As I mentioned previously, I’ve (not surprisingly) got some thoughts on the X-38 debacle (and contrary to those working the program, I believe that’s exactly what it was).

A little background. The International Space Station is currently constrained to only carry three crew members. This is only partly because of any limits in terms of room, or life support–it’s clearly capable of supporting more, as it did when, for example, Dennis Tito visited a year ago.

The main constraint on adding more crew is that there is only room for three people in the Soyuz capsule that is always available to return crew to earth in an emergency. Any more than three, and we have a “Titanic” situation–not enough “lifeboats.” There are many potential solutions to this problem, but for many reasons (few of which relate to actual program needs) NASA, and particularly the part of NASA in Houston, has fixated on the notion of simply building a larger “lifeboat.”

I will continue to put the word “lifeboat” in quotes throughout, for reasons to be explained shortly.

When they got the industry quotes for their desired “lifeboat” (at that time called Assured Crew Rescue Vehicle or ACRV–it had to have an acronym), they blanched. Never mind that it was an inevitable result of their own specifications and parametric costs based on past cost-plus contracts. So instead, they decided to build it in house.

Why was it called “X”-38? Well, it was testing out a parasail concept, but the real reason is that in the 90s, it was a lot easier to get funding for an X (experimental) program than it was for an operational one. So building X vehicles became a back-door way of instead building prototypes, under the guise of technology testing. The original X-34 was the poster child for this.

Anyway, the real problem with the vehicle was not whether it was built directly by NASA or a contractor, or what its specific design was, but the fundamental fact that it was unnecessary, and worth far less than it would cost.

The very premise of the program was flawed. The idea was that, if something went wrong on the space station, there had to be way to evacuate the entire crew, and return them immediately to earth. While I can sympathize with NASA officials who don’t want to have to testify before Congress as to why station crew who didn’t have a “lifeboat” died on orbit, this is not a result of rational analysis–it’s just to cover their keesters.

Let us stipulate that we want to minimize risk to astronauts (within reasonable cost–there is no affordable risk-free state this side of the grave). There are many ways to do this other than packing them all in a single vehicle and going home. There are, in fact, many better and less costly ways.

First of all, we have to assess how realistic is a scenario in which such an evacuation would be necessary. A mechanical failure, or cascading mechanical failures (in which one failure sets off another until things rage out of control) should be extremely unlikely in a system that cost tens of billions to design and many years to build. If that’s a possibility, then rather than building “lifeboats,” the designers should be fired now, and the design altered. (Note, I don’t believe that’s the case). Similarly, an out-of-control fire would also constitute a design failure.

The only contingency that I can imagine is a collision that took out major systems, most likely with something extraterrestrial (though slightly possible with a satellite in a different orbit). BUt there’s a good chance that such a catastrophic event would kill the crew anyway, allowing them no opportunity to man the “lifeboat.”

And, of course, the same thing could happen at Amundsen-Scott Station at the South Pole, and there would be no way, in the austral winter, to do an immediate evacuation. We live with this risk there–why can’t we do it in space?

One of the arguments trotted out is as an ambulance in the event of a sick crew member, but if that’s the case, you want a smaller vehicle to return just the crew member (and possibly one other to help), but not the whole crew, so this looks more like a rationale to do what they want to do anyway. The Soyuz can serve this function just as well, and probably better (and certainly cheaper).

But even if we stipulate that we must be able to evacuate the station, why in a single vehicle? Why not just use a second Soyuz? (Other than, of course, that that wouldn’t create jobs in Houston.) With such an inflexible system, any station emergency, including a sick crew member, would require evacuation of the whole station, since by the stated philosophy, no one could be left aboard without the “lifeboat.” That would mean abandoning the station, with the risk to it that entails, and the cost of delivering the crew all the way back to it, when many of them may not have had to leave.

And why is it called a “lifeboat”? Why all the way to earth? If it were truly a lifeboat, it might not be objectionable. What they’re proposing is much more than a lifeboat. The Titanic’s lifeboats were not designed to deliver passengers all the way to New York, or back to Southhampton. They were designed to provide some measure of safety in the event of a disaster, until the passengers could be rescued. If there is no other place in orbit for station evacuees to go, or no way to rescue them from the earth, then that would be a problem better addressed with the funds intended for the crew rescue vehicle.

For instance, there have been proposals to build private coorbital facilities, for better tourism amenities. Why not have NASA subsidize these (in a manner similar to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet), to help provide funding for them? That way, there would be redundant facilities on orbit, and no need to return crew all the way to earth for a (possibly) temporary emergency at the station. This would be a good way for NASA to demonstrate that it can work with (instead of against) actual commercial space activities, and establish a precedent for government serving as an anchor tenant of needed infrastructure provided by the private sector.

There is some indication that the Administration is thinking along these lines. Administrator O’Keefe has stated that a single-purpose crew return vehicle is not a good idea, and wants to expand it into something useful for purposes other than derriere upholstery.

And in the meantime, just give the Russians money for a second Soyuz and docking port, if you really think that everyone is going to have to come home at once.