A number of pundits and bloggers have been citing Easterbrook’s piece, so I decided to finally take the time and go through it to separate fact from fancy, so they’ll have a better idea whether or not to agree with him, and on which points. It’s not a true fisking, because I actually agree with most of it, but I do want to note a few places where he goes off the rails as a result of (as always) invalid assumptions.

The Space Shuttle Must Be Stopped

It’s costly, outmoded, impractical and, as we’ve learned again, deadly

A spacecraft is a metaphor of national inspiration: majestic, technologically advanced, produced at dear cost and entrusted with precious cargo, rising above the constraints of the earth. The spacecraft carries our secret hope that there is something better out there?a world where we may someday go and leave the sorrows of the past behind. The spacecraft rises toward the heavens exactly as, in our finest moments as a nation, our hearts have risen toward justice and principle. And when, for no clear reason, the vessel crumbles, as it did in 1986 with Challenger and last week with Columbia, we falsely think the promise of America goes with it.

Unfortunately, the core problem that lay at the heart of the Challenger tragedy applies to the Columbia tragedy as well. That core problem is the space shuttle itself. For 20 years, the American space program has been wedded to a space-shuttle system that is too expensive, too risky, too big for most of the ways it is used, with budgets that suck up funds that could be invested in a modern system that would make space flight cheaper and safer. The space shuttle is impressive in technical terms, but in financial terms and safety terms no project has done more harm to space exploration.

So far, so good. I find little to disagree with.

With hundreds of launches to date, the American and Russian manned space programs have suffered just three fatal losses in flight?and two were space-shuttle calamities. This simply must be the end of the program.

Now I’m missing his point here. Is he saying that we cannot fly unless we can guarantee that we’ll never lose lives? Or that the level of safety is unacceptable? What level would be acceptable? One could look at it another way and say that in four decades of manned space flight, we’ve only had three incidents of loss of life, and only two of them were Shuttle.

Will the much more expensive effort to build a manned International Space Station end too? In cost and justification, it’s as dubious as the shuttle. The two programs are each other’s mirror images. The space station was conceived mainly to give the shuttle a destination, and the shuttle has been kept flying mainly to keep the space station serviced. Three crew members?Expedition Six, in NASA argot?remain aloft on the space station. Probably a Russian rocket will need to go up to bring them home.

They already have a ride home–there is always a Soyuz docked at station capable of returning three passengers.

The wisdom of replacing them seems dubious at best. This second shuttle loss means NASA must be completely restructured?if not abolished and replaced with a new agency with a new mission.

Why did NASA stick with the space shuttle so long? Though the space shuttle is viewed as futuristic, its design is three decades old. The shuttle’s main engines, first tested in the late 1970s, use hundreds more moving parts than do new rocket-motor designs. The fragile heat-dissipating tiles were designed before breakthroughs in materials science. Until recently, the flight-deck computers on the space shuttle used old 8086 chips from the early 1980s, the sort of pre-Pentium electronics no self-respecting teenager would dream of using for a video game.

Most important, the space shuttle was designed under the highly unrealistic assumption that the fleet would fly to space once a week and that each shuttle would need to be big enough to carry 50,000 lbs. of payload. In actual use, the shuttle fleet has averaged five flights a year; this year flights were to be cut back to four. The maximum payload is almost never carried. Yet to accommodate the highly unrealistic initial goals, engineers made the shuttle huge and expensive. The Soviet space program also built a shuttle, called Buran, with almost exactly the same dimensions and capacities as its American counterpart. Buran flew to orbit once and was canceled, as it was ridiculously expensive and impractical.

Capitalism, of course, is supposed to weed out such inefficiencies. But in the American system, the shuttle’s expense made the program politically attractive. Originally projected to cost $5 million per flight in today’s dollars, each shuttle launch instead runs to around $500 million. Aerospace contractors love the fact that the shuttle launches cost so much.

Yes, this point can’t be emphasized enough. The incentives in the system are truly perverse, which is one of the reasons for the failure of the X-33 program. It was more in Lockmart’s interest for it to fail than succeed.

