Irrational

Mike Griffin is worried about losing a Shuttle crew if the program is extended:

“Given that our inherent risk assessment of flying any shuttle mission is about a 1-in-75 fatality risk, if you were to fly 10 more flights, you would have a very substantial risk of losing a crew. I don’t want to do that.”

If we accept his risk number, that translates into a 13% chance over ten flights. That doesn’t seem “substantial” to me. There are a lot of good reasons to not extend the program, but risk of crew loss isn’t one of them. I’m sure that most of the astronauts would be happy to take the risk, and the real loss wouldn’t be astronauts (of whom we have a large oversupply), but the loss of another orbiter, which would almost certainly end the program, because they probably couldn’t manage with only two left. If what they’re doing is important enough to risk an orbiter, that is almost literally irreplaceable, it’s surely important enough to risk crew, who are all volunteers, and fully informed of the risk.

When I was watching coverage of the cranewreck in Manhattan yesterday, they cited a statistic from the Bureau of Labor statistics that there were forty-three construction deaths last year (I think in New York alone). Can someone explain to me why is it acceptable to kill construction workers, but not astronauts?

On the other hand, here’s one thing that I do agree with Mike on: the last thing we need is another space race.

9 thoughts on “Irrational”

  1. Can someone explain to me why is it acceptable to kill construction workers, but not astronauts?

    Because astronauts are concentrated symbols of America, similar to soldiers but much more potent. They supposedly embody the peak of American accomplishment and potential. When they die, it sends a message that America is weak and failing. Thus they must not be allowed to die.

    Construction workers are not potent symbols of America. They are laborers who we suppose are getting paid commensurate with their risks.

    I’m not saying that any of these statements is actual or accurate or even logical, but they are perceived, like many other erroneous concepts.

  2. Astronauts cannot be risked precisely because what they are doing is not sufficiently important. Their deaths induce the wider public to think more about what the space program is providing and whether it is worth any of the costs.

    If the space program had good justifications, there would be no reason for anyone to pussyfoot around on the risk issue. They could just say, “like construction, driving, and many other activities, the benefits greatly outweigh the cost in voluntarily-risked human lives.”

  3. If we accept his risk number, that translates into a 13% chance over ten flights. That doesn’t seem “substantial” to me.

    You’re one brave dude. For a year I was something of a construction worker in Vietnam with substantially less risk to my being. Our soldiers and Marines in Iraq and Afghanistan face substantially less risk.

    Can someone explain to me why is it acceptable to kill construction workers, but not astronauts?

    A construction worker can last 30 years at far less risk of dying on the job.

  4. If we accept his risk number, that translates into a 13% chance over ten flights. That doesn’t seem “substantial” to me.

    That depends on how you value what the astronauts are doing, of course, but isn’t Griffin planning to fly 10 flights between now and 2011?

    If what they’re doing on ISS is worth the risk today, why does it abruptly cease to be worth the risk in 2011?

    And if it won’t worth the risk in 2011, why is it worth the risk today?

    If what they’re doing is important enough to risk an orbiter, that is almost literally irreplaceable, it’s surely important enough to risk crew, who are all volunteers, and fully informed of the risk.

    That doesn’t necessarily follow. Something can be worth risking A but not worth risking A + B, even if A is irreplaceable and B is easily replaced.

    Also, the astronauts’ training and the orbiter’s construction are both sunk costs. An astronaut has has salvage value, however: if you decide not to fly any more Shuttle flights, he can do other things, some of which might arguably have more value. An orbiter has negative salvage value: if NASA decides not to fly it again, the disposal will actually cost them money (although not as much money as continuing to fly it, obviously).

  5. You’re one brave dude. For a year I was something of a construction worker in Vietnam with substantially less risk to my being. Our soldiers and Marines in Iraq and Afghanistan face substantially less risk.

    My bravery isn’t the point, since I’m not an astronaut. But if I were, I’d consider it an acceptable risk. The risk to an individual astronaut is much less than 13%. The risk to an astronaut on any given flight is only one in seventy five (assuming that Mike’s numbers are correct). They’re flying with that risk now.

  6. A construction worker can last 30 years at far less risk of dying on the job.

    A NASA astronaut can conceivably last 30 years on the job without flying more than a few times (or at all).

    Astronauts are willing to accept the risks of flying on the Shuttle, but only because it’s a once-in-a-lifetime or few-in-a-lifetime event.

    That has to change, if we want spaceflight to become a common event.

    On the gripping hand, however, Mike Griffin wants to spend billions of dollars to replace the Shuttle with a system that will be even more expensive and not much safer (if it’s safer at all). There’s little reason to believe Ares will be more reliable than the Shuttle (no ELV ever has been). Escape systems can provide an extra degree of safety, but that degree is limited.

    Ares will risk fewer lives than the Shuttle not because it is significantly safer but simply because it will fly fewer astronauts than the Shuttle. What’s the sense of that? They can risk even fewer lives by flying no one at all.

  7. Now that NASA has fixed the SRB joint issues, developed heat shield inspection and repair techniques, has a much better understanding of what’s happening with the foam on the ET, and finally fixed the ECO sensor problem – it’s time to kill the shuttle? Aren’t the risks now less than they were before?

    If the shuttle is retired in 2010, we face a 5 year gap during which we depend on our potential enemies for a lift into space, and during which we have nothing capable of taking large payloads to the ISS. If Ares is canceled, we may be looking at 10 years stranded on the ground.

    Alternatively, the program can be continued until a replacement vehicle (NASA or commercial) is actually flying. NASA might even revisit the decision to leave already built components of the ISS on the ground and continue to build the station beyond “core complete”.

    I don’t know, it just seems like a typical government decision to cancel a program after 99% of the cost has been sunk and problems resolved, but the job unfinished.

  8. If the shuttle is retired in 2010, we face a 5 year gap during which we depend on our potential enemies for a lift into space

    Oh, bog, here we go again.

    Who does “we” refer to, and why do you believe Boeing, Lockheed, Orbital Sciences, SpaceX, Scaled Composites, Virgin Galactic, XCOR Aerospace, Pioneer Rocketplane, Armadillo Aerospace, etc. are your potential enemies?

  9. [main risk is] the loss of another orbiter, which would almost certainly end the program, because they probably couldn’t manage with only two left.

    If they’re cancelling the program shortly anyway, the orbiter is going to be scrap anyway. What will kill the program is:

    1) 3 strikes, you’re out
    2) the delay becoming terminal
    3) the politics of dropping radioactive programs like a hot potato

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