bob Park.
Manned space efforts would not be “vulnerable to someone like Bob Park” if they actually made sense. ESAS doesn’t. Park would argue that’s because no manned program could make sense, advocates would just say that particular implementation makes no sense.
The continuing track record of failure is strengthening the Parks of the world.
In any case the 2004 Royal Astronomical Society study on human space flight has rendered any of Bob Park’s arguments false and meaningless.
Haven’t read the Space Review article yet, but I looked up the Augustine Report online last week. To me, the recommendations still mostly make sense, and don’t seem like something that Bob Park would be thrilled about. For instance, the recommendation is to keep space science spending at 20% of NASA’s budget with no reductions. The heavy-lift launch idea probably could go away. Recommendations posted here for reference:
Recommendation 1: That the civil space science program should have first priority for NASA resources, and continue to be funded at approximately the same percentage of the NASA budget as at present (about 20 percent).
Recommendation 2: That, with respect to program content, the existing strategic plan for science and applications research proposed by NASA with input from the science community be funded and executed.
Recommendation 3: That the multi-decade set of projects known as Mission to Planet Earth be conducted as a continually evolving program rather than as a mission whose design is frozen in time. A combination of different size spacecraft appears to be most appropriate to meet the needs of simultaneity, accuracy, continuity and robustness. NASA also should reestablish research and development in support of environmental satellites to meet NOAA-started requirements. NOAA, for its part, must budget adequately to finance the operational costs of spacecraft and instruments, as well as related day-to-day support activities
Recommendation 4: That the Mission from Planet Earth be established with the long-term goal of human exploration of Mars, underpinned by an effort to produce significant advances in space transportation and space life sciences.
Recommendation 5: That the Mission from Planet Earth be configured to an open-ended schedule, tailored to match the availability of funds.
Recommendation 6: That NASA, in concert with its international partners, reconfigure and reschedule the Space Station Freedom with only two missions in mind: first, life sciences experimentation (including the accrual of operational experience on very long duration human activities in space) and, second, microgravity research and applications. In so doing, steps should be taken to reduce the station’s size and complexity, permit greater end-to-end testing prior to launch, reduce transportation requirements, reduce extra-vehicular assembly and maintenance, and, where it can be done without affecting safety, reduce cost. The planned ninety days may prove an inadequate period of time to conduct so significant reassessment. Such time as is required should be taken.
Recommendation 7: That technology be pursued which will enable a permanent, possible man-tended outpost to be established on the Moon for the purposes of exploration and for the development of the experience base required for the eventual human exploration of Mars. That NASA should initiate studies of robotic precursor missions and lunar outposts.
Recommendation 8: That NASA, in concert with the Office of Management and Budget and appropriate Congressional committees, establish an augmented and reasonably stable share of NASA’s total budget that is allocated to advanced technology development. A two- to three-fold enhancement of the current modest budget seems not unreasonable. In addition, we recommend that an agency-wide technology plan be developed with inputs from the Associate Administrators responsible for the major development programs, and that NASA utilize an expert, outside review process, managed from headquarters, to assist in the allocation of technology funds.
Recommendation 9: That the Administration promptly establish and fund a firm program for development of an evolutionary, unmanned but man- rateable, heavy lift launch vehicle. This system should reach operational capability in time to support all but the initial phase of the Space Station deployment.
Recommendation 10: The Committee recommends that the procurement of an additional Space Shuttle orbiter, for a five-orbiter fleet operation, not be undertaken at this time, but spares procurement should continue. If an orbiter is lost in the relatively near future, the decision on whether to procure another orbiter should be made in the context of the availability of the new heavy lift launch vehicle and the demands on the remaining orbiter fleet.
Recommendation 11: That NASA initiate design effort so that manned activity in the Space Station could be supported in the absence of the Space Shuttle. Crew recovery capability must be available immediately, and provision made for the relatively rapid introduction of a two-way personnel transport module on a selected expendable launch vehicle.
Recommendation 12: That a Space Council Executive Committee, chaired by the Vice President and consisting of the Administrator of NASA, the Directors of the Office of Management and Budget and the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence, be institutionalized. Other Space Council principals should participate in the Space Ex-Comm meetings when appropriate, at the invitation of the Chairman. Major issues would continue to be addressed by the Space Council as a whole.
Recommendation 13: That NASA management review the mission of each center and consolidate and refocus centers of excellence in currently relevant fields of science and technology with minimum overlap between centers. An appropriate balance between in-house and external activity also should be developed
Recommendation 14: That NASA should be designated a “pathfinding” agency for the implementation of an advanced personnel management system. Under this system the current legislative package would be expanded to include “pay for performance;” more flexibility in senior executive hiring, evaluation and removal; additional cost reimbursement for relocation; and a capability for handling extended temporary duty costs. NASA management should propose to OPM the personnel package it deems appropriate in the above regards.
Recommendation 15: That the Office of Personnel Management provide NASA the full flexibility permitted by law regarding dual compensation waivers, and that OMB allocate to NASA a significant portion of the 800 now approved “world-class” positions. NASA also should fully utilize the authority granted by the Space Act and fill all 425 “critical” personnel positions, thus helping redress locality pay inequities that will not be alleviated quickly enough by pay reform. New legislation should authorize NASA broad authority to establish, set the pay of, and fill up to 10 percent of its positions with “critical skills” appointments. In the event that recent and planned civil service reforms do not promptly alleviate the shortcomings of the NASA personnel system then, NASA should initiate the process of selectively phasing additional centers into the Jet Propulsion Laboratory model; that is, affiliate them with a university as Federally Funded Research and Development Centers.
Should have read the TSR article first…hmmmm…
Well, NASA rationalizations for manned space flight depend heavily on space science. That sort of reasoning is vulnerable to someone like Bob Park.
Manned space efforts would not be “vulnerable to someone like Bob Park” if they actually made sense. ESAS doesn’t. Park would argue that’s because no manned program could make sense, advocates would just say that particular implementation makes no sense.
The continuing track record of failure is strengthening the Parks of the world.
In any case the 2004 Royal Astronomical Society study on human space flight has rendered any of Bob Park’s arguments false and meaningless.