In two decades of use, shuttles have experienced an array of problems? engine malfunctions, damage to the heat-shielding tiles?that have nearly produced other disasters. Seeing this, some analysts proposed that the shuttle be phased out, that cargo launches be carried aboard by far cheaper, unmanned, throwaway rockets and that NASA build a small “space plane” solely for people, to be used on those occasions when men and women are truly needed in space.

Throwaway rockets can fail too. Last month a French-built Ariane exploded on lift-off. No one cared, except the insurance companies that covered the payload, because there was no crew aboard. NASA’s insistence on sending a crew on every shuttle flight means risking precious human life for mindless tasks that automated devices can easily carry out. Did Israeli astronaut Ilan Ramon really have to be there to push a couple of buttons on the Mediterranean Israeli Dust Experiment, the payload package he died to accompany to space?

No, he didn’t have to be there, but he wanted to be. This is one of my pet peeves about the general commentary on the manned space program. The same argument was made after the Challenger was lost–that we shouldn’t risk astronauts’ lives to deliver satellites. That resulted in a policy decision to no longer allow Shuttle to carry commercial payloads, particularly comsats. This was the right decision, for a dunderheaded reason (as is often the case with government decisions). The right reason to take the commercial payloads away from the Shuttle was to stop the unfair government-subsidized competition with the commercial launch industry, and allow the latter to develop. But the argument that people shouldn’t risk their lives to deliver satellites is just dumb, if that’s the best and cheapest way to do it (though in this case, it turned out not to be).

That is not a decision for Gregg Easterbrook, or presidential commissions, or Congress, to make. It’s not unreasonable, given the expense and difficulty of replacing it, to say that we shouldn’t risk expensive orbiters on routine satellite deliveries–that’s only fair to the taxpayers who have to replace the thing–but no one can assess the value of an astronaut’s life except the astronaut herself. It should be her decision–not some bureaucrat’s or pundit’s.

Switching to unmanned rockets for payload launching and a small space plane for those rare times humans are really needed…

I have to stop him here, because this is really the crux of the issue. When are humans “really needed”? Why is it assumed that the times that this occurs will be “rare”?

We don’t need to go into space at all–we survived millennia without doing it. It gets back to my point in yesterday’s NRO column that it’s pointless to even have these kinds of discussions in the absence of a national decision about what we’re trying to accomplish in space.

Yes, if the goal is simply to support the space station, with a few people changed out a few times a year, then Orbital Space Plane, launched on an expendable, might make sense. If, on the other hand, the goal is to enable large numbers of people to go to space, for whatever purpose they desire (and those purposes would dwarf “science and exploration,” other than personal exploration, by orders of magnitude), then such a system makes no sense at all.

…would cut costs, which is why aerospace contractors have lobbied against such reform. Boeing and Lockheed Martin split roughly half the shuttle business through an Orwellian- named consortium called the United Space Alliance. It’s a source of significant profit for both companies; United Space Alliance employs 6,400 contractor personnel for shuttle launches alone. Many other aerospace contractors also benefit from the space-shuttle program.

Any new space system that reduced costs would be, to the contractors, killing the goose that lays the golden egg. Just a few weeks ago, NASA canceled a program called the Space Launch Initiative, whose goal was to design a much cheaper and more reliable replacement for the shuttle. Along with the cancellation, NASA announced that the shuttle fleet would remain in operation until 2020, meaning that Columbia was supposed to continue flying into outer space even when its airframe was more than 40 years old! True, B-52s have flown as long. But they don’t endure three times the force of gravity on takeoff and 2000*none [sic] on re-entry.

A rational person might have laughed out loud at the thought that although school buses are replaced every decade, a spaceship was expected to remain in service for 40 years. Yet the “primes,” as NASA’s big contractors are known, were overjoyed when the Space Launch Initiative was canceled because it promised them lavish shuttle payments indefinitely. Of course, the contractors also worked hard to make the shuttle safe. But keeping prices up was a higher priority than having a sensible launch system.

Yes, and again, this point can’t be overemphasized. You cannot expect innovation from companies that are doing very well from the status quo. That’s why low-cost launch will not come from the existing aerospace industry.

Will NASA whitewash problems as it did after Challenger? The haunting fact of Challenger was that engineers who knew about the booster-joint problem begged NASA not to launch that day and were ignored. Later the Rogers Commission, ordered to get to the bottom of things, essentially recommended that nothing change. No NASA manager was fired; no safety systems were added to the solid rocket boosters whose explosion destroyed Challenger; no escape-capsule system was added to get astronauts out in a calamity, which might have helped Columbia. In return for failure, the shuttle program got a big budget increase. Post-Challenger “reforms” were left up to the very old-boy network that had created the problem in the first place and that benefited from continuing high costs.

Yes, NASA was punished for success, when their budgets were chopped back severely in the late sixties and early seventies, as the Apollo program wound down, and they were rewarded for failure in 1986. Unfortunately, the Administration’s knee-jerk response this weekend was to promise to increase the NASA budget. Government space programs are like any other government program. If you measure them by input, rather than output, you’ll get very expensive programs that don’t generate much value. We have to have a more intelligent response than, “send more money.”

Concerned foremost with budget politics, Congress too did its best to whitewash. Large manned-space-flight centers that depend on the shuttle are in Texas, Ohio, Florida and Alabama. Congressional delegations from these states fought frantically against a shuttle replacement. The result was years of generous funding for constituents?and now another tragedy.

The tough questions that have gone unasked about the space shuttle have also gone unasked about the space station, which generates billions in budget allocations for California, Texas, Ohio, Florida and other states. Started in 1984 and originally slated to cost $14 billion in today’s dollars, the space station has already cost at least $35 billion?not counting billions more for launch costs?and won’t be finished until 2008. The bottled water alone that crews use aboard the space station costs taxpayers almost half a million dollars a day. (No, that is not a misprint.) There are no scientific experiments aboard the space station that could not be done far more cheaply on unmanned probes. The only space-station research that does require crew is “life science,” or studying the human body’s response to space. Space life science is useful but means astronauts are on the station mainly to take one another’s pulse, a pretty marginal goal for such an astronomical price.

Again, an unstated assumption, i.e., the only reason to have a space station is for “science.” Until we break out of that mindset, we will not be able to have an intelligent discussion about policy options.

What is next for America in space? An outsider commission is needed to investigate the Columbia accident?and must report to the President, not Congress, since Congress has shown itself unable to think about anything but pork barrel when it comes to space programs.

For 20 years, the cart has been before the horse in U.S. space policy. NASA has been attempting complex missions involving many astronauts without first developing an affordable and dependable means to orbit. The emphasis now must be on designing an all-new system that is lower priced and reliable. And if human space flight stops for a decade while that happens, so be it. Once there is a cheaper and safer way to get people and cargo into orbit, talk of grand goals might become reality. New, less-expensive throwaway rockets would allow NASA to launch more space probes?the one part of the program that is constantly cost-effective. An affordable means to orbit might make possible a return to the moon for establishment of a research base and make possible the long-dreamed-of day when men and women set foot on Mars. But no grand goal is possible while NASA relies on the super-costly, dangerous shuttle.

This is correct. My only issue is that he seems to be implying that NASA should be allowed to build a Shuttle replacement. This would almost certainly be as disastrous as the Shuttle itself, because it will be subject to the same political and budgetary constraints as that program was.

We need to have competition, and we need to have multiple solutions. For that we need markets, which is what we’re really lacking, rather than technology.

In 1986 the last words transmitted from Challenger were in the valiant vow: “We are go at throttle up!” This meant the crew was about to apply maximum thrust, which turned out to be a fatal act.

Gregg damages his credibility again here. They had been at maximum thrust since liftoff. They were, in fact preparing to throttle back after passing through maximum dynamic pressure, in order to adhere to the three-gee acceleration constraint as the vehicle grew lighter by expending its propellants.

[Update, late Tuesday night]

OK, OK, numerous emailer and commenters have persuaded me that Gregg is right, and I’m wrong. They’d throttled back for max Q, and were about to throttle back up, until they reached the acceleration limit, which would occur several minutes later. Please quit commenting and emailing.

In the coming days, we will learn what the last words from Columbia were. Perhaps they too will reflect the valor and optimism shown by astronauts of all nations. It is time NASA and the congressional committees that supervise the agency demonstrated a tiny percentage of the bravery shown by the men and women who fly to space? by canceling the money-driven shuttle program and replacing it with something that makes sense.

Agreed. The issue is what makes “sense.” And there’s no way to determine that until we decide what we’re trying to accomplish.